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Introduction
Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe
Neoliberalism is dead again. Aft er the election of Donald J. Trump, politi-
cal economist Mark Blyth declared the “era of neoliberalism is over,” intel-
lectual historian Samuel Moyn tweeted neoliberalism “RIP,” and Cornel 
West wrote that “the neoliberal era in the United States ended with a 
neofascist bang.”1 Such pronouncements recur with regularity. A quarter-
century ago, a Latin American politician deemed neoliberalism “dead” 
aft er the election of another US president—Bill Clinton. Obituaries resur-
faced as critiques of the Washington Consensus in the wake of the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, returned on the crest of the Latin American pink 
tide (Evo Morales declared “neoliberalism is dead” in 2003), and peaked 
in the wake of the near-collapse of the global fi nancial system in 2008.
One year aft er Trump’s election, with a tax plan benefi ting corpora-
tions and the country’s wealthiest citizens as his only major legislative 
achievement, the obituarists for neoliberalism had fallen silent too. Th e 
real-estate magnate’s cabinet has pursued policies openly geared to the 
richest members of society and done little beyond making token gestures 
to reverse the fl ight of industrial jobs from the United States. Th e prom-
ised infrastructure plans that had some dreaming of a second New Deal 
vanished without ceremony.
Th e standard response to what Colin Crouch called the “strange
non-death of neoliberalism” has been a turn to the metaphor of the
1  Cornel West. “Goodbye, American neoliberalism. A new era is here.” Th e 
Guardian (17 Nov 2016).
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zombie.2 Yet invoking the occult in the interest of reasoned analysis 
strikes us as self-defeating. Jamie Peck has suggested that neoliberalism 
lost “another of its nine lives” aft er the global fi nancial crisis in 2008.3 
We adopt his metaphor in seeing neoliberalism as less like a zombie and 
more like a cat. Th ough cats are granted nine lives, this is not meant 
literally. Th ere is no sorcery in their survival, simply a preternatural abil-
ity. As a body of thought and set of practices, neoliberalism too has 
proven agile and acrobatic, prone to escaping alive from even the most 
treacherous predicaments. As Peck writes, it has shown a consistent 
feline capacity to “fail-and-fl ail-forward.”4
Th ere are two ways of making sense of neoliberalism’s longevity. One 
is to point to the durability of the blocs of capital and their allies in 
government. Th e other points to the expansion and adaptation of 
neoliberal worldviews encroaching upon the competing ideologies of 
conservatism and social democratic liberalism. Th is book has no quar-
rel with the former explanations, including those of neo-Gramscian 
International Political Economy, and fi nds them essential for making 
sense of the present.5 To draw attention to the intellectual history of 
neoliberalism as in the second model is not to insist dogmatically on the 
primacy of ideas. It would be ironic, as some have noted, if left ist critics 
became fi xated on the realm of ideas while the right adopted materialist 
explanations of the present. At the same time, proposals for social 
changes, whether large or small, do not emerge in a vacuum, which 
requires attention to the universe of ideologies and to the process of 
preference formation.
If neoliberalism’s demise has been foretold prematurely yet again, 
then we still need more and better analyses of its mechanics, its morphol-
ogy, and the stations of its metamorphosis. Eighty years aft er the term 
2  Colin Crouch, Th e Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
3  Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 277. He uses the metaphor elsewhere, including in the title of a foreword 
seen by this volume’s editors only aft er its completion. We credit him with the evocative 
metaphor. Jamie Peck, Nik Th eodore, and Neil Brenner, “Neoliberalism Resurgent? 
Market Rule aft er the Great Recession,” Th e South Atlantic Quarterly 111, no. 2 (Spring 
2012): 265; Jamie Peck, “Foreword: Th e Nine Lives of Neoliberalism,” in Urban Political 
Geographies: A Global Perspective, ed. Ugo Rossi and Alberto Vanolo (London: Sage, 
2012).
4  Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, 277.
5  See, e.g., Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, eds, New Constitutionalism and World 
Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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Introduction 3
was coined, forty years aft er the Volcker shock and the victories of 
Th atcher and Reagan, people still do not agree on whether neoliberal-
ism exists. Many continue to fi nd it useful to avoid the term—preferring 
“advanced liberalism,” distinguishing between “fi nancialization” and 
neoliberalism, or insisting on neoliberalization as a verb rather than a 
noun.6 Th e authors in this book fi nd it perfectly acceptable to use a word 
with a contested defi nition. Rather than jettisoning the term altogether, 
they seek to add precision to its use, examine its conceptual background, 
clarify important building blocks, and observe its evolution as a result of 
the interplay of intellectual debate, changing circumstances, and, not 
least, social struggles.
Th e alternative narrative according to which neoliberalism is not a 
suitable analytical category because it changes or because it has multi-
ple and sometimes contradictory meanings amounts to self-defeating 
denialism, expressing a desire for a neat and simple singular ideology 
with an ahistorical essence to replace the messy world of competing 
worldviews. Marxism, liberalism, and conservatism have experienced 
kaleidoscopic refraction, splintering, and recombination over the 
decades. We see no reason why neoliberalism would not exhibit the 
same diversity. Indeed, we can prove that it has. If the loose use of 
terms was the grounds for expungement, then “socialism,” “capital-
ism,” “conservatism,” and plain “liberalism” would have long been 
purged. Avoiding the term does little to address the ideology it was 
coined to describe.
In 2009, two editors of this volume helped launch a wide-ranging 
conversation about neoliberalism as an intellectual movement around 
the Mont Pèlerin Society, or what they dubbed with Bernhard Walpen 
the “neoliberal thought collective,” with the publication of Th e Road 
from Mont Pèlerin.7 In defense of its central contention that neoliberal-
ism could be studied as an intellectual network and not simply an agent-
less spirit of capitalism, the contributions to that book focused on the 
6  See, e.g. Nikolas Rose, “Still ‘Like Birds on the Wire’? Freedom aft er Neoliberalism,” 
Economy and Society, published online November 10, 2017; Aeron Davis and Catherine 
Walsh, “Distinguishing Financialization from Neoliberalism,” Th eory, Culture & Society 
34, nos. 5–6 (2017); Simon Springer, Kean Birch, and Julie MacLeavy, “An Introduction 
to Neoliberalism,” in Th e Handbook of Neoliberalism, ed. Simon Springer, Kean Birch, 
and Julie MacLeavy (New York: Routledge, 2016), 2. 
7  Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds, Th e Road from Mont Pèlerin: Th e Making 
of the Neoliberal Th ought Collective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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confl uence of national traditions of neoliberal economic thought in the 
postwar moment as well as the debates on a few key issues like competi-
tion, trade unions, and development economics. Th e book helped accel-
erate a shift  in the scholarship on neoliberalism. Critical studies of 
neoliberalism had begun in the 1990s with the basic contention that the 
ideology meant the rollback of the state and the return of laissez-faire: a 
market fundamentalism, which purportedly dictated the liberation of 
markets and the transformation of every member of the world’s popula-
tion into homo economicus. Th e scholarship evolved in the early 2000s 
to clarify that neoliberalism in both theory and practice actually meant 
a “strong state and free market” with a “roll-out” (Peck) of a new form of 
state to match its rollback.8
New work clarifi ed the importance of the knowledge problem for 
neoliberals and outlined their project of building a counter-public to the 
social democratic consensus aft er 1945. Insights from this literature 
surfaced during the Eurozone crisis with repeated arguments that the 
European Union seemed to realize F. A. Hayek’ s visions for federation 
from decades earlier. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble cited 
H ayek’s warnings against “the pretense of knowledge” as he clung to the 
precepts of austerian orthodoxy, and Chancellor Angela Merkel repeated 
a term coined by neoliberal Wilhelm Röpke a half-ce ntury earlier when 
she spoke of the need for a “market-conforming democracy.” Op-ed 
columns, social media feeds and academic journals were suddenly alive 
with pronouncements of the “return of ordoliberalism.”9
Despite—or because of—this fl ourishing of scholarship, the literature 
on neoliberalism is now at a critical juncture. Weary of the range and 
variety of analyses, some observers on the left  propose that there is “no 
such thing” as neoliberalism and that “the left  should abandon the 
concept.”10 Curiously, this is happening parallel to a moment when the 
IMF itself dares to speak the name of neoliberalism,11 and when members 
8  Werner Bonefeld, Th e Strong State and the Free Economy (London: Rowman & 
Littlefi eld, 2017); Jamie Peck, “Neoliberalizing States: Th in Policies/Hard Outcomes,” 
Progress in Human Geography 25, no. 3 (2001): 447. 
9  Werner Bonefeld, Th e Strong State and the Free Economy (London: Rowman & 
Littlefi eld, 2017); Jamie Peck, “Neoliberalizing States: Th in Policies/Hard Outcomes,” 
Progress in Human Geography 25, no. 3 (2001): 447. 
10  Bill Dunn, “Against Neoliberalism as a Concept,” Capital & Class 41, no. 3 (2017); 
Rajesh Venugopal, “Neoliberalism as Concept,” Economy and Society 44, no. 2 (2015).
11  Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri, “Neoliberalism: 
Oversold?” Finance & Development (June 2016).
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Introduction 5
of the market-right, including the venerable UK think tank, the Adam 
Smith Institute, have, in their own words, “come out as neoliberals.”12
Th is volume contends that more is to be learned by continuing the 
inquiry into neoliberalism than declaring it dead, defunct, or a diversion. 
It follows a number of exceptional publications on this topic.13 At the 
same time, it builds on this literature in ways that strike us as crucial for 
the development of the fi eld. Th e fi rst is its focus on institutional embed-
dedness. Nine Lives of Neoliberalism places ideas in context and follows 
them in action. Sites of analysis include the League of Nations’ intellec-
tual wing, the Bellagio Group of academics and central bankers, and the 
California tax and welfare reform movement. Against charges that criti-
cal scholars cast neoliberalism as a monolith, Nine Lives of Neoliberalism 
also emphasizes the diversity and heterogeneity of the neoliberal thought 
style. Attention is drawn to the deep infl uence of the philosophy of 
science on early neoliberalism, the contested nature of behavioral 
economics in neoliberalism, the divergent stances on the idea of intel-
lectual property rights, and the bitter confl icts within the Mont Pélerin 
Society (MPS) over what might underpin a global monetary order.
Th rough a serious engagement with the histories of actually existing 
neoliberals, their ideas, discussions, battles, projects, and legacies, we can 
learn about the ways in which neoliberals themselves thought of the polit-
ical and economic spheres as not being separate. Many critics of neoliber-
alism fail to acknowledge that neoliberals themselves moved beyond clas-
sical liberalism and economic naturalism. Since most critics continue to 
not take neoliberals seriously, they are content to equate neoliberal calls 
for a “free market” to neoliberalism regardless of the clear profession of all 
neoliberals that there is no such thing as a free market. Th e announce-
ment of “the death of homo economicus” is deployed as a supposedly 
radical provocation despite the fact that Hayek described “economic man” 
as a skeleton in the closet of economics eight decades ago.14 Against the 
12  Sam Bowman, “Coming out as Neoliberals,” Adam Smith Institute Blog (October 
11, 2016).
13  For a state of the fi eld, see the two impressive new handbooks: Springer, Birch, 
and MacLeavy, eds, Th e Handbook of Neoliberalism; Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, 
Martijn Konings, and David Primrose, eds, Th e Sage Handbook of Neoliberalism (Los 
Angeles: Sage, 2018).
14  F. A. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge (1937),” in Individualism and Economic 
Order, ed. F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 46. See Peter 
Fleming, Th e Death of Homo Economicus: Work, Debt and the Myth of Endless 
Accumulation (London: Pluto Press, 2017).
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reality of nearly half a century of modifi cations in neoliberal doctrine, 
political economists continue to (re)discover the origins of neoliberalism 
in the US Democratic Party of the 1980s and reduce it to the idea of a 
“single blueprint” for deregulation and privatization.15
By defi nition, theories that postulate free or pure markets per se are not 
neoliberal, and it is easy for neoliberals to point to the need for the right 
set of institutions, politics, and nowadays even behavior to allow markets 
to operate relatively freely, and, more importantly, to set market forces 
free. Th e charge of “one size fi ts all” fails in the face of the documentable 
shift s in neoliberal approaches to policy problems. Our case studies show 
that neoliberalism is less a policy orthodoxy than a consistent approach to 
policy problems. To adapt the famous legal maxim of Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, neoliberals hold that the market lives by prerequisites it 
cannot guarantee itself. Rather than operate with a belief in the “magic” of 
a putatively “natural” market, neoliberals are avowed interventionists of 
their own kind, rethinking policies according to context and showing 
both a capacity for improvisation and an attitude of fl exible response. If 
the end goal remains constant—safeguarding what neoliberals call a 
competitive order and exposing humanity ever more to the compulsions 
of adjustment according to the price mechanism—the means of arriving 
at this goal shift  with time and place. Only by understanding this fl exibil-
ity do the nine lives of neoliberalism become explainable.
Th e contributions in this book introduce readers to lesser-known 
but still infl uential neoliberal thinkers. Th ese include former MPS 
president Herbert Giersch, described as “Germany’s Milton Friedman”; 
Fritz Machlup, coiner of the term “the knowledge economy”; the 
generations of German ordoliberals taught by Walter Eucken; and 
another former MPS president, George Stigler, who oft en exists in the 
shadow of Friedman and Hayek in histories of the Chicago School. 
Th e contributions also show how much more attention to the broader 
philosophical and epistemological underpinnings of neoliberal ideol-
ogy and political theory is required in order to account for its infl u-
ence across disciplines and professions; for the creative and innovative 
15  Dani Rodrik, “Rescuing Economics from Neoliberalism,” Boston Review (6 Nov 
2017). On the history of supranational visions of order see Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: 
Th e End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2018). Quinn Slobodian, “Perfect Capitalism, Imperfect Humans: Race, Migration, 
and the Limits of Ludwig von Mises’s Globalism,” Contemporary European History 28(2): 
143–55.
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Introduction 7
development of new approaches to and theoretical understandings of 
economic and social theory, and the subtleties of neoliberal reasoning; 
for the institutional positions and embeddedness—both domestic and 
international—of key neoliberal intellectuals and events; and, last but 
not least, for the neoliberal capacities and infrastructures that infl u-
ence science and society, through networks of intellectuals and think 
tanks, donors, and supporters.
Lifeboat Neoliberalism
Th is book’s method can help explain some of the apparent contradic-
tions of the present. Many observers felt that neoliberalism lost its latest 
life with the victory of Brexit and Trump in 2016. Political diagnoses 
have pitched an ascendant populism against a degenerate neoliberalism 
reaping the eff ects of the inequality and democratic disempowerment it 
had sown. Yet a closer look at the standard-bearers of the right throws 
this dichotomy into question. We fi nd that many neoliberals are more 
than willing to fi nd a middle ground between their own principles and 
those of an exclusionary culturalist, and even racist, right.
To off er a few examples: Antonio Martino, MPS member since 1976 
and president from 1988–1990, was a founding member of Forza Italia 
in 1994 and a minister of foreign aff airs and minister of defense in two 
of Silvio Berlusconi’s governments. A member of the core negotiators in 
coalition talks for the Austrian Freedom Party (whose slogans included 
“Vienna must not become Istanbul”) in late 2017 was president of the 
Friedrich Hayek Institute, Barbara Kolm. Th e leadership of the German 
far-right party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), for whom opposi-
tion to migration from majority Muslim countries is central, includes 
multiple members of the Friedrich Hayek Society, some of whom have 
been active in Euro-critical parties since the early 1990s. Among the 
AfD’s founders are Joachim Starbatty, who fi led a constitutional 
complaint against Germany joining the Euro in 1997 and helped found 
an anti-European party with New Right politician Manfred Brunner in 
1994.16 As early as 1993, a Brussels think tank, Centre for the New 
16  For this history see Dieter Plehwe, “ ‘Alternative für Deutschland,’ Alternativen 
für Europa?” in Europäische Identität in der Krise? Europäische Identitätsforschung und 
Rechtspopulismusforschung im Dialog, ed. Gudrun Hentges, Kristina Nottbohm, and 
Hans-Wolfgang Platzer (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2017), 249–69; Quinn Slobodian and 
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Europe, was founded under the direction of MPS member Hardy 
Bouillon, criticizing EU policy. In the late 1990s, German neoliberals 
like Detmar Doering and Roland Vaubel were among the few to openly 
theorize and demand a right of secession in the EU with emphasis on 
the salutary nature of fragmentation and competition. Symptomatically, 
Doering wrote a column in 1999 attempting to rehabilitate the category 
of social Darwinism.17
Although the EU is described regularly as a neoliberal federation, 
there are clear forerunners to Brexit in neoliberal networks. One sees 
this in the European Conservatives and Reformers Group (ECR) and 
the affi  liated Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformers, both 
established in 2009 and led by British Conservatives. Th e Prague decla-
ration of the ECR, prepared by Tories and the Liberal Institute led by 
MPS member and former Czech president Vá clav Klaus, emphasized 
economic not political freedom as the foundation of individual freedom 
and national prosperity.18 At the MPS meeting in South Korea in 2017, 
Klaus voiced typical xenophobic “populist” themes, saying that “mass 
migration into Europe . . . threatens to destroy European society and to 
create a new Europe which would be very diff erent from the past as well 
as from MPS way of thinking [sic].”19 Referring to far-right parties in 
France, Austria, Germany, and Italy, he said: “Th e people are starting to 
open their eyes, to look around, to speak out, to express their dissatisfac-
tion with the brave new world without freedom and democracy, with 
the world heralding relativism, with the suppression of old values, tradi-
tions, customs and habits, with the world of new aristocracies.”20 Already 
in 2014 at an MPS meeting in Hong Kong, Klaus had made it clear that 
“to protect liberty  . . . we need to rehabilitate the sovereign nation-
state  . . . We need responsible citizens anchored in domestic realities, 
not cosmopolitan, selfi sh individuals ‘fl oating’ at the surface and search-
ing for short-term pleasures and advantages—without roots and 
Dieter Plehwe, “Neoliberals against Europe,” in William Callison and Zachary Manfredi, 
eds. Mutant Neoliberalism: Market Rule and Political Ruptures (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2019).
17  Detmar Doering, “ ‘Sozialdarwinismus’ Die unterschwellige Perfi die eines 
Schlagwortes,” Eigentümlich Frei 2, no. 6 (1999).
18  Th e declaration is available at http://ecrgroup.eu/about-us/our-history.
19  Vá clav Klaus, “Mont Pèlerin Society Speech in Korea” (2017), 12, available at 
montpelerin.org.
20  Ibid., 16.
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responsibility.”21 Along with parties organized in the AECR, the far-
right parties invoked by Klaus share the rejection of an ever-closer 
European Union and insist on a Europe of nations. Yet even as they 
reject free migration, they retain the other three freedoms of European 
integration: those of goods, services, and capital. Th e new variety of 
conservative-neoliberal perspectives combines uninhibited economic 
liberalism with limited mobility of people and a new attention to the 
sociological—and sociobiological—necessity of cultural homogeneity 
as a basis for order.
To understand the current convergence of far-right and neoliberal 
thought, it is helpful to return to the philosopher and ecologist Garrett 
Hardin’s essay on “lifeboat ethics” from 1974, subtitled “the argument 
against helping the poor.”22 Hardin is best known for his idea of the 
“tragedy of the commons” from 1968.23 While some take this to be a call 
for regulatory intervention, Hardin clarifi ed his own understanding in 
collaboration with the self-professed free market environmentalist and 
MPS member John Baden. To be used according to economic princi-
ples, nature had to be commodifi ed, declared the founder of so-called 
New Resource Economics. Th e solution to problems of scarcity was 
neither free access nor regulation but management according to prop-
erty rights and price signals.24
Hardin proposed his system of “lifeboat ethics” in response to 
contemporary concerns over ecology, overpopulation and migration, 
including Th e Limits to Growth report published by the Club of Rome in 
1972. He opposed the spaceship earth metaphor—introduced by Adlai 
Stevenson and developed by Barbara Ward—for implying central lead-
ership in the form of a captain that did not exist. Against the idea of 
global planning, he posed nation-states trapped in a realist game of 
global anarchy with relations between states depending on relative 
strength. Given the limited resources of the lifeboat nation, stranded 
21  Vá clav Klaus, “Careless Opening up of Countries (without Keeping the Anchor 
of the Nation-State) Leads Either to Anarchy or to Global Governance: Lessons of the 
European Experience,” Speech at the Mont Pèlerin Society General Meeting, Hong Kong 
(July 23, 2014), 16, available at montpelerin.org.
22  Garrett Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics: Th e Argument Against Helping the Poor,” 
Psychology Today 8 (1974): 38–43.
23  Garrett Hardin, “Th e Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, New Series 162, no. 
3859 (1968): 1243–8.
24  Garrett Hardin and John Baden, eds, Managing the Commons (San Francisco: W. 
H. Freeman and Company, 1977).
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swimmers (read: migrants) could not be taken aboard without endan-
gering the lives of others through overtaxing limited resources. 
Prefi guring the later anti-immigration slogan “the boat is full,” Hardin’s 
ethics posited the inhumanity of wealthier, more economically effi  cient 
nations as a utilitarian necessity.
In his fi nal book, Hayek referred to Hardin in a section titled “the calcu-
lus of costs is a calculus of lives.” Expanding on his ideas of cultural evolu-
tionary progress measured in the quality and quantity of lives, Hayek 
suggested that humans could be ranked by utility: “Th e good hunter or 
defender of the community, the fertile mother and perhaps even the wise 
old man may be more important than most babies and most of the aged.” 
“Th e requirement of preserving the maximum number of lives,” he wrote, 
“is not that all individual lives be regarded as equally important.”25
Th e far-right strain of neoliberalism deploys a similarly dispassionate 
calculus of human lives. Th e national community is not privileged for its 
transcendent value (in the Herderian sense of the Volk) but because of the 
utility of cultural homogeneity for stability and the accumulated cognitive 
capital of the population in industrialized nations. Combining critiques of 
foreigners and the welfare state with calls for closed borders and private 
property rights has become standard fare for right-wing neoliberals in the 
new millennium. A case in point is Erich Weede, sociology professor, MPS 
member since 1992, and leader of the right wing of the German Hayek 
Society. In an article from 2016, Weede, who has argued for the genetic basis 
of diff erential “human capital” endowments and has correlated economic 
growth to IQ, called for the closing and fortifi cation of borders to prevent the 
infl ux of refugees. Using an intergenerational zero-sum logic, he wrote that 
“one must not forget that governments are always dispensing other people’s 
money—or in the case of higher and rising state debts, even the money of 
underage and yet unborn tax payers. Th ose who give governments the free-
dom to do good for foreigners must by necessity take freedom and property 
away from citizens.”26 Lifeboat neoliberalism sees empathy as feckless state 
spending, and openness to foreigners as a downgrading of human capital.
25  F. A. Hayek, Th e Fatal Conceit: Th e Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), 132.
26  Erich Weede, “Vertragen die alternden europäischen Sozialstaaten die Massen zu-
wan derung, die wir haben?” Orientierungen zur Wirtschaft s- und Gesellschaft spolitik no. 
143 (June 2016): 64. On the intellectual history see Quinn Slobodian, “Anti-68ers and the 
Racist-Libertarian Alliance: How a Schism among Austrian School Neoliberals Helped 
Spawn the Alt Right,” Cultural Politics 15 no. 3 (2019): 372–86.
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Rather than posing a globalist neoliberalism against a neo-
nationalist and social conservative populism, we must remain mindful 
of the elasticity of neoliberal norms and principles. Principles of 
competition, private property, and consumer sovereignty can be tied 
to human rights, multicultural tolerance, and recognition of minori-
ties as well as exclusionary bonds based in culture and race. Neither 
left  nor right had much affi  nity to neoliberal-style individualism 
historically. But the advance of neoliberal worldviews expanded 
certain ideas at the expense of competing notions of individualism 
and solidarity. Social democracy has become less concerned with 
redistribution under the impact of advancing neoliberal understand-
ings of social life, while conservatism has become less concerned with 
tradition under the impact of advancing neoliberal understandings of 
competitiveness. Th e way in which neoliberal core ideas have made 
inroads and been absorbed by competing worldviews is among the 
most important reasons for the longevity of neoliberalism in spite of 
the perceptions of its eternal crisis.
Th e task at hand is twofold: observe the historical development and 
expansion of neoliberal ideas, or the morphology of neoliberal world-
views in their own right, while also tracking the linkages of elements of 
those worldviews to competing ideologies, or the mixed morphologies 
of both conservative-neoliberal and progressive-neoliberal perspec-
tives. Both more progressive and conservative fusions with neoliberal-
ism result in patterns of exclusive solidarity: progressive neoliberals 
preach recognition but not redistribution, and conservative neoliberals 
abandon the humanitarian face of social order. Once belief and trust in 
mutual and comprehensive solidarity is lost, communities of competi-
tion constitute themselves against one another: core workforce against 
peripheral workers, rich communities against poor, and so on.
Th e current fusion of neoliberalism and right-wing populism is a 
consequence of the unleashed notion of the competition state, the 
competition region, and the competitive units of and within the enter-
prise. Th e social reproduction of the moral underpinnings of neoliberal 
order—communitarian notions of self-help and caring, social responsi-
bility for those in close proximity—can be regarded as compensation for 
social redistribution and welfare, but it may not develop fast enough or 
at the same speed as the centrifugal notions of selfi shness and competi-
tiveness. Only time will tell when neoliberalism will use up its next—or 
even fi nal—life.
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Chapter Outline
Th e chapters of this book introduce domains of neoliberal theory unfa-
miliar to many and off er revisionist perspectives on supposedly well-
worn truths about what neoliberalism is. Th e book begins with the 
question of knowledge itself. Th e limitation of human cognition is a leit-
motif in neoliberal theory. Th e origin of the axiom that the mass of tacit 
human knowledge coordinated without direction by market actors 
trumps any attempt at centralized knowledge production, most oft en 
associated with Hayek, is rooted in debates in the philosophy of science 
dating before 1945. Martin Beddeleem’s chapter explains the innovative 
character and the strength of neoliberal epistemology vis-à-vis tradi-
tional liberal epistemologi es of empiricism and naturalism (based on a 
priori assumptions) on the one hand, and universal positivist episte-
mologies prevalent in both socialist and conservative Vienna Circles on 
the other. Faced with the scientifi c and rationalist optimism of the unity 
of science movement as well as much of Marxism, a cohort of early 
neoliberal philosophers of science, including Michael Polanyi, Hayek, 
Karl Popper, and Louis Rougier, developed a new epistemology of criti-
cal conventionalism. Separating the spheres of lawful exact knowledge 
from social spheres in which precise knowledge was impossible due to 
the dispersed, tacit, and opaque character of the subject, neoliberals 
intervened in the fi elds of both epistemology and public policy. Arguing 
for the unavoidability of human ignorance became an important precon-
dition for granting the market (and, by extension, its most powerful 
actors) superior powers of cognition and coordination.
Abstract debates happened in concrete places. We still know remark-
ably little about how neoliberals reacted to changes in their own primary 
places of employment—universities—and what infl uence, if any, they 
had on higher education. Understanding this history is pressing in light 
of present-day concerns about “the neoliberal university” and the shift  
from permanent faculty to adjunct labor, the restructuring of funding in 
pursuit of patents and other marketable research outcomes, the perva-
sive discourses of impact, customer (student) experience, and realign-
ment to forms of training rewarded by high post-graduate salaries. In 
his chapter, Edward Nik-Khah follows one such storyline through 
Chicago economist George Stigler. Beginning as an advocate of trustees 
as guardians of academic freedom against the student-as-customer, 
Stigler shift ed aft er the campus unrest of the late 1960s towards a distrust 
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of trustees themselves. He ended by advocating that research be hived 
off  from instruction. Instead, privately funded institutes should produce 
knowledge directly respondent to the demands of the broader 
marketplace.
Neoliberalism’s nine lives can only be understood as a chain of such 
transformations over time. In 1937, Lionel Robbins wrote that “true 
liberals should want more property all round, not less.”27 Mises compli-
mented him on the line in a letter, saying he would use the sentence as a 
motto for the new edition of his book.28 While such a statement may 
seem like a truism, paying attention to the transformations of neoliberal 
theory teaches one to be suspicious of eternal principles. Quinn 
Slobodian’s chapter shows that the dictum of “more property” was far 
from the stance on patents and copyright taken by many neoliberals 
who felt that weaker rather than stronger property rights in ideas would 
produce better outcomes. While arguments from Chicago School think-
ers like Stigler himself were central to the emerging intellectual property 
regime of the 1980s and beyond, Austrian and libertarian neoliberals 
continue to be forceful and sometimes radical critics of existing IP 
rights. Understanding neoliberalism requires fi rst disaggregating the 
competing claims of diff erent neoliberal factions and then asking which 
ideas are translated into policy and why.
One might also assume that the sphere of personal sexual freedom 
would be honored as sacrosanct by neoliberals on the principle of live-
and-let-live as long as lifestyle choices could be commodifi ed and 
marketed. In fact, as Melinda Cooper shows, neoliberal thinkers 
promoted various forms of intervention into the private sphere of 
kinship and marriage on the principle of offl  oading (and fi nancializ-
ing) state responsibilities for welfare onto the family unit. Actual exist-
ing neoliberalism in the US since the Reagan era has required the 
parallel discourse of social conservatism. Far from simply dissolving 
society down to atomistic consumer-entrepreneurs, family ties and 
family values were necessary to substitute for the shredded social 
safety net.
Th e reduction of neoliberal theory to market fundamentalism is one 
of the most misleading tendencies in comprehending it as a body of 
27  Lionel Robbins, Economic Planning and International Order (London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1937), 265.
28  Mises to Robbins, May 8, 1937. LSE Archive, Robbins Papers, Box 128.
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thought. In fact, the neoliberal project from the 1930s onward was about 
charting a route between laissez-faire and planning, between universal 
scientifi c optimism and anti-scientifi c nihilism, and between a belief in 
the imminent collapse of capitalism and a belief in its natural stability. 
Dieter Plehwe traces the engagement of neoliberals with one of the most 
notorious prophets of capitalism’s decline, Joseph A. Schumpeter. 
Plehwe shows how neoliberals revived and revised Schumpeter’s under-
standing of the entrepreneur. Israel Kirzner, Herbert Giersch, and others 
graft ed Schumpeter onto the theories of Ludwig von Mises, universal-
izing the concept of the entrepreneur and extending it from a discrete 
sociological group to each and every human.
Entrepreneurship in the new sense of entrepreneurial management 
of the self and others was not the only fi eld defi ning the current Zeitgeist 
where neoliberals left  their mark. Th e recent boom in behavioral 
economics, marked by the Nobel Memorial Prize for Richard Th aler in 
2017, is oft en described as a refutation of the supposedly one-
dimensional models of human behavior native to neoliberal thought. 
Yet this dichotomy relies on a false contrast and glosses over the many 
links between the two fi elds. Rüdiger Graf concentrates on the over-
looked case of Günther Schmölders. As a member of the Nazi party and 
SS from 1933 onward, and MPS president from 1968 to 1970, Schmölders 
was the proponent of an idiosyncratic strain of behavioral economics in 
Germany. Graf shows the multiple political uses to which behavioral 
economic approaches can be put—to both limit state power and extend 
it into new domains.
If neoliberal theory shares some moments of origin with behavio-
ral economics, it does so with the fi eld of international relations as 
well. Hagen Schulz-Forberg sheds new light on the early discussion of 
the interrelation of national and international order by looking at the 
role of neoliberals in networks linked to the League of Nations, 
including the Walter Lippmann Colloquium, organized under the 
aegis of the League’s International Intellectual Committees. Many of 
those involved in international networks in the wake of World War I 
and the Great Depresssion no longer believed that capitalism was a 
self-stabilizing system. Th e alleged correlation of trade and peace 
required rules and supranational institutions. Th e intellectual discus-
sions of the 1920s and 1930s helped pave the way for the Mont Pèlerin 
Society eff ort, but also for the discipline of international relations 
aft er 1945. Th e guiding principle for both was not democracy as a 
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principle in itself, but the stability of the free market order at the 
national and international levels.
One of the central debates that carried over from the League of Nations 
to the postwar period was about money and the global monetary order. 
Was it possible to return to a gold standard or was fi at money under 
systems of fi xed or fl exible exchange rates unavoidable? In the early 
twenty-fi rst century, neoliberalism would seem to mean, if anything, the 
approval of the “casino capitalism” of deregulated fi nancial markets, spec-
ulative capital fl ows, and fl oating currency exchange rates. Yet, Matthias 
Schmelzer shows that, while the core faith in the right of capital to move 
across borders was shared by all neoliberals, the debate over monetary 
order split the Mont Pèlerin Society into warring factions in the 1950s and 
1960s as the older gold bugs faced off  against the younger advocates of 
fl oating, including Milton Friedman. Far from being a merely technical 
discussion relevant only to experts and bankers, the choice about fi xed or 
fl oating exchange rates had huge consequences for both democratic 
governance and the volatility of the global capitalist system.
Even as it is denigrated as the “dismal science,” economics reigns 
supreme in the public mind as the social science with the most infl u-
ence on policy. One of the signs of the authority of the discipline is the 
awarding of a Nobel Prize in Economics—an honor shared by no other 
social science. In his chapter on the “Ersatz Nobel Prize,” Philip 
Mirowski emphasizes the relevance of cultural institutions for the rise 
and staying power of neoliberalism by recounting the genesis of the 
“Memorial Prize in Honor of Alfred Nobel” a half-century aft er the 
other prizes. He recounts a powerful confl uence of contingency and 
purposeful strategy in the creation of the prize by a group of offi  cials 
and economists of the Swedish Riksbank united in opposition to the 
Swedish welfare state in the 1960s. Mirowski details the Swedish push 
for modern American neoclassical economics and the right wing of 
neoliberal economics through the strategic selection of committee 
members and candidates. Th e eight “Nobels” enjoyed by organized 
neoliberals in the Mont Pèlerin Society, and the considerably larger 
number of prizes for work in the realm of neoliberal economics, testify 
to the way in which the institution has served to validate one perspec-
tive of many in the discipline of economics.
However signifi cant within the fi eld of economics, the role of the 
Riksbank Nobel pales in comparison to the importance of think tanks as 
platforms and megaphones for neoliberal ideas. While the role of think 
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tanks has been observed by journalists and scholars since the 1980s, 
empirical studies of their organization and activity remain surprisingly 
rare. An important case in point is the Atlas Economic Foundation 
(later Atlas Network), started in the early 1980s by Antony Fisher, the 
founder of the UK’s Institute of Economic Aff airs. Marie-Laure Djelic 
and Reza Mousavi trace the development of the Atlas Network under 
the long-term leadership of the Argentine economist Alejandro 
Chafuen, from a modest network of fi ft een think tanks in nine countries 
in the mid-1980s to a partnership of 457 in ninety-six countries. Beyond 
strongholds in North America and Europe (both West and East), the 
network is strong in Latin America and has reached signifi cant member-
ship in the Asia-Pacifi c Region and even Africa. In only a few decades, 
Atlas moved from the equivalent of small trade or handcraft  to mass 
production, creating replicable templates for the production and diff u-
sion of neoliberal ideas.
Stephan Pühringer also follows ideas in action, using empirical meth-
ods to evaluate the infl uence of neoliberalism on policy in Germany—a 
connection more oft en asserted than proven. Pühringer tracks the insti-
tutional affi  liation and public impact of 800 German economists from 
1945 to 1995. Comparing neoliberal to Keynesian economists, he fi nds 
an extremely uneven power structure in the discipline of economics in 
favor of the former.
Taken as a whole, this book seeks to move the study of neoliberalism 
beyond what has become a set of clichés that inhibit rather than advance 
understanding of the larger phenomenon. Th e chapters demonstrate 
varieties of neoliberal epistemology beyond market worship, and 
proposals for policy beyond a bullet-point list of edicts. Th ey outline a 
vision of subjectivity beyond the atomized utility-maximizing individ-
ual, and of organization beyond the shock doctrine. Grasping neoliber-
alism in its complexity will help its opponents better identify their 
antagonist, and its advocates contend both with the departures from 
classical liberalism and with the absence of a unifi ed theory. Recent 
splits within the neoliberal universe like the founding of the Property 
and Freedom Society by racialist right-wing libertarian Hans-Hermann 
Hoppe, or the failure of cosmopolitan neoliberals to purge the social 
conservative right-wing neoliberals from Germany’s Hayek Society, 
should not be read prematurely as signs of disintegration. Th ere has, 
however, certainly been a stronger dose of serious confl ict in the neolib-
eral camp, and we can expect more of it in the face of serious challenges 
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to the competitive order in issues like climate change, growing inequal-
ity, and mass human mobility.
Th e founding neoliberal group’s emphasis on the inviolability of the 
human and the epistemological baseline of human ignorance presents 
increasing diffi  culties for those who focus mainly if not exclusively on 
the maintenance of property rights, freedom of contract, and the praise-
worthiness of endless competition. Th ere are areas where neoliberalism 
appears to fail to reproduce the conditions on which its existence is 
based. Will the challenge of climate change and the depletion of natural 
resources lead to a modifi cation of neoliberal thinking, or will the oscil-
lating appeals to human ignorance and the superior wisdom of the 
market march capitalist civilization to its fi nal extinction? Nine lives 
may be long but, at least theoretically, they are fi nite.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   17 10/03/2020   13:59:54





9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   19 10/03/2020   13:59:54
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   20 10/03/2020   13:59:54
1
Recoding Liberalism: Philosophy and 
Sociology of Science against Planning
Martin Beddeleem
Our oft en unconscious views on the theory of knowledge and its central 
problems (“What can we know?,” “How certain is our knowledge?”) are 
decisive for our attitude towards ourselves and towards politics.
Karl Popper
In the wake of the global fi nancial crisis, the resilience of contemporary 
neoliberalism confounded its detractors who expected its “zombie 
economics” and obsolete policy models to give way to new horizons of 
expectations. Usually, these predictions focused either on a superfi cial 
reading of the defeat of neoliberalism-qua-austerity or insisted that its 
systemic fl aws had ruined any remnant of its legitimacy.1 More skepti-
cal authors remarked that, far from suff ering from a sudden collapse, 
neoliberalism has never been more palpable than in times of crisis, 
when it reinvents itself by metabolizing the criticisms leveled at it or by 
entrenching its dominance over the policy debate.2
To be sure, neoliberalism owes its ideological fl uidity and staying 
power to a hegemonic position among economic elites. Yet this puzzling 
continuity only becomes clearer once its epistemological fabric comes 
1  Cf. Mark Blyth, Austerity: Th e History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, Th e Crisis of Neoliberalism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
2  Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism 
Survived the Financial Meltdown (London: Verso, 2013); Colin Crouch, Th e Strange 
Non-Death of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). 
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into view. Th rough recent decades, neoliberals have demonstrated an 
uncanny ability to forsake obsolete theories and models in order to 
produce seemingly fresh answers to the repeated crises they have 
encountered. Although the original agenda of neoliberalism has been 
revised many times over, its programmatic ambition and scientifi c reach 
have steadily increased. Commonly overlooked, this scientifi c dyna-
mism, sponsored by private foundations, relayed by think tanks, and 
embedded within the “marketplace of ideas,” remains at the very heart 
of the neoliberal project today.
Since its inception, the problem space shared by neoliberals has been 
spread out on a modernist canvas, one which contrasted sharply with 
conservatives, reactionaries and old-fashioned liberals. During the inter-
war period, self-proclaimed neoliberals dismantled and recoded the 
unpopular laissez-faire liberalism with epistemological ideas adapted 
from the “new scientifi c spirit” of the early twentieth century.3 Breaking 
with naturalism and empiricism, they espoused a research program 
inspired by mathematical and physical conventionalism, one that balanced 
a skeptical epistemology with a commitment to scientifi c progress and 
objectivity. To this end, methodological rules were pivotal to the recon-
struction of a genuine science of liberalism which had fallen into disrepute. 
Th is agenda aimed at regaining the political ground lost to ‘collectivism’ in 
the twentieth century by tackling two sets of problems left  aside by ‘classi-
cal’ liberals: the positive role of the state and the social question.
While laying this epistemological groundwork, neoliberals battled 
competing claims about the nature of science, its history, and its posi-
tion in society by actively reshaping ideas about academic freedom, the 
discovery of knowledge, and their relationship with political institutions 
and social reform. Faced with the scientifi c and rationalist optimism of 
the unity of science movement as well as much of Marxism, early neolib-
erals demarcated and defended a liberal science against progressive 
scientists who promoted science as the midwife of social change. 
Crucially, they developed a new theory of knowledge-in-society which 
fused together philosophy of science and political economy into a single 
set of hypotheses. In these debates, concerns about the role of science in 
society linked up with the most pressing political question of the day: 
the rise of fascism and totalitarianism.
3  See Gaston Bachelard, Th e New Scientifi c Spirit (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984 
[1934]).
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Neoliberalism was thus born out of a collision between the contro-
versial importation of the methods and authority of the experimen-
tal sciences into politics on the one hand, and the acknowledgement 
of the social and political conditions for the discovery and justifica-
tion of knowledge on the other. It made the pursuit of knowledge 
and truth a political question, and gave the question of social order 
an epistemological answer: what we can do depends ultimately on 
what we can know. Nevertheless, this proclivity for epistemological 
investigations did not imply a unity of views among neoliberals, nor 
that their conclusions were devoid of political motivations. Moreover, 
in their contention to reclaiming the mantle of science, neoliberals 
shared many premises with progressive scientists regarding the posi-
tion and “function” of science in society. This apparent paradox 
explains both the fluidity of neoliberal thinking and the inspiration 
it has drawn from its detractors at a sociological and organizational 
level, two dimensions still relevant today in accounting for the stead-
iness of neoliberalism and its success in cannibalizing competing 
ideas.
Th e fi rst part of this chapter situates the scientifi c controversies in 
which neoliberal philosophers of science developed their intuitions. Th e 
second part revisits the socialist calculation debate as the cradle of their 
epistemological arguments for the superiority of the market. Th e third 
part deals with their common fi ght against the planning of science and 
the reciprocal relation they established between liberal institutions and 
the conduct of science.
Vienna
Th e early twentieth-century breakthroughs in relativity theory, quan-
tum mechanics, and non-Euclidean geometry had in common an 
encounter with phenomena from premises which were counter-
intuitive to a natural or rational picture of the world. Unshackling foun-
dational axioms from fi tting any “realist,” “naturalist” or “a priori” 
presuppositions unleashed extraordinary debates and ingenuity in the 
advancement of these disciplines. While scientists retreated from their 
pretension to describe the “real” world, their quest for new theories and 
assumptions, which combined methodological inventiveness and 
instrumental needs, became boundless.
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Neoliberalism owes its scientifi c imagination to the strong contingent 
of philosophers of science who participated in its elaboration. Michael 
Polanyi, Alfred Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises, 
and F. A. Hayek, among others, were all refugees and exiles from Austria 
and Hungary who were immersed in the scientifi c world and volatile 
political situation of the interwar period. Th ey unanimously perceived 
the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a disaster,4 respon-
sible for the rise of an antagonistic politics pitting nationalism and 
conservatism against the growing communist movement. At that time, 
Vienna underwent one of the most radical municipal experiments of the 
twentieth century with the large-scale social policies promoted by the 
Austrian Socialist Party. In 1919, the philosopher and socialist educator 
Otto Neurath, president of the Central Planning Offi  ce in the short-
lived Bavarian Soviet Republic, advocated a centrally planned economy 
in which money would be abolished and exchange would be made in 
kind. Before the war, Neurath had been a participant in the seminar led 
by Austrian economist Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, along with Joseph 
Schumpeter, Otto Bauer, Emil Lederer, and Ludwig von Mises, who 
remembered him, in his words, for the “nonsense” he presented with 
“fanatical fervor.”5
Th e refutation of Neurath’s scheme published in 1920 by Mises trig-
gered the Planwirtschaft  (planned economy) debate in Vienna, wherein 
Mises argued that economic calculation was naive and unmanageable 
without the indispensable role of prices as signals of the relative value 
of factors of production. Against Neurath’s desire to institute a scien-
tifi c management of the economy, Mises claimed that the complexity 
of the economic system made its apprehension in one mind or place so 
diffi  cult as to be near impossible. Th e debate received considerable 
attention, in part because physics and economics had displaced theol-
ogy as the main subjects for intellectual debate in Vienna. Within both 
disciplines, the Austrian scientifi c “culture of uncertainty” was unique 
in Europe: their embrace of probabilistic theory “was tied to a 
4  Popper writes in his autobiography that “the breakdown of the Austrian Empire 
and the aft ermath of the First World War, the famine, the hunger riots in Vienna, and 
the runaway infl ation [. . .] destroyed the world in which I had grown up.” Karl Popper, 
Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography (London and New York: Routledge, 
1992), 31.
5  See Bruce Caldwell’s introduction to F. A. Hayek, Socialism and War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 5.
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characteristically liberal and anticlerical rejection of absolute claims,”6 
and “philosophers who challenged certitude oft en led eff orts for social 
reform and popular scientifi c education.”7 As a matter of fact, Austrian 
Marxism itself was unique in drawing heavily on the ideas of Ernst 
Mach as it blended socialist economics with a positivist philosophy of 
science in the hope of attaining a truly scientifi c socialism. A rare 
fl uidity existed, then, between the new discoveries of the physical 
sciences, their impact upon philosophical debates, and their transla-
tion into economic theories or social reforms.
Th ough Mises never held a formal appointment at the University of 
Vienna, his Privatseminar became the meeting place for a new genera-
tion of liberal economists—fi rst among them Hayek—wherein the 
discussions ranged from sociology and psychology to logic and episte-
mology, with a strong interest in the “methodological and philosophical 
foundations of economics.”8 Participants were kept abreast of the latest 
philosophical developments through the participation of Felix 
Kaufmann, who was a member of the Vienna Circle formed in 1924 by 
philosopher Moritz Schlick. In its manifesto of 1929, the Vienna Circle 
had expressed confi dently that a scientifi c approach to social problems 
based on empiricism and logic ought to shape economic and social life 
in accordance with rational principles. In addition to Neurath, many of 
its important members like Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Philip 
Frank had socialist convictions and conceived the philosophical work of 
the Circle as intimately connected with the rationalization of politics 
and progressive social change. In its early days, the logical positivist 
movement had a distinctly political fl avor. Th eir unifi ed and scientifi c 
world conception provided the philosophical and methodological basis 
for the integration of everyday life with politics and science, aiming at a 
comprehensive reform of society along egalitarian lines.
6  Deborah R. Coen, Vienna in the Age of Uncertainty: Science, Liberalism and 
Private Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 13.
7  Malachi H. Hacohen, “Karl Popper, the Vienna Circle, and Red Vienna,” Journal 
of the History of Ideas 59, no. 4 (1998): 718.
8  F. A. Hayek, Th e Fortunes of Liberalism: Essays on Austrian Economics and the 
Ideal of Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 27. Hayek was also a 
founder of the “Geist circle” which comprised Herbert Fürth, Friedrich Engel-Janosi, 
Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Oskar Morgenstern, Alfred Schutz, Felix Kaufmann, 
and Karl Menger. Alfred Schutz elaborated his Phenomenology of the Social World (1932) 
in discussion with Austrian social theory, as he sought to reconcile Husserlian philosophy 
with the subjectivist standpoint of the Austrians.
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Th e positivist philosophy of science of the Vienna Circle became 
confl ated, in the minds of their opponents, with socialist politics and 
economics. Neurath’s radical politics repelled someone like Hayek, who 
credited the former’s “extreme” and “naive” views on economics with his 
conversion from positivism.9 In 1935, Karl Popper published in German 
Th e Logic of Scientifi c Discovery, his epistemological critique of the posi-
tivist premises of the Vienna Circle. Neurath and Carnap were singled 
out for their defense of physicalism: the view that scientifi c theories are 
little more than a formal system of signs with their corresponding rules 
for application—a “practical analog” to social reality. Against their “logi-
cal empiricism,” Popper proposed that theory and experience constantly 
modify each other through criticism to such an extent that “the empiri-
cal basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it.” Instead 
he famously proclaimed that science did not “rest upon solid bedrock” 
since “the bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp.”10 
Th e falsifi cation device favored by Popper to test the validity of theories 
did not convince the rest of the Vienna Circle, and Neurath remained 
adamant that Popper’s view of science as a permanent revolution neither 
refl ected scientifi c practice nor served it well.
Paradoxically, Neurath and Popper were much closer to each other than 
to some other Circle members. Both embraced a revised conventionalism, 
combining anti-absolutism and non-foundationalism, which discarded 
the view that scientifi c knowledge “corresponded” to reality. More impor-
tantly, Popper renounced any psychological foundation for knowledge, 
something which later became important for Hayek’s own rupture with 
Mises’s a priori praxeology of human action. In the cases of both Hayek 
and Popper, the distance they took from their initial intellectual environ-
ments entailed an epistemological argument that science could not rely on 
either deductive apodictic structures nor empirically derived protocols to 
guarantee its validity. Instead, they reckoned that truth corresponded to 
the result of an intersubjective process—thereby “socializing epistemology.”11 
Th e heuristics of this process depended on three interrelated provisions: 
the methodology employed for discovery and justifi cation, the design of its 
9  Alan Ebenstein, Friedrich Hayek: A Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2001), 157.
10  Karl Popper, Th e Logic of Scientifi c Discovery (London: Routledge, 2002), 93–4.
11  Jeremy Shearmur, “Epistemology Socialized?” ETC: A Review of General 
Semantics 42, no. 3 (1985): 272–82; Ian C. Jarvie, Th e Republic of Science: Th e Emergence 
of Popper’s Social View of Science 1935–1945 (Atlanta: Rodopi, 2001).
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institutions, and the values shared by the participants. In the end, the epis-
temological conditions of truth and of social order ultimately shared the 
same foundations: that of conventional rules which could be revised and 
improved according to an established method.
Th e existence of the Vienna Circle had been equally crucial for its only 
French member and other major philosopher of science within early neolib-
eralism: Louis Rougier. Although one of its most unsung representatives, 
Rougier charted the clearest path among early neoliberals for an epistemo-
logical critique of rival political ideologies (on Rougier see Schulz-Forberg’s 
chapter in this volume). His portrayal of socialism as a scientifi c fallacy 
originated in his early epistemological works in which he rejected the valid-
ity of all opodictic truths. Following Henri Poincaré, Rougier proposed that 
a scientifi c proposition, instead of being either a rational truth a priori, or an 
empirical truth a posteriori, could be a “hypothesis” or an “optional conven-
tion” picked for reasons of practical or theoretical convenience and tacitly 
accepted as such by the scientifi c community.12 Poincaré’s geometrical 
conventionalism, once extended to all disciplines, pointed  to a “third way” 
which preserved the possibility of scientifi c objectivity while acknowledg-
ing the artifi ciality of reasoning and truth.
Rougier’s real foe, however, was not so much rationalism as a philo-
sophical system than as a political doctrine. He contended that the spirit 
and ideas of the French Revolution, originating in classical rationalism, 
had ended up “par une sorte de logique immanente” in egalitarian social-
ism.13 For Rougier, political principles merely represented useful 
conventions suggested by experience. Any philosophical attempt to 
naturalize or rationalize these axioms must employ a metaphysical 
discourse that is ultimately unsubstantiated. To some extent, Rougier 
followed the same epistemological path as Hayek and Popper. Inspired 
by conventionalism, his criticism of a priori truths convinced him that 
the determinants of knowledge rested with the scientists themselves and 
the discrete but rigorous methodological rules they adopted.14 Rougier’s 
12  Louis Rougier, Les Paralogismes du rationalisme. Essai sur la théorie de la 
connaissance (Paris: Alcan, 1920), 439. Rougier’s doctoral dissertation dealt with 
Poincaré’s geometrical conventionalism. It was published as La philosophie géométrique 
de Henri Poincaré (Paris: Alcan, 1920).
13  Rougier, Paralogismes, 30.
14  “Contemplating its evolution,” writes Rougier, “the analysis of science now 
requires that we introduce historical, psychological and sociological considerations. 
Human science can only be interpreted, in the last instance, with the men who make it, 
just as the measurements of an instrument can only be interpreted through the theory 
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community of views with the Verein Ernst Mach in Vienna and 
Reichenbach’s Gesellschaft  für empirische Philosophie in Berlin led him 
to join both groups, and to attempt to create, without success, a similar 
society in France: la Société Henri Poincaré. Despite his close acquaint-
ance with Neurath, with whom he organized in 1935 the First 
International Congress of Scientifi c Philosophy in Paris, Rougier’s 
philosophy and politics were closer to the “right wing” of the Vienna 
Circle (Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, Felix Kaufmann) than to 
the left  one.15
Rougier and his Viennese colleagues hoped to demarcate a sphere of 
knowledge sheltered from the metaphysics inherent to any language, 
and by extension, to any political ideologies. For Hayek, Rougier, and 
Popper, the application of the methods of empirical science to social 
phenomena raised methodological dilemmas, which were superim-
posed onto diverging political orientations. While sharing the same 
imperative as their Viennese counterparts of demarcating a decontested 
language of science, neoliberal philosophers of science became skeptical 
of the powers of scientifi c method to directly shape social reform. 
Instead, they aspired to emulate the creative rupture they applauded in 
the philosophy of physics and mathematics to the doctrine of liberal-
ism.16 During the interwar period, rival epistemological doctrines came 
to be deeply interwoven with the political visions they promised to 
vindicate. Most of the methodological and epistemological disagree-
ments which came to light in 1920s Vienna would resurface as the 
economic crisis of the 1930s called past orthodoxies in economics and 
the social sciences into question.
Clarity and Opacity in the Liberal Order
Th e idea of a planned economy as the answer to the ‘chaos of laissez-faire’ 
circulated as early as 1929 on the fringes of all British political parties, 
while the Soviet Union implemented its fi rst Five Year Plan in 1928. 
of that instrument.” Louis Rougier, “Une philosophie nouvelle: l’empirisme logique, à 
propos d’un Congrès récent,” La Revue de Paris 43, no. 1 (1936): 194.
15  Mathieu Marion, “Une philosophie politique pour l’empirisme logique?” 
Philosophia Scientiae CS 7 (2007): 209–10.
16  Another crucial publication illustrating this evolution is Jacques Rueff , From the 
Physical to the Social Sciences (Baltimore, MD: Th e Johns Hopkins Press, 1929 [1922]).
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“Planning is forced upon us,” wrote one of its most vocal promoters in 
1933, “not for idealistic reasons, but because the old mechanism which 
served us when markets were expanding naturally and spontaneously is 
no longer adequate when the tendency is in the opposite direction . . . Th e 
economic system is out of gear,” concluded Harold Macmillan, echoing 
the Zeitgeist of post-1929 England.17 Such was the pervasiveness of plan-
ning that it became defi ned as the “middle opinion” of the 1930s, paving 
the way for the post-World War II consensus on the British welfare state.18 
Its popularity owed to the apparent scientifi city of its mechanism as well 
as to the promise of an engineered economy where control and reason 
would be restored at the hands of the state. Th e success of the experimen-
tal methods in the natural sciences provided a vivid case in point for 
reformers eager to rein in the growing complexity of the world economy, 
whereas the discipline of economics was seen to have failed to provide a 
coherent picture of the crisis or suitable remedies to cure it.
Founded in 1931, the British think tank Political and Economic 
Planning (PEP) aspired to design a theory of “capitalist planning” where 
legislative delegation, expertise oversight, and the cult of the scientifi c 
method would make economic policy a mere matter of arbitration 
between public and private interests. Resolutely pro-business, their 
proposal was also fi ercely anti-free-market, testifying to how unpopular 
laissez-faire had become with large sections of the business world itself. 
Not unlike the rhetoric of the New Deal, “rational capitalism,” “orderly 
economy,” and “scientifi c planning” were all terms used in contraposi-
tion to the “evils of competition” or the “chaos of overproduction.”19 
With the exception of Mises, few free market economists on either side 
of the Atlantic denied that better state controls were needed to rein in 
the economic crisis.20 Confronted with the popularity of state controls, 
17  Harold Macmillan, Reconstruction: A Plea for a National Policy (London: 
Macmillan, 1933), 18, 23.
18  Arthur Marwick, “Middle Opinion in the Th irties: Planning, Progress and 
Political ‘Agreement’,” Th e English Historical Review 79, no. 311 (1964): 285–98. 
19  If a wide spectrum of politicians agreed on planning however, no one could 
reach an understanding as to what it meant and covered: it ranged “from capitalist-
sponsored eff orts to ‘rationalize’ industries to market socialism to Soviet-style 
Gosplanning, with Keynes-inspired fi scal ‘planning’ oft en thrown in for good measure.” 
Ben Jackson, “At the Origins of Neo-Liberalism: Th e Free Economy and the Strong State, 
1930–1947,” Th e Historical Journal 53, no. 1 (2010): 139–40.
20  “Th ere is now an imperative need for a sound, positive program of economic 
legislation,” announced Chicago economist Henry Simons in the opening pages of his 
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F. A. Hayek and Michael Polanyi in England, and Walter Lippmann in 
the United States, independently reached the same conclusion: the feasi-
bility of economic planning was not solely a technical problem, but 
called for a much larger understanding of the epistemological founda-
tions of liberalism and its relationship with the market economy.
Arriving in England in 1931, Hayek did not simply apply his exper-
tise on the German-language calculation debate of the 1920s to the 
English situation. Rather, his own thinking was transformed by the 
planning mania of the 1930s. As he emphasized in his inaugural lecture 
at the LSE, the way forward for liberals was to learn from the failures of 
free market rhetoric in order to initiate a long-term process of ideologi-
cal change. He worried that the masses were deluded by the promise of 
reason and science to direct social reform. While the scientifi c econo-
mist cautioned against government interference, the layman demanded 
immediate change in society. Th e lack of legitimacy of a market econ-
omy lay precisely with the hidden nature of the economic problem—the 
invisibility of Adam Smith’s hand.21
Th is was the spirit in which Hayek published his contribution to the 
socialist calculation debate in 1935. He was confi dent that a technical 
demonstration of the economic impossibility of socialism was all that 
was needed to undermine its political appeal, the same way that Mises’s 
critique had discredited the Austrian socialist plan for a centrally 
planned economy. His goal was to bring socialism out of the ethical and 
political realm to wage a scientifi c battle against it: to subject its ideology 
and plans of social organization to a scientifi c examination of their 
proposed means.22 Hayek’s strategy was two-pronged. On the one hand, 
the signaling function of prices was reliable for economic decisions and 
Positive Program for Laissez-faire: “in earlier periods, [our economic organization] could 
be expected to become increasingly strong if only protected from undue political 
interference. Now, however, it has reached a condition where it can be saved only 
through adoption of the wisest measures by the state.” Henry Simons, A Positive Program 
for Laissez-faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy, Public Policy Pamphlet 
no. 15 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 2.
21  Hayek wrote in 1935 that “the fact that in the present order of things such 
economic problems are not solved by the conscious decision of anybody has the eff ect 
that most people are not conscious of their existence.” Hayek, Socialism and War, 56.
22  Hayek states in his refutation that “on the validity of the ultimate ends science 
has nothing to say. Th ey may be accepted or rejected, but they cannot be proved or 
disproved. All that we can rationally argue about is whether and to what extent given 
measures will lead to the desired results.” Ibid., 62.
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forecasts insofar as markets were competitive. Information, as relayed 
by prices, was not only carried but generated through the market—a 
crucial insight. On the other hand, this limited the kind of problems that 
economic science could solve. Widely shared among neoliberals, Hayek’s 
critique pivoted around one single axis: the (seemingly infi nite) cogni-
tive function of markets worked hand in hand with the epistemic limita-
tions of other disciplines and institutions aiming to correct its workings. 
Knowledge remained irrevocably local, dispersed, and impossible to 
centralize; the marketplace produced a continuous stream of new data 
within the confi nes of a radical skepticism towards intervention.
Like Hayek, Michael Polanyi perceived the obscure workings of 
economics as demanding both explanation and passivity. Aft er his 
multiple trips to the Soviet Union as a chemist, he published a detailed 
study of Soviet statistics demonstrating the failure of the Communist 
Party to reach the objectives set by their plan. Despite its abysmal record, 
the genuine support of the population puzzled Polanyi, who spotted in 
the Soviet propaganda’s displays of “public emotion” a “vivid form of 
social consciousness” which provided clear purpose and direction to the 
citizens. At the core of the desire for social revolution in Western socie-
ties, he concluded, brewed a frustration with the opacity of the market 
system, a lack of a refi ned grasp of its concealed mechanisms.23
Taking it upon himself to correct the situation, Polanyi produced an 
educational motion picture expounding the workings of a market econ-
omy which aimed at embedding in the public spirit an expert under-
standing of the economic mechanism.24 Inspired by Keynes’s General 
Th eory, the fi lm centered around the representation of the money belt, 
streaming from industries, to shops, to consumers, with a central bank 
regulating the fl ow of spending and saving. Praising the fi lm’s semiotic 
properties, which allowed an invisible complex structure to be seen and 
thus understood, Polanyi was optimistic about its educational impact on 
the lay masses, hoping it would turn them away from central planning 
and restore their confi dence in a market economy. A society so trans-
formed by this eff ort to publicize the coordinating virtues of markets 
would fulfi l the “promise of liberalism”: the social integration achieved 
23  Michael Polanyi, U.S.S.R. Economics: Fundamental Data, System and Spirit 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1936).
24  Th e fi nal version titled “Unemployment and Money” (1940) is available at the 
following address: www.youtube.com/watch?v=qTMdHC_OU2w. Trivial nowadays, 
the use of fi lm for economic education was entirely novel at the time. 
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in the Soviet Union through public emotion and propaganda could be 
accomplished in liberal societies through reason and public education.
Commending Polanyi as an “exceptionally gift ed observer,” Walter 
Lippmann refl ected on the same theme in the opening chapters of his book 
Th e Good Society, published in 1937. Th e complexity of social life appeared 
to him as an invisible canvas into which our daily interactions were woven. 
Th e opacity of the individual psyche veiled a wealth of knowledge which the 
market artfully and effi  ciently coordinated. Complete planning, by bringing 
all the economic processes to the fore, failed to acknowledge the cognitive 
economy brought forth spontaneously by the division of labor. Once the 
intrinsic limitations of thought were established, conscious control over 
social orders became a delusion. “No human mind has ever understood the 
whole scheme of society,” wrote Lippmann, “at best a mind can understand 
its own version of this scheme, something much thinner, which bears to 
reality some such relations as a silhouette to a man.”25 Th e opacity of society 
to our eff orts of scientifi c probing had become so overwhelming that no 
science of society could form the basis of its conscious control.26 
Consequently, the legitimacy of the market economy relied on entrenching 
these invisible processes within public opinion.
Taken together, these arguments against the possibility of planning 
revolved around the elaboration of two key ideas. First, social knowledge 
is irremediably divided and dispersed. Second, it is a resource that remains 
largely implicit and tacit. In his seminal article on “Economics and 
Knowledge” from 1937, Hayek argued that the assumption of perfect 
knowledge in economic science was eliding the most important question 
that the social sciences had to address: “how knowledge is acquired and 
communicated.”27 Epistemic limitations deriving from the division of 
25  Walter Lippmann, Th e Good Society (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publisher, 
2005 [1937]), 31.
26  Lippmann’s criticism of a socialist economy, however, did not originate with the 
preparation of Th e Good Society. Already in 1933, he was familiar with the socialist 
calculation debate and pointed at the same epistemological argument which Hayek and 
Polanyi had exposed. Quoting the American Austrian economist Benjamin Anderson, 
Lippmann stated clearly in his column “Today and Tomorrow” from February 27, 1934 
that the state was in no position to intervene in a detailed manner in the economy 
because “to regulate the business of a country as a whole and to guide and control 
production there is required a central brain of such vast power that no human being can 
be expected to supply it.” Cf. Craufurd D. Goodwin, Walter Lippmann: Public Economist 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 149.
27  F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1948), 46.
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knowledge had both scientifi c and political consequences for just how 
much one (e.g. the state; the planning board; the welfare economist) was 
capable of knowing and thus of predicting adequately. Neoliberals shared 
the same critique of planning based on the impossibility of centralizing 
information effi  ciently, and the necessity of letting horizontal adjustments 
substitute for vertical decisions. But there existed an additional epistemo-
logical limit to planning. It was not only that social knowledge could not 
be centralized in one place, but also that it remained largely implicit, that 
is, tacitly embedded in traditions and customs.
In order to articulate a model for a liberal society, neoliberals agreed, one 
had to start from the complexity of existing orders wherein “we make constant 
use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand 
and through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowl-
edge which individually we do not possess.”28 Th e superiority of competitive 
markets did not lie only with the putatively eff ortless coordination of the vari-
ous individual plans, but stemmed from their capacity to draw out, compute, 
and value the tacit knowledge carried by the participants.
As a result, the neoliberal argument about the superiority of a market 
economy was predicated upon an epistemology which distinguished 
between spheres of lawful exact knowledge, and spheres where precise 
knowledge was impossible because it remained dispersed, tacit, and 
opaque. Th is assumption accounted for much of the anti-positivist and 
anti-reductionist position shared by neoliberals, as well as their insist-
ence upon the observation of actions rather than the sociological scan-
ning of intentions.29 First rolled out in the analysis of the economic 
order, these epistemological ground rules were later extended by anal-
ogy to all “spontaneously arising orders”: common law, language, 
aesthetics, traditions, etc.30 By the end of the 1930s, the socialist calcula-
tion debate had been reframed in terms of the defence of liberalism 
against totalitarianism, giving political leverage to epistemological argu-
ments which had been originally devised to discredit the idea of 
economic planning. Far from evident at the outset, this recoding has 
become a hallmark of neoliberal thinking.
28  Ibid., 88.
29  In his lectures on Th e Birth of Biopolitics (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), Michel Foucault clearly identifi ed this core element in the neoliberal 
theory but attributed it mainly to the social theory of Gary Becker. Th e postulate of a 
sociological anti-reductionism within neoliberalism was instrumental from the beginning.
30  Michael Polanyi, “Th e Growth of Th ought in Society,” Economica 8 (1941): 432.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   33 10/03/2020   13:59:55
34 Martin Beddeleem
The Mantle of Science
Beyond economics, the 1930s also proved to be a pivotal decade in the 
discipline of the history of science, a period “when radical historicist 
messages from Central Europe and the new Soviet Union combined 
with local antiquarian cultures into historiographical and institutional 
changes.”31 Th e movement for the planning of science gained promi-
nence in the United Kingdom aft er a Russian delegation led by Nikolai 
Bukharin stunned the Second International Congress for the History of 
Science held in London in 1931.32 Th e audience, largely scientists and 
amateurs, had been unprepared to hear the discourse of dialectical 
materialism applied to the history of science. What sounded like a 
Martian language to some was a revelation to others. Relating scientifi c 
discovery to historical processes, Soviet scientists openly challenged the 
dominant internalist accounts of progress and discovery in science. 
Th ese birth pangs of the externalist account of the history of science 
activated an intense scrutiny over the possibility and desirability of 
planning in science. Many left -leaning scientists and intellectuals visited 
the Soviet Union in the early 1930s looking for an alternate model for 
the organization of science and railed against the “frustration of science” 
felt in Europe because of its lack of coordination and planning.
Th is conference, remarked Edward Shils, “led an important bloc of 
British scientists to support the Marxist theses that all scientifi c work, 
however abstruse, is a witting or unwitting response to the practical 
problems confronting the society or the ruling classes of the society in 
which the scientists live.”33 Pure research meant nothing on its own, but 
constituted a preparatory step to applied science and, ultimately, social 
change. At the same time, many natural scientists themselves supported 
a wider application of science to social problems, promoting its rational-
ity and tangibility over the dead-end of partisan shibboleths. Th e fact 
that economic planning had been infused with scientifi c credibility 
31  Anna-K. Mayer, “Setting up a Discipline, II: British History of Science and ‘the 
End of Ideology,’ 1931–1948,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35, no. 1 
(2004): 43.
32  Th e papers given by the Russian delegation were published together a couple of 
days aft er the end of the Congress and were widely disseminated. See N. I. Bukharin, ed., 
Science at the Cross-Roads (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1971 [1931]).
33  Edward Shils, “A Critique of Planning: Th e Society for Freedom in Science,” 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3, no. 3 (1947): 80.
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granted a good measure of legitimacy to sympathetic scientists. Th ey 
were to be the “men of science” or “experts” in charge of rationalising 
the economy and the administration. In his 1933 presidential address to 
the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), the 
President of the Royal Society Frederick G. Hopkins applauded the use 
of science to solve social problems, adding that “the trained scientifi c 
mind must play its part” in the current debates on planning.34
Under the leadership of J. D. Bernal, P. M. S. Blackett, Joseph 
Needham, and Lancelot Hogben, the “social relations of science move-
ment” put forward a fuller integration of society, industry, and science, 
in which the latter, rationally planned and emancipated from capitalism, 
would fulfi l its natural object of serving human welfare. Th ey adopted 
the conclusion of Soviet scientists that “only in a socialist society will 
science genuinely belong to all mankind.”35 Capitalism, they thought, 
had led to a scientifi c regression, introducing competition between 
researchers “when what is really needed is more science applied to the 
convenience of living instead of to profi t-making.”36 Bernal, their most 
vocal spokesperson, denounced liberalism as the method of chaos, 
“spontaneously grown,” hindering the use of knowledge in society 
because innovation was corrupted by private profi teering. On the 
contrary, communism as a political system bore the closest resemblance 
to the collaborative method used by researchers.37
The challenge of “Bernalism,” and its continuous influence during 
World War II, vastly influenced the orientation of neoliberalism. 
Epistemological battles around the scientific method reverberated as 
a political and ideological argument over the best form of govern-
ment. The formative political activities of neoliberals during the 
1930s were chiefly set against natural scientists promoting socialism 
and planning as the logical extrapolation of a scientific worldview 
34  Frederick G. Hopkins, “Some Chemical Aspects of Life,” Nature 132, no. 3332 
(1933): 394.
35  Boris Hessen, “Th e Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s ‘Principia’,” in Science 
at the Cross-Roads, ed. Bukharin, 212.
36  See Daniel A. Hall, ed., Th e Frustration of Science (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1935), 60.
37  “Th e task which the scientists have undertaken,” Bernal concluded in his Social 
Function of Science, “the understanding and control of nature and of man himself, is 
merely the conscious expression of the task of human society  . . . in its endeavour, 
science is communism.” J. D. Bernal, Th e Social Function of Science (London: Routledge, 
1939), 415.
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and organization. They are set to show that the scientific community, 
far from embodying an archetypal communist society, represented, 
on the contrary, the incarnation of a liberal order guided by the 
scientific method.
As the 1930s progressed, it became increasingly obvious that scien-
tifi c research in totalitarian countries was impaired to a large extent. Th e 
academic purge in Nazi Germany and Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union 
had laid bare the gradual submission of science to ideological purposes. 
Th is spectacle, Rougier admitted, had proven to him through “the 
absurd, the necessity and the soundness of liberalism.” He portrayed the 
mystique soviétique as a new form of “state religion,” “whose particular-
ity is to present itself as . . . the highest synthesis of the totality of scien-
tifi c knowledge.”38 Rougier’s portrait of the state of the Soviet Union was 
one of complete failure in all domains, as whole areas of scientifi c 
research, notably genetics, had been deemed incompatible with ortho-
dox Marxist-Leninism. Th e gradual alignment of Russian scientifi c 
research with the Soviet ideology equally disturbed Polanyi, who set 
chemistry aside and endeavored to write about the nature of science 
specifi cally in reaction to the Vavilov-Lysenko controversy. He 
condemned the corruption of Russian science, where the authority of 
science had been replaced “by that of the State,” and advocated the self-
government of science to restore the “independence of scientifi c 
opinion.”39 Polanyi argued that both science and truth were lost when-
ever political liberty fell, as independent thought was subjugated to 
temporal powers. Th erefore, there existed “a common fate between 
independent science and political liberty.”40 A free society cultivated 
science as the boundless quest for new truths whose ultimate uncer-
tainty lay at the core of the liberal values of tolerance and freedom of 
conscience: science under political direction was thus bound to become 
an instrument of propaganda.
Both Hayek and Polanyi were looking for ways to defeat the “scient-
ism” and “scientifi c socialism” which they felt dominated the media and 
the public intelligentsia, thanks to the well-disposed editorship of Nature 
38  Louis Rougier, “La mystique soviétique. Une scolastique nouvelle: le marxisme-
léninisme,” La Revue de Paris 41, no. 2 (April 1934): 622. 
39  Michael Polanyi, Th e Logic of Liberty (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998 [1951]), 
81, 78.
40  Michael Polanyi, “Congrès du Palais de la Découverte,”  Nature 140 (October 
1937): 710.
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and the BBC. Returning to England aft er the Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium in Paris in 1938, Hayek committed himself to his Abuse and 
Decline of Reason project in which a series of historical case studies and 
problems of methodology would lead to “the fundamental scientifi c 
principles of economic policy and ultimately to the consequences of 
socialism.”41 In parallel, his position as editor of Economica aff orded him 
an outlet both to present his own views and to publish major papers by 
Polanyi (1941), Schutz (1943), and Popper (1943–44) which comple-
mented his arguments. In the midst of the project, Hayek wrote to 
Polanyi that he attached “very great importance to these pseudo-
scientifi c arguments on social organization being eff ectively met and I 
am getting more and more alarmed by the eff ects of the propaganda” of 
the left -wing scientists which “discredit the reputation of science by 
such escapades.”42 Th e movement for economic planning supported by 
socialist scientists and engineers, Hayek wrote in Nature, had now so 
“succeeded in capturing public opinion that what little opposition there 
is comes almost solely from a small group of economists.”43 In due 
course, his Abuse of Reason project laid the groundwork for Th e Road to 
Serfdom and prolonged the previous developments of his methodologi-
cal views. But to a large extent, it amounted to a wartime eff ort against 
the left  scientists in England who occupied vital positions within the 
wartime government, continued to infl uence the general public, and 
met regularly to discuss their views in the Tots & Quots discussion 
group.
In the meantime, Polanyi’s own refutation of planning evolved from 
a defence of pure science towards an epistemological defence of liberal-
ism based on the position of thought in society. Th e struggle for pure 
science had been a small but revelatory part of a much larger civiliza-
tional struggle. “Th e attack on science,” he proclaimed, “is a secondary 
battlefi eld in a war against all human ideals, and the attack on the free-
dom of science is only an incident in the totalitarian assault on all free-
dom in society.”44 In 1941, Polanyi founded the Society for Freedom in 
41  F. A. Hayek, Letter to Machlup, dated August 27, 1939. Cf. F. A. Hayek, Studies in 
the Abuse and Decline of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 1.
42  F. A. Hayek, Letter to Michael Polanyi, dated July 1, 1941, Polanyi Papers, Box 4, 
Folder 7.
43  F. A. Hayek, “Planning, Science, and Freedom” (1941), in Hayek, Socialism and 
War, 213.
44  Polanyi, “Th e Growth of Th ought,” 454.
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Science (SFS) with Oxford zoologist J. R. Baker. Like his rivals from the 
left , he dismissed the neutralist position as naive in the face of the “abso-
lute state,” citing the detachment of the scientist as a main cause for 
concern. Th e SFS circulated a four-page letter among scientists in May 
1941 which pressed for the “defence of scientifi c freedom” not to be put 
to rest once peacetime came. Explicitly conceived as an organization to 
match the infl uence of the ‘social relations of science movement’, the SFS 
insisted that adhering to a liberal view of science was not to retreat into 
the high spheres of knowledge, but to serve society to the scientist’s best 
abilities. As long as it remained free from state interference, science 
stood as the perfect example of liberalism in action, demonstrating how 
individual liberty may be seamlessly reconciled with authority, tradi-
tion, and social control.
Despite their irreconcilable political diff erences, Polanyi and Bernal 
envisaged in remarkably similar ways the operation of social norms 
within the scientifi c community and the paucity of a history of science 
told as the progressive evolution of intangible ideas. Each argued in 
their own way “for a social turn in studying the history and philosophy 
of science.”45 As a result, the project of recoding liberalism incorpo-
rated the growing externalist account of science that sought to reground 
its history within the social and economic determinants of scientifi c 
research and knowledge. Neoliberal philosophers of science largely 
agreed with the necessity of conceptualizing knowledge and science 
within their institutional conditions and not as a disembodied process, 
yet proposed an alternative model for the workings of science which 
drew its inspiration from economic liberalism: the Republic of Science.46 
In this model, the metaphor of the market played out as the epistemo-
logical engine of a largely dispersed and tacit knowledge between indi-
viduals, be they scientists, producers, lawyers, or road-users. Th e rule 
of law, market regulations, and scientifi c conventions were conceived as 
so many analogical methods of social coordination to achieve a liberal 
social order, as they ensured a variety of ends with minimum direct 
control. Peculiar to neoliberalism therefore is the strong epistemologi-
cal bent of its social theory, one where freedom is recoded as 
45  Mary-Jo Nye, Michael Polanyi and his Generation: Origins of the Social 
Construction of Science (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), 184.
46  Michael Polanyi, “Th e Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Th eory,” 
Minerva 1 (1962): 54–74.
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instrumental to the activity of separate independent orders working 
according to analogous principles.
Building a Neoliberal Research Program
During the Second World War, the polemical use of the term “scient-
ism” by Hayek complemented Popper’s refutation of “historicist” 
doctrines, Polanyi’s defense of pure science, Lippmann’s call for the 
restoration of a “liberal science,” and Rougier’s dichotomy of doctrine 
and mystique. Each demonstrated that liberal principles were concomi-
tant with the proper view of science while a purely instrumental concep-
tion served the goals of collectivist ideologies. Arguments once used 
against Viennese philosophers were recycled in a context in which prep-
aration and planning for war had given pride of place to applied scien-
tists and engineers. From varying angles, they all accused the applica-
tion of the aims and methods of the natural sciences to power social 
change of usurping the mantle of science out of sheer intellectual error. 
Th e opacity of the “sense-data” in the social sciences made its methods 
and orientation diff erent than those of the natural sciences, because it 
could only observe man’s actions—and their undesigned results—with-
out accessing the inner realm of consciousness. Opinions, they believed, 
constituted the genuine “facts” of the social sciences.47
On the one hand, neoliberals argued, any theory of historical devel-
opment wrongfully applied lawful assumptions to the contingency of 
history, thereby confusing prophecy and prediction,48 and mistaking 
explanation by general principles with the knowledge of deliberate 
direction. On the other hand, engineers and planners suff ered from a 
“slavish imitation of the method and language of Science” which they 
used for the purpose of “social midwifery.”49 By denying the fundamen-
tal uncertainty in social processes, and the logical impossibility of 
controlling social wholes, Polanyi contended that their mentality veered 
towards “utopian engineering,” and was the inspiration for “grandiose 
planning.”50 Th e application of statistics and mathematics to social 
47  Hayek, Studies, 86ff . 
48  Karl Popper, Th e Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 2002), 110ff .
49  Hayek, Studies, 80; Popper, Poverty, 52.
50  Michael Polanyi, Th e Contempt of Freedom: Th e Russian Experiment and Aft er 
(London: Watts & Co., 1940), 28.
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problems was inadequate because of epistemological complications 
linked with the use of probabilities for predictions. To Rougier, “social 
engineering” and the use of econometrics amounted to a “technocratic 
conceit,” whose method “to put everything into equations” was stimu-
lated by a metaphysical belief in universal determinism incompatible 
with the fundamental indeterminacy found at the atomic level.51
To rescue a “liberal science” meant wresting the authority of science 
away from these competing projects. Th e polemical use of “scientism” 
and its analogues served precisely this purpose. Th is came at the cost of 
acknowledging that liberalism was itself an ideology, that is, a conven-
tional doctrine that is socially constructed and not the logical output of 
abstract reason. As such, they eff ectively contended, there is no intrinsic 
relationship between objective science and a specifi c social philosophy. 
Neoliberals and social engineers alike fully embraced the scientifi c 
modernism of the twentieth century, wherein scientifi c arguments 
provided the ultimate source of authority to arbitrate political and social 
questions. Moreover, neoliberals and their opponents both sought to 
capitalize on that authority in order to make their discourse more persua-
sive. Like the “men of science” or the engineers they criticized, both 
groups believed in science as a way to gain truth and a mastery of social 
phenomena. Nevertheless, between pure and applied science lay the 
neoliberal gap: a refusal to harness the progress of knowledge to social 
expediency. Neoliberals believed an elective affi  nity endured between the 
rigors and complexity of economic science, the dispersed and tacit state 
of social knowledge, and a restrained liberal doctrine. Neoliberals alone 
embraced the fact that ideology and science ultimately shared the same 
conventional framework, whereby axiomatic rules had to be trusted by 
their participants to bring about optimal yet uncertain results.
Th e sophistication of neoliberal sociological thinking owed much to 
the thought and writings of fellow Hungarian exile Karl Mannheim. 
Between his arrival in London in 1933 and his death in 1947, Mannheim’s 
output combined his sociology of knowledge developed in Ideology and 
Utopia with a dark assessment of the course of European history, where 
the safeguard of freedom could only be achieved through planning lest 
the masses fall for totalitarian ideologies. In the Germany of the 1920s, 
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge aimed at creating a scientifi cally 
51  Cf. Louis Rougier, “L’impossibilité scientifi que du planisme économique,” Les 
Écrits de Paris (January 1948): 36.
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informed politics which could overcome the irrational elements present 
in ideology. He proposed the “free-fl oating intelligentsia” as being in a 
privileged position to achieve the integration of the common denomi-
nator present in the various thought-models, thereby actualizing the 
emancipatory promise of sociology. In the England of the 1930s, 
however, Mannheim turned towards the idea of “planning for freedom” 
as a way to pre-emptively safeguard Western civilization, which meant 
that traditional elites ought to embrace his sociological diagnosis of 
their failures and apply remedies.52 He shift ed from a conception of 
knowledge with a catalytic function at the service of a better-informed 
politics towards a knowledge instrumental for control by the planning 
elite as a way to counter social disintegration. Liberalism could only be 
rescued through a positive understanding of its automatic mechanism 
of integration, then to be strategically reoriented towards a therapeutic 
reconstruction of society.
Popper, Hayek, and Polanyi all came into contact with Mannheim 
during his London exile. Hayek and Mannheim were colleagues at the 
LSE and Mannheim invited Polanyi to participate in Th e Moot, a 
Christian discussion circle initiated by J. H. Oldham and attended by T. 
S. Eliot.53 Th ey all perceived his sociology of knowledge in the service of 
scientifi c politics as deeply antagonistic to the neoliberal project which 
sought to sever the link between knowledge and social reform. Polanyi 
considered Mannheim’s sociological reductionism antithetical to the 
restoration of dynamic orders founded in the personal knowledge of 
individuals.54 Planning entailed a revaluation of the old traditional 
beliefs to achieve a controlled direction of the masses. Polanyi, on the 
other hand, valued the continuity of Western intellectual custom, where 
dedicated communities of practitioners were guided by tradition and 
52  See Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940).
53  Phil Mullins and Struan Jacobs, “T. S. Eliot’s Idea of the Clerisy, and its Discussion 
by Karl Mannheim and Michael Polanyi in the Context of J. H. Oldham’s Moot,” Journal 
of Classical Sociology 6, no. 2 (2006): 147.
54  Polanyi wrote personally to Mannheim: “As regards the social analysis of the 
development of ideas, suffi  ce it to say that I reject all social analysis of history which 
makes social conditions anything more than opportunities for a development of thought. 
You seem inclined to consider moral judgments on history as ludicrous, believing 
apparently that thought is not merely conditioned, but determined by a social or 
technical situation. I cannot tell you how strongly I reject such a view.” Michael Polanyi, 
Letter to Karl Mannheim, dated April 19, 1944, Polanyi Papers, Box 4, Folder 13.
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faith. Equally for Popper, uncovering the “social determination of scien-
tifi c knowledge” annihilated the basis of free discussion and controversy 
and the quest for scientifi c objectivity.55 Th e goal of a higher synthesis of 
dormant elements by an intelligentsia contradicted the process of scien-
tifi c discovery, which remained always incomplete and subject to modi-
fi cation. Popper identifi ed Mannheim’s utopian vision with that of a 
closed society which was fundamentally hostile to his own open society 
based on conjectures and refutations. Equally mistaken in Popper’s view 
was Mannheim’s conception of knowledge: like Polanyi, Popper empha-
sized the personal elements of scientifi c knowledge and discovery. 
“What the ‘sociology of knowledge’ overlooks,” he wrote in Poverty of 
Historicism, “is . . . the fact that it is the public character of science and 
of its institutions which imposes a mental discipline upon the individual 
scientist, and which preserves the objectivity of science and its tradition 
of critically discussing new ideas.”56
Similarly for Hayek, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge was the 
latest avatar of “scientism” where the comprehension of the mechanisms 
of thought would allow the theoretician to predict its development. Th e 
“constitutional limitations of the individual mind” proposed by Hayek 
as the foundation of spontaneous orders solved the problem of coordi-
nation and integration that Mannheim was hinting at with his scientifi c 
planning. “Th ose who hold these views,” Hayek wrote, “have indeed 
regularly some special theory which exempts their own views from the 
same sort of explanation and which credits them, as a specially favoured 
class, or simply as the ‘free-fl oating intelligentsia’, with the possession of 
absolute knowledge.”57 All three eff ectively argued that scientifi c knowl-
edge was a socially determined process, yet an intersubjective and 
rational one, and not the result of social conditioning. Th eir philosophy 
of science, valuing the social process of science within dedicated institu-
tions as independent from the scientist’s social position, was, in eff ect, 
an answer to any materialist sociology of knowledge.
Mannheim represented one of the most potent intellectual adversar-
ies of early neoliberals because he advertised planning not as a rejection 
of liberalism but as its most advanced stage, in line with scientifi c 
55  Karl Popper, Th e Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routledge, 2013 [1945]), 
420.
56  Popper, Poverty, 144.
57  Hayek, Studies, 150–3.
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modernity. Like the neoliberals, Mannheim argued against objectivism 
and scientifi c detachment and attempted to save a scientifi cally valid 
knowledge beyond relativism.58 While their political conclusions radi-
cally diverged, neoliberals shared a substantial number of commitments 
with Mannheim. First among them was the acknowledgment that 
knowledge is socially produced and disseminated. Furthermore, 
Mannheim also advocated environmental interventions—or indirect 
methods of social control—to orient society from the top, and acknowl-
edged the functional role of the elite above the masses. While criticizing 
Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, neoliberals would come to build 
their own “neoliberal” model for the production and diff usion of knowl-
edge in society. From Hayek’s intention to found the Mont Pèlerin 
Society as a closed group of like-minded individuals to his 1949 article 
on “Intellectuals and Socialism,” neoliberals embraced a sociology of 
knowledge at the service of their ideological project. What Hayek iden-
tifi ed as the hubris of the sociologist would ironically be the position he 
aimed at occupying with the Mont Pèlerin Society.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has shown how the production of a neoliberal epistemology 
supported the ideological project of revamping liberalism on a new scien-
tifi c basis. Many of the subsequent theoretical elaborations within neoliber-
alism derived from the common epistemological framework drawn here. 
On the theoretical level, early neoliberals sought to distance themselves 
from the rationalism, empiricism, and naturalism which prevailed in classi-
cal liberalism, and to adopt a critical conventionalism, where knowledge 
and truths were established intersubjectively in a constant process of 
exchange between theories and the test of experience. As a result, neoliberal 
thinkers devised a skeptical view of the reach of the social sciences as their 
prime angle from which to attack competing ideologies promoting an 
instrumentalist view of knowledge. Paradoxically, they also came to share 
many premises with the most sophisticated of their adversaries.
Th e science of liberalism that neoliberals attempted to mend over-
lapped with the construction of a liberal view of science as these two 
strands became intimately conjoined in the shadow of totalitarianism. 
58  Nye, Michael Polanyi, 282.
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Th rough their publications and correspondence, neoliberals fortifi ed 
their epistemological insights and complementary social theory. Th is 
was one in which the method of freedom was bound by conventional 
rules which had to be adopted as articles of faith, that is, as a constitu-
tion. Nonetheless, when neoliberalism started taking institutional shape, 
many of the latent divergences became manifest and its scientifi c and 
ideological turf fi ssured. Th e fi rst decades of the Mont Pèlerin Society 
can be seen retrospectively as the impossible attempt to reconcile these 
diverging views. Many of the polymaths, including Polanyi, left  the 
Society during the fi rst decade of its existence as it relinquished its role 
as a multidisciplinary intellectual center for the growth of an alternative 
theory of liberalism venturing beyond economic freedom. Th e disap-
pearance of self-proclaimed neoliberals, and the fortune of “neoliberal-
ism” as a critical concept, prove beyond doubt the discontinuities 
between its many lives.
Since its inception, neoliberalism has hinged on two forces tugging in 
opposite directions: a scientifi c program based on a strict respect for the 
scientifi c method, and strategic appeals to morals and values when 
results did not point to an agreeable consensus. As a consequence, the 
neoliberal attempt to recode liberalism left  an ambiguous legacy. On the 
one hand, the neoliberal discourse of the superiority of the market, the 
rule of law, and the rejection of economic intervention became fi rmly 
anchored in a coherent research program. On the other hand, the project 
to redefi ne liberalism along the lines of a liberal science collapsed 
because of its contradictions with the ideological goal of controlling the 
production and diff usion of theoretical knowledge. Accordingly, the 
neoliberal ideological project superseded the scientifi c intuitions 
advanced by its early promoters. From a critical program designed to 
contest the opportunity of economic intervention, it had progressed 
through an epistemological recoding of liberalism. Following the 
success of Th e Road to Serfdom, Hayek further elaborated an ideological 
strategy in which a closed circle of intellectual producers feed their ideas 
to the public through strategically placed intermediaries.59 As well as 
their democratic aspirations, the cognitive capacity of the masses was 
deemed trivial compared with the intellectual infl uence of the elites, 
which neoliberals began to purposefully target.
59  F. A. Hayek, “Th e Intellectuals and Socialism” (1949), in Hayek, Socialism and 
War, 221–37.
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As a result, neoliberals developed a sociology of knowledge wherein 
discourses enunciated at diff erent levels preserved the critical philoso-
phy of uncertainty which had been developed in the late 1930s at the 
core, while frankly embracing an instrumentalist and positivist view of 
knowledge at the lower end of its channels of distribution. If the episte-
mological agility aff orded by conventionalism eroded some of its found-
ing principles, it nurtured the think tank ideological machines and their 
capture of the marketplace of ideas. Largely imperceptible, these delib-
erate epistemic inconsistencies paved the way for the long-term resil-
ience and success of neoliberalism as a social and political ideology.
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On Skinning a Cat: George Stigler 
on the Marketplace of Ideas
Edward Nik-Khah
Th e great majority of Americans would not dream of abandoning the 
important regulatory policies . . . [but] what is not commonly realized 
is that there are several ways to skin even a reforming cat.
George Stigler, 19731
It seems that those wishing to grapple with neoliberalism face a nearly 
irresistible temptation to reduce a complex and heterogeneous collec-
tive movement to the ideas of a single charismatic individual.2 Or, 
perhaps two of them. Take, for example, one of the most celebrated 
histories of the Mont Pèlerin Society, Angus Burgin’s Th e Great 
Persuasion.3 In his history, Burgin portrays neoliberalism as comprised 
of two periods, and identifi es each period with an exemplary individual. 
1  George Stigler, “Th e Confusion of Means and Ends,” in Regulating New Drugs, ed. 
Richard Landau (Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1973), 10–12. 
2  Th is chapter draws from and expands upon portions of “Th e ‘Marketplace of 
Ideas’ and the Centrality of Science to Neoliberalism,” in Th e Routledge Handbook of the 
Political Economy of Science, ed. David Tyfi eld, Rebecca Lave, Samuel Randalls, and 
Charles Th orpe (New York: Routledge, 2017), 32–42. I wish to thank Stephen Stigler for 
his permission to access the George J. Stigler Papers, Anna Yeatman for helpful 
comments in improving a previous draft , and Quinn Slobodian for editorial suggestions 
in improving the present one. Archival materials from the George J. Stigler Papers 
(Special Collections Research Center, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago) are 
quoted with permission.
3  Angus Burgin, Th e Great Persuasion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2012). 
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Th e fi rst, lasting from the founding of the MPS until the early 1960s, was 
the “Age of Hayek,” which in Burgin’s telling was characterized by a 
wide-ranging discussion of pro-market principles, aimed at creating a 
moderate social philosophy. But the possibilities for such moderation 
were foreclosed during the “Age of Friedman,” ushered in by the ascen-
sion to the leadership of the MPS of the cruder and economistic Milton 
Friedman, and refl ecting in part the movement of the center of gravity 
from Europe to the US. One takes from Burgin’s history a sense that we 
are still well within Friedman’s Age. His hope seems to be that we reject 
the cruder Friedman and set to the Hayekian task of developing a more 
sophisticated market philosophy.
At fi rst glance, the choice to portray Hayek and Friedman as central 
protagonists in the neoliberal program seems understandable. If the 
central purpose of a history concerns the persuasion of the masses into 
pro-market thinking, it makes a certain sense to focus on instantly 
recognizable Big Names. Yet, for those familiar with the fi gures in ques-
tion, the resulting history seems too coarse—and this is true even if we 
follow Burgin in confi ning most of our attention to the US. At the 
University of Chicago, fi gures other than Friedman were at least as 
responsible (and arguably more so) for its ascendance to the most infl u-
ential neoliberal outpost in the US.4 By the 1980s those who were at 
Chicago acknowledged that Friedman’s views about markets had been 
eclipsed by George Stigler’s, which were in some important respects 
opposed to Friedman’s, as we will see below.5 To the general public, 
Stigler was not nearly as well-known as Friedman, and the same could 
be said of other neoliberals in close proximity (such as Aaron Director 
and Allen Wallis), pointing to a second curiosity. Many of the most 
infl uential neoliberals had little patience for “persuasion,” and hence 
carried out their activities well outside the public eye. Indeed, one might 
4  Robert Van Horn and Philip Mirowski, “Th e Rise of the Chicago School of 
Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism,” and Robert Van Horn, “Reinventing 
Monopoly and the Role of Corporations,” both in Th e Road from Mont Pèlerin, ed. Philip 
Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Edward 
Nik-Khah, “George Stigler, the Graduate School of Business, and the Pillars of the 
Chicago School,” in Building Chicago Economics, ed. Robert Van Horn, Philip Mirowski, 
and Tom Stapleford (New York: Cambridge, 2011); Edward Nik-Khah and Robert Van 
Horn, “Th e Ascendancy of Chicago Neoliberalism,” in Th e Handbook of Neoliberalism, 
ed. Simon Springer, Kean Birch, and Julie MacLeavy (New York: Routledge, 2016).
5  Melvin Reder, “Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 20, no. 1 (1982); Nik-Khah, “George Stigler.”
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attribute the very existence of the MPS precisely to the wish to carry out 
a political program to which the public could not be reconciled, at least 
in the foreseeable future.
Within the confi nes of the MPS meetings, debates erupted concern-
ing the best way to bring about an ideal market society under these 
unfavorable conditions. As the movement matured, neoliberals sought 
to reconcile the various aspects of their program to a shared commit-
ment to the market as an information processor of unsurpassable 
power.6 Increasingly, neoliberals considered their own roles as intellec-
tuals in light of a “marketplace of ideas,” and advanced the distinctive 
positions they arrived at in terms of how they understood its 
operation.
Importantly, the person who most doggedly pursued the implications 
of the concept of the marketplace of ideas for the neoliberal project was 
not Milton Friedman, but his Chicago colleague (who would also serve 
as president of the MPS), George Stigler. Stigler’s views did not emerge 
fully formed like Athena from Zeus’s head, but developed over time as 
he questioned whether and under what circumstances the university 
upheld the epistemic virtues of the marketplace. He would eventually 
relinquish an early hope that existing institutions devoted to producing 
and ratifying knowledge (universities—or, more precisely, an elite subset 
of them, such as Chicago) could be reconciled to the proper functioning 
of the marketplace of ideas, in favor of the more hard-edged position 
that this would require them to undergo radical reorganization. So, too, 
would Stigler challenge the most prominent activities of his fellow 
neoliberals: he would reject Friedman’s approach to dealing directly 
with an obstinate public, and urged his fellow neoliberals to do the same. 
Popularizing neoliberal economics was at best useless, at worst 
dangerous.
Viewing neoliberalism through the lens of Friedman has the eff ect of 
considering only one possible approach to the neoliberal problem of the 
public, and thereby introducing a grave misunderstanding about how 
neoliberalism works. Th ere was, as Stigler argued, more than one way to 
skin this cat, more than one strategy to triumph over the will of the 
6  Philip Mirowski, Science-Mart (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) 
and Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste (New York: Verso, 2013); Edward Nik-Khah, 
“Neoliberal Pharmaceutical Science and the Chicago School of Economics,” Social 
Studies of Science 44, no. 4 (2014); David Tyfi eld, “Science, Innovation, and 
Neoliberalism,” in Springer et al., eds, Th e Handbook of Neoliberalism. 
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public. By understanding these strategies we may come to better appre-
ciate the reason neoliberalism itself has had “nine lives.”
Science Contra Democracy
When Friedrich Hayek intervened in the socialist calculation contro-
versy by reconceptualizing the economy from a system of allocation to a 
system of communications, this brought knowledge and information 
under the purview of economics for the fi rst time.7 Markets would now 
be praised for their epistemic virtues. But for neoliberals, this would 
raise thorny questions: how could the market—the best method of 
organizing and disseminating knowledge hitherto known to human-
kind—give rise to knowledge that was hostile to its very operation? Why 
had the intellectual tide moved against them?
Hence, neoliberals felt compelled to contemplate organizing intellec-
tual life in such a way that would respect their developing pro-market 
creed. Th ey did so in a variety of ways, too many to discuss here. One of 
the most signifi cant concerned the appropriation of the “marketplace of 
ideas,” a metaphor previously used by their political enemies to support 
robust democratic discussion, but now repurposed by neoliberals to 
rebut an ambition they increasingly regarded as dangerous.8 Beginning 
with Aaron Director, MPS members would with increasing frequency 
place intellectual, political, and trade concepts side by side in their 
work.9 Consequently, they came to explore the implications of the 
metaphor for organizing intellectual life more closely.
No single way of understanding these implications commanded the 
assent of all neoliberals. Th is was due in part to a previous unwillingness 
to nail down exactly what the real-world equivalent to the market was 
7  Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah, Th e Knowledge We Have Lost in 
Information (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
8  Edward Nik-Khah, “What is ‘Freedom’ in the Marketplace of Ideas?” in 
Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Public Institutions, ed. Anna Yeatman (Rydalmere, NSW: 
Whitlam Institute within Western Sydney University, 2015). 
9  Director fi rst unveiled this argument in 1953, though it remained unpublished for 
over a decade. Aaron Director, “Th e Parity of the Economic Market Place,” Journal of 
Law and Economics 7 (1964). On Director, see also Robert Van Horn and Ross Emmett, 
“Two Trajectories of Democratic Capitalism in the Post-War Chicago School: Frank 
Knight versus Aaron Director,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 35, no. 5 (2014); 
Nik-Khah and Van Horn, “Th e Ascendancy.”
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and how it gave rise to the desired commodity (presumably “knowledge,” 
though this was not always made entirely clear). Th is issue fi rst surfaced 
in a 1957 MPS session entitled “Egalitarianism and ‘Democratisation’ in 
Education,” which turned out to be a wide-ranging traverse over history, 
philosophy, education theory, and economics. In what seemed at fi rst 
glance to be a narrowly “economic” contribution, Benjamin Rogge deliv-
ered a paper on the fi nancing of higher education.10 Rogge argued that 
the appropriate way to respect the pro-market creed in the organization 
of colleges and universities would be to fi nance all their operations out of 
student tuition fees. Rogge decried the subsidization of student educa-
tion on the grounds that it served as an unnecessary and unwarranted 
intervention into the education market. He found it especially objection-
able that people routinely denied the principle of consumers’ sovereignty 
in this market on the grounds that those seeking education were unedu-
cated. Contrariwise, he held that having students pay the full cost of 
education would force professors to more faithfully attend to the instruc-
tion of their students. To subsidize students’ education, colleges and 
universities placed themselves in the position of needing funds from the 
government, alumni, the wealthy, and corporations. But relying on these 
groups for funding gave them undue sway over the curriculum, stifl ing 
intellectual diversity. Rogge noted, “he who pays the piper will call the 
tune.”11 He did not begrudge funders for seeking to “call the tune,” but he 
sought to diff use such power among many more, and diverse rather than 
organized, tune-callers (the students themselves). A full-cost pricing 
method would achieve this because the consumers of education—the 
students—were, in his view, many and diverse. Consequently, full-cost 
pricing would also supposedly promote intellectual diversity. Specifi cally, 
by eliminating the state’s funding of professors’ activities, full-cost pric-
ing would help to combat “collectivism.”
Th e person assigned as discussant for Rogge’s paper was the Chicago 
economist and founding MPS member George Stigler. Stigler would 
come to occupy an unusual position within the intellectual and political 
crosscurrents of the Cold War economics profession—we might even 
characterize his position as unique. He was able to combine an interest 
10  Rogge was at that time serving as dean of Wabash College, a US private liberal 
arts college. Th e paper he presented at the MPS meetings, “Financing Higher Education 
in the United States,” was later published in his Can Capitalism Survive? (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1979). 
11  Rogge, Can Capitalism Survive?, 255.
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in formal models of information, orthodox economics, pro-market 
politics, and the role of the intellectual in capitalism into something 
approaching a coherent set of views and practices that he then deployed 
both inside and outside economics—indeed, inside and outside the 
academy—all the while claiming to uphold the best traditions of science, 
and gaining a reputation among even his intellectual antagonists for 
doing just this.
Stigler rejected Rogge’s argument. First, he denied that full-cost pric-
ing would necessarily attract a variety of funders and promote intellec-
tual diversity. Research funding already utilized it, he argued; neverthe-
less, the US federal government and the Ford Foundation managed to 
exert tremendous infl uence over research priorities.12 Second, Stigler 
objected to the proposal to promote student sovereignty over higher 
education. He argued that students lacked the qualifi cations to judge 
either the quality of a course or the quality of research. He noted dryly: 
“At Minnesota, 2 Mt. Pèlerin Members [were] at [the] bottom in 1946.”13 
At that time, the University of Minnesota’s Department of Economics 
employed three MPS members: Rogge, Stigler, and Milton Friedman.
Stigler then attacked the metaphor of the democratic diff usion of 
power that underpinned Rogge’s consumer sovereignty argument:
In general in intell[ectual] aff airs democracy is not a proper system of 
organizing. Th e best econ[omics] in the US is not the one the public 
would elect; a science must impose the standards of an elite upon a 
profession . . . Aff airs of science, and intellectual life generally, are not 
to be conducted on democratic procedures. One cannot establish a 
mathem[atical] theorem by a vote, even a vote of mathematicians. An 
elite must emerge and instill higher standards than the public or the 
profession instinctively desire.14
Here Stigler expressed a deep suspicion about the knowledge of the 
public. Th e preferences of the patrons of science might indeed triumph, 
12  Stigler oft en decried the infl uence of the Ford Foundation, despite its instrumental 
role in establishing Chicago’s Graduate School of Business as a “center of excellence.” See 
Nik-Khah, “George Stigler.” 
13  George Stigler, “Comments on Rogge’s ‘Financing Higher Education in the 
United States’,” George J. Stigler Papers, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago 
(hereaft er, GSRL), Box 26, File: Mont Pèlerin Society 10th Anniversary Meeting.
14  Ibid.
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but their sovereignty over the knowledge produced was nothing neces-
sarily to celebrate. Unless, that is, they were the right kind of patrons.
Stigler elaborated on his views in his 1963 publication Th e 
Intellectual and the Market Place. In the title essay, Stigler announced 
an intention to persuade intellectuals to reexamine their attitudes 
towards markets:
Th e intellectual has never felt kindly toward the marketplace. Whether 
this intellectual be an ancient Greek philosopher, who viewed 
economic life as an unpleasant necessity that should never be allowed 
to become obtrusive or dominant, or whether this intellectual be a 
modern man, who focuses his scorn on gadgets and Madison Avenue, 
the basic similarity of view has been pronounced.15
Roughly contemporaneously, Stigler complained: “social problems are 
the creation of the ‘intellectual.’ Th e intrinsic importance of a complaint 
against a social system, as judged by later opinion, has little to do with 
its eff ectiveness in shift ing opinion. If enough able and determined 
men . . . denounce and denounce a defi ciency, that defi ciency becomes 
grave.”16 Lurking was a question about what role, if any, economics 
could play in preventing or at least counteracting the intellectuals’ 
monstrous creations. Although Stigler is well-known for arguing that 
the study of economics may make one “conservative,” he held that in 
practice this conversion would rarely happen.17 It would require people 
to acquaint themselves with economics at a very high level. But, more 
importantly, even for the persistent student who undertook such a 
regimen, the baleful eff ects of culture could never be entirely wiped 
away:
I cannot believe that any amount of economic training would wholly 
eliminate the instinctive dislike of a system of organizing economic 
life through the search for profi ts. It will still appear to many intellec-
tuals that a system in which men were driven by a reasonably selfl ess 
devotion to the welfare of other men would appear superior to one in 
15  George Stigler, Th e Intellectual and the Market Place (New York: Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1963), 85.
16  George Stigler, Essays in the History of Economics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1965), 285–6. 
17  Ibid., 56.
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which they sought to their own preferment. Th is ethic is deeply 
imbedded in the major religions.18
In Stigler’s view, the study of economics had little eff ect in eliminating 
collectivist policies. Additionally, there were features of the academic 
community that further entrenched such harmful views.
Stigler argued that state universities were inhospitable to freedom of 
inquiry. Only an elite few truly promoted it:
Not only have the productive achievements of the marketplace 
supported a much enlarged intellectual class, but also the leaders of 
the marketplace have personally been strong supporters of intellectu-
als, and in particular those in the academic world. If one asks where, 
in the Western university world, the freedom of inquiry of professors 
has been most staunchly defended and energetically promoted, my 
answer is this: not in the politically controlled universities . . . and not 
in the self-perpetuating faculties . . . No, inquiry has been most free in 
the college whose trustees are a group of top-quality leaders of the 
marketplace, men who, experience shows, are remarkably tolerant of 
almost anything except a mediocre and complacent faculty.19
One may be reminded of Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy, wherein he argues that markets produced the conditions 
that allowed intellectuals to thrive.20 But Stigler is going further than 
Schumpeter. Intellectuals should show greater appreciation for those 
who make their living in the marketplace, not only because their actions 
have provided for the material progress necessary to support them, but 
also because by their oversight of elite private universities they have 
personally safeguarded freedom of inquiry. In his private correspond-
ences, he was candid:
A college community—faculty, and their disciples, the students—is a 
cohesive group, sharing to remarkable degree a common cultural life, 
similar educational backgrounds, and even fairly similar political 
18  Stigler, Th e Intellectual, 94–5.
19  Ibid., 87.
20  Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1942).
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views. If this community were to govern the college exclusively (as 
was true at Oxford and Cambridge for several centuries), the college 
sooner or later would become “academic” in some undesirable 
senses—precious, narrow, removed from unpleasant realities, and 
downright lazy. Th e trustees are men of aff airs, and bring to the 
college decisions an element of the virility and realism of the non-
college world.21
In arguing for the superiority of the “leaders of the market place,” Stigler 
eff ectively dismissed Rogge’s concern that a small group of people would 
stifl e inquiry—so long as the group is composed of the right kind of 
people. In the elite private universities, freedom of inquiry would fl our-
ish. Th eir trustees would see to that.
If bringing the good deeds of businesspeople to the attention of intel-
lectuals was insuffi  cient to convince them to reexamine their attitudes, 
then perhaps closer scrutiny of the deep similarities between the market-
place and the intellectual world would do the trick: “Th e organizing 
principles of [the marketplace and intellectual world] are the same . . . 
Just as real markets have some fraud and monopoly, which impair the 
claims for the marketplace, so the intellectual world has its instances of 
coercion and deception, with the coercion exercised by claques and 
fashion. But again these deviants are outside the logic of the system.”22 
Stigler continued, “the analogies could be pursued much further,” and 
so one should not read too much into his apparent distinction between 
“real” markets and the intellectual world.23 Of course, one could certainly 
dispute his characterization of monopoly as ruled out by some universal 
“logic of the [market] system”—many economists of his day would have. 
Nevertheless, for Stigler, the rationality of science and the eff ectiveness 
of the market for goods and services were due to the same organiza-
tional principles. Hence, intellectuals should regard the marketplace 
favorably.
21  George Stigler, Letter to Robert F. Leach, dated May 23, 1969, GSRL Box 22, File: 
1969 Student Aid. As he was then serving on the board of Carleton College, it was an 
observation Stigler surely believed he was well-positioned to make.
22  Stigler, Th e Intellectual, 87–8.
23  Th is was, aft er all, one who in completing a foray into science policy portrayed 
scientifi c labor as no diff erent from any other type of labor. See David Blank and George 
Stigler, Th e Demand and Supply of Scientifi c Personnel (New York: NBER, 1957). He 
would later explicate this theme, presenting economics as off ering a diff erent model for 
the scientifi c occupations than those who view science as a vocation. 
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On the surface, Stigler’s appeal to a marketplace of ideas may seem to 
suggest a view of science as “self-regulating.”24 However, Stigler had 
already argued that one should not trust the academy to regulate itself. 
Absent some jolt from the outside, a faculty would become “mediocre 
and complacent.” But this raised a perplexing question. If the organizing 
principles of intellectual life and markets really were the same, then how 
could one reasonably hold—as Stigler did—that there was something 
persistently wrong with the kind of knowledge it produced? Stigler’s 
answer is worthy of close scrutiny. Markets did give people what they 
wanted. But this was nothing to celebrate, because most people are 
instinctively predisposed to hold the wrong views about them. Markets 
produced the wrong kind of knowledge because they gave people what 
they wanted.
Aft er all, there was something to be said for coercion. An elite could 
potentially countervail such views. But larger political forces hampered 
its ability to do so. Stigler complained that the demand expressed by 
government for science as channeled through the system of publicly 
funded universities and grant programs had become intertwined with a 
set of egalitarian concerns, encouraging “diff usion” of talent, leading 
ultimately to a decrease in the quality of research, entrenching profes-
sional consensus.25 Estate taxes eliminated the possibility of a future 
Rockefeller, and therefore the establishment of another University of 
Chicago was out of the question. States had diverted resources to the 
system of public universities that otherwise would have gone to a 
Harvard or, better yet, a Chicago. Overall, Stigler was skeptical of the 
prospects for US higher education, but he held out limited hope that a 
small set of institutions might yet help to impose the higher standards 
that he so desired.
24  James Wible (mistakenly, in my view) picks up on this aspect of Stigler’s account, 
and identifi es Stigler as an advocate of the position that science is self-regulating. See 
James Wible, Th e Economics of Science (New York: Routledge, 1998). 
25  Such diff usion was a disaster, since science was properly an elite activity: “there 
are at most fourteen really fi rst class men in any fi eld, and more commonly there are 
about six.” See Stigler, Th e Intellectual, 37. Th is followed straightforwardly from his elitist 
views about human abilities: “there are natural diff erences in the quality of both men 
and acres, unlikely to be eliminated under any social system.” See Stigler, Essays, 280. 
Egalitarianism was a sin against nature, and a sin against science.
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Intellectual Freedom Contra Academic Freedom
Clearly, Stigler and his fellow neoliberals expressed concern for “free-
dom of inquiry”—particularly the freedom to promote their views of 
the marketplace within the academy, which they felt to be implacably 
opposed to their aims. Th is raised the question about whether it would 
be possible to promote their interests within existing academic struc-
tures, or whether this called for a more radical response.
Th e question would surface as neoliberals considered the appropriate 
attitude to take towards established principles of academic freedom.26 At the 
MPS, the president of Brooklyn College (and later the New School of Social 
Research) Harry Gideonse became the standard-bearer for the position that 
an imminent communist threat rendered principles of academic freedom 
quaint.27 He argued for suspending tenure protection for communists and 
purging them from the professorate. On the other hand, MPS members 
were keenly aware that they themselves were an intellectual minority. Did 
rules supporting academic freedom help or hinder neoliberal aims?
In 1964, the Austrian economist and founding MPS member, Fritz 
Machlup, delivered a defense of academic freedom, and in particular its 
tenure protection (on Machlup see Slobodian’s contribution to this 
volume). At that time, Machlup was serving as president of the American 
Association of University Professors. In his talk, he focused specifi cally 
on how tenure helped “to secure the great benefi t of academic freedom 
and of the fruit it bears.”28 Machlup viewed the professor as playing a 
crucial role in the advancement of knowledge:
26  In 1940, the American Association of University Professors had approved its 
“Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure”; subsequently, many US 
institutions of higher education and professional bodies endorsed this statement (the 
American Economic Association eventually did so in 1962).
27  It boggles the mind to realize that Gideonse previously found himself as one of the 
accused during the hearings into communism at the University of Chicago. See John Boyer, A 
Twentieth-Century Cosmos (Chicago: Th e College of the University of Chicago, 2007). Th ese 
hearings set into motion a sequence of events that led decades later to George Stigler assuming 
the Walgreen Chair. See Nik-Khah, “George Stigler.” One full session at the 1950 MPS 
meetings was devoted to discussing Gideonse’s “Th e Moral Basis of Academic Freedom.” For 
Gideonse’s published work on academic freedom, see Harry Gideonse, “Changing Issues in 
Academic Freedom in the United States Today,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 94, no. 2 (1950); “Academic Freedom: A Decade of Challenge and Clarifi cation,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 301, no. 1 (1955). 
28  Fritz Machlup, “In Defense of Academic Tenure,” AAUP Bulletin 50, no. 2 (1964), 
119.
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One incident during my term of offi  ce has, more than anything else, rein-
forced my belief in the importance of tenure. It had to do with a young 
medical researcher in the last year of his probationary period, who had 
discovered toxic qualities of a drug distributed by a company which was 
supporting his university with generous research grants. Should he 
publish the report of his fi ndings? Would he risk nonrenewal of his 
appointment if his publication angered the donor and the chairman of 
the department? As it was, or as I was told, the young man decided to 
publish and he lost his post . . . Just think how easy it would have been for 
this scientist to postpone publication by just one year; and what conse-
quences for the health, perhaps the lives, of many could have been 
entailed by postponement of such publications by as little as a month.29
In order for them to play this important role, professors have to person-
ally sacrifi ce: “[T]he free competitive market for higher learning would 
not guarantee all the academic freedom which society ought to provide 
in the interest of progress; without the interference through the univer-
sal tenure system the degree of academic freedom would be only that 
which professors would be willing to pay for, and this would be much 
less than what is socially desirable.”30 Machlup portrayed the intellec-
tual marketplace as beset by “externalities.” For Machlup, professors 
produced the fruits of academic freedom. Th e problem was that they did 
not reap the full benefi ts of such freedom, while at the same time they 
solely bore the costs of it. In forging a binding commitment amongst 
professors, trustees, and administrators, tenure operated as a corrective 
for this “market failure.”
Th e central question was whether tenure could be squared with 
developing notions of the intellectual marketplace. Th ere were a variety 
of reasons that Machlup’s position on its operation would eventually be 
viewed as intolerable to Chicago neoliberals. His statement came at 
almost precisely the same time as the advent of the “Coase Th eorem.” 
Stigler interpreted and promulgated the Coase Th eorem (a term Stigler 
claims to have “christened”), which eff ectively denied that externalities 
posed any signifi cant problem for economies.31 For Stigler, the inability 
29  Ibid., 124.
30  Ibid., 119–20.
31  On Stigler’s invention of the Coase Th eorem, see Steven Medema, “A Case of 
Mistaken Identity: George Stigler, ‘Th e Problem of Social Cost,’ and the Coase Th eorem,” 
European Journal of Law and Economics 31, no. 1 (2011). 
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to appropriate the fruits of academic freedom would suggest at most 
rejiggering the property rights associated with intellectual activities—
for example by the expansion of intellectual property.32
But Stigler had an additional reason for rejecting Machlup’s argu-
ment. Stigler wrote Machlup in 1969 with the following objection:
[T]he censorship of professors is more severe than that of either trus-
tees or the market. Could you conceive of Princeton appointing an 
economist who actively professed racist views? I cannot. Indeed I am 
impressed that Allen Wallis has yet to receive his fi rst L.L.D.—I would 
welcome an explanation other than his association with Nixon in 
1959–60. Professors are highly conformist and make very poor custo-
dians of intellectual freedom when it confl icts with the academy’s 
beliefs.33
One fi nds in this letter a similar praise of the role of non-academics in 
stimulating intellectual innovation as that off ered in Th e Intellectual and 
the Market Place. But whereas Stigler earlier argued that the coercive 
power of intellectual “claques and fashions” was much exaggerated, here 
he expresses doubts. Th e faculty had control of the university and intel-
lectual freedom had suff ered. What had happened?
Th e short answer is: the student movement. Th e intervening years 
between Th e Intellectual and the Market Place and Stigler’s correspond-
ence with Machlup had been a turbulent time in US higher education, 
and the University of Chicago was not spared. In 1967 the Chicago 
campus was roiled by a series of disruptive student protests.34 Reasons 
for the unrest included the administration deciding to comply with 
32  For his part, Machlup had expressed considerable doubt about the role of patents 
in spurring innovation. See Fritz Machlup, “Patents and Inventive Eff ort,” Science 111, 
no. 3463 (1961).
33  George Stigler, Letter to Fritz Machlup, dated April 14, 1969, GSRL Box 10, File: 
Machlup. Allen Wallis attended the University of Chicago as a graduate student at the 
same time as Stigler and was a member of the MPS; later (as dean of the Graduate School 
of Business) Wallis hired Stigler to Chicago from Columbia and arranged for him to 
receive the Walgreen Chair. See Nik-Khah, “George Stigler.” In the US, an L.L.D. (Doctor 
of Laws) is awarded as an honorary degree.
34  Th e following two paragraphs draw from Terry Anderson, Th e Movement and 
the Sixties (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), and Marina Fang, “Born Amidst 
’60s Protests, Kalven Report Remains Controversial,” Th e Chicago Maroon, February 21, 
2013. 
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Selective Service requirements to share student transcript information 
with draft  boards (this meant that students with low grades might then 
fi nd themselves reclassifi ed by the draft  board as eligible for military 
service) and the University’s partnership with Continental Illinois Bank 
(which held investments in South Africa). Students held several rallies 
on campus; a group of 400 students staged a sit-in within the adminis-
tration building.
In response to the student protests, University of Chicago president 
George Beadle appointed a group of luminaries to craft  a university 
policy and to carry this out. It met during 1967, and aft er a period of 
study and internal debate produced a fi nal report in June.35 Th at same 
month, members of the Chicago faculty senate unanimously approved 
the principles established in that report.36 George Stigler was a member 
of this group.37
Th e Kalven Report was one of the most famous statements on 
academic freedom produced during that era, and many at the University 
of Chicago still regard it as authoritative.38 In light of this, it is revealing 
that Stigler felt the need to issue a dissenting statement. He took excep-
tion with a passage in the report which allowed that, “in the exceptional 
circumstance,” the university might need to consider the compatibility 
35  University of Chicago Kalven Committee, “Report on the University’s Role and 
Social Action,” University of Chicago Record 1, no. 1 (1967).
36  Richard Shweder has summarized the report as having established two principles. 
Th e fi rst obligated the university to defend the autonomy of its faculty and students “in 
the discovery, improvement, and dissemination of knowledge.” Th e second principle 
was that the university should maintain a position of “institutional neutrality” on 
matters of public import. See Richard Shweder, “Protecting Human Subjects and 
Preserving Academic Freedom: Prospects at the University of Chicago,” American 
Ethnologist 33, no. 4 (2006), 511. 
37  Th e other members were John Hope Franklin, Gwin Kolb, Jacob Getzels, Julian 
Goldsmith, Gilbert White, and Harry Kalven, who would serve as chair of what would 
henceforth be known as the Kalven Committee.
38  In recent years the Kalven Report has been cited in support of divestment from 
companies conducting business with Sudan, in a proposal to change university policy 
towards research on human subjects (Shweder, “Protecting Human Subjects”), and, 
interestingly, in opposition to the establishment of the Milton Friedman Institute. See 
Jamie Kalven, “Unfi nished Business of the Kalven Report,” Th e Chicago Maroon, 
November 28, 2006; Shweder, “Protecting Human Subjects”; Bruce Lincoln, “Address to 
the University Senate,” October 15, 2008. For a discussion of the contretemps over the 
establishment of the Milton Friedman Institute, see Edward Nik-Khah, “Chicago 
Neoliberalism and the Genesis of the Milton Friedman Institute (2006–2009),” in 
Building Chicago Economics, ed. Robert Van Horn, Philip Mirowski, and Tom Stapleford 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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of its business dealings with “paramount social values.” Stigler, in 
dissenting, argued: “Th e university should not use [its] corporate activi-
ties to foster any moral or political values because such use of its facili-
ties will impair its integrity as the home of intellectual freedom.”39
Stigler was coming around to the position that matters had become 
dire. Students’ demands for greater say in administering the university 
had disturbed him. But the decisions of some faculty to support them in 
their demands had shaken him even more. And by now his experience 
had tempered his admiration of the trustees, to say the least: “[T]he 
trustees have been as craven and irresponsible as the faculties. Th e trus-
tees have not led the movement towards the political college or univer-
sity, but they have hastened along in the rearguard—dutifully repenting 
to themselves that academic freedom includes the freedom to abandon 
academic standards and to smash academic windows.”40 Once the great 
hope for the private university, these “top-quality leaders of the market-
place” were now, when they were most needed, missing in action.
By Stigler’s reckoning, even some of his most trusted colleagues had 
abandoned their posts. In 1968, Edward Levi—who participated in the 
Free Market Study and the Antitrust Project, programs of crucial impor-
tance to the development of the Chicago School of Economics and 
Chicago Law and Economics—assumed the presidency of the University 
of Chicago.41 Initially, Stigler’s praise of Levi was extravagant. But Stigler 
quickly became disenchanted:
President Levi has read the trends of our times, and concludes that 
they are irresistible. What then can he do to preserve his beloved 
university? Since he cannot preserve it as a premier intellectual insti-
tution, he will minimize the travail in its accommodation to those 
forces which have brought down Columbia, Harvard, and in fact in 
39  Kalven Committee, “Report.” Stigler’s full statement can be found in a manuscript 
entitled “Th e University in Political and Social Movements,” GSRL Box 22. In 1970, 
when the Kalven Committee was reconvened, Stigler took the opportunity to amplify on 
his dissent: “Disengagement and specialization are a sane man’s—and a sane 
university’s—way of living in an infi nitely complex world.” “Supplementary Statement” 
(to Kalven Committee Report), dated May 1, 1970, GSRL Box 22. 
40  George Stigler, “Do Trustees Have a Place in Education?” GSRL Box 22.
41  On the Free Market Study and Antitrust Project, See Van Horn, “Reinventing 
Monopoly”; Edward Nik-Khah and Robert Van Horn, “Inland Empire: Economics 
Imperialism as an Imperative of Chicago Neoliberalism,” Journal of Economic 
Methodology 19, no. 3 (2012).
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some measure every premier university in our nation . . . Th e alterna-
tive view makes a diff erent reckoning of prospects for one university, 
ours. A few universities can oppose the trends toward making the 
university a social welfare mission operated by a miniature democ-
racy, on this view . . . Th e diffi  culty is that the Levi policy has never 
given this alternative a hearing.42
Th e number of academics whom Stigler trusted to carry forth the 
university’s proper mission was now vanishingly small. In a 1969 letter, 
Stigler admitted, “I am becoming increasingly more critical of present-
day higher education.”43 Students had taken to acting as “barbarians”; 
the president and trustees had fi ddled while Rome burned; and the 
faculty had given the hordes military training. In a paper intended for 
Irving Kristol’s Th e Public Interest, Stigler blamed the behavior of the 
students on the system of higher education: “Th ere are many complaints 
today about our turbulent college students: should they not be directed 
instead at an educational system that off ers so little to the ambitious and 
energetic young?”44 Even aft er the issues of the day had been resolved, 
fundamental problems would remain: “Th e forces politicizing the 
university, and turning it into a sort of faculty-student guild socialism, 
are not going to end the day the last infantryman limps out of Viet 
Nam . . .”45 Th e prospects were dim: “Who will dedicate his life to seek-
ing to reverse the most powerful, most intelligent, most unrelenting, 
most sinuous university president in America—a man who does not 
even lack high purpose?”46 Stigler answered his own question: “I know 
that I shall not.”
Hence, by the time of his 1969 correspondence with Machlup, Stigler 
would not have accepted his argument that an agreement between trus-
tees, regents, administrators, scholars, and teachers would foster intel-
lectual freedom. He would have been skeptical that any one of those 
groups could be trusted to do so.
Stigler began to contemplate radically reorganizing the dissemina-
tion and ratifi cation of knowledge. He came around to Rogge’s position 
42  George Stigler, “Whither Mr. Levi’s University?” GSRL Box 22.
43  Stigler, Letter to Leach, dated May 23, 1969.
44  See George Stigler, “Th e Academic Featherbed,” GSRL Box 22. Kristol rejected 
Stigler’s paper, objecting to its tone.
45  Stigler, “Whither Mr. Levi’s University?”
46  Ibid.
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of supporting professors’ salaries by student fees, but not because he 
now had more confi dence in students’ judgments. If anything, he was 
even more dubious: “Students—even college graduates—are poorly 
informed judges of teachers and universities.”47 Instead, it was because 
he was anxious to spin off  teaching from research. Th is would leave 
most schools in the position of catering entirely to undergraduate 
instruction: “In a few schools the research function is paramount; in 
nearly a thousand others teaching is the dominant or exclusive 
function.”48 Th is was as it should be. Because undergraduate teaching 
distracted from both graduate instruction and research, it would be 
necessary to free elite scientists from such teaching responsibilities. As 
for the lowly undergraduate professors, they would be subject to the 
whims of the market—and possibly eliminated by it: “Instruction by 
direct fore-to-fore methods is an anachronism, left  over from the days 
before books were available. Now the professor is an inspirational guide 
to the literature—a task which requires few class hours—and can 
usefully perform this task at numerous universities simultaneously.”49 
Following Stigler’s blueprint, professors would be uprooted from their 
home universities, forced to bid for teaching space, and hence would 
cobble together a full-time teaching load across institutions. Stigler did 
throw out a suggestion for a nationwide standardized test, to make 
students more serious about “hiring” quality professors, but he did not 
devote a great deal of attention to it: undergraduate instruction was 
mostly a distraction, and so improving it did not concern him.
Recall, he believed in a science advanced by imposing the standards 
of an elite on a profession and, ultimately, a society. But the class was 
small:
Th e faculty of American colleges and universities are composed of 
two classes. One class are the teachers: they engage in little research, 
seldom if ever publish, and spend the overwhelming portion of their 
days on the campus, in the classroom and the committee room. Th ey 
constitute perhaps 96 percent of the faculty members. Th e second 
class is composed of the productive scholars and the academic entre-
preneurs. Th ey receive most of the research money, publish almost all 
47  George Stigler, “Higher and Higher Education,” GSRL Box 22.
48  George Stigler, “Th e Economic Structure of Universities,” GSRL Box 22.
49  George Stigler, “Are Th ere Any Professors Left ?” GSRL Box 22
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the serious research, manage and staff  all the major conferences, and 
hold the offi  ces of the professional societies. Th ey are the other 4 
percent.50
Academic elites needed to be protected from coercion by students, the 
state, and the faculty. Stigler regarded the university as unreliable in 
doing so. Stigler then proceeded to imagine how to leave aside the 
unproductive 96 percent and provide “care and banqueting” for the 
productive 4 percent. He posed the question: “Is the university a sensi-
ble base of operations for the research scholars?”51
Stigler Contra Friedman
On October 20 and 21, 1972, a conference was held at the University of 
Virginia in honor of Milton Friedman’s sixtieth birthday. It coincided 
with the tenth anniversary of the publication of Capitalism and Freedom, 
and so the conference was framed as an exploration of the issues raised 
by that book—of its “Problems and Prospects.” George Stigler took the 
occasion to express his concern about one troubling feature of the work 
of his old friend and close colleague:
As I mentally review Milton’s work, I recall no important occasion on 
which he has told businessmen how to behave  . . . Yet Milton has 
shown no comparable reticence in advising Congress and public on 
monetary policy, tariff s, schooling, minimum wages, the tax benefi ts 
of establishing a ménage without benefi t of clergy, and several other 
subjects  . . . Why should businessmen—and customers and lenders 
and other economic agents—know and foster their own interests, but 
voters and political coalitions be so much in need of his and our lucid 
and enlightened instruction?52
Stigler took exception to what he believed to be the confused image of 
the marketplace for ideas that was implicit in Capitalism and Freedom. 
50  George Stigler, “Th e Care and Banqueting of Scholars,” GSRL Box 22.
51  Ibid.
52  George Stigler, “Th e Intellectual and His Society,” in Capitalism and Freedom: 
Problems and Prospects, ed. Richard Selden (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia 
Press, 1975), 312.
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If Friedman’s popularization of Chicago neoclassical economics in his 
advice to the public was eff ective, this would imply that the public 
“underinvests” in knowledge—a market failure. But if agents maximize 
in collecting information (since his 1961 paper “Th e Economics of 
Information,” Stigler argued that they did), they will already have gath-
ered all the information that it was appropriate for them to have. 
Friedman’s eff orts at popularization would be of no use to them.53 
Worse still, Stigler believed any reference to market failure tended to 
provide intellectual support for objectionable eff orts to expand regula-
tion, and so popularizations of neoliberal views might turn out to be 
politically dangerous.
Stigler posed a provocative question: If markets generally work, 
then why should this not be the case for the marketplace of ideas? 
And if the marketplace of ideas works, then why should the public 
need a Milton Friedman? Or, for that matter, a George Stigler? It was 
a threatening question for an economist, and Stigler knew it. He had 
titled one article “Do Economists Matter?” Within it, Stigler insisted 
that the demand of the community of scholars for science was negli-
gible: “[T]o a scientist educated hands make more melodious applause 
than ignorant hands, but too oft en the educated hands seem to be sat 
upon by educated asses.”54 Th is memorably advanced a point that 
Stigler had made in a number of other published and unpublished 
papers.55
Stigler answered the question affi  rmatively by adopting something 
akin to the commonsense view of science as rational and refl ecting 
nature (or, in this case, society), and expressing it in the language of 
commodity exchange: “A rational society must accept tested scientifi c 
fi ndings because they reveal a portion of the inescapable external world. 
Scientifi c knowledge must be accepted by men of all parties.”56 Science 
53  He later repeated this specifi c criticism: “[Average people] lead useful lives, and 
they buy the amount of economic information that’s appropriate for them to have. And 
they don’t go home every night and say, ‘I wonder what Friedman wrote today that I can 
read.’ ” See Th omas Hazlett, “Interview with George Stigler,” Reason, January 1984.
54  George Stigler, “Do Economists Matter?” Southern Economic Journal 42, no. 3 
(1976), 354.
55  Th e problem was not confi ned to economics: “What would be the use of 
intellectuals—meaning people who strongly prefer talking and writing to physical 
exertion—in a world where men knew their interests and effi  ciently pursued them?” See 
Stigler, Th e Intellectual, 313.
56  Ibid., 316. 
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was a very special kind of commodity, diff ering from other information-
commodities in its eff ects. Science is rational, and so is society (albeit in 
a diff erent way), and therefore a rational society must make use of 
science. Society did need Friedman’s work—not his popularizations, but 
his economic science. It needed his Monetary History of the United 
States, but not his Free to Choose. It needed his scientifi c work, but it did 
not need to agree with it, much less comprehend it.
But “society” doesn’t purchase knowledge. People do, and for specifi c 
purposes. Students decide from which college or university to purchase 
knowledge. Patrons of research do much the same: in an unpublished 
1977 lecture whose title “To What Tune Does Science Dance?” clearly 
echoed Rogge, Stigler observed: “[the] huge area of antitrust & 
I[ndustrial] O[rganization economics] in [the] US [was] generated by 
both public policy and business defenses against it.”57 Stigler was in an 
excellent position to make such an observation. He played an important 
role in developing a distinctive Chicago approach to industrial organi-
zation, and had consulted for fi rms facing antitrust action. Economists 
develop ideas in response to consumer demand for them. In Stigler’s 
words, the economist was a “customer’s man.”
Th e argument led Stigler to state what he himself called a “paradoxi-
cal” conclusion: economists are truly infl uential only when they work 
on technical matters for an audience of technical economists and not 
when they speak directly to society. (Here we encounter yet another 
expression of the belief that the teaching of economics is mostly incon-
sequential.) Only in the former case will economists achieve the funda-
mental eff ect of changing the platform upon which policy debates take 
place, a change due to the special reception given by the public and 
polity to science.58
Stigler believed the university was beset by serious problems. He set 
out to construct an institution exempt from them. He would substitute 
contract research for tenure, thereby providing a director with clear 
lines of control in assigning research tasks to junior economists. Th is 
private research institute would provide “an authoritarian structure 
57  George Stigler, “To What Tune Does Science Dance?” GSRL Box 20. Th e 
economic fi eld of industrial organization had traditionally concerned itself with 
assessing the competitiveness of market structures; work in this fi eld was oft en used in 
adjudicating antitrust cases in the US, and economists, Stigler included, oft en served as 
expert witnesses.
58  Stigler, “Do Economists Matter?” 351.
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which is appropriate for contract research: there is authority over junior 
members (more than in the university) and hence a capacity for main-
taining and discharging promises.”59 To view science as thriving on the 
curiosity of fresh minds called to science as a vocation was for Stigler 
misguided. Junior scholars would provide the “semi-skilled labor of 
research.” Th e best method of producing research would concentrate 
scholars in a setting freed from teaching obligations, removed from the 
inconvenient protection of tenure, and placed under the watchful super-
vision of an “authoritarian” master. In this way, Stigler hoped to impose 
the standards of an elite upon his profession.60
To do so, it would be necessary to fi nd a set of patrons uncontami-
nated by the egalitarian views of the government and the public at large. 
Stigler found them in corporations and pro-market foundations. Such 
patrons had funded the rise of Chicago Law and Economics and the 
development of a Chicago neoliberal version of Industrial Organization. 
Stigler heeded his own advice; so did those in his orbit. Th e topics Stigler 
settled on, studies of the economy and the state, had the virtue of appeal-
ing to a paying clientele. He believed that economists and political 
scientists held unrealistically optimistic views about the ability of 
democracy to address social problems, and that these views tainted their 
studies of democracy and regulation. Stigler held that studies of the 
“capacities of democracy” could counteract prevailing beliefs about the 
way the political system functions, beliefs that supported the expansion 
of what he called “governmental control of economic life.”
Stigler was keen to persuade his newfound patrons that science’s 
eff ects truly were special. In an unpublished 1971 memo proposing a 
privately funded research institute, he insisted: “Th e relevance of this 
work to public policy will be both indirect and decisive . . . It is essen-
tially and exclusively scientifi c work, and is intended to work its eff ects 
upon the appropriate disciplines (economics and political science) 
rather directly than on public opinion. Th e work will oft en shatter the 
fond hopes of the scholarly professions.”61 Stigler argued that using 
59  Stigler, “Th e Care and Banqueting of Scholars.”
60  Hence, I cannot accept Arthur Diamond’s characterization that Stigler harbored 
an “aversion to institutional reform” of science and refused to draw any direct lessons for 
the organization of science. See Arthur Diamond, “Measurement, Incentives, and 
Constraints in Stigler’s Economics of Science,” European Journal of the History of 
Economic Th ought 12, no. 4 (2005), 641–2.
61  George Stigler, “A Research Institute in Economics,” GSRL Box 21.
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science was the best—indeed, the only—way to achieve the infl uence 
that patrons might desire. He proposed using two types of studies to 
deliver this infl uence. Th e fi rst would study the eff ects of past economic 
policies to develop techniques for auditing and guiding, and therefore 
controlling, administrative bodies. Th e second would study and test 
hypotheses on the nature of the political process, for the purpose of 
counteracting the attitudes of political scientists and economists within 
those academic disciplines. Together, these studies would impose the 
standards of an economic elite on the social sciences.
Three Ways to Skin a Cat
By the 1970s, Milton Friedman was surely the most famous US exponent 
of neoliberalism. He popularized Chicago neoliberal analysis, though 
sometimes crudely and ineff ectively, as when he called for eliminating 
regulatory agencies. In urging that there were “several ways to skin even 
a reforming cat,” Stigler hoped to draw his fellow neoliberals’ attention to 
that fact that there were alternative means of advancing neoliberal aims. 
Notwithstanding Friedman’s public claims, it was perfectly possible to do 
so by keeping regulatory agencies in place so long as regulators were 
forced to follow cost-benefi t procedures and neoliberal scholars had 
identifi ed the relevant costs and benefi ts for them:
Th e appraisal of the achievements of a regulatory body is not impos-
sible: a whole series of such appraisals is gradually developing an arse-
nal of techniques for measurement. I may cite . . . a large number of 
economic studies, many of which have appeared in the Journal of Law 
and Economics. It would at least be a minor improvement of our world 
if once a decade each major regulator was reviewed by a committee 
appointed by the appropriate scientifi c body, with funds and subpoena 
powers provided by the OMB.62
Th e Journal of Law and Economics was the house organ for the neoliberal 
law and economics movement. Th e most important use of the arsenal of 
“measurement” techniques was not necessarily to persuade anyone of 
anything—but instead to redirect state policy. No longer would 
62  Stigler, “Th e Confusion of Means and Ends,” 16.
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regulation be conceived as inevitably bad or ineffi  cacious, but instead as 
improvable; econometric method was to be deployed not merely for 
convincing fellow economists, but for eff ecting this improvement. 
Th rough these newly developed neoliberal techniques of auditing, with 
the promise of more to come, Stigler sought to impose the views of an 
economic elite on the social sciences, and ultimately regulators.
In short order, his ideas took root. At the University of Chicago, 
Stigler opened the Center for the Study of the Economy and the 
State, which dedicated itself to pursuing the plan he outlined in his 
1971 memo to achieve “decisive influence” over the conduct of 
government. Outside of Chicago, Stigler, his students, and those in 
their close orbit developed relationships with scientists, resulting in 
a variety of interlinked and coordinated research institutes spanning 
economics, politics, and even the biomedical sciences.63 These efforts 
were significant enough to draw the attention of Michel Foucault 
who, in his Birth of Biopolitics, not only mentions Stigler’s research 
by name, but also singles out the work of the American Enterprise 
Institute’s Center for Health Policy Research as an exemplary instance 
of the “permanent criticism of governmental policy” so characteris-
tic of neoliberalism.64
In the decades following Foucault’s prescient observations, neoliber-
als solidifi ed their connections with scientists. Th ey pioneered argu-
ments that science must endorse the epistemic superiority of the market-
place; if it fails to do so, it is illegitimate. Neoliberals denied that the 
scientifi c community could access knowledge apart from the market-
place. Such eff orts gave rise to what amounted to a third skinning strat-
egy: the science used by regulatory bodies should itself be regulated by 
the marketplace. Neoliberals would now actively encourage the 
commercialization of science; they also begin to engage in direct inter-
vention into the conduct of science itself, thereby introducing multitu-
dinous ways for regulated industries to harness it.65 Machlup’s position 
63  Nik-Khah, “Neoliberal Pharmaceutical Science.”
64  Michel Foucault, Th e Birth of Biopolitics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
246–7. Th e fi rst director of the Center for Health Policy Research was Robert Helms, 
Sam Peltzman’s PhD student at UCLA; its fi rst publication was a book-length treatment 
of Peltzman’s work on pharmaceutical regulation. 
65  Nik-Khah, “Neoliberal Pharmaceutical Science”; Edward Nik-Khah, “Neoliberalism 
on Drugs: Genomics and the Political Economy of Medicine,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Genomics, Health and Society, ed. Sahra Gibbon, Barbara Prainsack, Stephen Hilgartner, 
and Janelle Lamoreaux (New York: Routledge, 2018).
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on academic freedom—both in general, and in the specifi c case of 
drugs—had been thoroughly repudiated.
Well in advance of these developments, Stigler had provided a blue-
print for the emerging epistemic regime. A market-governed science 
should utilize contract research and be conducted outside the structure 
of academic departments, under close supervision of one empowered to 
deliver on promises made to patrons. Th e purpose was not merely to 
produce “more” science, and certainly not to ensure the freedom of the 
individual scientist to pursue independent inquiry. Far from it. Instead, 
it was to free elite scientists from the need to satisfy their students and 
fellow faculty. If it worked to plan, it would free them from the need to 
persuade most anyone of anything. Anyone, that is, apart from their 
patrons, who demanded they produce the “right” kind of knowledge, 
and justifi ably so. Stigler’s vision, although ahead of its time, anticipated 
the private funding of economics imperialism and neoliberal govern-
mentality that has transformed the academy and science in the four 
decades since.
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The Law of the Sea of Ignorance: 
F. A. Hayek, Fritz Machlup, and 
other Neoliberals Confront the 
Intellectual Property Problem
Quinn Slobodian
Neoliberalism is oft en presented as a set of solutions: a ten-point plan to 
destroy solidarity and the welfare state. John Williamson’s Washington 
Consensus is the most famous example with its edicts to privatize, liber-
alize, and deregulate. Neoliberals are oft en said to off er a laundry list, a 
recipe book, a panacea and a one-size-fi ts-all rostrum. Such totalizing 
and apparently fi nal descriptions have accorded well with the subjective 
sense of many on the left  in Europe and the US from the 1990s onward 
that we are eff ectively “post-democracy.”1 Governments are now left  
“ruling the void,” where an impotent Staatsvolk is left  open to the vagar-
ies of a Marktvolk comprising the transnational investor class.2 
Neoliberals have imposed a “worldwide institutional grid that off ers 
transnational capital multiple exit options” and “locks in” a “market-
disciplinary agenda.”3
Resistance, it seems, might be futile. Wendy Brown, an important 
tone-setter for the discussion, wrote an article in 2003 titled “neoliberal-
ism and the end of liberal democracy.”4 Th e last section of her 2015 
1  Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (London: Polity, 2004).
2  Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: Th e Hollowing of Western Democracy (New York: 
Verso, 2013). For the latter description see Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: Th e Delayed 
Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (New York: Verso, 2014).
3  Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Th eodore, “New Constitutionalism and 
Variegated Neo-Liberalization,” in New Constitutionalism and World Order, ed. Stephen 
Gill and A. Claire Cutler (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 127, 29.
4  Wendy Brown, “Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Th eory & 
Event 7, no. 1 (2003).
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book on “neoliberalism’s stealth revolution” was titled simply “despair.”5 
Examples from the right would be equally easy to fi nd with the senti-
ment that the rule of the “globalists” and an international elite have left  
nations powerless and stripped of their strength. Th e Alt Right itself, 
despite the large number of libertarians in its ranks, has taken up the 
claim of being critics of neoliberalism in a racist register.6
Like other authors in this volume, I suggest that we might better 
understand neoliberalism not as a collection of foregone conclusions 
and formulae, let alone as the fi nal chapter in human history, but as a set 
of open-ended problems and questions. Among the unresolved ques-
tions faced by neoliberals are those of culture (are all populations equally 
capable of rational market activity?), of design (can institutions and laws 
be made or must they grow?), of legitimacy (how can markets survive 
despite their frequent cruelty?), of leadership (can judges, autocrats, 
central bankers, or businesspeople off er reliable guardians of order?), 
and of democracy (can it be contained and directed or must it be 
escaped?). While the fi nal goal of creating a competitive order immu-
nized from popular demands for social justice remains constant over 
time, neoliberal strategies for arriving at the goal change considerably. A 
historical approach is necessary to avoid misidentifying the object of 
critique.
Th is chapter concentrates on one of the best examples of a neoliberal 
problem—that of intellectual property (IP). Since the 1980s, IP rights 
have moved from the periphery to the center of confl icts over the shape 
and future of the world economy. Th e shift  of the US economy’s compet-
itive edge from manufacturing to entertainment, apparel, pharmaceuti-
cals, and information technology has led policy-makers and corporate 
interests to seek globally enforceable protection of the oft en intangible 
and easily reproducible recipes for drugs or sequences of bits that 
become movies or soft ware as well as trademarks, designs, circuit board 
layouts, and other lucrative pieces of information. Th e last change of the 
thirty companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Index refl ects the ongoing 
shift  in the US economy as the aluminum company Alcoa and telecom 
giant AT&T made way for Apple and Nike in 2015.
5  Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: 
Zone Books, 2015), 220.
6  See, e.g. Ahab, “Neoliberalism Is Hell-Bent on Destroying the White World,” 
Altright.com (May 29, 2017).
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In an epochal transformation occurring within the last generation, IP 
rights have become binding international economic law with the passage 
of the Agreement on Trade-Related International Property Rights 
(TRIPS) as part of the WTO Agreement signed in 1994 and coming into 
force the following year. IP rights have been extremely controversial, 
especially around the issues of patenting lifeforms, the prohibitive pric-
ing of potentially life-saving drugs in the Global South, and, less existen-
tially, infringements on cultural and intellectual liberty represented by 
prohibitions on sharing, adapting, and “remixing” data of text, music, 
images, and code.
Aggressive IP rights are oft en assumed to be one feature of the global 
neoliberal regime snapping into place since the 1970s. According to the 
dominant reading, because property rights are central to neoliberalism, 
then IP rights must be too. Yet, as this chapter shows, neoliberals them-
selves have been far from unanimous on the question of when, how, and 
even if ideas can be treated as property. If neoliberalism is synonymous 
with hardline intellectual property rights, what to make of the signa-
tures of MPS members Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, and Ronald 
Coase on a friend-of-the-court brief opposing the Copyright Extension 
Act of 1998? How to explain the fact that Richard Posner, the leading 
fi gure of the Law and Economics movement and a member of the Mont 
Pèlerin Society, has not only suggested that there are “too many patents 
in America” but cites Hayek in his authoritative work on IP law to the 
eff ect that “a slavish application of the concept of property as it has been 
developed for material things has done a great deal to foster the growth 
of monopoly and . . . here drastic reforms may be required if competi-
tion is to be made to work”?7 Th e text is not marginal—it comes from 
one of Hayek’s addresses at the founding MPS meeting in 1947.8
Neoliberals were—and are—far from IP fundamentalists in the sense 
of propagating a refl exive extension of property rights in perpetuity to 
intangible entities. Th e overarching goal of securing a capitalist compet-
itive order has sometimes led them to support property rights in ideas 
and sometimes to oppose them. While a host of Chicago School 
7  Richard A. Posner, “Why Th ere Are Too Many Patents in America,” Th e Atlantic 
(July 12, 2012); Hayek quoted in William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Th e 
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 415. 
8  F. A. Hayek, “ ‘Free’ Enterprise and Competitive Order (1947),” in Individualism 
and Economic Order, ed. F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 107.
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economists and MPS members including Harold Demsetz, Steven 
Cheung, and Richard A. Epstein were indeed key fi gures in shift ing the 
US legal consensus away from antitrust since the 1980s, not all neoliber-
als took the “shift  on patents” tracked by scholars.9 As alternatives, this 
chapter looks at the heterodox Austrian approaches of Hayek and his 
contemporary Fritz Machlup, coiner of both the terms “knowledge 
economy” and “production of knowledge” and an understudied member 
of the Mont Pèlerin cohort.
Th rough the case of IP, this chapter also makes three methodological 
points for the study of neoliberalism writ large. First, scholars need to 
diff erentiate more systematically between the utterances of those indi-
viduals defi ned as neoliberals and the developments in global capitalism 
since the 1970s as a whole. Second, even the rough heuristic of defi ning 
neoliberal status through affi  liation with the MPS does not allow for 
generalizing statements about anything resembling a neoliberal party 
line. Th e case of IP shows diversity within the MPS cohort and, thus, 
within neoliberal thought itself. Last, appreciating the heterogeneity of 
neoliberal thought encourages us to revisit the so-called political power 
of economic ideas.10 If what scholars call “neoliberalization” is clearly 
not “a unidirectional process of enacting a master plan cooked up by 
Hayek and friends at their mountain resort in Mont Pèlerin,” we must 
ask which ideas eventually become policy and why.11 Th e case of IP 
suggests that it is those neoliberal ideas most compatible with corporate 
interests that have been transmuted into law. Neoliberal theory is an 
intellectual reservoir drawn on selectively rather than as a readymade 
blueprint for later realization.
9  Robert Van Horn and Matthias Klaes, “Intervening in Laissez-Faire Liberalism: 
Chicago’s Shift  on Patents,” in Building Chicago Economics: New Perspectives on the 
History of America’s Most Powerful Economics Program, ed. Robert Van Horn, Philip 
Mirowski, and Th omas A. Stapleford (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
See also William Davies, “Economics and the ‘Nonsense’ of the Law: Th e Case of the 
Chicago Antitrust Revolution,” Economy and Society 39, no. 1 (2010): 64–83; Robert 
Pitofsky, ed., How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: Th e Eff ect of Conservative 
Economic Analysis on US Antitrust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
10  Peter A. Hall, ed., Th e Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
11  Jamie Peck, “Explaining (with) Neoliberalism,” Territory, Politics, Governance 1, 
no. 2 (2013): 145.
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F. A. Hayek and the Knowledge Problem
To understand why intellectual property is such a confounding problem 
within neoliberal theory, it helps to revisit Hayek’s idea of what an econ-
omy is and the centrality of what has been called the knowledge prob-
lem.12 As many have pointed out, Hayek rethought the problem of capi-
talism from one of labor, commodities, or even value, to one of 
knowledge and information.13 Th e world’s knowledge was strewn across 
the globe’s diverse populations and individual actors. In Hayek’s retell-
ing, the story of capitalism becomes one of how this so-called distrib-
uted knowledge was recombined in ways productive for the human 
race’s survival, propagation and ongoing expansion on the planet. As 
Hayek wrote in 1973,
Economics has long stressed the ‘division of labor’ . . . But it has laid 
much less stress on the fragmentation of knowledge, on the fact that 
each member of society can have only a small fraction of the knowl-
edge possessed by all, and that each is therefore ignorant of most of 
the facts on which the working of society rests. Yet it is the utilization 
of much more knowledge than anyone can possess . . . that constitutes 
the distinctive feature of all advanced civilizations.14
To bring home the link between tacit knowledge and productive action, 
Hayek quoted the Enlightenment philosopher Giambattista Vico to the 
eff ect that “man unknowingly makes all things.”
Following his mentor Ludwig von Mises’s idea of the “division of 
knowledge,” Hayek’s narrative of civilization was one of innovating new 
means for putting the knowledge of person A into productive contact 
with persons B through Z and from person B to persons A through Z and 
12  See Lynne Kiesling, “Th e Knowledge Problem,” in Th e Oxford Handbook of 
Austrian Economics, ed. Peter J. Boettke and Christopher J. Coyne (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). Don Lavoie, “Th e Market as a Procedure for Discovery and 
Conveyance of Inarticulate Knowledge,” Comparative Economic Studies 28 (Spring 
1986).
13  See Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah, Th e Knowledge We Have Lost in 
Information: Th e History of Information in Modern Economics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017).
14  F. A. Hayek, Rules and Order: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice 
and Political Economy, vol. 1, Law, Legislation, and Liberty (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1973), 14.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   74 10/03/2020   13:59:56
The Law of the Sea of Ignorance 75
so on in an endless, unmappable, and indeed unrepresentable series of 
branching, splitting and star-bursting nodes and networks. Philip 
Mirowski has insisted correctly that Hayek saw the market as a “uniquely 
omnipotent information processor”—but even this metaphor is too 
concrete, conjuring up the image of an actual piece of hardware as it 
does—a supercomputer that one can look at.15 Hayek’s metaphors are 
more evanescent. Th e example he uses are the reconfi guration of neurons 
in the brain or a system of leaky tubes set into a pliable material so that 
pressure from the tubes creates new channels and rivulets in a constantly 
shift ing and undulating arrangement. Th is vision of the economy diff ered 
starkly from that of Keynesianism visualized in the MONIAC machine 
designed by the economist Arthur Philips in 1949 to portray the econ-
omy as a self-contained hydraulic system of neat reservoirs and volumes 
responsive to the fi ne-tuning of the enlightened policy-maker.
In the Keynesian vision, the national economy is contained and 
money moves through it in broadly predictable and indeed plannable 
ways. Hayek conceded that his own vision of tubes failed for being too 
mechanical: it is not one substance that moves through neutral channels 
but energy, or knowledge, which is released in neurons at every node of 
connection, or the unlocking of the local knowledge of the “man on the 
spot” about conditions that perhaps even he could not put into words. 
Among his favored metaphors were the crystals formed inside of a petri 
dish or the constellations of iron fi lings responding to a magnet. As he 
wrote, such “physical examples of spontaneous orders . . . are instructive 
because they show that the rules which the elements follow need of 
course not be ‘known’ to them.” In the same way, “man does not know 
most of the rules on which he acts; and even what we call his intelligence 
is largely a system of rules which operate on him but which he does not 
know.”16
Th e error that Hayek spent his life diagnosing and denouncing was 
what he called “the synoptic delusion,” the belief that humans could gain 
an overview of the economy adequate to plan it eff ectively. Th e means to 
solve the resultant calculation or coordination problem was the combi-
nation of laws and prices. Private property rights here were key. Th rough 
15  Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism 
Survived the Financial Meltdown (New York: Verso, 2013), 141.
16  F. A. Hayek, “Kinds of Order in Society,” New Individualist Review 3, no. 2 (1964): 
461.
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what he calls the institutions of meum and teum, mine and yours, 
combined with the free movement of prices, packets of knowledge 
would fi nd their way to the most productive users. What he calls the 
“constitutional ignorance” of humans meant that we could only surren-
der the task to the market. Given an adequate legal framework, we could 
let the market eff ectively think for us.
While some scholars sympathetic to Hayek have celebrated the subtle 
and even mystical quality of these insights, others have condemned 
their implicit “agnotology” or reliance on a benighted and uneducated 
set of consumers and producers.17 What neither side has delved into, 
however, is the delicacy of the question of intellectual property within 
Hayek’s framework. If the economy is knowledge before it is property, 
then the question of how much of that knowledge should be made into 
property is of critical importance. Private property is not an end in itself. 
Hayek’s was not an argument based on natural law or Lockean just 
desert for labor spent. Private property was a means not an end—a 
means to coordinate dispersed knowledge in conjunction with contracts 
and the price mechanism.
It follows from a commonsense understanding of neoliberalism that 
state ownership of property would be ineffi  cient, but it is also true from 
within neoliberal thought that if you privatize too much or incorrectly, 
knowledge could also be misallocated, blocked, or left  stagnant. MPS 
president and Bank of Sweden Prize winner James M. Buchanan 
suggested that expansion of patents on basic scientifi c research, for 
example, could lead to a “tragedy of the anti-commons”—where too 
many competing property claims impeded effi  ciency and innovation.18 
As scholars point out, there is the danger, even from a utility-
maximizing perspective, of “too much property.”19
Hayek’s own position shift ed little over the decades. In Th e Road to 
Serfdom, he suggested that patent law had been one of the measures that 
17  Philip Mirowski, Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), chapter 7.
18  James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, “Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and 
Anticommons,” Journal of Law and Economics 43 (April 2000). Th is idea was also cited 
in the friend-of-the-court brief mentioned above. See George A. Akerlof et al., “Th e 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998: An Economic Analysis” (May 2002): 13, 
available at brookings.edu.
19  Lawrence Becker quoted in Robert P. Merges, “One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000,” California Law Review 88, no. 6 (December 
2000): 2240.
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had “led to the destruction of competition in many spheres,” and he 
repeated the statement almost verbatim twenty-fi ve years later.20 IP law 
was a specifi c case because of its potential to block the fl ow of knowl-
edge. As Hayek wrote in 1960, “Knowledge, once achieved, becomes 
gratuitously available for the benefi t of all. It is through this free gift  of 
the knowledge acquired by the experiments of some members of society 
that general progress is made possible, that the achievements of those 
who have gone before facilitate the advance of those who follow.”21 
Obstructing the dissemination of knowledge threatened the very mech-
anism of advancing civilization itself. For Hayek, patents and copyrights 
could be a particularly pernicious form of legally sanctioned monopoly. 
His skepticism towards IP in the 1940s refl ected a consensus both within 
early neoliberal circles and indeed in the larger economic discourse and 
even the US Supreme Court in the “antitrust moment” from the New 
Deal to the 1950s.22 Yet, it is striking that, even within this overall 
climate, some of the arguments against strong IP rights that continue to 
be cited by scholars come from early neoliberals and MPS members.
Th e fi rst of these is Arnold Plant, Hayek’s close friend and colleague 
and a founding member of the MPS.23 Plant, who began his career at 
the University of Cape Town (alongside later MPS member William H. 
Hutt from 1928) before moving to the LSE in 1930, later credited conver-
sations with Hayek for infl uencing his own theories of intellectual prop-
erty law.24 Lionel Robbins, a colleague of Plant and Hayek at the LSE, 
off ered the most lasting twentieth-century defi nition of economics in 
20  F. A. Hayek, Th e Road to Serfdom (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1944), 39; 
“Liberalism (1973),” in Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the 
History of Ideas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
21  F. A. Hayek, Th e Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011 [1960]), 97.
22  Horn and Klaes, “Intervening,” 184.
23  On Plant as one of Hayek’s “closest friends” see Stephen Kresge and Leif Wenar, 
eds, Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue (London: Routledge, 1994), 68. 
Although Plant did not attend the early MPS meetings, Hayek remained in contact with 
him and invited him unsuccessfully to speak on the topics of development policy and 
property in the early 1950s. Hayek, Letter to Plant, dated April 1, 1951. Hayek, Letter to 
Plant, dated April 4, 1954. Both in Stanford University, Hoover Institution Archives, 
Hayek Papers (hereaft er Hayek Papers), Box 78, Folder 33. Plant left  the MPS with 
Robbins in the 1950s. Philip Plickert, Wandlungen des Neoliberalismus. Eine Studie zu 
Entwicklung und Ausstrahlung der ‘Mont Pèlerin Society’ (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 
2008), 166.
24  Quoted in John Gray, Hayek on Liberty (New York: Routledge, 1984), 168.
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1932 when he said that it was “the science which studies human behav-
iour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alter-
native uses.” An idea, once thought, or knowledge once discovered, was 
no longer scarce. In two articles on copyrights and patents from 1934, 
Plant made what has now become a standard argument that ideas are 
not like other property. Rather, they are non-rivalrous and non-
excludable. As he pointed out, property rights in ideas created scarcity 
artifi cially through statute law and thus resembled monopolies.25 
Present-day libertarians continue to appeal to Plant to criticize IP 
rights.26 MPS members William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner begin 
their authoritative economic analysis of IP rights with reference to his 
“pathbreaking” work.27
Another of the most strident critics of patents was MPS member, 
chemist, and Karl’s brother, Michael Polanyi (on Polanyi see Beddellem’s 
contribution to this volume). He wrote in 1944 that patent law
tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into a series of distinct 
claims, each of which is to constitute the basis of a separately owned 
monopoly. But the growth of human knowledge cannot be divided up 
into such sharply circumscribed phases . . . Mental progress interacts 
at every stage with the whole network of human knowledge and draws 
at every moment on the most varied and dispersed stimuli. Invention 
is a drama enacted on a crowded stage.28
Polanyi’s suggestions went beyond compulsory licensing for new prod-
ucts and towards the socialization of all research—a direction conso-
nant with his own openness to social democratic planning that led to 
Wilhelm Röpke’s later call for his expulsion from the MPS.29
25  Keith Tribe, “Liberalism and Neoliberalism in Britain, 1930–1980,” in Th e Road 
from Mont Pèlerin, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 80.
26  Aaron Steelman, “Intellectual Property,” in Th e Encyclopedia of Libertarianism, 
ed. Ronald Hamoy (London: Sage, 2008), 250.
27  Landes and Posner, Th e Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, 2.
28  Quoted in Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System (Washington, 
DC: United States Government Printing Offi  ce, 1958), 103–4. For the original see 
Michael Polanyi, “Patent Reform,” Th e Review of Economic Studies 11, no. 2 (1944).
29  Adrian Johns, “Intellectual Property and the Nature of Science,” Cultural Studies 
20, nos. 2–3 (March/May 2006): 153; Victor L. Shammas, “Burying Mont Pèlerin: Milton 
Friedman and Neoliberal Vanguardism,” Constellations 25, no. 1 (2018).
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Th e ideas of Plant and Polanyi were echoed in the work of neoliberals 
from the 1930s to the 1950s. As cited by Landes and Posner, Hayek 
singled out patents at the fi rst meeting of the MPS as a case where state 
intervention was needed to encourage competition.30 Here he followed 
the leaders of the Freiburg School of ordoliberalism, Walter Eucken and 
Alexander Rüstow, who held a similar position on patents.31 In a book 
from 1942, Röpke cited Plant to write that “the modern patent system 
has developed into a weapon of the big against the small.”32 Like many 
aft er him, he advocated a shortened patent protection and compulsory 
licensing “which would permit everyone to make free use of the inven-
tion on payment of a fee.” Th e assumption that neoliberals were skeptics 
of IP was widespread from the 1940s to the 1960s. In 1952, later MPS 
president Herbert Giersch described “transformation of association and 
patent law” as one of the “instruments of competition policy  . . . 
discussed in neoliberal circles.”33 An American article on “German 
neoliberalism” from 1960 identifi ed patent-law reform as one of the 
pillars of their anti-monopolism, including shortening patent protec-
tion, preventing misuse of patent law, and generally including it as part 
of their anti-monopoly vision.34
Fritz Machlup and the Invention of the Knowledge Economy
Perhaps the most infl uential critic of IP from the neoliberal world—and 
one who did not take the later turn on patents that Chicago School 
economists did—was the Austrian economist Fritz Machlup, a fellow 
member of Mises’s seminar with Hayek in 1920s Vienna and also a 
founding member of the MPS. Born in 1902, Machlup emigrated to the 
US in the 1930s and taught at the University of Buff alo, Johns Hopkins 
University, Princeton University, and New York University before his 
death in 1983. Beginning in 1950, Machlup wrote sympathetically with 
30  Hayek, “ ‘Free’ Enterprise and Competitive Order,” 113.
31  Th e core of the proposal was compulsory licensing. See Hans Otto Lenel, 
“Alexander Rüstows Wirtschaft s- Und Sozialpolitische Konzeption,” Ordo 37 (1986): 50.
32  Wilhelm Röpke, Th e Social Crisis of Our Time (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1950), 250.
33  Herbert Giersch, “Das Beste aus beiden Welten: Planung und Preismechanismus,” 
Weltwirtschaft liches Archiv, no. 69 (1952): 227.
34  Henry M. Oliver Jr., “German Neoliberalism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 74, 
no. 1 (February 1960): 142.
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his student, the economist Edith Penrose, about the tradition of what he 
called “patent abolitionism” among free trade liberals in the nineteenth 
century.35 By harking back to this earlier period of anti-patent activism, 
Machlup found forebears for his own skepticism towards arguments 
about the need for patents related to natural law ideas of property as well 
as incentivizing invention and disclosure.
In 1958, Machlup spoke before a US congressional subcommittee 
considering the question of what was then called “industrial property” 
as oft en as intellectual property. In calling patents into question, he 
cited MPS neoliberals from Mises and Hayek to Plant and Robbins. A 
striking absence in his discussion was the notion that property rights 
could apply in a commonsense way to ideas as they did to things. As 
he wrote in 1962, “If a public or social good is defi ned as one that can 
be used by additional persons without causing any additional cost, 
then knowledge is such a good of the purest type. To seek knowledge, 
to create, acquire, transmit, or retrieve knowledge—all these activities 
are ordinarily associated with eff ort or sacrifi ce of some sort; that is, 
they are not without cost. To use existing knowledge, however, may be 
costless.”36 Machlup’s appearance before Congress led to a fi ght with 
fellow MPS member John Van Sickle for what was interpreted as his 
call to eliminate patents altogether.37 Although this misrepresents 
Machlup’s view, he did demand the shortening of patent protection as 
well as schemes for compulsory licensing. Th e guiding belief was that 
economic actors did not have to be incentivized to innovate as compe-
tition would do the incentivizing for them. Keeping or gaining the 
lead in a crowded fi eld would compel companies onward to fund 
research and development. In the case of patents, it was weaker rather 
than stronger property rights that would serve the higher interests of 
the competitive order.
From 1958 to 1968, Machlup received nearly $400,000 in funding 
(nearly $3 million in 2017 values) from a series of foundations including 
the National Science Foundation to investigate the question of technology, 
35  Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, “Th e Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Th e Journal of Economic History 10, no. 1 (1950).
36  Fritz Machlup, Th e Economics of Information and Human Capital, vol. 3, 
Knowledge, Its Creation, Distribution, and Economic Signifi cance (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 159.
37  Albert Hunold, Letter to Wilhelm Röpke, March 5, 1962. Röpke Archive, File 
238.
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including patent protection, and copyrights.38 Th e gist of the research was 
skeptical about IP rights. Among the project’s products was a talk by 
German economics student Gerhard Prosi at the Caracas, Venezuela, 
regional meeting of the MPS in 1969 on “patents and copyrights as obsta-
cles to development.” Prosi argued forthrightly that “no economic justifi ca-
tion for the protection of foreign inventions in developing countries can be 
derived from traditional theories.”39 Machlup has remained an inspiration 
to later critics. Th e most radical opponents of IP in recent years, the econo-
mists Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, frame their book as a long 
dialogue with the Austrian neoliberal.40
While his work on patents was infl uential, Machlup’s place alongside 
Hayek as the leading thinker on the knowledge question in neoliberal 
circles was cemented, above all, with his 1962 book on Th e Production 
and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States, where he popular-
ized the terms “production of knowledge,” “the knowledge economy,” 
and “the knowledge industry” and introduced a means of quantifying 
knowledge that is used by the OECD up until the present.41 Machlup’s 
framework reimagined the economy as a whole, attempting to displace 
the idea of a three-sector economy—of raw materials, manufacturing, 
and services—developed in the 1930s, for one with only two sectors: 
knowledge-producing and non-knowledge producing.42 In the process 
he came to the startling conclusion that 29 percent of the US GNP sat in 
the knowledge industry. Machlup was a pioneer of the epistemic shift , 
which would follow structural change, from a focus in the US on manu-
facturing objects to manufacturing—and collecting rent on—ideas.
38  See Folder 4702, Box, 550, ser. 200, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation records, 
Rockefeller Archive Center.
39  Gerhard Prosi, “Patents and Copy-Right as Obstacles to Development,” Caracas 
Conference, 1969, Hayek Papers, Box 86, Folder 4.
40  Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 243.
41  Fritz Machlup, Th e Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Dominique Foray, Economics of 
Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 25. For a thorough analysis see Benoît 
Godin, “Th e Knowledge Economy: Fritz Machlup’s Construction of a Synthetic 
Concept,” Project on the History and Sociology of S&T Statistics Working Paper, no. 37 
(2008).
42  On the intellectual origins of the “three-sector” model see Rüdiger Graf and Kim 
Christian Priemel, “Zeitgeschichte in der Welt der Sozialwissenschaft en. Legitimitä t 
und Originalitä t einer Disziplin,” Vierteljahrsheft e für Zeitgeschichte 59, no. 4 (October 
2011): 497–9.
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Although the terms “knowledge worker” and the “production of 
knowledge” are now standbys of left -leaning academics, the fi rst 
response from the left  to Machlup’s terminology was revolt. When 
University of California president Clark Kerr used Machlup’s terms, he 
created some of the fi rst sparks to the fi re of the Berkeley Free Speech 
Movement as young students protested against what they misheard as 
the “knowledge factory” and its apparent reduction of learning to 
economic incentives and standardizing conformity.43 Machlup insisted 
in response that he meant the analogy not as a pejorative “in any sense 
demeaning intellectual and humanistic knowledge” but as praise.44
Daniel Bell noted later that Machlup’s fi gure of nearly 30 percent of 
GNP was extremely high.45 How did he arrive at this fi gure? We can see 
some of the specifi cally “Austrian” features of his framework through closer 
examination. Machlup began by measuring what he called the “stocks of 
knowledge.” He attempted to tabulate what he called a “universal library” 
of all books and scientifi c journals ever published before conceding that, in 
fact, “ ‘living knowledge,’ or what living people know, may be the relevant 
stock of knowledge in society.”46 Before despairing at how one might meas-
ure this reservoir, he determined that it made more sense to measure 
instead “fl ows of information.” Because the fi nal reference point was GNP, 
these fl ows would include everything that was priced.
In measuring the fl ows of information, Machlup’s emphasis was not 
on invention or the creation of new knowledge but on the communica-
tion of existing knowledge. As he put it, “the ‘knowledge-producing’ 
occupations include all workers engaged in communication or in any 
other kind of endeavor related to knowledge transmission: analyzers, 
interpreters, processors, transformers and transporters of knowledge, as 
well as original creators.”47 In this sense, apparent craft speople like 
43  Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole 
Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), 12; Clark Kerr, Th e Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of 
California, 1949–1967, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 153.
44  Fritz Machlup, Knowledge and Knowledge Production, vol. 1, Knowledge, Its 
Creation, Distribution, and Economic Signifi cance (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), xxiv.
45  Daniel Bell, Th e Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973), 212.
46  Machlup, Knowledge and Knowledge Production, 1, 162–7.
47  Fritz Machlup and Trude Kronwinkler, “Workers Who Produce Knowledge: A 
Steady Increase, 1900 to 1970,” Weltwirtschaft liches Archiv 111, no. 4 (1975): 756.
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lithographers and typesetters were “knowledge producers” or, as he 
called them elsewhere, “brain workers.” In Machlup’s model, new knowl-
edge is appended almost as an aft erthought. Th e emphasis is on the 
extension of the network or the system of knowledge transmission 
rather than the conditions for knowledge creation. His resistance to 
strong IP laws becomes legible in this light. Th e point was not to protect 
knowledge for its initial producer but to expand its use and circulation 
in the aggregate.
Machlup’s approach was consistent with his background in Austrian 
marginalism, where the focus is not on the worker supposedly produc-
ing value by her labor but on the price-setters and price-takers, that is 
the entrepreneurs and the consumers. Machlup’s “knowledge industry” 
dissolved work into a form of exchange. It moved from a labor theory of 
value to a knowledge theory of labor. Th e Machlup model of the knowl-
edge economy displaced the laboring body and dissolved economics 
into information. He off ered a vision of the economy as a fl at network, 
where work was synonymous with communication.
Hayek cited Machlup on patents and copyrights until his fi nal book 
published in 1988, and Machlup cited Hayek on knowledge in his three 
volumes of a planned ten-volume “Knowledge Project” cut short by his 
death in 1983.48 Th ese two leading neoliberals were united by a skepti-
cal attitude towards intellectual property premised fi rst on their faith in 
competition and suspicion of monopoly and second on their epistemo-
logical belief in distributed knowledge composed of both “known 
knowns” and “unknown knowns,” or to use Michael Polanyi’s category, 
tacit knowledge.49 Because of the importance of the latter, IP becomes 
relatively less important as the use of knowledge always relies on a 
certain locally embedded set of understandings and inherited practices 
to be made operational. Th e benefi ts of free knowledge-fl ow generally 
outweighed the supposedly incentivizing traits of IP rights.
Hayek and Machlup represent a tradition of IP critique within neolib-
eral theory. Th e tension was never resolved. As economist and MPS 
member Peter Lewin puts it, “the status of IP in an Austrian worldview is 
48  Richard N. Langlois, “From the Knowledge of Economics to the Economics of 
Knowledge: Fritz Machlup on Methodology and on the ‘Knowledge Society’,” Research 
in the History of Economic Th ought and Methodology 3 (1985).
49  Michael Polanyi, Th e Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009).
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not unambiguous. It is a diffi  cult question.”50 Hayek and Machlup’s skepti-
cism was seconded by other thinkers in the self-described libertarian tradi-
tion, who question the capacity of state actors to make effi  cient allotments 
of monopoly—leading, as it oft en does, to outright rent-seeking—and who 
sometimes object to IP rights by doubling down on property rights. 
Libertarian economist Stephen Kinsella argues, for example, that if some-
one owns a piece of soft ware, they should be able to distribute and copy it 
to whoever they want.51 To stop them would infringe on their own prop-
erty rights in the object purchased. Yet even Ayn Rand, who appeared to 
take a fundamentalist position on IP rights as “a man’s right to the product 
of his mind,” nonetheless conceded the need for time limits on patent and 
copyright protection to prevent “parasitism.”52 Th e Cato Institute’s sugges-
tions to Congress in the early 2000s recommend “balancing artistic and 
entrepreneurial incentives to create with the interests of the larger commu-
nity of users in an unhindered exchange of ideas and products.”53
Th e choice of most neoliberals, especially within the Law and 
Economics tradition, has been to take a “consequentialist” rather than 
an “axiomatic” position, working from a pragmatic evaluation of 
outcomes rather than infl exible fi rst principles.54 Led by Posner, these 
economists use both modeling and historical observation to advocate 
policy based on the conclusion that well-designed patent rights incen-
tivize innovation. Th is is also the stance taken by latter-day ordoliberals, 
including the former director of the Kiel Institute, Horst Siebert, and in 
the pages of Ordo journal, founded by the IP-skeptical Walter Eucken.55
50  Peter Lewin, “Review: Dina Kallay, the Law and Economics of Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property,” Review of Austrian Economics 18, nos. 3/4 (2005): 344.
51  See, e.g., Boudewijn Bouckaert, “What Is Property?” Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 13 (1990). N. Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property (Auburn: 
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008).
52  Ayn Rand, Capitalism: Th e Unknown Ideal (New York: Signet, 1967), 130–1.
53  Cato Institute, Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 
108th Congress (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2003), 411.
54  Peter Lewin, “Creativity or Coercion: Alternative Perspectives on Rights to 
Intellectual Property,” Journal of Business Ethics 71 (2007). See Landes and Posner, Th e 
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law.
55  Horst Siebert, Th e World Economy: A Global Analysis, 3rd edition (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 259. For a distortion of Hayek’s own take on IP see Gerard Radnitzky, 
“An Economic Th eory of the Rise of Civilization and Its Policy Implications: Hayek’s 
Account Generalized,” Ordo 38 (1987): 59. Th omas Oppermann and Jutta Baumann, 
“Handelsbezogener Schutz geistigen Eigentums (‘TRIPS’) im GATT: Ein neues Stück 
Weltmarktwirtschaft  durch die GATT-Uruguay-Runde?” Ordo 44 (1993): 134.
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Th e neoliberal discourse on IP is nonetheless contextual and inter-
nally heterogeneous. Even the consensus around the so-called Posnerian 
utilitarian position is not absolute.56 As mentioned above, Posner 
himself has argued that there might be too many patents in America. 
Th e writings of one-time MPS member Douglass C. North, winner of 
the Bank of Sweden Nobel Memorial Prize in 1993, off ers a further 
example. While North argued himself for the centrality of patents to 
innovation, he also suggested that the system that had developed in the 
US failed to provide adequate incentives.57 In 2009, he argued that “most 
of what patents and copyrights are about is the protection of monopo-
lies, not the encouragement of more rapid development.”58 Referring to 
Hayek on the importance of cognitive psychology, he also put the edict 
of fl exible adaptation programmatically: “Th e world is evolving. What 
made sense and structured the game yesterday does not necessarily 
work today and tomorrow.”59
We are far from the one-size-fi ts-all recipe that neoliberals are oft en 
accused of wielding. One need look no further than Hayek’s fi rst MPS 
speech when he said that “Patents, in particular, are specially interesting 
from our point of view because they provide so clear an illustration of 
how it is necessary in all such instances not to apply a ready-made 
formula but to go back to the rationale of the market system and to 
decide for each class what the precise rights are to be which the govern-
ment ought to protect.”60 One thinks here also of Milton Friedman’s 
description of economics as “a body of tentatively accepted generaliza-
tions” rather than ironclad laws of nature (and the neoliberal rejection 
of naturalism described in Beddeleem’s contribution to this volume).61 
By this understanding, the attitude of the neoliberal intellectual is not 
56  For a critique of Posner from a Hayekian perspective by current MPS member, 
senior fellow at Cato and vice-president of the Atlas Network, see Tom G. Palmer, 
“Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,” Hamline Law 
Review 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 261–304.
57  See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 75.
58  “A Recommendation on How to Intelligently Approach Emerging Problems in 
Intellectual Property Systems,” Review of Law & Economics 5, no. 3 (December 2009): 
1131.
59  Ibid., 1133.
60  Hayek, “ ‘Free’ Enterprise and Competitive Order,” 114.
61  Milton Friedman, “Th e Methodology of Positive Economics (1953),” in Essays in 
Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 39.
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that of dogmatist but shares some of the traits of alertness they them-
selves attribute to the entrepreneur (see Plehwe’s contribution to this 
volume). Th e open-endedness of the evolutionary process of capitalism 
meant that the devising of new frameworks of incentives was also never-
ending. For most neoliberals, it is not property itself that is the absolute 
value but the fl uctuating set of human-made laws required to encase the 
competitive order.
Explaining the Global Enclosure of Ideas: TRIPS against the NIEO
Speaking at the Walter Eucken Institute in Freiburg in 1967, F. A. Hayek 
spoke of the need for rules and law in “the sea of ignorance in which we 
move.” Fift een years later, a literal Law of the Sea was signed at the 
United Nations, a non-binding agreement to manage the resources of 
the world’s oceans collectively. Th ough seemingly unrelated, the two 
invocations of the sea point to a problem central to both neoliberal 
thought and twentieth-century global political economy at large. Given 
the unknowability of both the totality of human knowledge and the 
totality of the world’s resources, how much of both must be left  in the 
commons as part of what has been called the common heritage of 
mankind?
Linking knowledge and natural resources is not only a poetic choice. 
In 1974, the UN General Assembly passed a declaration on the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) proposed by the G77 coalition 
of developing nations, approving an ambitious set of demands for global 
redistribution, increased aid, stabilization of commodity prices, and 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources.62 Th e G77 made 
demands for collective management and ownership of the seabed, the 
moon, and Antarctica alongside those for central management of the 
world’s information. Th ird World demands for rents for the airspace 
used by Western satellites circling overhead was only one of the ways 
that the materiality of information infrastructure met the spaces of the 
so-called natural world.
Th e origins of the current global regime of IP rights can only be 
discerned by tracking the counter-mobilization to Global South 
demands alongside the contributions of neoliberal theory. In the late 
62  On the NIEO see the special issue of Humanity 6.1 (2015).
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1970s, the G77 extended its demands to a New International Information 
Order, focusing on news production and, fatefully, the question of 
copyrights and patents. In the early 1980s, they began to push for revi-
sion of patent and copyright conventions in the main responsible 
agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which 
became an agency of the UN in 1974.63 As the NIEO ramped up, US 
industrial associations began to lobby Washington to tighten IP protec-
tions, relying on a negative rhetoric of “piracy” in the Th ird World 
contrasted with the positive rhetoric of the natural rights of patent and 
copyright holders.
While, as shown above, the received economic analysis was about 
fi nding the balance between rewarding innovation and throttling it, 
campaigners for global IP protection wrapped themselves “in the mantle 
of property rights.”64 Th e new language of IP in the 1980s fi gured it as “a 
system to protect and exclude, rather than one based on competition 
and diff usion.”65 National competitiveness rather than the competitive 
order was the watchword, a shift  signaled by the Presidential Commission 
on Industrial Competitiveness created in 1984 and the rise of both 
competitiveness indices and the competitiveness advice industry.66
While neoliberal economists did not follow natural law IP arguments 
as a group, neoliberal-affi  liated think tanks including the Cato Institute 
(founded by MPS members Charles Koch, Ed Crane, and Murray 
Rothbard) and the Heritage Foundation (founded by MPS member and 
president Edward Feulner) lent their weight to the corporate campaign. 
MPS member and Cato senior fellow Douglas Bandow, special assistant 
to Reagan at the Th ird UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (and later 
disgraced in the Abramoff  scandal), linked the Law of the Sea and the 
New International Information Order (with eff orts to “limit trademark 
and patent rights”) as a common campaign of “totalitarian global 
management.”67 He applauded the US for its refusal to sign the Law of 
the Sea Treaty in 1982 and its withdrawal from UNESCO two years later 
63  Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: Th e 
New Enclosures? (London: Routledge, 2000), 68, 83.
64  Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: Th e Globalization of Intellectual Property 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 51.
65  Ibid., 75.
66  See William Davies, Th e Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the 
Logic of Competition (London: Sage, 2014), chapter 4.
67  Doug Bandow, “Totalitarian Global Management: Th e UN’s War on the Liberal 
International Economic Order,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 61 (October 24, 1985).
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as the body joined the push for a New International Information Order. 
An author for the Heritage Foundation denounced the “war on patents” 
and recommended creating “specifi c counter-proposals to the develop-
ing nations—particularly G77’s—proposals.”68 Counter-attack is what 
the industrial associations did in their campaign to have IP included in 
the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which commenced in 1985 
and culminated in the creation of the WTO in 1995. Th e outcome was 
not good for the developing world. Th e WTO’s “grand bargain” by which 
the Global South conceded to trade disciplines in IP and services in 
exchange for reciprocity on agriculture and textiles ended up favoring 
the Global North disproportionately.69
Th e NIEO had made the radical claim that much of the world’s 
knowledge was an inalienable part of the common heritage of mankind.70 
Corporate advocates of IP responded with a claim that was equally radi-
cal and equally at odds with mainstream and neoliberal economic 
discourse: that IP rights were simple analogues of other property rights. 
Vulgarized economic discourse was used to serve private interests. Th e 
only academic economist with a starring role in the global IP story, 
Jacques Gorlin, by his own confession, acted as a lobbyist representing a 
client and relied on no sophisticated argumentation. In his account, 
TRIPS was not an economic document nor even a legal document: “It is 
a political document. Th e decision to bring cases is a political decision. 
Th e decision to push a case in terms of supporting a certain interpreta-
tion is a political decision.”71 While the shift  of Chicago School econo-
mists towards a more charitable perspective on market concentration 
and monopolies helped lay the intellectual groundwork for the new 
policies, the global enclosure of ideas took place without consulting the 
68  Roger A. Brooks, “At the UN, a Mounting War on Patents,” Th e Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, (October 4, 1982); Roger A. Brooks, “Multinationals: First Victim of the 
UN War on Free Enterprise,” Th e Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, (November 16, 
1982). See also Th omas E. L. Dewey, “At WIPO, New Th reats to Intellectual Property 
Rights,” Th e Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, (September 11, 1987).
69  See Sylvia Ostry, “Th e Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications 
for Future Negotiations,” in Th e Political Economy of International Trade Law, ed. Daniel 
M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
70  Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism (London: Earthscan, 
2002), 112.
71  Jacques J. Gorlin, “US Industries, Trade Associations and Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking,” Cardozo Journal of International Comparative Law 10 no. 1 (2002): 11.
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original theorists of the knowledge economy.72 Under TRIPS, Hayek’s 
sea of ignorance was parceled off  into real estate.
Conclusion: Three Ways of Historicizing Neoliberalism
Where does the story of intellectual property leave us? Th e mismatch 
between the divisive discussion of IP within neoliberal circles and the 
bluntness of its application in foreign economic policy should not lead 
us to throw our hands up in despair at the incoherence of neoliberalism 
as a category of analysis. Rather, the neoliberal confrontation with the 
intellectual problem can help to distinguish between three ways of 
historicizing neoliberalism that have surfaced in recent scholarship.
Th e fi rst mode of explanation is ideational. In this model, based on 
the political power of economic ideas, neoliberal theory incubates in 
think tanks before being transformed into policy. We can think of a 
range of examples tracking the diff usion of policy models, from the 
Laff er Curve to central bank independence, austerity, formalization of 
property in the Global South, the move to fl oating exchange rates, and 
the globalization of all manner of “zones.” Th is conception of intellec-
tual mobilization refl ects the discourse of neoliberals themselves. In 
1986, Edwin Feulner spoke of the “war of ideas.”73 Th e Institute of 
Economic Aff airs, founded by MPS member Antony Fisher, also takes 
this framing as their own, subtitling a recent collection on think tanks 
“Waging the War of Ideas around the World” (on Fisher see Djelic and 
Mousavi’s contribution to this volume; on fl exible exchange rates see 
Schmelzer’s contribution).74
A second form of scholarly explanation, favored in the fi eld of 
International Political Economy, uses the language of capture. Critics 
from both sides of the political spectrum use this category to criticize the 
current global IP regime.75 Here special interests, usually the wealthiest 
72  On Chicago School infl uence see Sell, Private Power, Public Law, 72; Horn and 
Klaes, “Intervening,” 204.
73  Edwin J. Feulner, “Waging and Winning the War of Ideas,” Th e Heritage Lectures, 
no. 84 (1986).
74  Colleen Dyble, ed., Taming Leviathan: Waging the War of Ideas around the World 
(London: Institute of Economic Aff airs, 2008).
75  Amy Kapczynski, “Intellectual Property’s Leviathan,” Law and Contemporary 
Problems 131 (Fall 2014).
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sectors of society—but also specifi c industry interest groups, nations, or 
even individuals such as Charles and David Koch—capture policy 
through proactive lobbying eff orts. Th e think tank is part of the story but 
in a supplemental role. Against the political power of economic ideas, 
this could be called the political power of economic power. Examples of 
this storyline include studies of the creation of international trade trea-
ties, international investment law, the WTO, and other international 
fi nancial institutions, including the creation of TRIPS, where the Cato 
Institute and Heritage Foundation play a supporting but not a crucial 
role. Neoliberalism is seen in this analysis primarily as the restoration of 
class power; ideas take a back seat to market forces.
A last mode of explanation follows a methodology emerging, in part, 
as a backlash against what is seen as an excessive emphasis on the power 
of ideas. Th is is a historicization of the rise of neoliberalism based on 
contingency. Here it is less the political power of economic ideas or 
economic power but the accumulation of political decisions of ad hoc 
governance. Th ese scholars suggest that it is a fool’s errand to look for 
theoretical coherence or consistency in historical developments such as 
the Reagan tax cuts, the fi scal crisis of New York in the 1970s, or the 
decisions to deregulate fi nancial industry or to build the European 
Monetary Union. Th ese were all decisions made by harried politicians 
under acute pressures of management and not according to precon-
ceived plans.76
In some cases, the backlash against ideational explanations arguably 
goes too far. Kim Phillips-Fein, for example, writes in her excellent book 
that New York’s civic leaders did not think of ways of managing debt 
through austerity “because they had read the free-market critiques of 
economist Milton Friedman or the antigovernment philosophizing of 
University of Virginia professor James Buchanan.”77 Yet the crux of her 
narrative is the dogged refusal of Gerald Ford, William Simon, and Alan 
Greenspan to bail out the city’s debt. A story of contingency hits a 
76  See Monica Prasad, “Th e Popular Origins of Neoliberalism in the Reagan Tax 
Cut of 1981,” Journal of Policy History 24, no. 3 (2012); Jan-Otmar Hesse, 
“Wissenschaft liche Beratung der Wirtschaft spolitik,” in Das Bundeswirtschaft sminsterium 
in der Ära der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft , ed. Werner Abelshauser (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2016); Greta R. Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: Th e Political Origins of the Rise of 
Finance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Harold James, Making the 
European Monetary Union (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2012).
77  Kim Phillips-Fein, Fear City: New York City’s Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity 
Politics (New York: Metropolitan, 2017), 161.
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three-person wall which included a long-time devotee of Ayn Rand in 
Greenspan and, in Simon, an MPS member who wrote a neoliberal tract 
with a foreword written by Hayek himself.78 We need not choose 
between contingency, materialist forces, and the infl uence of ideas—the 
forms of explanation can and must work together.
Th e story of intellectual property off ers evidence that there is no 
trans-historical set of policy prescriptions within neoliberal thought 
prone to summary in the Washington Consensus or any other bullet-
point list. In fact, the end goal of a competitive order requires fl exibility 
by its very nature. Part of the capacity of neoliberalism to survive a series 
of what should have been existential crises must be credited to the 
adaptability of its basic policy prescriptions. Because neoliberals believe 
that markets are not natural but made possible through human inter-
vention, they also believe that diff erent circumstances require diff erent 
solutions. Precisely because the unpredictability of capitalist evolution is 
an article of faith for neoliberals of the Hayekian variety, there can be no 
fi nal blueprint.
Neoliberals frequently appeal to Hayek’s idea of the limits of knowl-
edge to justify their adherence to rules prohibiting solutions to prob-
lems of inequality through redistribution, progressive taxation, or 
tighter regulation of corporate power. Because our knowledge is limited, 
so their argument goes, we must respect the wisdom of private actors in 
the market. Such pieties have their obvious hypocrisies as in the series of 
bailouts that have encouraged the fi nancial boom-and-bust cycle of the 
last half century and repeatedly socialized private debt. Yet the idea of 
the sea of ignorance is also a genuine constraint on arriving at a fi nal 
prescription. To take the sea of ignorance seriously means that its law is, 
at least potentially, always open to revision.
78  Philips-Fein noted this herself in her previous book. Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible 
Hands: Th e Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009), 246.
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4
Neoliberalism’s Family Values: Welfare, 
Human Capital, and Kinship
Melinda Cooper
Writing at the end of the 1970s, the Chicago School neoliberal econo-
mist Gary Becker remarked that the “family in the Western world has 
been radically altered—some claim almost destroyed—by events of the 
last three decades.”1 He went on to list a familiar series of ills, from the 
rapid rise in divorce and female-headed families, to the decline in birth 
rates and the growing labor force participation of married women, 
which he claimed had “reduced the contact between children and their 
mothers and contributed to the confl ict between the sexes in employ-
ment as well as in marriage.” Becker believed that such dramatic changes 
in the structure of the family had more to do with the expansion of the 
welfare state in the postwar era than with feminism per se—which could 
be considered a consequence rather than an instigator of these dynam-
ics. Like many of his contemporaries, both neoliberals and neoconserv-
atives, Becker singled out AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children)—the “poor woman’s alimony”—as one of the primary causes 
of the breakdown of the family.2
Fift een years later, we fi nd Becker congratulating President Bill 
Clinton on his eff orts to “end welfare as we know it.”3 Th ese eff orts 
would soon bear fruit with the passage of Clinton’s monumental welfare 
1  Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family, enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993 [1981]), 1. 
2  Becker, “Altruism in the Family,” in ibid., 357. 
3  Gary S. Becker, “Unleash the Bill Collectors on Deadbeat Dads,” Bloomberg, July 
18, 1994, available at bloomberg.com.
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reform act of 1996—the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)—a piece of legislation that dramatically 
restricted the scope of AFDC.4 Clinton’s welfare reform act is infamous 
for installing both workfare and marriage promotion at the heart of 
American social policy. It is less well known that PRWORA essentially 
federalized a principle of poor relief dating right back to the old poor 
law tradition—the principle, that is, of private family responsibility for 
the welfare of dependents. Even less well known is the fact that Ronald 
Reagan fi rst initiated this project as Governor of California in the 1970s, 
when he sought to revive the state’s old poor law rules for compelling 
family members to look aft er impoverished relatives.5
As defenders of the competitive free market order, neoliberals may not 
have cared much for the active promotion of marriage, responsible father-
hood programs, and faith-based provision of services, all of which were 
supported by communitarians and social conservatives and included 
within Clinton’s welfare reform. But neoliberals were certainly in favor of 
eff orts to enforce kinship obligations as an alternative to the redistribution 
of income by the state. When welfare recipients refused to take care of 
themselves within the proper structure of the family, neoliberals believed 
that the state had every right to leverage (or indeed to create) these rela-
tionships by force, just as it had every right to compel the long-term 
unemployed to work. Unmarried mothers who sought welfare from the 
state should fi rst be obliged to seek support from an “absent father,” via 
child support orders, before the state disbursed any funds.
Becker’s abiding concern with the destructive eff ects of public spend-
ing on the family represents a key element of his microeconomics—but 
one that is consistently overlooked by the critical literature. At diff erent 
times and in diff erent contexts, each of the key fi gures of American 
neoliberalism can be found invoking the idea that the “natural obliga-
tions” of family should serve as a substitute for the welfare state, indeed 
that the “altruism” of the family represents a kind of primitive mutual 
insurance contract that we would do well to revive today.6 From here 
4  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 
3734 104th Cong. (1995–1996).
5  Governor of California (Ronald Reagan), California’s Blueprint for National 
Welfare Reform: Proposals for the Nation’s Food Stamp and Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children Programs (Sacramento, CA: Offi  ce of the Governor, 1974).
6  Richard Posner refers to the “insurance function of marriage,” pointing to the fact 
that marriage is expected to serve as a form of risk protection in those social contexts 
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derives the notion, now pervasive in American welfare practice, that the 
state has the right to identify and enforce legal obligations of marital 
support and child custody even when the parties concerned do not 
consent to or recognize this relationship. In the absence of a suitable 
family structure, the state is authorized to enforce the sexual contract 
just as it is authorized to enforce work.
What are we to make of the fact that the same neoliberal thinkers 
who extolled the virtues of the free market order were also prepared to 
defend the legal and economic bonds of kinship as inescapable, noncon-
tractual obligations? And should we be surprised to learn that the 
American neoliberals were stridently opposed to the sexual privacy 
jurisprudence of the 1970s which turned sexual freedom into a consti-
tutional right and ushered in the so-called sexual revolution in family 
law? Or that Gary Becker and Richard Posner were opposed to no-fault 
divorce? Only, I would argue, if we neglect the necessary role of family 
responsibility within the neoliberal vision of a free market order and 
only if we forget the historical relationship between economic liberalism 
and the poor law tradition—a tradition which, in the words of one 
historian, confounds the “moral and economic functions of the family.”7
“where kinship has receded but market and social insurance is not yet common” (or, we 
might add, has signifi cantly diminished). Th e “insurance function” of marriage, he 
writes, “arises from the fact that the correlation of spouses’ health and other welfare 
factors is less than one, so given a mutual obligation of support and assistance, marriage 
serves as a form of health, hunger, and life insurance.” Richard A. Posner, Th e Economics 
of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 190. On the family as a 
natural insurance mechanism, see also Becker, “Altruism in the Family.” For Richard 
Epstein, the rules of social welfare should “follow the basic pattern of natural obligation 
as it is perceived to arise within families.” Th e task of neoliberal welfare reform is “to 
transform [this] inclination into duty” and thus to “derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought.’ ” 
Richard Epstein, Principles for a Free Society (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 23. For the 
argument that “family responsibility and solidarity” have been weakened by the welfare 
state, see James M. Buchanan, Th e Public Finances (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc. 1960), 399. On the link between the destruction of the family, declining 
morality and the welfare state, see James M. Buchanan, “Th e Samaritan’s Dilemma,” in 
Altruism, Morality, and Economic Th eory, ed. E. S. Phelps (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1975), 71–85; James M. Buchanan, “Methods and Morals in Economics: 
Th e Ayres-Knight Discussion,” in Science and Ceremony: Th e Institutional Economics of 
C. E. Ayres, ed. W. Breit and J. William Patton Culbertson (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1976), 163–74.
7  M. A. Crowther, “Family Responsibility and State Responsibility in Britain before 
the Welfare State,” Th e Historical Journal 25, no. 1 (1982): 135. Crowther is referring 
specifi cally to the English New Poor Law of 1834, which inspired America’s post-bellum 
system of public relief.
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I have argued elsewhere that American neoliberalism, as it matured 
in the 1970s, must be understood as an attempt to revive and reinvent 
the poor law tradition as a wholesale alternative to the mid-
twentieth-century welfare state. Th is was not a project that was self-
evident in the Chicago School of American neoliberalism at its starting 
point in the 1930s, and indeed it was far from evident as late as 1970, 
when Milton Friedman could be found collaborating with President 
Nixon on the project of a basic guaranteed income.8 Rather, it crystal-
lized in the mid-1970s—a turning point in American politics, when the 
perfect storm of infl ation, unemployment, and the rising militancy of 
the new left  convinced neoliberals they must articulate a much more 
potent critique of the expansion of welfare under President Johnson’s 
Great Society. It is at this point that American neoliberals perfected 
their signature critique of the welfare state and that American neoliber-
alism per se acquired its mature form, in many ways distinct from the 
early Chicago School neoliberalism of the 1930s. And it is at this point 
that someone like Friedman completely abandoned any attempt to 
reform the welfare state in its existing form. Instead, the American 
neoliberals now turned back to the much older poor law tradition of 
relief to fi nd inspiration for their welfare reform initiatives. Th is is a 
tradition that dates right back to the Elizabethan poor laws and last 
fl ourished in the late nineteenth century, in what is referred to as the 
Gilded Age of American capitalism. A guiding principle of this poor law 
tradition was the notion of family responsibility.
Family Responsibility and the American Poor Laws
What is family responsibility? And what is the relevance of the poor law 
tradition to the history of American social welfare? Th e principle of 
family responsibility for welfare has deep roots in the British and North 
American traditions of public relief and can be traced back to the 
Elizabethan poor laws of 1601, where it is stated that “the father and 
grandfather, and the mother and grandmother, and the children of every 
poor, old, blind, lame and important person, or other person not able to 
work, being of a suffi  cient ability, shall, at their own charges, relieve and 
8 Marisa Chappell, Th e War on Welfare: Family, Poverty and Politics in Modern 
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
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maintain every such poor person.”9 Th e poor laws distinguished 
between the impotent poor, unable to work and eligible for care in an 
almshouse; the able-bodied poor, who must be compelled to work in a 
poorhouse; and the idle poor or vagrants, who could be imprisoned or 
confi ned in a House of Correction. But before any recourse to forced 
labor or incarceration could be activated, all three of these populations 
were subject to the principle of familial responsibility. In other words, 
before the parish took any action, family members would be compelled 
to provide as much support as they could.
Th e early American colonies imported the poor laws virtually verba-
tim and they were later incorporated into state legal systems during the 
early American Republic. Th ese laws were continually reinvigorated and 
embellished to adapt to what we might call periodic episodes of sexual 
revolution. Th at is, at each historical juncture where the legal obliga-
tions of family were somehow weakened or threatened by the generali-
zation of divorce, the waning importance of marriage, or the liberation 
of slaves who had never been married, the poor laws would be rein-
forced to punish those who threatened to transfer the costs of their 
welfare onto the state.10 As divorce became more common in the nine-
teenth century, the poor laws were modifi ed to require post-divorce 
child support.11 When slaves were enfranchised in the 1860s, they were 
immediately encouraged to enter formal marriages and were subse-
quently subject to new legal rules of family support and mutual depend-
ence.12 In many instances, those who failed to comply with family 
responsibility rules of economic obligation were subject to criminal 
sanctions such as forced labor or imprisonment. Th e poor laws helped 
the state to contain the costs of evolving sexual mores by imposing 
marital and familial support as an economic obligation.
If the poor were unwilling to enter into binding agreements of 
 9  43 Eliz. 1, ch.2, § VI (1601) (as amended).
10  Daniel R. Mandelker, “Family Responsibility under the American Poor Laws I,” 
Michigan Law Review 54, no. 4 (1956): 497–532; Daniel R. Mandelker, “Family 
Responsibility under the American Poor Laws II,” Michigan Law Review 54, no. 5 (1956): 
607–32.
11  Drew D. Hansen, “Th e American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and 
Punishment in Early American Child Support,” Yale Law Journal 108, No. 5 (1999): 
1123–53.
12  Katherine Franke, “Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of 
African American Marriages,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 11 (1999): 
251–309.
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marriage and kinship by consent, then the state was quite happy to 
conjure up these unions out of thin air and impose them as a legal obliga-
tion of mutual support. If a male servant refused to pay for the support of 
his presumptive bastard child, then he would be called upon to perform 
unpaid labor to pay off  his debts to the parish.13 If recently freed slaves 
continued to live together outside of wedlock, the state would compel 
them to marry and threaten them with forced labor if they refused to 
comply.14 Th ese laws remained very much in vigor right up until the mid-
twentieth century, when they came into confl ict with the principles of 
state-managed social insurance championed by New Deal reformers. In 
many instances, they were never completely overridden.
From Private Family Responsibility to Public 
Responsibility for the Family
Th e comprehensive forms of social insurance that had been imple-
mented in Germany under Otto von Bismarck as early as the 1880s, and 
in other European states throughout the following decades, were much 
slower to be accepted in the United States, where they had to overcome 
both elite and popular attachment to notions of personal and family 
responsibility.15 Th roughout the early twentieth century, opponents of 
social welfare argued that the socialization of risk would destroy the 
family as a moral institution by displacing economic solidarity among 
kin. Even public assistance to noncontributing dependents such as 
widows and the aged was attacked as a threat to the values of family 
responsibility and self-support.
With the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, the advocates of 
social insurance claimed a decisive victory. Th e New Deal introduced 
comprehensive forms of social insurance against workplace accidents, 
unemployment, and aging and defi nitively removed one class of work-
ers (standard, white, male workers) from the poor law system of family 
13  Mary Ann Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights: Th e History of 
Child Custody in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
14  Franke, “Becoming a Citizen.”
15  For a comparative account of social insurance in Bismarck’s Germany, other 
European states, and the United States, see John Fabian Witt, Th e Accidental Republic: 
Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 71–102.
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responsibility. Hoping to capitalize on this victory, federal administra-
tors on the Social Security Board launched a vigorous assault on state 
poor laws over the following years and sought as far as possible to limit 
their use.16 Yet, many states resisted these intrusions and continued to 
enforce family responsibility in public assistance programs for the 
nonworking and noncontributing poor—including, most notably, Aid 
to Dependent Children or ADC (later renamed AFDC).17
Th e dividing line between federal social insurance programs and 
state-governed public assistance became increasingly meaningful in this 
period. At a time when the government was assuming full social respon-
sibility for standard male workers and their dependents, public assis-
tance claimants were relegated to an older tradition of private (albeit 
state-enforced) family obligations.18 When single mothers, the blind, 
the disabled, the mentally ill, or the indigent claimed public assistance, 
state welfare departments were authorized to investigate and enforce 
private family obligations before disbursing any public funds. An adult 
child could be brought to court to pay for an elderly parent’s nursing 
home costs; aunts and uncles held accountable for the costs of housing 
and educating a blind relative; and parents forced to contribute to the 
care of an insane child. In some states, the welfare department could 
claim retrospective compensation for benefi ts paid or seize the estate of 
a deceased claimant to reimburse the public purse.
During this period of rapid liberalization, the much-maligned AFDC 
program remained fi rmly embedded in the poor law tradition. Far from 
phasing out the family responsibility provisions of AFDC, state legisla-
tures continued to strengthen them aft er World War II, reinforcing the 
idea that impoverished women should look to individual men and not the 
state as sources of support. So-called “substitute father” or “man-in-the-
house” rules had been imposed on welfare mothers since the beginning of 
the program, serving to create a de jure relationship of paternal and mari-
tal responsibility where none had been consented to by the parties 
concerned. From the 1950s onward, many states, including California, 
extended their family responsibility laws to include “absent fathers”—the 
16  Alvin Louis Schorr, Filial Responsibility in the Modern American Family. US 96. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Division of Program Research (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Offi  ce, 1960), 23; R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: 
Interpreting Welfare Rights (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 67–8. 
17 Schorr, Filial Responsibility, p. 23; Melnick, Between the Lines, 69–70. 
18  Mandelker, “Family Responsibility under the American Poor Laws II,” 626.
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former husbands of women who had been separated or divorced or the 
biological fathers of children who had been born out of wedlock.19 Now 
more than ever, women were reminded that their economic welfare 
depended primarily on their legal connection to a man.
Yet the fortunes of AFDC changed dramatically around 1965, thanks 
in large part to the rise of a new kind of public-interest lawyer working 
in close collaboration with the nascent welfare rights movement.20 In 
mounting their case against public assistance laws, these lawyers looked 
to recent changes in family law as a model of the kinds of freedoms that 
might also be extended to those on welfare. Family law was eff ectively 
undergoing an extraordinary process of liberalization during this 
period. Aft er more than a century of little change at all, laws that limited 
divorce, stigmatized non-marital unions, and discriminated against ille-
gitimate children were repealed or ceased to be enforced within the 
space of a decade or so.21 Alongside the marginalization of older, status-
based rules governing sexual relationships, a new jurisprudence came 
into being that explicitly recognized “sexual freedom” as a constitution-
ally protected right. In two landmark decisions, Griswold v. Connecticut 
(1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the Supreme Court fashioned a 
new “right to privacy” that limited the power of the state to police inti-
mate, sexual relationships in the home. Yet none of these innovations 
extended to impoverished women on welfare who were regularly subject 
to salacious investigations into their sexual histories, unannounced 
home visits, and strict moral policing under state law. As the fi eld of 
family law entered a new age of relative sexual freedoms, welfare law—
aptly dubbed the “family law of the poor” by legal scholar Jacobus 
tenBroek22—continued to refl ect the punitive moral conservatism of 
the poor law tradition.
Relaying the most radical voices in the welfare rights movement, 
progressive public-interest lawyers questioned why recipients of public 
assistance and public housing were still subject to such intrusive forms 
19  Melnick, Between the Lines, 96.
20  Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960–
1973 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Mark Neal Aaronson, “Representing the 
Poor: Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform during Reagan’s Gubernatorial Years,” 
Hastings Law Journal 64 (2013), 992.
21  Jana B. Singer, “Th e Privatization of Family Law,” Wisconsin Law Review 5 
(1992): 1443–568.
22  Jacobus tenBroek, “California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, 
Development, and Present Status: Part I,” Stanford Law Review 16, No. 2 (1964): 257–84.
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of moral surveillance. If the Supreme Court now recognized a constitu-
tional right to sexual privacy, why would this right not be extended to 
women on welfare? If middle-class women were now free to dissolve 
marriages at will and had increasing power to earn an independent wage 
in the labor market, why should poor women remain imprisoned within 
the private bonds of economic dependence? If marriage no longer 
counted in determining the legal status of middle-class children, why 
would the children of welfare mothers still be classifi ed as illegitimate 
and punished for the sins of the parents?23 In short, poverty lawyers 
were looking to the liberalization of family law to argue against the 
continuing enforcement of private familial obligations in the realm of 
welfare.
Th e institutional and judicial environment of the 1960s was extraor-
dinarily conducive to such ambitious social reform agendas. Public-
interest litigators who sought to reform welfare found an unusually 
receptive audience in the progressive Warren Court and the even more 
liberal California Supreme Court. Th eir strategy of test-case litigation 
turned state public assistance into a federal issue, forcing the Supreme 
Court to pass judgment on matters it would rarely have encountered in 
the past. Th e outcome of these decisions was both to federalize (and 
thus liberalize) control of welfare and to align its provisions with recent 
changes in family law. In the King v. Smith case of 1968, Chief Justice 
Earl Warren ruled that Alabama’s substitute father rule violated the 
terms of the Social Security Act and was out of touch with family law, 
which no longer sought to punish extramarital relations and no longer 
recognized any valid status distinction between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children.24 In another decision, Justice Brennan opposed child 
support enforcement as an invasion of privacy.25 As a result of these 
rulings, the number of welfare applicants who refused to cooperate with 
district attorneys in child support matters rose dramatically.26
By placing welfare benefi ts on a more secure footing and ridding 
them of punitive behavioral rules, the federal court decisions of this era 
23  Th ese arguments were lucidly outlined by Yale law professor Charles A. Reich in 
“Individual Rights and Social Welfare: Th e Emerging Legal Issues,” Yale Law Journal 74, 
No. 7 (1965): 1245–57, and “Social Welfare in the Public-Private State,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 114, No. 4 (1966): 487–93.
24  Melnick, Between the Lines, 84.
25  Ibid., 103.
26  Governor of California, California’s Blueprint for National Welfare Reform, vii.
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had the eff ect of liberating women from the confi nes of private family 
dependence. Th e overall message conveyed by these rulings was that the 
welfare of poor women was a public responsibility on a par with that of 
standard male workers. Whatever their marital status, sexual history, or 
race, impoverished women were just as deserving of a social wage as any 
other citizen. At a time when middle-class women were entering the 
workforce in growing numbers and achieving some degree of economic 
independence from men, unmarried women on welfare also appeared 
to be in reach of a social wage that was no longer mediated through a 
“substitute husband.”
Public assistance benefi ts, however menial, were functioning like a 
social wage for unmarried women—a confi guration that had not been 
envisaged in the Social Security Act, and one that many perceived as a 
perversion of its original intent. As Stephanie Coontz points out, it was 
not so much women’s dependence on the state that turned a generation of 
social reformers against the welfare state tout court; it was rather the 
growing realization that welfare was making women independent of indi-
vidual men and freeing them from the obligations of the private family.27
Th is particular challenge to the Fordist family wage system was 
profoundly unsettling to people from right across the political spec-
trum, and it is fair to say that it crystallized the enormous welfare back-
lash of the 1970s. It is in this period that you begin to hear the argu-
ment—echoed by both neoliberals such as Gary Becker and 
neoconservatives such as Daniel Bell and Daniel Patrick Moynihan—
that public spending on welfare was making women too independent of 
presumptive husbands and fathers and thus eff ectively subsidizing the 
breakdown of the family. Neoliberals and neoconservatives were united 
in their opposition to the expansion of the welfare state under the sign 
of “sexual freedom,” although their motivations were very diff erent. 
Neoconservatives feared that the subsidization of non-normative life-
style choices by the welfare state would undermine the moral founda-
tions of social order. Neoliberals were primarily motivated by economic 
concerns: if growing numbers of women were now claiming both equal 
wages and an independent social wage, the resulting expansion of claims 
on the state threatened to exacerbate the problem of infl ation.
27  Stephanie Coontz, Th e Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia 
Trap (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 59.
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Neoliberalism and the Revival of Family Responsibility
Milton Friedman’s evolving position on welfare is exemplary of this shift . 
Up until 1970, Friedman was a pragmatic supporter of at least some of 
the elements of the New Deal welfare state and indeed was actively 
involved in eff orts to extend public assistance to families with dependent 
children under Nixon. His pragmatism was in keeping with the biparti-
san consensus on the basic premise of redistributive social welfare which 
existed up until the late 1960s. Until this time, Democrats and Republicans 
alike were committed to the redistributive policies of the family wage, 
although they were divided on the question of whether or not it should 
be extended to African American men. By 1969, however, even the 
Republican President Nixon was convinced that the public assistance 
program, AFDC, should be made more inclusive and secured on a fi rmer, 
federal basis. His proposed new program—the Family Assistance Plan or 
FAP—promised to extend basic income guarantees to men, to two-parent 
families, and to those engaged in low-waged work.28 It also promised to 
include African American men within welfare benefi ts for the very fi rst 
time. Th e reform responded to both progressive and conservative critics 
of the old AFDC program: tarred with the brush of subsidizing the 
immoral lives of single mothers, welfare support would now function as 
an extension of the Fordist family wage and seek to buttress normative 
kinship structures by prioritizing intact families and unemployed fathers; 
at the same time, the normative family wage structure would be extended 
to African American men also.
When it was fi rst proposed, Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan attracted 
an extraordinarily broad alliance of supporters—embracing the 
Republican president and moderate conservative Richard Nixon, the 
neoliberal Milton Friedman, the Democrat Moynihan, the liberals and 
left ists of the National Welfare Rights Movement, and liberal econo-
mists such as John Kenneth Galbraith and James Tobin. Th ere were of 
course clear diff erences of opinion among those who supported the 
plan—Friedman, for example, envisaged a more frugal form of welfare 
redistribution than that favored by liberals or left ists (in private 
28  Th ere are several excellent historical accounts of the FAP and the welfare rights 
movement. See Chappell, Th e War on Welfare; Felicia Kornbluh, Th e Battle for Welfare 
Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); and Premilla Nadesan, 
Welfare Warriors: Th e Welfare Rights Movement in the United States (London: Routledge, 
2005).
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correspondence, he conceded that he saw the negative income tax as a 
pragmatic step towards the elimination of all social welfare programs).29 
But with the exception of a few dissident, feminist voices in the National 
Welfare Rights Movement, all agreed that welfare in its existing form 
undermined the traditional family. And all converged on the necessity 
of maintaining some kind of redistributive welfare system. In the 1960s, 
even Friedman recognized the need for a basic income redistribution 
program to ameliorate the inevitable market failures of private charity.
In its broad conception, the plan was inspired by the work of the 
Catholic Democrat (and future neoconservative) Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, who in his Th e Negro Family: Th e Case for National Action 
had denounced the corrosive eff ects of welfare benefi ts to single moth-
ers on black masculinity and the black family.30 By extending welfare 
entitlements to African American husbands and fathers, Moynihan 
hoped to include them within the stabilizing norms of the family and to 
undo the moral damage infl icted by the old AFDC program.31
In its practical details however, the Family Assistance Plan was based 
on the idea of a negative income tax fi rst proposed by Friedman in 
1962.32 Friedman conceived of the negative income tax as a way of 
channeling income redistribution through the federal tax system, 
thereby eliminating the excessive administrative costs associated with 
dedicated welfare programs. With each annual tax submission, those 
whose income fell below a certain threshold would receive a sum of 
money in return, guaranteeing them an annual basic living wage. By 
replacing in-kind welfare with the most liquid form of benefi t—cash—
Friedman thought that the negative income tax would encourage the 
poor to behave as responsible free market actors. With its minimal but 
effi  cient system of redistribution, the negative income tax would bypass 
the disabling paternalism of the welfare state and undermine the 
29  Milton Friedman, Letter to Patrick Buchanan, dated October 25, 1973, Box 22, 
Folder 11, Friedman Papers. Cited in Angus Burgin, Th e Great Persuasion: Reinventing 
Free Markets Since the Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 
197. 
30  Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “Th e Moynihan Report. Th e Negro Family: Th e Case 
for National Action,” Th e Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy, ed. Lee 
Rainwater and William L. Yancey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967 [1966]), 39–124.
31  Kornbluh, Th e Battle for Welfare Rights, 148.
32    Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), 192–5.
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entrenched power base of liberal welfare bureaucrats.33 It would also 
eliminate the moral hazards embedded in the old AFDC program—that 
of promoting nonwork and family breakdown—by extending subsidies 
to those in low-wage work and intact families.
In 1970, the Democratic Party-controlled House of Representatives 
approved Nixon’s recommendations by a large majority. Th e success of 
the Family Assistance Plan was short-lived, however. Later that year, the 
plan was roundly defeated by a coalition of Republicans and Democrats 
in the Senate, presaging a long-term reshuffl  ing of left  and right in the 
American political landscape. Designed to suit all stakeholders, the fi nal 
version of the Family Assistance Plan ended up disappointing everyone. 
Welfare rights activists objected that the plan would reduce benefi ts to 
well below the poverty line for most welfare recipients, would eliminate 
the right to a fair hearing, and would reintroduce arbitrary powers of 
surveillance.34 Free market economists such as Friedman thought the 
plan ended up complicating rather than streamlining the current welfare 
bureaucracy and did not suffi  ciently remove disincentives to work.35
What defeated the plan, however, was not so much these specifi c 
objections as Nixon’s own decision to abandon the politics of consensus 
on welfare in a context of rising infl ation.36 In the fi rst year of his presi-
dency, Nixon had surrounded himself with policy advisors such as 
Moynihan and Robert Finch, who convinced him that an expansion of 
the family wage was the best way to placate racial tensions while simul-
taneously allowing him to wrest the white working class from its tradi-
tional allegiance to the Democratic party. By his second year in govern-
ment, the economic outlook had soured and Nixon was less convinced 
that this strategy would work. Instead, he decided, behind closed doors, 
to abandon any attempt to reform AFDC while simultaneously oversee-
ing some of the most generous expansions to Social Security in the 
program’s history.37 Social Security was (and still is) one of the New 
Deal’s less contentious social insurance programs precisely because it 
33  Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 120, 123.
34  Chappell, Th e War on Welfare, 90–1.
35  William Ruger, Milton Friedman (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 120–1.
36  Nixon’s change of tack on the black family wage presaged a more general turn to 
the right within his administration. See Kornbluh, Th e Battle for Welfare Rights, 148–50.
37  Jill Quadagno, Th e Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 158.
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remains relatively untouched by the normative issues of race, gender, 
and family formation that intersect in programs such as AFDC.
When Nixon retreated from the agenda of reforming AFDC then, the 
extraordinary consensus that had formed around the project of the 
expanded family wage came apart and reshuffl  ed into distinct political 
positions. As the expanding economy of the mid-1960s gave way to the 
soaring infl ation of the 1970s, AFDC became the touchstone for increas-
ingly acrimonious debates about the very feasibility of welfare redistri-
bution. In particular, the rising demands of the welfare rights move-
ment—along with its successes in the federal courts—convinced many 
former pragmatic supporters of the New Deal welfare state that a crisis 
point had been reached. Th e importation of “sexual freedom” argu-
ments into welfare rights law opened up the distinct possibility that the 
federal government would now be compelled to subsidize the existence 
of women who wantonly chose to live without the support of a man, 
thereby greatly increasing the burdens on state coff ers. In this regard, 
the phenomenon of stagfl ation (combining infl ation and unemploy-
ment) began to be understood as much more than a macroeconomic 
problem in the conventional sense of the term—what it refl ected was a 
breakdown of moral order itself, an unsustainable infl ation of monetary 
and libidinal demands beyond the limits established by the Keynesian 
consensus. If one could imagine an expansion of welfare state spending 
to include nonwhite men within the category of breadwinner, one could 
not question the normative premise of the male breadwinner family 
itself without completely defeating the arithmetic of restrained public 
spending—and thus generating runaway infl ation.
In this new economic context, free market neoliberals such as 
Friedman who had once accepted the pragmatic necessity of a state-
subsidized family wage began to formulate a distinct new political 
philosophy of non-redistributive family values. Th ey now perceived the 
“perverse incentives” of the Great Society welfare state as responsible for 
both a breakdown in family values and an unsustainable infl ation of 
monetary demands. Turning against the New Deal welfare state tout 
court, they now called for the strategic reinvention of a much older, poor 
law tradition of private family responsibility, using the combined instru-
ments of welfare reform, changes to taxation, and monetary policy.
In 1980, for instance, Friedman, who had been so instrumental in the 
campaign for an expanded family wage, could be found reiterating the 
arguments of early twentieth-century opponents of social insurance, 
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that social welfare was fundamentally inimical to the bonds of family 
responsibility. Pointing to the example of Social Security, he observed 
that the natural obligations of kinship that had once compelled children 
to look aft er their parents in old age had now been supplanted by an 
impersonal system of social insurance whose long-term eff ect was to 
usurp the place of the family:
the diff erence between Social Security and earlier arrangements is 
that Social Security is compulsory and impersonal—earlier arrange-
ments were voluntary and personal. Moral responsibility is an indi-
vidual matter, not a social matter. Children helped their parents out of 
love or duty. Th ey now contribute to the support of someone else’s 
parents out of compulsion and fear. Th e earlier transfers strengthened 
the bonds of the family; the compulsory transfers weakened them.38
Much like Friedman, Gary Becker credits AFDC (along with social 
insurance programs and public services such as state education) with 
weakening the bonds of familial obligation. For Becker, the family in its 
equilibrium state or free market state could be understood as serving a 
kind of natural insurance function that was fatally disturbed when the 
welfare state socialized insurance.39 Writing in the early 1980s, Becker 
credits the postwar welfare state with destroying the natural altruism of 
the family, but surmises that the decline in welfare initiated by Reagan 
will ultimately compel the poor to restore the bonds of kinship as a 
source of privatized welfare.40
Once we restore the question of family to its central place within the 
neoliberal critique of social welfare, we are in a much better position to 
understand the nuance of the neoliberal position on sexual freedom. It 
is almost universally assumed that neoliberal legal scholars were sympa-
thetic to—perhaps even ultimately responsible for—the jurisprudence 
of privacy that transformed sexual freedom into a (limited) constitu-
tional right in the late 1960s and 1970s. Th us, a certain kind of left -wing 
critique of neoliberalism sees it as having inspired the individualist 
ethics of sexual choice informing such landmark cases as the Roe v. 
38  Friedman and Friedman, Free to Choose, 106.
39  On the family as a natural insurance mechanism, see Becker, “Altruism in the 
Family,” 281–2.
40  Becker, “Th e Evolution of the Family,” in A Treatise on the Family, 360.
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Wade decision of 1973 and by extension all other cases involving the 
recognition of a constitutional right to sexual liberty.41 In fact, the 
opposite is true: a scholar such as Richard Posner who otherwise 
supported the extension of the private commercial contract (in such 
areas as the trade in drugs, sex and babies) was unequivocally hostile to 
the idea of a constitutional right to sexual freedom, for the simple reason 
that it might impose an obligation on the state to actively enable and 
subsidize the freedoms in question.42 Th is was precisely what occurred 
when sexual privacy jurisprudence was extended to welfare recipients in 
the 1970s. Instead, neoliberals support the more limited notion that 
private contractual freedom (as opposed to a constitutional right to 
freedom) should be extended to all arenas of social and intimate life, on 
the proviso that the associated costs are fully internalized by the 
contracting parties. Failing this, neoliberals are no less willing than 
social conservatives to invoke the necessity of noncontractual obliga-
tions in marriage and parenthood and are more than prepared to call on 
their enforcement by the state.
Posner and Becker were adamantly opposed to no-fault divorce, not 
out of any overt moral concern with the decline of family life (the rising 
divorce rates of the late twentieth century were inevitable, Becker insists) 
but because of the potential social costs involved in supporting depend-
ent women and children.43 When women and men fail to privatize the 
costs of their sexual behavior, instead transferring these costs to the 
state, neoliberals make an exceptional case for the imposition of noncon-
tractual obligations. In cases of marital dissolution then, the legal 
responsibilities of marital and child support must take precedence over 
the wishes of the parties involved. As noted by the Chicago School legal 
41  Th is assumption is widespread in the critical literature on neoliberalism. See, for 
instance, Anne Alstott, “Neoliberalism in US Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-
Faire Markets in the Minimal State,” Law and Contemporary Problems 77, No. 4 (2014): 
25–42. For a detailed rebuttal of this position with respect to Richard Posner, see Jean L. 
Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 77–124. 
42  In Posner’s words, the “Supreme Court’s decisions on sexual privacy are not only 
poorly reasoned but poorly informed.” Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 7. 
43  Ibid., 181–9, and Gary S. Becker, “Finding Fault with No-Fault Divorce (1992),” 
in Th e Economics of Life: From Baseball to Affi  rmative Action to Immigration, How Real-
World Issues Aff ect Our Everyday Life, ed. Gary S. Becker and Guity Nashat Becker (New 
York: McGraw Hill Education, 1998), 98–100.
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scholar, Richard A. Epstein, the rules of social welfare should “follow the 
basic pattern of natural obligation as it is perceived to arise within 
families.”44 Th e task of neoliberal welfare reform is “to transform [this] 
inclination into duty” and thus to “derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’ ”—a 
precise translation of the poor law philosophy of natural charity within 
the family.45
The Revival of Family Responsibility in 
Practice: From Reagan to Clinton
Th e neoliberal critique of welfare had a profound infl uence on the 
subsequent history of American social policy and informed both direct 
eff orts to revive the poor laws and much more general interventions into 
the realm of fi scal and monetary policy, all of which had the eff ect of 
transferring economic responsibility to the family. As Governor of 
California in the late 1960s and 1970s, Ronald Reagan was one of the 
fi rst to implement the desiderata of the neoliberals with respect to 
welfare reform. In 1971, he pushed a comprehensive Welfare Reform 
Act through the Californian legislature with the intent of reactivating 
the state’s poor law provisions. In the words of Reagan’s task force on 
welfare reform, the intervention was designed to
enforce the principle that family members are responsible for the 
support of relatives. In its simplest form, the argument was that every 
dollar contributed by the relative of a person on the welfare rolls was a 
dollar saved the taxpayer. However, the welfare reform goals went 
further and identifi ed the family as the basic unit in society, emphasiz-
ing increased dependence upon the family and eliminating aspects of 
the welfare system that constitute incentives to break up the family.46
44  Richard Epstein, Principles for a Free Society (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 23.
45  Epstein’s wording closely follows that of a famous family responsibility judgment 
made by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1896, People v. James W. Hill, 163 Ill. 186 (1896). 
Here it was stated that the object of both the original Elizabethan poor laws and those 
enacted by the state of Illinois was “to protect the public from loss occasioned by the 
neglect of a moral or natural duty imposed on individuals, and to do this by transforming 
the imperfect moral duty into a statutory and legal liability.”
46  Ronald A. Zumbrun, Raymond M. Momboisse, and John H. Findley, “Welfare 
Reform: California Meets the Challenge,” Pacifi c Law Journal 4 (1973): 769.
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With recommendations extending to all of the state’s public assistance 
programs, Reagan’s welfare reform ended up reinstating family respon-
sibility rules covering relationships between adult children and aged 
parents; grandparents, aunts, uncles, and impoverished children; parents 
and unwed minor mothers; as well as stepfathers and nonadoptive chil-
dren—with most attention focusing on single mothers and their “absent 
husbands.”47
As president, Reagan attempted to translate his Californian project in 
welfare reform onto the federal stage, without success. Instead Reagan’s 
project was brought to fi nal fruition by President Clinton, whose monu-
mental welfare reform of 1996 eff ectively federalized the poor law tradi-
tion, turning America’s welfare bureaucracy into an immense national 
apparatus for policing and enforcing child support obligations amongst 
the welfare poor.
Beyond these direct eff orts to revive state poor laws of family respon-
sibility, however, the infl uence of the poor law tradition can be observed 
in many other aspects of the neoliberal campaign to reform fi scal and 
monetary policy. It can be seen in eff orts to repeal the estate tax on 
inherited wealth, a campaign that was loudly supported by neoliberal 
thinkers in the 1970s; in the local and state tax revolts that began in 
California in the late 1970s and then spread throughout the country, 
placing permanent limits on the power of the state to spend, tax, and 
most importantly, redistribute wealth; in the war of attrition to replace 
Social Security and work-based health insurance with private asset 
accumulation strategies; and in eff orts to promote home ownership as a 
form of “asset-based welfare” under Clinton and George W. Bush. We 
tend to forget how central the problematic of the family was to each of 
these campaigns, but it was always front and foremost in the eyes of 
neoliberal policy-makers, who saw asset-based welfare as a way of 
replacing the “impersonal bonds” of social insurance with family-based 
forms of wealth accumulation and transmission.48
We can also observe multiple ways in which cuts to public funding in 
healthcare, education, and welfare have pushed more and more people 
back towards kinship-based forms of self-care and mutual support and 
47  Ibid.
48  For a more detailed account of the role of the family in these various campaigns, 
see my Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Conservatism (New 
York: Zone Books, 2017).
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how the expansion of consumer credit has turned household defi cit-
spending into a substitute for state defi cit-spending. Today, family 
responsibility very oft en takes the form of intergenerational debt where 
parents and other family members are actively enrolled in the debt obli-
gations of children, signed up as guarantors or required to post their 
housing wealth as collateral to fund the social mobility (or simply stasis) 
of younger generations. Here too neoliberal policy prescriptions have 
played an important role, as Friedman and Becker were among the fi rst 
to suggest that investment in “human capital” such as education should 
be the responsibility of the family, aided and abetted by private credit 
markets, not the state. Th eir policy prescriptions have had a profound 
infl uence on higher education funding in the United States, as the 
federal government and states have progressively chipped away at public 
funding and private credit markets have expanded to fi ll the gap—with 
parents oft en acting as co-signors or guarantors of student debt. I now 
turn to the issue of higher education funding in more detail, with the 
aim of showing just how central the concept of family responsibility was 
to neoliberal thinking on human capital theory.
Human Capital, Household Debt, and Family Responsibility
Today, human capital theory is almost synonymous with Chicago School 
neoliberalism, thanks in large part to the publication of Foucault’s semi-
nars at the Collège de France.49 In the late 1950s and 1960s, however, 
the concept of human capital was much more closely associated with the 
name of Th eodore Schultz, an economist who worked alongside 
Friedman and Becker at the University of Chicago but who would be 
more accurately described as a neo-Keynesian of the likes of Paul 
Samuelson, Robert Solow, and Richard Musgrave. It was Schultz who 
fi rst popularized the idea that spending on human services such as 
education should be considered an investment rather than an act of 
consumption—and therefore that education itself should be considered 
a form of capital or interest-bearing asset.
Specifi cally, Schultz believed that investment in education could 
49  See Foucault’s discussion of Gary Becker’s theory of human capital in Michel 
Foucault, Th e Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979, ed. 
Frédéric Gros (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 215–37.
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help explain a hitherto perplexing problem in the calculation of 
national economic growth, one that had been identifi ed by the found-
ing fi gure of neoclassical growth economics, Solow. In two seminal 
articles in the fi eld, Solow reported that only a small part of the rapid 
economic growth of the United States in the early twentieth century 
could be attributed to increases in the size of the labor force or physi-
cal capital—the sources of investment traditionally thought to account 
for GDP growth.50 Schultz thought that the problem could be resolved 
if one took into account the sustained increase in private and public 
investments in education that had occurred over this period, an 
increase that was not the result of any conscious policy decision but 
that nevertheless had had the desirable eff ect of greatly improving 
GDP. Human capital investment, then, was the missing production 
factor in growth economics.
Schultz’s insights led him to a number of practical conclusions regard-
ing the role of public investment in education. First, he reasoned that if 
haphazard investment in higher education had been responsible for 
such a large portion of national economic growth, then the federal 
government would be well advised to adopt an active policy of sustained 
investment in the sector. Second, he argued that selective underinvest-
ment in the education of the working class, African Americans, and 
women could account for the labor market discrimination experienced 
by these demographics.51 Underinvestment in education was not only a 
source of economic, racial, and gender inequality; it was also a waste of 
national human resources that could have greatly increased GDP had 
they been deployed. When Friedman, commenting on one of Schultz’s 
draft s, asked him the critical question of whether returns to investment 
in education accrued primarily to the individual or the collective, 
Schultz replied that such investment raised national income and was 
therefore in the interests of the public as a whole. Th e public provision 
of free education, moreover, enabled rich and poor to attend college, 
independently of family wealth; the corresponding increase in wages for 
50  Robert M. Solow, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” 
Th e Review of Economics and Statistics 39 (1957): 312–20; and Robert M. Solow, 
“Technical Progress, Capital Formation, and Economic Growth,” Th e American 
Economic Review 52 (1962): 76–86.
51  Th eodore W. Schultz, “Investment in Human Capital,” Th e American Economic 
Review 51, No. 1 (1961): 13–14; Th eodore W. Schultz, “Woman’s New Economic 
Commandments,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists XXVIII, No. 2 (1972), 29–32.
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poor students could be justifi ed in the same way as progressive 
taxation.52
Th eodore Schultz’s human capital theory can be said to have inspired 
the Higher Education Act of 1965, a piece of legislation that doubled the 
federal budget for the sector, increased the number of grants available to 
low-income students and created a program of guaranteed student loans 
to be subsidized by the federal government. In 1972, Congress supple-
mented this act by approving a program of grants for low-income 
students (later renamed Pell grants). Th ese policies had the eff ect of 
welcoming unprecedented numbers of low-income, black, Latino/a and 
women students into colleges and universities, a demographic shift  that 
would soon be refl ected in the political and pedagogical demands of the 
student movement. As Schultz had foreseen, sustained federal invest-
ment in higher education functioned much like an “inheritance tax”:53 
by redistributing the costs of education through the tax base, President 
Johnson had made it possible for students without family wealth to 
access an institution that had once been a major conduit of class repro-
duction. During the 1970s, Pell grants were generous enough to cover 
both tuition fees and living costs, liberating students from the need to 
rely on the contributions of their parents.54
From the beginning, Schultz had his critics. Friedman and Becker in 
particular developed a perspective on human capital which highlighted 
the value of private as opposed to public returns to investment and led 
to policy recommendations at complete variance with those of Schultz. 
In their 1962 publication, Capitalism and Freedom, Rose and Milton 
Friedman pronounced themselves decisively in favor of private invest-
ment in human capital. Here they argued that the returns to investment 
in education accrued entirely to the individual student and that any 
ostensible social benefi ts were merely the summation of private wage 
gains.55 Th e individual student should therefore be held responsible for 
the costs of his education. Th e Friedmans concurred with Schultz that 
there had been massive underinvestment in higher education, but unlike 
Schultz, believed that this failure could best be remedied through the 
liberalization of credit. Th e fact that low-income students were unable 
52  Schultz, “Investment in Human Capital,” 15.
53  Ibid.
54  Suzanne Mettler, Degrees of Inequality: How the Politics of Higher Education 
Sabotaged the American Dream (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 53.
55  Friedman and Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 100–1.
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to pay for a degree and thus discriminated against in the labor market 
could be attributed to “imperfections in the capital market,” that is, the 
absence of a liquid market in private student loans.56 At best, the 
Friedmans conceded that the state might play a minimal role in remedy-
ing this state of aff airs by providing loans repayable through the tax 
system and contingent on future earnings.57 But they clearly saw the 
private credit market as the most effi  cient source of funding for student 
loans and thought that government incentives to banks were the best 
way of stimulating this market.
Becker had a very similar position to Friedman but as a microecono-
mist was always much more attentive to the intimate, domestic underpin-
nings of human capital investment and therefore has the merit of render-
ing explicit what remains unsaid in the work of the other neoliberals. Free 
public education, Becker argued, could be critiqued on the same grounds 
as the progressive income tax, which (in his words) “initially narrows 
inequality” but ends up raising the “equilibrium level of inequality  . . . 
because families reduce their investments in descendants.”58 If we could 
only turn off  the spigots of government spending, then families would 
spontaneously rediscover their natural altruism and start investing in 
their children again. Th e argument was improbable and at odds with the 
evidence but it enabled Becker to identify private credit markets as a logi-
cal alternative.59 In Becker’s ideal world, students would once again look 
to the family as a source of economic support, and yet the old stratifi ca-
tions of family wealth would simultaneously be deferred and elasticized 
by expanding opportunities for private debt.
Becker’s microeconomic perspective on human capital investment 
was a mirror image of the more familiar theories of the Chicago and 
Virginia School neoliberals, who famously argued that public defi cit 
spending and the resulting national debt had the unfortunate eff ect of 
“crowding out” private credit markets and discouraging private invest-
ment. But whereas Friedman and James M. Buchanan were primarily 
referring to business investment, what Becker meant by private invest-
ment was intergenerational, family investment. If the government would 
56  Ibid., 107.
57  Ibid., 102–5. Friedman’s vision of a federally administered student loan program 
tied to the tax system was formalized as the “income-contingent loan” and implemented 
in Australia in 1989. 
58  Becker, “Inequality and Intergenerational Mobility,” in A Treatise on the Family, 222. 
59  Ibid.
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only scale back on its investments in public goods, Becker surmised, 
then the family would resume its proper role of investing in children.60 
Further than this, the family’s traditional economic responsibility in 
ensuring the welfare of its members would be greatly expanded by the 
stimulation of appropriate credit markets. With a little help from govern-
ment, the old poor law tradition of family responsibility could be rein-
vented in the form of an infi nitely elastic intergenerational debt.
Friedman in particular had a direct infl uence on this trajectory of 
higher education funding in America. Reagan, a vocal opponent of the 
Berkeley student movement, invoked Friedman’s version of human capi-
tal theory to attack the funding structures of the University of California 
system as Governor of California in the late 1960s.61 Free tuition, he 
believed, had destroyed the incentive structures of private family respon-
sibility and in the process stoked the anti-authoritarianism of the student 
movement. Only a return to private, parental investment in the education 
of children, he thought, could resolve the fi scal and moral problems asso-
ciated with public education.62 A few short days aft er his swearing in as 
governor of the state of California in 1967, Reagan seized the opportunity 
to announce a 10 percent cut to the annual budget of the UC and state 
colleges and, more controversially, put forward a plan to introduce tuition 
fees as a way of covering the shortfall.63
Reagan’s plan to introduce tuition fees was ultimately defeated by the 
regents in August 1967, although they did allow him to raise the revenue 
he wanted by increasing existing administrative charges.64 In economic 
terms, the diff erence between Reagan’s plan and the regents’ eventual 
compromise solution was minimal. Yet the idea of introducing tuition 
fees was understood as a devastating symbolic attack on the tradition of 
60  Ibid.
61  Ronald Reagan, “Th e Perils of Government-Sponsored Higher Education,” in 
Th e Creative Society: Some Comments on Problems Facing America (New York: Devin-
Adair Company, 1968), 109–17; Milton Friedman, “ ‘Free’ Education,” Newsweek 
(February 14, 1967), 86.
62  Reagan, “Th e Generation Gap,” in Th e Creative Society, 63.
63  Ray Zeman, “Reagan Pledges to Squeeze, Cut and Trim State Spending: Reagan 
Pledges Strict Government Economy,” Los Angeles Times (January 6, 1967), 1 and 20. 
Th e UC budget for 1967–8 was eventually cut by $20 million.
64  Gladwin Hill, “Reagan Defeated on Tuition Plans: Regents Vote, 14–7, to Bar 
Fees at the University,” New York Times (September 1, 1967), 13. Th e existing 
administrative fees were minimal and could be spent on noninstructional expenses only, 
such as administration, health services, and counselling.
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free college education. Once tuition was accepted in principle, how could 
one remain committed to the ideal of free education? And what limits 
would be placed on annual increases? Reagan’s state-level experiment in 
education reform subsequently served as the blueprint for the massive 
overhaul of higher education which he undertook as president.65
When we look at the subsequent history of higher education funding 
in the United States, it is astounding how closely neoliberal reforms of 
the sector have followed the prescriptions set out by Friedman and 
Becker. Since Reagan’s reforms of higher education in 1980, federal 
policy has tended to diminish the spending power of Pell grants and to 
push instead for the expansion of federal and private student loans. At 
the same time, state governments have been chipping away at their 
investments in public universities so that institutions that were free for 
state residents before the 1980s have now become eff ectively private. 
Th e eff ect of this policy drift , as few would be unaware, has been rapidly 
infl ating tuition costs and an enormous expansion in student debt. As 
movements such as Strike Debt have explained so well, inequality now 
tends to manifest in the form of diff ering degrees of debt servitude 
rather than outright exclusion.
What Strike Debt fails to take into account, however, is the fact that 
so-called private or personal debt is very oft en intergenerational, famil-
ial debt. As tuition fees have skyrocketed and lending thresholds have 
been raised, both the federal government and private lenders have 
pushed students towards loans that are signed by parents in the name of 
their children and where the obligations between parent and child serve 
as a kind of substitute for secure collateral.66 It is not the case then that 
we might undermine the debt obligations of high fi nance by valorizing 
our “debts . . . to our friends, families, and communities,” as Strike Debt 
advises us, since the global market in securitized household debt is 
entirely dependent on our intimate obligations to each other, particu-
larly at the level of the family.67 Th e fact that we are unwilling to abandon 
such obligations serves a highly useful anchoring role for the market in 
65  Michael Mumper, Removing College Price Barriers: What Government Has Done 
and Why It Hasn’t Worked (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 94.
66  Marian Wang, Beckie Supiano, and Andrea Fuller, “No Income? No Problem! 
How the Government is Saddling Parents with College Loans Th ey Can’t Aff ord,” 
Propublica (October 4, 2012), at propublica.org.
67  “We want an economy where our debts are to our friends, families, and 
communities—and not to the 1%” (homepage of strikedebt.org).
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securitized credit, ensuring that consumer debtors will typically remain 
wedded to a contract much longer than professional market players.
Th e key fi gures in American neoliberalism cannot of course be held 
responsible for the enormous liberalization of fi nancial markets that 
took place from the 1980s onward. But they were certainly some of the 
fi rst to advocate private over public defi cit spending as a way of fi nanc-
ing investment in “human capital,” and the fi rst to call for the subsidiza-
tion of private credit markets as a way of satisfying the minority desires 
unleashed by the 1960s’ social revolution. Friedman and Becker could 
not have foreseen how dramatically consumer credit markets would 
expand in the following decades, nor could they have anticipated how 
closely the student loan market would approximate their policy prescrip-
tions. Yet they understood very clearly how private credit markets could 
perform democratic inclusion without disturbing the economic struc-
tures of private family wealth.
Today the eff ects of this shift  in public fi nance are experientially self-
evident. Th e Federal Reserve recently published a report seeking to 
explain the fact that a growing number of young adults are living at 
home with their parents well into their twenties and even thirties—a 
demographic trend it attributes fi rst and foremost to college debt.68 Th e 
shift  from public to private investment in so-called human capital has 
forcefully reinvigorated the importance of family debt networks and 
inherited wealth in the shaping of social destinies. Th e eff ect of more 
than three decades of neoliberal economic reform has been to reinstate 
the legal and economic function of the private family as the fi rst-line 
provider of welfare, very much in keeping with the policy prescriptions 
of neoliberals themselves.
68  Zachary Bleemer, Meta Brown, Donghoon Lee, and Wilbert van der Klaauw, 
Debt, Jobs, or Housing: What’s Keeping Millennials at Home? Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Staff  Reports (November 1, 2014), at newyorkfed.org.
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Schumpeter Revival? How Neoliberals 
Revised the Image of the Entrepreneur
Dieter Plehwe
Connecting neoliberalism and entrepreneurship has become a scholarly 
commonplace. Expanding on Michel Foucault, Wendy Brown has elab-
orated on the replacement of political man by economic man: a univer-
salized notion of entrepreneurship dedicated to the self-maximization 
of one’s human capital.1 While acknowledging the neoliberal traditions 
of German ordoliberalism and Austrian economics, Brown’s analysis is 
limited to the Chicago School, with a focus on Gary Becker. William 
Davies, in turn, bases his thesis on the divergent arguments of Mont 
Pèlerin Society (MPS) member Ronald Coase and the critic of the MPS, 
Joseph Schumpeter. Both Coase and Schumpeter justifi ed imperfect 
competition and replaced institutional with psychological formats for 
competition.2
Although Davies links Coase and Schumpeter to the contextual 
changes in competition policies that have been employed since the late 
1970s, he remains silent on the paradox of the Schumpeter revival. Aft er 
all, Schumpeter foresaw the end of capitalism due to the inevitable decline 
of entrepreneurship in managerial capitalism. Davies reports on 
Schumpeter’s pessimism regarding the sociological decline of the class of 
true entrepreneurs. Yet he follows by giving precedence to Schumpeter’s 
1  Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: 
Zone Books, 2015), 17f.
2  William Davies, Th e Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic 
of Competition (Th ousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2014), 54. 
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visionary mindset in his chapter on “competitive psychologies” beyond 
the economic sphere.3
Schumpeter’s essentialist concept of small groups of entrepreneurial 
elites has been resurrected well beyond the confi nes of business leader-
ship. Allegedly “Schumpeterian” explanations of the driving forces of 
economic development have been universalized by management gurus 
and consultants to advance competitiveness strategies of nations and 
regions. Th e small-elite concept has been extended to political and 
cultural leadership responsible for human development at large.4
If the ubiquity of entrepreneurship discourse is impossible to miss, 
scholarly explanations of its origins have been more elusive. Neither 
Brown nor Davies deal with the shift  of attention by neoliberals to ques-
tions of institutional and political context since the 1970s, which 
contributed decisively to overcoming essentialist versions of entrepre-
neurship. Nor do they trace important conversations among neoliberals 
on the topic of entrepreneurship that took place from the late 1940s 
onward, which is necessary to shed light on the neoliberal eff ort to 
revive entrepreneurship. Schumpeter played a central but variegated 
and changing role in these conversations. He was the nemesis for those 
who tried to prevent the seemingly inevitable decline of entrepreneur-
ship and also acted as the expert economist in need of correction against 
whom to pitch an alternative neoliberal theory of entrepreneurship.5 
Ultimately, Schumpeter was enlisted as the crown witness for capital-
ism’s revival in direct opposition to his own theory of decline.
Th e failure to untangle the process of reviving and revising 
Schumpeter means that diverse and even contradictory entrepreneur-
ship theories are now presented under the common banner of 
neoliberalism,6 although “[t]here is not much left  of Schumpeter’s 
entrepreneur in the post-Schumpeterian entrepreneurial theories. Only 
3  Ibid., 51–4. 
4  Ibid., 113. 
5  Max Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1995), 102. Johannes Großmann, Die Internationale der Konservativen. Transnationale 
Elitenzirkel und private Außenpolitik in Westeuropa seit 1945 (Berlin: De Gruyter 
Oldenbourg, 2014), 409–16.
6  Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Neoliberalism: Th e Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 
2016), 56f. For an instructive eff ort to distinguish expansive entrepreneurship concepts 
across a) actor groups, b) social and institutional contexts, and c) management levels 
and functions (innovation systems) see Richard Sturn, Varianten des Unternehmertums 
in der Österreichischen Schule (Graz: GSC Discussion Paper No. 18, 2017). 
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the conception that the entrepreneur need not be the owner has 
survived.”7 Critics of neoliberalism are thereby unwittingly complicit 
in covering up important dimensions of the intellectual history of entre-
preneurship and they miss the crux of the matter.
Th e purpose of the entrepreneurship revival was not only to postulate 
allegedly universal characteristics of economic humankind. It also 
morphed into an eff ort to induce a far-reaching conceptual change in 
the understanding of both private and public management. Lost in what 
amounts to a whitewashing of the history of entrepreneurship theory 
are the ambiguities of Schumpeter’s own daimonic understanding of the 
entrepreneur.8 Th e successful integration of Schumpeter in the neolib-
eral narrative of entrepreneurial management indicates a steadily 
increasing neoliberal self-confi dence. Schumpeter was fi rst defeated 
symbolically to create room for neoliberal perspectives before the pres-
tige of his name was integrated in a reinvigorated neoliberal perspective 
on economics, politics, and society.
Th is chapter explains the apparent Schumpeter paradox by tracing 
the postwar evolution of the entrepreneurship revival in neoliberal 
discussions. Alongside Schumpeter, another Austrian émigré econo-
mist, Ludwig von Mises, is central to the story. I show how Austrian 
economists like Mises and his British-born student at NYU, Israel 
Kirzner, alongside German economists like Günter Schmölders and 
Herbert Giersch, as well as a slate of other neoliberal scholars, rebutted, 
revived, and revised Schumpeter’s theory of the entrepreneur from the 
1950s to the 1980s. Apart from what must be considered a pseudo-
Schumpeter revival and the important shift  of attention to internal 
causes of economic development, innovation, and growth by the Kiel 
School of neoliberal economic geographers,9 for example, students of 
Mises like Kirzner helped resurrect a functional and contextual entre-
preneurship theory, which needs far greater attention in the eff ort to 
explain the rise of the entrepreneurial self. Beyond intellectual history, 
7  Peter Swoboda, “Schumpeter’s Entrepreneur in Modern Economic Th eory,” in 
Lectures on Schumpeterian Economics: Schumpeter Centenary Memorial Lectures Graz 
1983, ed. Christian Seidl (Berlin: Springer, 1984), 17–28, 24.
8  Robert Fredona and Sophus A. Reinert, “Th e Harvard Research Center in 
Entrepreneurial History and the Daimonic Entrepreneur,” History of Political Economy 
49, no. 2 (2017): 268–314.
9  Dieter Plehwe and Quinn Slobodian, “Landscapes of Unrest,” Modern Intellectual 
History (August 2017): 1–31; Swoboda, “Schumpeter’s Entrepreneur”, 24.
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a diverse group of neoliberal authors and businessmen—many of them 
MPS members—contributed decisively to moving entrepreneurship 
from the wings of economic theory and economic policy-making onto 
center stage.
Entrepreneurship’s Underdog: Ludwig von Mises
Th e central fi gure in the neoliberal discourse of entrepreneurship is not 
Schumpeter but Ludwig von Mises. As opposed to Schumpeter, who has 
become synonymous with entrepreneurship, Mises has little if any place 
in the mainstream intellectual history of the topic. Th is may be because 
his signature book Human Action,10 published in 1949, “was already 
considered a closed chapter in the history of thought”11 when it fi rst 
appeared, according to his followers. His monetary and business cycle 
theory had been buried by John Maynard Keynes. He was seen to have 
lost the socialist calculation debate to the followers of Leon Walras, and 
his price theory was replaced by the competing Austrian tradition of 
Friedrich von Wieser. Mises’s failure to win a permanent professional 
position in either Vienna or the United States left  him ostracized in the 
academic world. Compared to Schumpeter, employed at Harvard since 
1932, Mises was an outsider in the US educational fi eld with only an 
adjunct position at New York University alongside paid consulting work 
for the Foundation of Economic Education and the National Association 
of Manufacturers.
Despite his professional marginality, Mises’s theories had a formative 
infl uence on the revival of the Austrian School in the US and in Latin 
America aft er the 1970s.12 Part of what made him marginal in the 
1940s—and attractive to Austrian revivalists later—was the grandiosity 
of his scholarly goals. His large and heterodox claim was to have clari-
fi ed not only economic activities, but human action in general. His 
10  Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. Th e Scholarly Edition (Auburn: Ludwig von 
Mises Institute 1998) [German: Nationalökonomie: Th eorie des Handelns und 
Wirtschaft en (Genf: Union, 1940)].
11  Jeff rey M. Herbener, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, and Josef T. Salerno, “Introduction 
to the Scholarly Edition,” in Mises, Human Action, v.
12  Floyd A. Harper, Henry Hazlitt, Leonard Read, Gustavo R. Velasco, and F. A. 
Hayek, eds, Toward Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises (Menlo Park: Institute 
for Humane Studies, 1971).
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central book, Human Action, if professionally ignored, has enjoyed 
popular success, having been translated into eight languages with over 
500,000 copies sold.
A comparison between Mises and Schumpeter on the topic of entre-
preneurship is instructive. Schumpeter pointed to the decline of a 
particular class of entrepreneurs. Th is refl ected a change in the struc-
ture of global capitalism, and especially American capitalism, in the 
1930s and 1940s. Partly as a result of the advance of socialist planning 
and the ideological confl ict between socialism and capitalism, there 
was a growing consensus around large-scale, macroeconomic manage-
ment and planning. Expanding bureaucracies in both the public and 
the private sector undermined the previous role of individual entrepre-
neurship and family fi rms, which Schumpeter had originally led to 
expect society to become more entrepreneurial.13 At the microeco-
nomic level, the modernization theme was mirrored by the new theory 
of the fi rm in the discipline of management and economics. Replacing 
the individualism of entrepreneurship, scholars pointed to the largescale 
organizational dimension and complex management requirements of 
the multi-divisional business organization, or what Alfred Chandler in 
1962 called the “M form.”14 In line with a view to the distribution of 
responsibility, the secret of economic progress lay not in individualism 
and entrepreneurship but in management coordination and the coop-
eration of employees.
Th e rise of giant corporations and bureaucratic management led 
Schumpeter to predict the end of capitalism.15 According to him, 
individual entrepreneurs who were capable of relevant innovations 
and pushing through new combinations in the marketplace in the 
face of resistance (due to the inevitable destruction of previously 
existing market relations) were the true cause of macroeconomic 
progress. Th e successful entrepreneur would thereby also yield 
considerable profi t (temporary monopoly), enabling, eventually, the 
13  Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Th eory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into 
Profi ts, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, trans. Redvers Opie (London: 
Routledge, 1984 [based on original material published by Harvard University Press, 
1934]), 127f.
14  Alfred D. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the 
American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962), 42.
15  Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1942), chapter XII.
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building of lasting (family capital) empires. Too easily forgotten is 
Schumpeter’s reserved attitude about the role of entrepreneurs in 
society at large. While considered agents of change, they were neither 
considered initiators of economic progress per se nor heroes of the 
Ayn Rand variety.16
If Schumpeter came to see entrepreneurs as a doomed class, Mises 
saw entrepreneurship as a general feature of human behavior due to 
the need to make choices under conditions of unavoidable uncertainty. 
For Mises, the entrepreneur was literally everyone. In Human Action, 
Mises defi ned the entrepreneur as “acting man in regard to the changes 
occurring in the data of the market.”17 At the center of his entrepre-
neurial function is the anticipation of the future demand of the 
consumer. Unlike Schumpeter’s focus on innovation and change, for 
Mises the entrepreneur needs nothing but market relations to perform 
his or her role in the economy and society. Th e performance earns 
profi t for the entrepreneur, which is nothing but the acknowledgment 
of the capacity for making the price function work. Th is is why Mises 
reacted with hostility when profi ts were considered expressions of 
malfunctioning markets to be overcome by equilibrium. He saw the 
defense of profi t (and loss) opportunity as central to a free economy 
and society.18
Mises’s theory was marginal, if not totally foreign, to the Marshallian-
Keynesian academic mainstream of the neoclassical synthesis in the 
postwar United States. Yet beyond a rather signifi cant aft erlife with a 
popular readership, Mises’s theory also off ered later neoliberals a source 
for their theory of a general economic system that stood in stark contrast 
to neoclassical equilibrium theory, Marxist historical materialism, and 
other historicist approaches in economics like that of Schumpeter. 
Notwithstanding its limited reception in the discipline of economics 
proper, and the widespread belief in his lack of importance within Mont 
Pèlerin circles, the work of von Mises ended up contributing to one of 
the most important and lasting neoliberal projects of the 1960s and 
1970s: the revival of the concept of entrepreneurship.
16  Fredona and Reinert, “Th e Harvard Research Center,” 289.
17  Mises, Human Action, 255.
18  Ibid. 
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Building on Mises: Kirzner Confronts Schumpeter
Th e topic of entrepreneurship arrived rather slowly at the meetings of 
the Mont Pèlerin Society.19 It was not discussed explicitly until the 
Vichy general meeting in 1967, when Israel Kirzner drew on Mises and 
Hayek in his important paper on “Methodological Individualism, 
Market Equilibrium and the Market Process” in a session on “Th e 
Teaching of Economics at the Present.” Kirzner drew a distinction 
between “Anglo-American price theory” interested in conditions of 
equilibrium and “Austrian price theory” interested in the market 
process. Kirzner suggested that, in contrast to the purely calculating and 
economizing role of the individual in the Anglo-American equilibrium 
world, there was an additional entrepreneurial element in the Austrian 
world of market processes due to the fact that individuals operate under 
conditions characterized by a lack of knowledge necessary to calculate 
and economize. “It is the entrepreneur,” he wrote, “who is the prime 
mover in the market process.”20
It is notable that entrepreneurship entered the business school curric-
ulum precisely at the time when some of the key exponents of the new 
entrepreneurship literature, and Kirzner in particular, started talking 
about teaching economics. Th e fi rst entrepreneurship courses in the 
United States were off ered at Stanford and New York Universities in the 
second half of the 1960s. Th e fi rst entrepreneurship MBA program in 
the United States was off ered in the early 1970s at the University of 
Southern California. A decade later, several hundred undergraduate 
schools and universities featured entrepreneurship courses if not 
programs in the United States alone.21 (Fift y years later, Marroquin 
University in Guatemala would name its own entrepreneurship center 
aft er Kirzner himself).
19  For earlier work of Mont Pèlerin members Otto von Habsburg, president of the 
Centre Europèenne de Documentation et d’Information, and Arvid Fredborg, head of 
the Institut d’Etitudes Politiques Vaduz in Liechtenstein in the 1960s, including eff orts 
to establish a “Free Enterprise University” and an organization in defense of free 
entrepreneurship see Johannes Großmann, Die Internationale, 412.
20  Israel Kirzner, “Methodological Individualism, Market Equilibrium, and Market 
Process,” Il Politico 32, no. 1 (1967), 788.
21  G. T. Solomon and L. W. Fernald, Jr., “Trends in Small Business Management 
and Entrepreneurship Education in the United States,” Entrepreneurship Th eory and 
Practice 15 (1991), 25–39. Compare the “Entrepreneurship Education Chronology” 
off ered by Saint Louis University, at slu.edu.
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Following the Vichy meeting, Kirzner also gave a paper on 
“Entrepreneurship and the Market Approach to Development” at the 
regional meeting of the MPS in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1969. In this 
paper, Kirzner tackled Schumpeter’s concept of innovation entrepre-
neurship. According to him, Schumpeter’s failure to recognize the entre-
preneur as a decision-maker, and his exclusive emphasis on disruptive 
innovation, left  market-correcting policies to planners. Kirzner’s own 
concept considered entrepreneurship decisive to explain the equilibrat-
ing adjustments over time, replacing static equilibrium by intertemporal 
equilibrium. Kirzner distinguished two entrepreneurship issues: a) the 
discovery of the best way of action, and b) actually carrying out activi-
ties no matter if best or second or third best. According to him, the focus 
of the existing entrepreneurship discussion was on the fi rst—
calculative—dimension whereas he conceived of the need to recognize 
the second dimension as the real entrepreneurial function.22 Kirzner felt 
that the diff erence mattered because Schumpeter and all the other 
abstract calculation experts failed to recognize the most important 
concrete dimension of development, namely taking advantage of oppor-
tunities presented by the market process.23
Kirzner’s observations about real-life entrepreneurs were foreshad-
owed by neoliberal interventions in the debate over international devel-
opment. Since the end of the 1950s, development economist and MPS 
member Peter Bauer had used a sociological perspective akin to 
Schumpeter to decry the notion of a lack of entrepreneurs in developing 
countries—a view also shared by important Mont Pèlerin members like 
Wilhelm Röpke.24 Ignoring progressive critics who emphasized a short-
age of (domestic) capital rather than a lack of entrepreneurs, Bauer’s 
emphasis on the market process and entrepreneurship in the South 
sought to advance a universal neoliberal economic perspective in the 
fi eld of development economics.
While Kirzner attacked the eminent economist Schumpeter, he was 
also eager to stress how close Schumpeter’s emphasis on “dynamic 
22  Israel Kirzner, “Entrepreneurship and the Market Approach to Development,” in 
Toward Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises, ed. Floyd A. Harper et al. (Menlo 
Park: Institute for Humane Studies, 1971), 201.
23  Ibid., 203.
24    Dieter Plehwe, “Th e Origins of the Neoliberal Economic Development 
Discourse,” in Th e Road from Mont Pèlerin, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 249.
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disequilibrium”25 and innovation were to his own concept of “alertness” 
and to the independence of entrepreneurship from the factors of 
production.26 According to Schumpeter, only the owners of capital were 
bearing risk, which set his reasoning apart from the contributions on 
uncertainty of Frank Knight at the University of Chicago, for example. 
Yet unlike Schumpeter, Kirzner emphasized the market process in which 
the entrepreneur takes a role, rather than the innovative contribution of 
the entrepreneur himself. He did so for a reason: Schumpeter’s wartime 
observations regarding the decline of heroic, innovative entrepreneur-
ship and, correspondingly, family fi rms, led him to expect the rise of a 
version of elite socialism that was diffi  cult to counter in the age of 
monopoly capital, large organizations, and managerialism. Th e central 
weakness of Schumpeter’s sociology of entrepreneurship, however, was 
a tendency to naturalize entrepreneurial talent and quality (the substan-
tive capacity of the class of innovative individuals and the macroeco-
nomic relevance of innovations, respectively). Th is was no longer 
needed if the entrepreneur merely reacts to market opportunities rather 
than having to create them. Kirzner’s shift  of attention to the simple 
individual quality of “alertness” and the primacy of market processes 
which present opportunities redirected the argument to the general 
system of thought of Ludwig von Mises.
No macroeconomic dimension of innovation was required to meet 
his threshold of abundant entrepreneurship, and the market process 
trumped market structure in what became a contingency theory of 
more or less restricted entrepreneurship. Following this shift , Mont 
Pèlerin members increasingly directed their attention to the wide range 
of restrictions on entrepreneurship. Instead of the traditional focus on the 
monopoly power of fi rms as an impediment to the market, the subtle 
move towards market practice enabled the shift  of attention to state-
related policy issues like taxation and regulation, and trade-
union-related collective action, as the primary targets of critique.
25  Harald Hagemann, “Capitalist Development, Innovations, Business Cycles and 
Unemployment: Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Emil Hans Lederer,” Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics 25, no. 1 (January 2015): 117.
26  Israel Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1973), 80. 
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Günter Schmölders and the Image of the Entrepreneur
Th e topic of entrepreneurship arrived at the Mont Pèlerin Society in earnest 
in 1970 when the German economist Günter Schmölders opened the 
conference on the “image of the entrepreneur” which took place from 
August 30 to September 5 (on Schmölders and his early contribution to 
behavioral economics, see Graf in this volume). Th e content of the Munich 
MPS conference papers was not a purely academic matter.27 Th e focus on 
the entrepreneur was also part of a strategic agenda-setting eff ort on the 
part of neoliberal intellectual circles in close interaction and collaboration 
with corporate leaders from industry and banking. West Germany’s leading 
technology company, Siemens, provided offi  ce space and logistics. A wide 
range of medium and large German enterprises provided funding. 
Schmölders used the Aktionsgemeinschaft  Soziale Marktwirtschaft  (Action 
Group for a Social Market Economy) and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Selbständiger Unternehmer (Association of Independent Entrepreneurs) to 
obtain funding. Th e former is a think tank fi nanced by corporate members, 
which had been originally founded in 1953 to support Ludwig Erhard’s 
neoliberal version of a social market economy.28 Th e latter is a business asso-
ciation of family fi rms, which had contributed heavily to think tanks.29 Th e 
support from big corporations and family fi rms suggested cross-sectoral 
interest in the entrepreneurship theme in Germany. Instead of an opposi-
tion between big-fi rm management and family-fi rm entrepreneurship, 
there was an emerging consensus on the need for a common approach to 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial management.30 Th e conference 
served to showcase the value and the use of entrepreneurship research and 
education in Germany and internationally. Unsurprisingly, many if not all 
contributions to the conference defended entrepreneurs against critics and 
aimed at advancing entrepreneurship from a normative perspective.31
27  Th e papers were pubished as Günter Schmölders, ed., Der Unternehmer im 
Ansehen der Welt (Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lübbe Verlag, 1971).
28  Ralf Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations 
of the Social Market Economy,” in Th e Road from Mont Pèlerin, ed. Mirowski and 
Plehwe, 98–138.
29  Hartwig Pautz, “Revisiting the Th ink-tank Phenomenon,” Public Policy and 
Administration 26 (2011): 419–35.
30  Unternehmer und Bildung. Festschrift  zum 60. Geburtstag von Ludwig Vaubel 
(Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968).
31  Only B. R. Shenoy from India told his audience that corporate tax evasion was a 
real problem and not just a fantasy of socialist propaganda. His chapter arguably comes 
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In his opening address, Schmölders made three points to undergird 
the new focus on entrepreneurs. First, postwar capitalism had been 
hugely successful, but its very success obscured the foundations of the 
market system, which were considered old-fashioned or even reaction-
ary by much of the public. Th is required a new eff ort to examine the 
functioning of the system, with entrepreneurs as one of the critical 
aspects. Second, this eff ort could help to atone for the longstanding sin 
of omission, namely the missing focus on entrepreneurs and entrepre-
neurship in economics. Much like Kirzner, Schmölders argued that 
attention needed to shift  from abstractions like capital or economic 
laws to the real actors. Th ird, the public opinion of entrepreneurs was 
as important as the role of the entrepreneur in the functioning of the 
economy. Only the deep knowledge of “opinions on facts” allowed 
responsible politicians and their advisors to develop an understanding 
of preference formation processes in economic and economic policy 
questions.32
Schmölders thus set the double task of pursuing both research on 
entrepreneurs as critical agents and research on opinions of entrepre-
neurship in general. Th e lineup for the conference followed the dual 
purpose spelled out by the MPS president. A fi rst group of speakers 
addressed the relevance and image of the entrepreneur in diff erent 
countries, and a second group examined particular groups in society 
and how to improve the image of entrepreneurs. Schmölders himself 
covered Germany, Lawrence Fertig the United States, Francois Bilger 
France, Ralph Horwitz the UK, Chiaki Nishiyama Japan, B. R. Shenoy 
India (complemented by Peter Bauer on developing countries). James 
Buchanan and G. M. Wattles discussed education in the United States. 
Th e roster of speakers on the second theme included Gilbert Tixier on 
the perspective of French tax collectors, Götz Briefs on trade unions, 
Jean-Pierre Hamilius on intellectuals, and Erich Streissler on the left . 
Last but not least, we fi nd Franz Böhm, Milton Friedman and Christian 
Gandil discussing how to improve the image of the entrepreneur. Th e 
closest to Schumpeter’s interest in business history. Shenoy off ered insight into the 
historical impact of the caste system and the institutional restrictions on entrepreneurship 
for members of castes that did not belong to the designated commercial class (Vaishya). 
B. R. Shenoy, “Das Bild vom Unternehmer in Indien,” in Der Unternehmer im Ansehen 
der Welt, ed. Schmölders, 156–71.
32  Günter Schmölders, “Eröff nungsansprache zur Tagung der Mont Pèlerin Society 
am 31. August 1970 in München,” in ibid., 7–11.
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1970 meeting thus placed entrepreneurship fi rmly on the agenda of the 
neoliberal intellectual movement both as subject of analytical research 
and as object of popular promotion eff orts.
Th e unfolding revival agenda at this point in time can be best summa-
rized as an exercise in defensive optimism. Speakers at the 1970 MPS 
conference observed a decline of owner-entrepreneurs along the lines 
expected by Schumpeter. Contrasting the concerns and fears voiced in 
conservative and neoliberal circles during the 1950s and 1960s,33 the 
speakers in Munich highlighted surprising sources of optimism with 
regard to the future of the market economy. Authors pointed to consid-
erable entrepreneurship in large corporations and to the changing 
behavior of average citizens. Fertig observed that 12 percent of 
Americans owned shares, for example, and reported a strong increase in 
the volume of investment funds. Th e former read like a preview of the 
“intrapreneurship” and innovation system discourse to be further 
discussed below, and the latter pointed to the impending expansion of 
scope of the entrepreneurship discussion.
While the familiar neoliberal mood of tragedy is quite present, the 
contributors were also eager to point out bright spots. Schmölders 
emphasized an improving approval rate for the role of entrepreneurs in 
Germany, although other professions were clearly held in higher esteem. 
Compared to the relatively positive accounts of Germany and the United 
States, the British perspectives off ered by Hamilius and Fisher were 
bleak. Negative stereotypes of “Mammonism” were blamed on the poli-
tics of nationalization of industries like coal and steel. Th e French 
picture presented in turn was more positive again. A fi rst wave of opin-
ion surveys on the topic (like in Germany), did not display the expected 
stereotypes of French entrepreneurs (nationalist, protectionist). Th e 
assessment of the role and functioning of enterprises and owners was 
mixed, but Bilger suggested the biggest obstacle was a lack of intimate 
knowledge of French companies. He found old resentments based on 
class struggle to be in decline, while new objections against effi  ciency 
under the keyword of “Americanism” seemed to be fashionable. Tixier 
also pointed to a lack of employer ideology in France, which left  entre-
preneurs feeling helpless in the face of animosities. Japan, in turn, was 
held to suff er from a serious decline in the number of entrepreneurs, 
and the increasing relevance of large enterprises. Kiuchi’s comments 
33  Großmann, Die Internationale der Konservativen, 406f.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   131 10/03/2020   13:59:58
132 Dieter Plehwe
once again lent support to an expanded entrepreneurship perspective 
within the corporate sector.
Th e sociological perspective presented focused on the perceived 
sources of negative public opinion: intellectuals, educators, tax authori-
ties, trade unions, and the left  (though Erich Streissler explicitly 
defended Karl Marx and blamed Rousseau instead for the hostility of 
the New Left  towards entrepreneurship). In a wide-ranging chapter on 
intellectuals and entrepreneurs, Hamilius argued that intellectuals were 
sawing off  the branch on which they were sitting by turning against 
entrepreneurs. Böhm suggested that the eff ort to support entrepreneurs 
needed to be concentrated on the image of the market order. He off ered 
three reasons for the intellectual opposition to entrepreneurs and the 
market: resentment, utopian ideas, and lack of knowledge. Hamilius 
summarized the challenges that entrepreneurs faced in a graphical 
display (Figure 5.1). In the face of manifold and comprehensive chal-
lenges, and the anti-intellectual alternative of totalitarianism, Hamilius 
demanded that the entrepreneur turn himself into an intellectual. One 
can easily interpret this as a recommendation for entrepreneurs to 
strengthen their own corps of organic intellectuals represented by the 
very group assembled at the MPS meeting in Munich.
Aft er 1970, entrepreneurship was no longer considered doomed due 
to an inevitable decline of the class of individual entrepreneurs. Th e 
essentialist perspective of Schumpeter was increasingly replaced by the 
political contingency perspective of Mises. True, the end of the 1960s 
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and early 1970s are usually considered a very dark time for neoliberals. 
Student revolts and working-class collective action reached unprece-
dented levels in many countries, constituting the illiberal tendencies 
neoliberals bemoaned. Reading the papers of the Munich conference, 
however, one sees not just concern but also a clear sense of direction as 
to how to strategically address the challenges.
Firstly, neoliberal scholars used survey studies in diff erent countries 
to direct attention to challenges and to off er solutions to contrast nega-
tive images. Secondly, they developed clarity about the need to defend 
economic freedom and the market system as a whole rather than the 
individual entrepreneur; the entrepreneurship function rather than the 
particular person. Th irdly, they clarifi ed the sources of negative images 
of entrepreneurs, ranging from educators, trade unions, tax offi  cials to 
intellectuals, which served also to develop agendas adequate to address 
particular audiences (e.g. teachers, journalists) in addition to the general 
public. Th is job was given to the growing army of neoliberal think 
tanks.34 Fourthly, authors ascertained the positive roles and functions 
of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship both at the micro and at the 
macroeconomic level. In line with the unambiguous endorsement of 
entrepreneurship, ever more attention was directed at the constraints 
entrepreneurs faced from various sides.
Th e 1970 MPS conference thus marked the end of Schumpeterian 
essentialism and pessimism and a shift  in focus to the conditions of 
economic freedom and entrepreneurship. Apart from delivering clarity 
about the need for lowering constraints on business transactions, the 
conference also marked the beginning of revisionism with regard to 
Schumpeter’s innovation entrepreneurship and a new perspective on 
corporate management. Such revisionism arguably culminated in the 
work of Herbert Giersch, Mont Pèlerin Society president from 1986–88, 
when he announced a new age of Schumpeter in 1984.
34  Richard Cockett, Th inking the Unthinkable: Th ink-Tanks and the Economic 
Counter-Revolution, 1931–83 (London: Harper Collins, 1994); Lee Edwards, Th e Power 
of Ideas: Th e Heritage Foundation at 25 Years (Ottawa, IL: Jameson Books, 1997); Arthur 
Seldon, ed., Th e Prime Mover of Progress: Th e Entrepreneur in Capitalism and Socialism 
(London: Institute of Economic Aff airs, 1980). Quite a number of think tanks even 
refl ect the task in their name. Among those founded in the orbit of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society are the Competitive Enterprise Institute (US, 1984), the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sobre la Libre Empresa (Mexico, 1984), the Instituto de Estudos Empresariais (Brazil, 
1984), and the Institut für Unternehmerische Freiheit (Germany, 2006), for example. 
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Incorporating Schumpeter: Herbert Giersch’s 
Unifi cation of Schumpeter and Mises
Herbert Giersch’s work marks the reversal of previous approaches of 
neoliberals to issues of entrepreneurship. While Mises, Kirzner, 
Schmölders, and many others scrutinized the diff erent constraints 
faced by entrepreneurs, Giersch turned the tables to emphasize the 
constraints that entrepreneurs themselves presented to regulators and 
other enemies of economic freedom at and beyond the scale of the 
region and nation. Th e long-time president of the Kiel Institute for the 
World Economy was at the center of a newfound interest in global 
competitiveness, innovation, and locational dynamics. Unlike well-
known fi gures such Michael Porter, Jeff rey Sachs, and Paul Krugman, 
Giersch has been unjustly forgotten in the Anglo-Saxon discussion of 
new growth economics and new economic geography.35 He and his 
students and colleagues were at the forefront of the development of a 
new—and in Giersch’s case, decidedly neoliberal—economic geogra-
phy. Th ey are also at the center of the intellectual history of the entre-
preneurship revival of the 1980s.
Giersch’s work completes the circle described above. Schumpeter’s 
original perspective was on innovation as disruption coupled with a 
pessimism regarding the future of capitalism. Kirzner refuted 
Schumpeter’s belief in the equilibrating function of entrepreneurship 
and argued that the future of capitalism depended on removing market 
restrictions. Finally, with Giersch, we see the invocation of Schumpeterian 
innovation as the inevitable fate of all economic regions due to globalized 
competition and the realities of technological innovation in communi-
cation.36 Th e world economy as an “object of experience” requires the 
replacement of nationalist ideology with a “cosmopolitan welfare func-
tion (in the sense of Meade . . .)”37 wrote Giersch, suggesting the rise of 
a new version of cosmopolitan capitalism. It was not capitalism in 
general that was doomed due to the lack of a capable class of entrepre-
neurs, but only those regions and nations unwilling or incapable of 
35  Karl-Heinz Paqué , “Die Welt als Kegel und Vulkan,” in Das Zeitalter von Herbert 
Giersch. Wirtschaft spolitik für eine off ene Welt, ed. Lars P. Feld, Karen Horn, and Karl-
Heinz Paqué (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013).
36  Herbert Giersch, “Anmerkungen zum weltwirtschaft lichen Denkansatz,” 
Weltwirtschaft liches Archiv 125, no. 1 (1989): 13. 
37  ibid., 15.
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enabling innovation-oriented competition and advancing the competi-
tiveness of their local economic entities.
Giersch has been considered a modern Keynesian economist in 
Germany, but his work displayed a decisive swerve towards supply-
side economics and Austrian perspectives from the 1970s onward. 
Even before this redirection he was personally close to Hayek and 
maintained a friendship with him throughout his life. For example, 
Giersch’s wife, Friederike, herself a PhD in economics, reported in a 
personal letter that the Gierschs and Hayek met in January 1978 at 
the European Management Forum in Davos.38 In 1983, Giersch 
presented at the Davos Forum again, this time on the topic of 
Europessimism. He was soon to publish his famous diagnosis of 
“Eurosclerosis,”39 demanding and supporting deregulation and the 
European liberalization required to enable cross-border competition 
and the passage to a more complete single European market. 
Notwithstanding his faith in the moving force of globalization, 
Giersch was an important neoliberal agenda-setter in European inte-
gration and global trade politics.
Giersch published his seminal text on the new age of Schumpeter in 
1984,40 which marked the end of the age of merely defensive optimism 
within MPS neoliberalism. Now relying on a selective reading of 
Schumpeter, neoliberals like Giersch proudly professed a new confi -
dence in greatly expanded notions of entrepreneurship. Th e age of 
Keynes and macroeconomic steering had come to an end according to 
Giersch. Keynes is presented as the pessimist instead of Schumpeter, 
who is turned into a trusting supporter of capitalist revival right aft er 
World War II.
Th is point about “regenerative creeds”—made in 1946 [by Schumpeter 
against Keynes]—highlights Schumpeter’s postwar optimism. Th e 
point is gaining more and more relevance in our present phase of slow 
world economic growth, a phase with cumulating pains of delayed 
adjustment. In such a phase, the faith in the regenerative forces of a 
38  Friederike Giersch, Letter to Hayek, December 31, 1977. I thank the estate of F. 
A. Hayek for permission to quote from his correspondence.
39  Herbert Giersch, “Eurosclerosis: Th e Malaise that Th reatens Prosperity,” 
Financial Times, January 2, 1985.
40  Herbert Giersch, “Th e Age of Schumpeter,” Th e American Economic Review 74, 
no. 2 (1984), 103–9.
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decentralized market system has once more become critical for the 
choice of the appropriate socioeconomic paradigm.41
Giersch’s research focus from the second half of the 1970s onward was 
on structural change in the world economy. Th is positioned him to 
address supply-side conditions in general and entrepreneurial activity 
in particular. He merged the German tradition of marginalist locational 
economics of Th ünen and Lösch with the dynamic evolutionary 
economics of Schumpeter.
At the heart of Giersch’s new economic geography was what he called the 
“Schumpeter volcano,” a center of innovation in a specifi c location, which 
would provide the innovating company or business unit with a temporary 
monopoly. Once the innovation “lava” fl owed downward and cooled, 
competitive advantage was lost. Th e volcano thus must continue producing 
new innovations (new technologies) or move to the margins in the process 
of locational competition (Standortwettbewerb). While established “volca-
noes” can maintain their position due to incumbency eff ects, the frame-
work allows for imitation and the possibility of new centers to emerge and 
successfully compete with existing fi rms, business units, and regions.
In line with Mises, innovation thus became a function of enabling 
factors and actively jumping at chances rather than an essential and rare 
ingredient of the economic process. Th e entrepreneurial mindset has to 
function perpetually or else miss opportunities and pass the command 
on to others. Giersch quite obviously follows Kirzner without explicit 
reference to his notion of alertness. To this end, local, regional, and 
national entities can align policies in favor of competitive practices. 
Successful entrepreneurship is seen to require complementary public 
and private initiative and resolve. While trade economists and new 
economic geographers like Krugman would challenge free trade on a 
similar basis, Giersch was adamant about unrestricted movements of 
capital, goods, and to a certain extent, labor. Support for innovative 
regions and companies would need to combine open markets and 
enabling policies for market participants.42
In reaction to the slow growth patterns of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Giersch directly opposed Keynesian economics in his nine-point 
program allegedly based on Schumpeter. His third point noted:
41  Ibid., 105.
42  Paqué, “Die Welt als Kegel und Vulkan.”
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What matters most in present circumstances are the driving forces of 
economic development. Emphasis, therefore, is on the growth and 
dissemination of knowledge, on path breaking entrepreneurs and 
eager imitators, on credit creation for the supply of venture capital, 
and on Schumpeterian competition (i.e. on innovative monopolistic 
competition rather than sterile perfect competition, on oligopolistic 
rivalry rather than collusive equilibria and on aggressive trading 
rather than arbitrage transactions). In the international economy, 
which Schumpeter mostly neglected [sic!], emphasis is on free trade 
rather than fair trade (trade minus competition) and on export orien-
tation rather than import substitution.43
Giersch’s last point number nine reads: “Entrepreneurial talent is in 
almost unlimited supply, but it oft en fi nds productive outlets only 
abroad, or less productive (or even counterproductive) use in politics 
and government, in public and private bureaucracies or in the military.”44 
Giersch evidently took his page from Mises. Entrepreneurs are every-
where, both in the public and the private sector: in human action 
hampered or enabled by the institutional make-up of society. Once deci-
sion-makers embrace this understanding, society can be moved towards 
productive entrepreneurship. Otherwise society will have to live with an 
exodus of talent to better locations and with sub-optimal application of 
the remaining talent.
In the 1980s, Giersch divided the world into advanced innovative 
(Schumpeterian) regions—at the time US and Japan—and less devel-
oped Schumpeterian regions like Taiwan and Singapore, and 
advanced Keynesian and less developed Keynesian regions, which 
hampered entrepreneurship. Additional regions were categorized as 
Ricardian, Malthusian, or Marxist. Progressive change was on the 
way in the Keynesian regions (of Europe) due to disillusionment 
with the welfare state and increasing sensibility for the fiscal crisis, 
the growth of the shadow economy, mass unemployment and the 
spectacular growth of self-employed and employees in new busi-
nesses, and, last but not least, the decentralization potential of new 
telecommunication technologies.45
43  Giersch, “Th e Age of Schumpeter,” 105. Emphasis added.
44  Ibid., 106.
45  Ibid., 108.
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Giersch’s dynamic reasoning has subsequently been vindicated by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the ongoing and massive neoliberal 
transformation of welfare state capitalism in the OECD world. Dynamics 
of structural change unsettled most national and regional economies, 
which ironically became increasingly subject to strategic planning, both 
public and private, precipitating the neo-nationalist rise of right-wing 
populism following the global fi nancial crisis. Contrary to anti-statist 
rhetoric, the (competition) state has been charged with advancing the 
neo- and post-Schumpeterian notions of entrepreneurship through 
regional, educational, economic, and even social policies. Giersch 
himself speaks of a post-Schumpeterian approach because of the limits 
and problematic ambiguities of the original. While older welfare state 
institutions were and are shrinking, new public management and public-
private governance institutions are advancing at all levels of govern-
ment, supranational, national, regional, and local. Competitiveness has 
become the universal buzzword for all kinds of “market units,” individ-
ual, companies, regions, states, and world regions.46
With regard to the new economic geography based on neo- and post-
Schumpeterian (Gierschian) insights it is important to emphasize both 
the political dimension and the openness or non-local dimensions. 
Unlike Porter, Giersch did not perceive competitive advantages in terms 
of a local or national combination and allocation of resources. Th e world 
market was the key referent, attracting mobile factors of production to 
the most competitive region: capital and knowledge. Flexible regions are 
upwardly mobile, and regions marked by rigidity are prone to decline. 
Local endowments can be more or less favorable to local development, 
but they do not explain the trajectory.
Contrary to Kirzner’s eff ort to de-emphasize innovation and the 
resulting disruption, Giersch reinstated the innovator-entrepreneur 
without reinstating the small social class of Schumpeter’s elite entrepre-
neurs. Instead, Giersch adopted the far-and-wide approach to risk and 
responsibility carrying entrepreneurship off ered by Knight and Mises, 
and the special ability entrepreneur off ered by Kirzner, all fellow MPS 
members. All these elements of an individualist entrepreneurial mind-
set fed the new perspective of entrepreneurial management, collabora-
tion in innovation systems and “intrapreneurship,” or “Schumpeter 
46  See Davies, Th e Limits of Neoliberalism.
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Mark 2.”47 Creative destruction would no longer require the boom and 
bust of the fi rm. Giersch raised the question: Is there “enough good 
entrepreneurial talent and if not  . . . can [we] produce more of it by 
forming teams?” His “tentative” answer was “there is no shortage of 
entrepreneurial talent, but institutional resistances and technical 
requirements may create so complicated situations that no single person, 
but only a combination of persons, can successfully perform the entre-
preneurial role.48
Herbert Giersch’s entrepreneurship amounts to the paradox of indi-
vidualism. Th e complexity of contemporary capitalism requires a collec-
tive eff ort disguised by a language of entrepreneurship. Individual entre-
preneurial behavior aside, the discussion is focused on the fi rm, on 
capital, on technological knowledge, and on managerial skill for the 
entrepreneurial talent to work out. Since it is probably “easier for a 
person to acquire managerial skills than to accumulate capital, it appears 
evident that capitalists will normally hire entrepreneurs. In this case, 
capital becomes the limiting factor and the barrier to entry,” writes 
Giersch.49 Note that the person hires managerial skills suddenly rather 
than entrepreneurial talent. Entrepreneurial management of companies 
and regions is not considered in contrast to economic and political 
intervention and planning. Entrepreneurship criteria simply replace the 
traditional socioeconomic criteria (e.g. GDP per capita) for regional 
and national development. Weaker regions are no longer treated as 
equal. Deserving regions are those that support entrepreneurial initia-
tive and forge an ever-closer alliance of public and private actors to this 
end.
In any case Giersch declined the invitation off ered by several authors 
to integrate entrepreneurship into the realm of macroeconomic neoclas-
sical equilibrium thinking. Th e important link between Schumpeter, 
Mises, Kirzner, Schmölders, and Giersch is the emphasis on market 
process, dynamic, and change. Th e vastly expanded vision of individual 
entrepreneurship we already found in the writing of Mises and expressed 
by some of the speakers at the 1970 MPS conference was thereby consol-
idated in a theoretical position, and was ready to be projected to ever 
47  Sturn, Varianten des Unternehmertums, 10.
48  Herbert Giersch, “Th e Role of Entrepreneurship in the 1980s,” Kiel Discussion 
Papers (August 1982): 5. 
49  Ibid., 6.
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wider classes of citizens within corporations (intrapreneurship) and 
outside. Th e underemployed and unemployed are turned into self-
employed, provided the political institutions are adequately reformed 
and the incentives are right. Giersch calls this the demand side for entre-
preneurship, “the demand permitted, induced or actively provoked by 
the socio-economic structure and the political and cultural 
environment.”50 Th e demand for entrepreneurship, in other words, 
depends on the social arrangements in support of economic freedom. 
“Th e central question is  . . . What institutional frameworks are best-
suited to tap the reservoir of entrepreneurial alertness which is certainly 
present among the members of society? Th e answer is that entrepre-
neurial talent is ‘switched on’ by the prospect of ‘pure gain’—broadly 
defi ned to include fame, prestige, even the opportunity to serve a cause 
or to help others.”51 Progress in favor of entrepreneurship can thus be 
measured by reforms dedicated to enabling the prospect of pure gain, to 
advance economic freedom broadly conceived, and reaching far into the 
nonprofi t sector to advance social entrepreneurship and civic engage-
ment. Restrictions on economic freedom included the welfare state and 
the whole range of legal regulatory measures that compromise price 
signals.52
Conclusion
Excavating and reconstructing the entrepreneurship discourse from the 
1960s to the 1980s complements the existing narrative about the rise of 
shareholder-value ideas in the United States. Apart from the American 
students of Ludwig von Mises like Israel Kirzner, many of the key actors 
were located in Europe. Th e rise of the German-language literature on 
the entrepreneurship topic (Unternehmertum) during the 1970s and 
50  Ibid., 15.
51  Israel Kirzner, “Th e Primacy of Entrepreneurial Discovery,” in Th e Prime Mover 
of Progress, ed. Seldon, Summary / Extracts 1–2.
52  Th e history of the institutionalization of policy instruments in support of 
entrepreneurship—such as the Economic Freedom Index, developed by the Canadian 
Fraser Institute with funding from the Liberty Fund (Indianapolis) during the second 
half of the 1980s and the early 1990s—remains to be written. See Steve H. Hanke and 
Stephen J. K. Walters, “Economic Freedom, Prosperity, and Equality: A Survey,” Cato 
Journal 17, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 117–46, and Jim Stanford, Economic Freedom for the Rest of 
Us (Halifax: Canadian Autoworkers Union, 1999), at www.csls.ca. 
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1980s was arguably due to the challenges emanating from institutional 
restrictions like co-determination and corporatist arrangements. 
Paradoxically, arm’s-length-type market relations gave rise to manageri-
alism and planning in the United States, whereas institutions of coordi-
nated capitalism generated a strong sensibility for the role and relevance 
of entrepreneurs.
But the new entrepreneurial behavior was certainly not just left  as a 
choice for individuals. All kinds of state and private institutions involved 
in regional and business development, education, and even unemploy-
ment insurance and labor exchanges were involved in craft ing the new 
entrepreneurship agendas quite in line with the thinking and advice of 
neoliberal intellectuals like Herbert Giersch. Take Germany as an exam-
ple: transfer payments for economic development are no longer distrib-
uted evenly across space and population. Th ey are redirected to promis-
ing locations and fi rms.53 Private companies in turn provide incentives 
for intrapreneurship: most company units are now organized according 
to the cost-center principle to simulate market relations within corpora-
tions. Th e meaning and practice of managerialism has changed signifi -
cantly as a result. Public sector universities receive additional funding 
specifi cally for the establishment of entrepreneurship chairs, and both 
public and an increasing number of private business schools and univer-
sities engage in entrepreneurship education and support for start-ups.54
Following the Hartz reforms of social security and unemployment 
insurance, long-term unemployed people in Germany are off ered 
monthly payments to start their own business for up to three years. 
Hundreds of thousands of new small businesses dubbed Ich-AG 
(I-corporation) have been funded, albeit with mixed success. In any case 
it is clear that entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial behavior is not left  
to natural development or chance. Th ere is a common and clear under-
standing across the mainstream political parties now to transform 
public and private institutions in support of entrepreneurship. Only a 
53  Neil Brenner, “Building ‘Euro-Regions’: Locational Politics and the Political 
Geography of Neoliberalism in Post-Unifi cation Germany,” European Urban and 
Regional Studies 7, no. 4 (2000): 319–45.
54  Jasmina Haus, Förderung von Unternehmertum und Unternehmensgründungen 
an deutschen Hochschulen (Lohmar: Josef Eul Verlag, 2006). By 2017, German 
universities counted 133 entrepreneurship chairs. Although the United States had 
already reached the number of 400 chairs in 2004, the number of chairs per capita are 
now approximately even in the US and Germany. Compare the tables and statistics 
supplied by FGF e.V. online at fgf-ev.de.
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lack of political initiative and stamina gives reason for pessimism, pace 
Schumpeter.
While Mises is not invoked nearly as frequently in the ongoing revival 
as Schumpeter, it is the former who can be seen smiling. Following the 
general theory of Human Action, neoliberals subscribe to the axiomatic 
statement according to which the potential supply of entrepreneurship is 
unlimited. Demand can be raised, according to Giersch, by ending the 
growth of restrictive rules and regulations, by way of overcoming the 
“domestic imperialism of the welfare state,” by stopping “the growth of 
bureaucracy within industry, greatly but only partly induced by govern-
ment bureaucracy,” and by ending “excessive wage pressures from 
organized labor.”55 Freedom of action thus becomes freedom of profi t-
oriented management, and the entrepreneurial self is shrinking to self-
reliance and individual responsibility of those not fortunate enough to 
forge a liaison with capital owners.
55  Giersch, “Role of Entrepreneurship,” 12.
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Human Behavior as a Limit to and a 
Means of State Intervention: Günter 
Schmölders and Behavioral Economics
Rüdiger Graf
Over the last fi ft een years, behavioral economists have increasingly 
provided policy-makers with the expertise to use the heuristics and 
biases of people’s decision-making processes in order to infl uence or, in 
the words of Richard Th aler and Cass Sunstein, “nudge” them in the 
spirit of what they call “libertarian paternalism.”1 Criticizing this 
approach, the French economist Gilles Saint-Paul argues that the grow-
ing infl uence of the behavioral and social sciences on policy-making 
might lead to a “tyranny of utility.”2 Referring to F. A. Hayek’s Th e Road 
to Serfdom, he describes economics as the guardian of individual liberty 
and the values of the Enlightenment. Recent developments, he suggests, 
threaten these ideals: “If current trends continue, I foresee a gradual 
elimination of individual freedom as ‘social science’ makes progress in 
documenting behavioral biases, measuring happiness, and evaluating 
the eff ects of coercive policies.”3 Whereas Hayek feared social democ-
racy, communism, and National Socialism, Saint-Paul sees tyranny 
lurking in present-day behavioral policy. Neoliberal critics of state 
1  Richard H. Th aler and Cass R. Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” Th e American 
Economic Review 93, no.  2 (2003); Richard H. Th aler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: 
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness (London: Penguin Books, 
2009). I would like to thank Ralf Ahrens, Dieter Plehwe, and Quinn Slobodian for their 
helpful suggestions and critical comments on this chapter.
2  Gilles Saint-Paul, Th e Tyranny of Utility: Behavioral Social Science and the Rise of 
Paternalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Th aler and Sunstein, Nudge.
3  Saint-Paul, Th e Tyranny of Utility, 4.
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interventionism echo this rejection. In 2014, for example, when Angela 
Merkel announced the creation of a government unit on behavioral 
policy (catching up on a development that had already taken place in 
most other Western countries),4 Mont Pèlerin Society member Philip 
Plickert immediately rejected the idea as driven by a paternalistic intru-
sion into private lives.5
Th e source of the confl ic t between behavioral economics—or, more 
broadly, behavioral public policy—and neoliberalism, seems evident at 
fi rst glance. Aft er all, behavioral economists reject the homo economicus 
of neoclassical economics upon which neoliberals are assumed to make 
their claims.6 Behavioral economists contend that individuals possess 
only a limited or “bounded rationality” that restricts their capacity to act 
freely as their decision-making processes are infl uenced by irrelevant 
factors. Systematically and predictably, people fail to choose what is in 
their best interest. If human capacities to appreciate costs and benefi ts, 
evaluate probabilities or exercise self-control are severely limited by 
behavioral principles beyond individual control, people are only “free to 
choose”—as Milton and Rose Friedman entitled their popular book and 
TV series—in a restricted sense of the word freedom.7
Yet closer examination reveals a more complex relationship, demon-
strating that the gap between behavioral economics and neoliberal 
thought may not be as wide as it seems. Hayek, the founding father of 
the MPS, rejected the abstraction of homo economicus in favor of a 
subjectivism characteristic of Austrian economics. He also thought it 
was impossible to achieve full knowledge and saw the imperfections of 
human rationality as reasons to advocate the market as a clearing 
mechanism between competing perspectives and interests.8 Hence, in 
4  Mark Whitehead et al., “Nudging all over the World: Assessing the Global Impact of 
the Behavioral Sciences on Public Policy,” at changingbehaviours.fi les.wordpress.com.
5  Philip Plickert, “Paternalisten,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 27, 2014.
6  S. Mullainathan and Richard H. Th aler, “Behavioral Economics,” in International 
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes, eds. vol. 2 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2001), 2, 1095.
7  Sören Brandes, “ ‘Free to Choose’: Die Popularisierung des Neoliberalismus in 
Milton Friedmans Fernsehserie (1980/90),” Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in 
Contemporary History 12, no. 3 (2015).
8  F. A. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge” (London Economic Club, November 
10, 1936), in Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1948); Hayek, “Individualism: True and False” (Twelft h Finlay Lecture, Dublin, 
December 17, 1945), in ibid.; Hayek, “Th e Overrated Reason,” Journal of the History of 
Economic Th ought 35, no. 2 (2013).
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1986 the editors of the fi rst handbook on behavioral economics quoted 
Hayek approvingly.9 More recently, he has even been described as a 
fi rst-generation behavioral economist in line with Herbert Simon, 
 George Katona, Harvey Leibenstein, Richard Nelson, and Sidney 
Winter.10
Th is chapter off ers a further contribution to the study of the ambiva-
lent relationship between neoliberalism and behavioral economics by 
examining the lesser-known German fi nance and taxation expert 
Günter Schmölders, who served as president of the MPS from 1968 to 
1970. As a professor in Cologne in the 1950s, Schmölders founded his 
own research institute on “empirical socioeconomics” or “economic 
behavioral research,” trying to integrate fi ndings from the social and 
anthropological sciences into economic reasoning and developing an 
early and now largely forgotten version of behavioral economics.11 
Analyzing Schmölders’s extensive writings on economics under three 
diff erent political regimes, I will try to answer the question of how he 
reconciled the rejection of homo economicus and the emphasis on the 
need for behavioral research with an approach to economics that made 
him a prominent member of what has been described as the neoliberal 
thought collective.12 On the one hand, I will argue that, in the vein of 
German ordoliberalism, Schmölders criticized certain forms of state 
intervention but, in general, favored a strong state to guarantee func-
tioning markets. On the other hand, it will turn out that acknowledging 
behavioral biases and rejecting a rational, self-interested decision-maker 
can serve as a reason for both restricting and enhancing state interven-
tion. Th erefore, behavioral economics can promiscuously serve various 
economic policies.
9  Benjamin Gilad and Stanley Kaish, eds, Handbook of Behavioral Economics: 
Behavioral Microeconomics (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1986), xx–xxi: “As early as 1945, 
Hayek’s famous essay, ‘Th e Use of Knowledge in Society,’ contended that the most 
important function of the market system is ‘the utilization of knowledge which is not 
given to anyone in its totality’.”
10  Roger Frantz, “Frederick [sic] Hayek’s Behavioral Economics in Historical 
Context,” in Hayek and Behavioral Economics, ed. Roger Frantz and Robert Leeson 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1.
11  Floris Heukelom’s history of behavioral economics does not even mention 
Schmölders, who had only limited reception in the Anglophone world. Floris Heukelom, 
Behavioral Economics: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
12  Philip Mirowski, “Postface: Defi ning Neoliberalism,” in Th e Road from Mont 
Pèlerin, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2009).
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Aft er outlining Schmölders’s academic upbringing in Weimar 
Germany and his early career under National Socialism, I analyze why 
and how he developed his theory of behavioral economics, comparing it 
with the simultaneous, yet largely independent, emergence of Herbert 
A. Simon’s conception of “bounded rationality” in the United States.13 
Aft er that, I will examine to what extent Schmölders’s analysis of human 
behavior that drew on results from neighboring disciplines informed his 
economic expertise and policy advice in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. In conclusion, I will try to assess both Schmölders’s specifi c 
version of behavioral neoliberalism as well as the relationship between 
neoliberalism and behavioral economics more generally.
Alcohol, Taxation, and Price Policy—Schmölders 
in Weimar and the Third Reich
Günter Schmölders was born in 1903, the son of a lawyer and grandson 
of the Breslau orientalist August Franz Schmölders. In Berlin and 
Tübingen he studied political economics (Staatswissenschaft en), receiv-
ing his doctorate in 1926 with a study of diff erent systems of prohibition 
in Northern Europe. Six years later, Schmölders wrote his habilitation 
thesis on the fi scal potential of alcoholic beverage taxation, before 
becoming a professor of political economy at the University of Breslau. 
In 1940, he assumed the prestigious chair for political economy at the 
University of Cologne, now focusing on fi nance. A member of the 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) since May 1933, as 
well as of the Schutzstaff el SS from 1933 to 1937, he served in various 
functions as an economic advisor during the Th ird Reich. Yet, during 
the war, Schmölders also draft ed an economic program for European 
postwar recovery for the oppositional Kreisauer Kreis. Aft er 1945, 
Schmölders resumed his position in Cologne, heading the Financial 
Research Institute from 1950, founding the Research Center for 
Empirical Socioeconomics (Forschungsstelle für empirische 
Sozialökonomik) in 1958, and becoming the university’s president in 
1965 and 1966. He remained in Cologne until his retirement in 1973, 
served as a member of the Scientifi c Advisory Board of the German 
13  Herbert A. Simon, “Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Journal of Economics 
69 (1955).
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Federal Ministry of Finance from 1949 to 1972 and of the directorate of 
the Federation of German Tax Payers from 1951 to 1991. On Hayek’s 
invitation, he presented a paper on progressive taxation at the Mont 
Pèlerin Society’s meeting at Seelisberg in 1953 and became a member.14 
At its seventh conference in Aviemore, Scotland, in 1968, Schmölders 
was elected president and organized the following meeting in Munich in 
1970 which, on his suggestion, was dedicated to the “entrepreneur in 
modern economy and society.”15
In his early works in Weimar Germany, Schmölders examined the 
economic and fi scal as well as general political and social eff ects of the 
prohibition and taxation of alcoholic beverages, touching upon themes 
that would occupy him for the rest of his life as an economist, political 
advisor, and public intellectual.16 Schmölders criticized prohibition 
because it failed to reduce alcohol abuse and had negative side eff ects, 
undermining state authority, harming the economy, and decreasing 
state revenues. In particular, the “massive sociological experiment” in 
the United States had failed to change the “deeply rooted habits of the 
whole of humanity.”17 Comparing the taxation of alcoholic beverages in 
various countries in his habilitation thesis, Schmölders concluded that 
taxes could not eff ectively reduce alcohol consumption but only help to 
increase state revenues.18 In general, Schmölders maintained that it was 
paradoxical to use taxation to infl uence consumption patterns and 
improve public health, because reaching the non-fi scal goal simultane-
ously diminished the fi scal eff ect. Even worse, taxation for non-fi scal 
purposes would undermine people’s willingness to pay taxes as well as 
their loyalty to the state.19 In his inaugural lecture at Berlin University 
in January 1932, Schmölders generalized these fi ndings further, arguing 
14  Communication and paper in: Hoover Institution, Stanford CA, Schmölders 
(Günter) papers 1940-1985, 85017 [hereaft er: Hoover Institution, Schmölders papers], 
Box-folder 179.
15  On the meeting see Plehwe’s contribution to this volume.
16  Günter Schmölders, Prohibition im Norden: Die staatliche Bekämpfung des 
Alkoholismus in den nordischen Ländern (Berlin: Unger, 1926).
17  Günter Schmölders, Die Prohibition in den Vereinigten Staaten: Triebkräft e und 
Auswirkungen des amerikanischen Alkoholverbots (Leipzig: C. L. Hirschfeld, 1930), v. 
18  Günter Schmölders, Die Ertragsfähigkeit der Getränkesteuern: Vergleichende 
Übersicht über die Voraussetzungen der Alkoholbesteuerung im Deutschen Reich, in 
Großbritannien, Frankreich, der Schweiz, Dänemark und den Vereinigten Staaten: ein 
Beitrag zur deutschen Finanzreform (Jena: Fischer, 1932), 4–5.
19  Ibid., 2–4 and 232–4. 
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that there was a specifi c tax morale that diff ered from conceptions of 
morality in other fi elds.20 Th is tax morale could easily be undermined if 
people felt overburdened or treated unfairly or even if the state spent tax 
revenues unwisely. Th ese beliefs—which Schmölders developed in the 
second half of his twenties while the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic 
eroded due to attacks from left - and right-wing extremists as well as the 
growing discontent among conservative elites with the parliamentary 
system—continued to guide his academic research and political inter-
ventions in the Federal Republic of Germany.
In the meantime, like many other academics of his generation, 
Schmölders eagerly off ered his expertise to the construction of the 
National Socialist state and economic order. He joined the NSDAP in 
May 1933 and the SS in November of the same year. Moreover, he 
became a member of the Association of National Socialist Lawyers 
(NS-Rechtswahrerbund), the National Socialist Lecturers’ League 
(NS-Dozentenbund), the Academy for German Law (Akademie für 
Deutsches Recht) in 1938, worked for the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF), 
and functioned as an advisor to the Gauleiter of Silesia Josef Wagner.21 
Aft er Schmölders had sent a card announcing the birth of his fi rst 
daughter to the SS-journal Das Schwarze Korps in 1936, an investigation 
followed because the SS Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt had no records 
of having granted him permission to marry. Schmölders defended 
himself vigorously, claiming that he had asked for and received permis-
sion, aft er having obtained an expert opinion from a race researcher at 
the Department of the Interior on his wife because, being born in France, 
she lacked documentation about her ancestors.22 Before the issue was 
settled, however, Schmölders left  the SS voluntarily, allegedly for health 
reasons.
Schmölders gained infl uence during the war as an economic adviser 
in Jens Jessen’s class at the Academy for German Law, heading the work-
ing group on price policy. Th e group assembled central fi gures of 
German ordoliberalism, such as Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, who 
were critical of the controlled war economy. Aft er the war, Schmölders 
20  Günter Schmölders, Steuermoral und Steuerbelastung (Berlin: C. Heymann, 
1932).
21  Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereaft er BArch), Sammlung Berlin 
Document Center: PK/Parteikorrespondenz, VBS 1/1170012440, Q 0065.
22  BArch, Sammlung Berlin Document Center: Personenbezogene Unterlagen der 
SS und SA, R 9361-III/180670, F 0473.
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repeatedly described the workings of this group as resistance against the 
Th ird Reich, especially referring to a conference at which a future 
conspirator against Hitler, Peter Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, was 
present.23 Th e publication of the proceedings as “Competition as a 
Means to Enhance Economic Performance and Selection,” which argued 
that the market mechanism was superior to price controls and state 
monopolies in stimulating economic performance, was indeed coura-
geous, as any critique was under the conditions of the National Socialist 
dictatorship. Yet, the contributions hardly amounted to resistance 
against the Th ird Reich, as the National Socialists had few fi xed views on 
economic policy, and the book off ered suggestions on how to improve it, 
focusing in particular on the postwar economic order.24
Carefully calibrating his suggestions with National Socialist ideas, in 
1941 Schmölders even declared at a public lecture celebrating the 
National Socialist seizure of power that the current “elastic administra-
tion of the price stop” was best suited to fulfi ll Hitler’s demand of “wage 
price stability.”25 In the same speech, Schmölders praised National 
Socialist economic policy, acknowledging the Führer’s demand that 
economics had to serve politics. He claimed that the fi rst four-year plan 
had been the most magnifi cent example of economic policy ever 
conducted, and encouraged its further study because it had revolution-
ized existing theories of business cycles.26 According to Schmölders, 
National Socialist economic policy was superior because the authoritar-
ian state off ered greater opportunities for technocracy. In contrast to 
democratic and parliamentary systems, Schmölders argued, there was 
no need to accommodate politicians and interest groups in a dictator-
ship as the government could rely solely on the advice of economic 
23  Günter Schmölders, Lebenserinnerungen: “Gut durchgekommen?” (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1988), 1, 64—82; Hoover Institution, Schmölders papers, 
Box-folder 127.
24  Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft : Die 
Kriegswirtschaft  im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982); Ralf Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus zur 
Sozialen Marktwirtschaft : Stationen des Neoliberalismus in Deutschland (Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft en, 2004), 61–2.
25  Günter Schmölders, Wirtschaft slenkung als angewandte Wirtschaft swissenschaft : 
Festrede gehalten bei der Feier des Tages der nationalen Erhebung verbunden mit der 
feierlichen Immatrikulation für das Trimester 1941 am 29. Januar 1941 (Cologne: Oskar 
Müller Verlag, 1941).
26  Ibid., 16.
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experts.27 In Schmölders’s view, German economic experts were supe-
rior to those populating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Brains Trust” because 
they could rely on the “creative powers of the German spirit with its 
sense for thorough and systematic planning” and organization.28
It would overlook the nature of the National Socialist dictatorship to 
take Schmölders’s public utterances at face value and conclude that he 
was an illiberal advocate of central planning. On the contrary, he was 
critical of monopolistic and collectivistic tendencies and preferred a 
market-oriented economic system, as his 1942/43 memorandum for the 
Kreisauer Kreis on “Th e Economy and Economic Leadership in a 
European Bloc aft er the War” shows.29 Economic competition in a 
market economy, Schmölders argued, was ideally suited to increase effi  -
ciency and stimulate growth as the price mechanism awarded the best 
and punished the worst product better than any planning institution.30 
While Schmölders considered it necessary to stimulate and enhance 
individual economic performance, he rejected plans, orders, and other 
external incentives. Rather, the innate desire to gain money and achieve 
social recognition should be set free. While competition was the funda-
mental principle to engender economic prosperity, Schmölders 
acknowledged that it could produce ineffi  ciencies and injustice and, 
therefore, needed a strong state, setting a legal order to guarantee its 
functioning. In this respect, his vision of the future economic order was 
in line with fellow ordoliberals like Ludwig Erhard, Alexander Müller-
Armack, and the Freiburg School, who later helped to create the “social 
market economy” in the Federal Republic.31 For some time aft er the 
war, Schmölders even saw the “necessity of some steering of produc-
tion” at least in “parts of the economy.” Th is should be done by means of 
subsidies and benefi ts that would not disturb the price mechanism in 
principle.32 In sum, Schmölders’s early writings exhibit both an adher-
ence to the core principles of ordoliberalism (superiority of markets; 
27  Ibid., 23. 
28  Ibid., 26. 
29  Günter Schmölders, “Wirtschaft  und Wirtschaft sführung in einem Europa-
Block nach dem Kriege,” in Personalistischer Sozialismus: Die 
Wirtschaft sordnungskonzeption des Kreisauer Kreises der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung 
(Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969), 67–91; similar statements in Hoover Institution, 
Schmölders papers, Box-folders 21-23.
30  Ibid., 76.
31  Ptak, Ordoliberalismus, 90–132.
32  Schmölders, Wirtschaft  und Wirtschaft sführung, 88.
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need for a strong state to secure economic competition) and a fl exibility 
to adapt them to changing political circumstances. His economic liber-
alism had apparently no intrinsic connection to civil liberties and demo-
cratic political institutions, as will also become clear in his later inter-
ventions as a public intellectual.
Economic Behavioral Research and Empirical 
Socioeconomics in Cologne
Staying in his position as a professor in Cologne and becoming the 
director of the university’s Financial Research Institute in the 1950s, 
Schmölders pursued two diff erent but closely interconnected research 
interests. On the one hand, he scrutinized diff erent methods of taxation 
in order to off er political advice for the reform of the German taxation 
system. On the other hand, he set out to develop a new academic fi eld 
that he called “economic behavioral research” (ökonomische 
Verhaltensforschung) or, later, “empirical socioeconomics” (empirische 
Sozialökonomik). Comparing taxation systems in various countries, 
Schmölders developed a “General Th eory of Taxation” that was supposed 
to off er scientifi c guidance for the “Great” or “Organic Tax Reform” in 
the Federal Republic. According to Schmölders and many of his 
colleagues, a general overhaul of the German taxation system was neces-
sary because the taxation levels that resulted from “dictatorship and the 
war economy” impeded rationalization and risk-taking.33 In their report 
for the German Ministry of Finance, most taxation experts agreed that 
exceedingly high taxes would undermine the market economy itself.34 
While there were some dissenting voices, arguing that the potential to 
change the wealth distribution by means of taxation was higher, most 
experts assumed that above a rather low “psychological breaking point” 
(using the English term in their report), tax resistance would intensify 
and tax morale decrease.35
33  Günter Schmölders, Die große Steuerreform (Bad Nauheim: Vita-Verlag, 1953), 
5–6.
34  Wissenschaft licher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen, ed., 
Organische Steuerreform: Bericht an den Herrn Bundesminister der Finanzen (Bonn, 
1953), 12. Fritz Terhalle was head of the advisory council and Günter Schmölders 
among those members who draft ed the fi nal report.
35  Ibid., 12. 
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   151 10/03/2020   13:59:59
152 Rüdiger Graf
When Arthur Laff er was still a child, Schmölders’s primary research 
interest was to locate this psychological breaking point and, thereby, 
deduce the ideal level of taxation. In his “General Th eory of Taxation,” 
he argued that the essential purpose of taxation was to provide the state 
with fi nancial resources to fulfi ll its basic functions, namely, to guaran-
tee the freedom and security of its population and to off er a stable legal 
framework for economic and social activity to take place.36 In line with 
German ordoliberalism, he did not deny the necessity and legitimacy of 
taxation in order to sustain these vital state functions. At the same time, 
however, he vigorously criticized taxes for “non-fi scal purposes,” espe-
cially those that were supposed to infl uence people’s behavior. Coming 
back to the theme of his inaugural lecture and drawing on earlier works 
by Wilhelm Gerloff  and others, Schmölders emphasized that the 
“economic and psychological preconditions on which every taxation 
depended” would prevent the production of state revenues if non-fi scal 
purposes dominated.37 If the burden of taxation increased, people’s 
“taxation morale” would decrease and they would try to avoid paying 
taxes. Having studied the Swedish tax-payers’ movement already in the 
1920s, Schmölders became one of the founding fathers of its German 
counterpart, the German Taxpayers Federation.38 Simultaneously, he 
broadened the scope of his research on “taxation psychology” towards a 
general fi nancial psychology.39
In order to understand people’s fi nancial and economic activity, 
Schmölders argued, it was inadequate to conceptualize them as rational 
utility maximizers presuming a “primitive hedonism.” In his view, 
developments in psychology in the twentieth century had rendered 
such an understanding of human beings obsolete.40 Moreover, 
Schmölders criticized the “eclectic psychologisms” put forward by 
other economists, in particular by John Maynard Keynes, who used 
concepts like “liquidity preference,” “saving propensity,” “inducement 
36  Günter Schmölders, Allgemeine Steuerlehre (Stuttgart: Humboldt-Verlag, 1951).
37  Ibid., 44. 
38  Günter Schmölders, Ursprung und Entwicklung der Steuerzahlerbewegung, 2nd 
edition (Bad Wörishofen: Holzmann, 1977).
39  Günter Schmölders, “Das neue Finanzwissenschaft liche Forschungsinstitut,” in 
Finanzwissenschaft liche Forschung und Lehre an der Universität zu Köln 1927–1967, ed. 
Wilhelm von Menges (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1967), 41.
40  Günter Schmölders, “Finanzpsychologie,” FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis, 
New Series 133, no. 1 (1951/52), 2; Günter Schmölders, Das Irrationale in der öff entlichen 
Finanzwirtschaft : Probleme der Finanzpsychologie (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1960). 
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   152 10/03/2020   13:59:59
Günter Schmölders and Behavioral Economics 153
to invest/save,” or “propensity to consume.”41 Rather, economists should 
take the full spectrum of emotional attitudes and psychological moti-
vations into account, making use of the most advanced sophisticated 
psychological techniques they could fi nd in interdisciplinary exchang-
es.42 According to Schmölders, depth psychology rendered the idea of 
the rational homo economicus absurd. He remarked ironically that it 
was even more absurd to assume a “gladly giving” or a “stupid” human 
being, a “homo libenter contribuens” or a “homo stultus,” as some 
policy-makers apparently did.43 Against these idealizations or even 
caricatures, Schmölders emphasized the need for empirical research on 
the actual behavior of economic actors in real-world situations, as was 
conducted at his Research Center on Empirical Socioeconomics.
In 1953, Schmölders published a fi rst programmatic paper on 
“economic behavioral research” in the journal Ordo, which Walter 
Eucken and Franz Böhm had founded aft er World War II, giving 
German ordoliberalism its name.44 Publication in Ordo, however, did 
not mean that other ordoliberals endorsed his ideas. On the contrary, 
Fritz W. Meyer and Hans Otto Lenel—who had both studied with Walter 
Eucken in Freiburg and now functioned as Ordo’s editors, with Meyer 
also being a member of the Mont Pèlerin Society—explicitly distanced 
themselves from Schmölders’s article in their preface: “One paper in this 
volume calls for an economic behavioral research. We have to admit that 
we do not agree with the author on essential points but we hope that the 
article may stimulate discussion on this special topic.”45
In contrast to the editors’ assessment, Schmölders had not intended 
to write a treatise on a specialized topic. Rather, he proposed a thorough 
reorientation of economics as it was commonly researched and taught 
in academia. In no other fi eld of knowledge, according to Schmölders, 
was the gap between theory and practice wider than between economic 
research and economic policy, since economists had withdrawn into an 
“ivory tower of mathematical abstractions and hypothetical logicisms.”46 
41  Schmölders, “Finanzpsychologie,” 2. 
42  Ibid., 2.
43  Ibid., S. 22.
44  Günter Schmölders, “Ökonomische Verhaltensforschung,” Ordo. Jahrbuch für 
die Ordnung von Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft  5 (1953).
45  Fritz W. Meyer and Hans O. Lenel, “Vorwort,” Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung 
von Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft  5 (1953), IX.
46  Schmölders, “Ökonomische Verhaltensforschung,” 204.
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Economic behavioral research was Schmölders’s attempt to bridge the 
gap and overcome the predicament. He carefully distinguished his 
approach from a narrower understanding of traditional behaviorism. 
Economists should make use of all “anthropological sciences” that 
off ered insights into the motives, incentives, and impetuses of economic 
activity: “psychology of the conscious and unconscious (including its 
behavioristic branches), biology and brain science, . . . as well as sociol-
ogy, history, social anthropology, linguistics and comparative animal 
ethology and sociology.”47
For Schmölders, the Archimedean point that economics had lacked 
thus far was to be found in the “laws of human nature,” the invariant 
elements of economic behavior.48 Th e fi rst victim of such a “realistic” 
approach to economic phenomena was the fi gure of the homo 
economicus. It was not only modern psychology that rendered it 
implausible for Schmölders. Ethnographic research also suggested 
that the variety of economic exchanges in diff erent cultures could be 
captured more adequately with the assumption of a “homo institu-
tionalis” governed by unwritten customary laws of morality.49 Close 
but without reference to Hayek’s ideas about the evolutionary primacy 
of customs and habits over reason,50 Schmölders even referred to 
animal ethologists whose experiments allegedly proved that certain 
apes exhibited forms of economic behavior commonly ascribed to 
human beings.51 Th erefore, drawing on Arnold Gehlen’s conservative 
philosophical anthropology, Schmölders suggested that economics 
should neither postulate an idealized decision-maker nor start with 
the individual economic choice act. In contrast to Hayek, he did not 
make the argument that economists could “derive from the knowl-
edge of our own mind in an ‘a priori ’ or ‘deductive’ or ‘analytic’ fash-
ion an (at least in principle) exhaustive classifi cation of all the possi-
ble forms of intelligible behavior.”52 Rather, Schmölders suggested 
that economists should use the means of the neighboring social 
47  Ibid., 205.
48  Ibid., 206.
49  Ibid., 221.
50  Hayek, “Th e Overrated Reason”; see also Hayek, “Individualism.”
51  Günter Schmölders, Der verlorene Untertan: Verhaltensforschung enthüllt die 
Krise zwischen Staatsbürger und Obrigkeit (Düsseldorf: ECON, 1971), 14–15.
52  F. A. Hayek, “Th e Facts of the Social Sciences” (Cambridge, November 19, 1942), 
in Individualism and Economic Order, 68, fn. 8; see also Frantz, “Frederick Hayek’s 
Behavioral Economics,” 15.
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sciences in order to empirically scrutinize the “predictable, regular, 
and to a certain degree evocable behavior that may be called quasi-
instinctive or quasi-automatic.”53
Th e paradigmatic cases for Schmölders’s plea to introduce psycho-
logical and behavioral insights into economic reasoning came from 
the realm of public and private fi nance, focusing on tax morale, trust 
in money, and the psychology of saving. While these fi elds formed the 
core of its research agenda, the Research Center for Empirical 
Socioeconomics also ventured into other areas. Ten years aft er the 
presentation of his research program, Schmölders presented the insti-
tute’s achievements again in Ordo.54 Acknowledging that his previous 
article had failed to spark a debate in the journal, Schmölders proudly 
presented fi ft y-seven publications on what he now called “socioeco-
nomic behavioral research” (sozialökonomische Verhaltensforschung) 
that had been produced in Cologne. Working together with renowned 
public opinion and market research institutes, such as Emnid and 
Allensbach, as well as with the Institute for Applied Mathematics, 
Schmölders’s research center had conducted numerous surveys. Th ey 
analyzed people’s attitudes towards taxation and the state, political 
decision-makers’ knowledge and views on taxation, and, more gener-
ally, how individual households spent their money, and their attitudes 
towards consumption and savings.
With his non-behavioristic approach to the analysis of empirically 
observable behavior, Schmölders was a rather solitary fi gure in the 
German academic economics of his time.55 Yet, he was part of a broader 
international trend of the 1950s to naturalize behavior and analyze it by 
social scientifi c means. Especially in the United States, a funding 
scheme initiated by the Ford Foundation launched a “behavioral revo-
lution,” re-organizing large parts of the social and human sciences 
under the label “behavioral sciences” in order to improve the under-
standing of all aspects of human behavior.56 Neoclassical economists, 
53  Schmölders, “Ökonomische Verhaltensforschung,” 214.
54  Günter Schmölders, “10 Jahre sozialökonomische Verhaltensforschung in Köln,” 
Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft  14 (1963).
55  Hayek was equally careful in distinguishing his approach from classical 
behaviorism. Hayek, “Th e Facts of the Social Sciences,” 65.
56  Bernard R. Berelson, “Behavioral Sciences,” in International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences, vol. 2 (1968), 2; Jeff erson Pooley, “A ‘Not Particularly Felicitous’ Phrase: 
A History of the ‘Behavioral Sciences’ Label,” Serendipities 1 (2016).
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however, generally shied away from interdisciplinary collaboration on 
human behavior.57 An exception to the rule were members of the 
Cowles Commission at the University of Chicago and protagonists of 
early consumers’ research, such as George Katona.58 Having already 
advised the Ford Foundation on its program for the behavioral sciences 
in particular, Herbert A. Simon formulated a research agenda that 
resembled Schmölders’s economic behavioral research. Having worked 
on theories of organization and administration, in 1955 Simon 
suggested to “substitute for ‘economic man’ or ‘administrative man’ a 
choosin g organism of limited knowledge and ability. Th is organism’s 
simplifi cations of the real world for purposes of choice introduce 
discrepancies between the simplifi ed model and the reality; and these 
discrepancies, in turn, serve to explain many of the phenomena of 
organizational behavior.”59 Simon wanted to develop a theoretical 
model of “rational behavior that is compatible with the access to infor-
mation and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by 
organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which they 
exist.”60 While this idea of a “bounded rationality” became infl uential 
for the ascendency of behavioral economics in the 1980s, Schmölders 
was not that successful and his empirical socioeconomics appear rather 
as an episode in the history of German economics.61
Schmölders claimed that he had been unaware of Simon and the 
eff orts of the Ford Foundation before the publication of his program-
matic piece in Ordo. Yet, aft erwards he saw it as a boon to his position.62 
Despite their diff erences in intellectual scope, theoretical ambition, and 
style, there were salient commonalities between Schmölders’s and 
Simon’s early attempts to establish a research program in behavioral 
57  Jeff erson Pooley and Mark Solovey, “Marginal to the Revolution: Th e Curious 
Relationship between Economics and the Behavioral Sciences Movement in 
Mid-Twentieth-Century America,” History of Political Economy 42 (annual supplement) 
(2010), 200.
58  Heukelom, Behavioral Economics, 48–82; Esther-Mirjam Sent, “Behavioral 
Economics: How Psychology Made Its (limited) Way Back into Economics,” History of 
Political Economy 36, no.  4 (2004); Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics 
Becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 242–55, 266.
59  Simon, “Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” 114.
60  Ibid., 99.
61  Matthias Klaes and Esther-Mirjam Sent, “A Conceptual History of the Emergence 
of Bounded Rationality,” History of Political Economy 37, no. 1 (2005).
62  Günter Schmölders, Ökonomische Verhaltensforschung (Cologne & Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1957), 41.
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economics. To begin with, both rejected the ideal of the homo economi-
cus as inadequate, while advocating the empirical analysis of the deci-
sions of real people in actual situations. Moreover, deviating from meth-
odological individualism that focused on the individual choice act, they 
looked for patterns of choice or principles of behavior in larger groups 
that made individual actions predictable. In addition, they did not 
consider these behavioral patterns specifi c to human beings; some of 
them allegedly were also found in apes or, as Simon would suggest, 
construed in machines. Characteristically, Simon spoke of “choosing 
organisms.”63 Finally, both looked at neighboring disciplines for meth-
odological help and theoretical inspiration in order to understand the 
principles of human behavior, demanding the interdisciplinary opening 
up of economics. In particular, they advocated the reintroduction of 
psychology into economics. In contrast to the earlier subjective value 
theory, however, psychological motives of economic behavior should 
not be determined by means of introspection but through the most 
advanced methods of the social and behavioral sciences.64
Behavioral Limits to State Intervention
As Günter Schmölders’s political statements and interventions clearly 
show, the assu mption of the homo economicus, or rather of rational and 
self-interested actors, is not a necessary condition for the neoliberal 
advocacy of market mechanisms. On the contrary, Hayek himself had 
emphasized repeatedly that the limits to individual knowledge made 
market mechanisms necessary to allocate knowledge and negotiate 
supply and demand.65 Economics, for Hayek, tried to answer the ques-
tion that he considered central to all social sciences, namely “how can 
the combination of fragments of knowledge existing in diff erent minds 
bring  about results which, if they were to be brought about deliberately, 
63  Simon, “Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” 114; Mirowski, Machine Dreams, 
argues that Simon “was simulating the operation of a number of problem-solving tasks 
as though they were the manipulation of symbols on something very nearly 
approximating a serial von Neumann architecture” (464).
64  Sent, “Behavioral Economics.”
65  F. A. Hayek, “Th e Pretense of Knowledge” (Nobel Memorial Lecture, Stockholm, 
December 11, 1974), in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of 
Ideas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
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would require a knowledge on the part of the directing mind which no 
single person can possess?”66 Focusing not on the economy as a whole 
but on individual economic actors, Schmölders argued that irrational 
factors infl uenced their economic choices, circumscribing their free-
dom to choose what was in their best interest.67 Whereas other neoliber-
als, like Gary Becker, maintained that predictions assuming behavior in 
line with the homo economicus could still produce valid results,68 
Schmölders argued that explanations could only rarely confi ne them-
selves to the hypothesis of economic rationality alone but had to inte-
grate sociological and psychological factors.69 For Schmölders these 
non-economic principles of human behavior not only infl uenced indi-
vidual economic activity but also, and more importantly, established 
boundaries for state intervention into the economy.
Th e argument concerning the behavioral limits of state intervention, 
which Schmölders used repeatedly as a political advisor and public intel-
lectual, had already been implied in his early research on the prohibition 
or taxation of alcoholic beverages. Here, Schmölders had tried to show 
that people’s customs and habits were stronger than the state’s means of 
infl uence. Generalizing this position in his fi nancial psychology, 
Schmölders argued that politicians could not and should not impose 
taxes that ignored or contradicted the basic principles of “human 
nature.”70 High taxes would necessarily result in tax evasion, eff ectively 
reduce state revenues, and even undermine the citizens’ loyalty to state 
institutions. In an imperfect world, the state and its offi  cials had to 
consider the “human, all too human” factors, Schmölders argued in 
Nietzschean terms. He declared that it was a mistake to view citizens only 
as tax payers whose behavior could easily be changed by setting fi nancial 
incentives.71 Referring to the German sociologist Hans Freyer, who had 
advocated a “revolution from the right” in Weimar Germany and turned 
conservative again aft er his disillusionment with National Socialism, 
Schmölders rejected the belief in the “malleability of everything” (die 
66  Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge,” 54.
67  Schmölders, Das Irrationale in der öff entlichen Finanzwirtschaft , 9.
68  Gary S. Becker, “Irrational Behavior and Economic Th eory,” Journal of Political 
Economy 70, no. 1 (1962).
69  Schmölders, “10 Jahre sozialökonomische Verhaltensforschung in Köln,” 265.
70  Schmölders, “Finanzpsychologie,” 8.
71  Günter Schmölders, “Der Staatsbürger als Steuerzahler: Wandlungen des 
Menschenbildes in Finanzwissenschaft  und Steuerpraxis,” FinanzArchiv/Public Finance 
Analysis 27, no. 1/2 (1968), 121.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   158 10/03/2020   13:59:59
Günter Schmölders and Behavioral Economics 159
Machbarkeit aller Dinge). He considered it wrong to conceive of citizens 
as the mere material of political designs.72 On the contrary, Schmölders 
argued that human nature set the boundaries for political interventions 
into society and economy. His socioeconomic behavioral research, in 
turn, was the means to establish the fundamental principles of human 
behavior and thus the limits to interventionism.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Schmölders’s institute conducted surveys on 
consumption and savings behavior of workers as well as lower- and middle-
class clerks in order to assess the viability of state programs to encourage 
private savings. He did not generally oppose these programs but established 
signifi cant diff erences in their eff ects on the accumulation of personal 
wealth among workers and employees. While both low-income and white-
collar workers behaved similarly, spending wage increases for immediate 
consumption, above a certain level of income they diff ered. Whereas work-
ers still consumed more, employees started to save money and build up 
personal savings. Th us, Schmölders concluded that global wage increases 
would not lead to a buildup of wealth among workers. Accordingly, state 
policies to encourage the accumulation of private property and savings 
could only address the middle-income employees because “the masses of 
the workers and lower employees today do not have the necessary inner 
prerequisites that would empower them to build up capital; they naturally 
spend income increases on consumption.”73 It was impossible, Schmölders 
maintained, to instill a behavior that had no support in the life worlds of the 
strata of society in question. Despite looking at the upper classes for behav-
ioral orientation, workers adopted only the openly visible markers of success 
but not savings behavior. Moreover, according to Schmölders, the many 
additional benefi ts such as Christmas or sickness allowances systematically 
discouraged “responsible savings behavior.”74 Th us, he argued, a mixture of 
natural, political, social, and cultural factors was responsible for the impos-
sibility of encouraging the accumulation of wealth among workers. “Well-
intended” measures neglecting people’s behavioral patterns could not 
succeed in “imposing a certain behavior.”75
72  Ibid., 138.
73  Günter Schmölders, “Zur Psychologie der Vermögensbildung in Arbeiterhand,” 
Kyklos: International Review for Social Sciences 15 (1962), 179.
74  Ibid., 180. His arguments against state subsidies that allegedly produced a 
“subsidy mentality” and had to be countered by “subsidy pedagogy” were similar; 
Schmölders, “Das neue Finanzwissenschaft liche Forschungsinstitut,” 41. 
75  Schmölders, “Zur Psychologie der Vermögensbildung,” 175.
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Whereas most of his studies concentrated on economic behavior in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Schmölders reached similar conclu-
sions concerning theories of economic development. By the late 1950s, 
experiences in development policy had clearly established that the injec-
tion of capital and technology was not suffi  cient to instill economic 
growth. Publicly, Schmölders rejected attempts to explain diff erences in 
economic development by theories of race and climate, and acknowl-
edged that talents were equally distributed across diff erent peoples.76 Yet 
he claimed that, in analogy to the personal character, there was also a 
“people’s character” (Volkscharakter), consisting of attitudes, norms, 
customs, and values that could be ascertained by means of socioeco-
nomic behavioral research.77 Th is people’s character could explain the 
diff erences in economic development since it determined the “willing-
ness of a majority to leave their accustomed ways of life for more lucra-
tive ones,” to work more and relocate, as well as the ability to appropriate 
new technologies.78
Whereas Schmölders had seen no possibility to infl uence workers’ 
savings behavior eff ectively, he formulated a more ambitious goal for 
development policy. Behavioral research was supposed to develop 
methods to “eff ectively and responsibly infl uence the motives and atti-
tudes of economic actors.”79 Besides development policy, Schmölders 
also advocated further international comparisons of fi nancial psychol-
ogy in order to distinguish diff erent tax mentalities that would deter-
mine the acceptance and eff ectiveness of various taxes.80 In his view, 
there were constant aspects of human behavior that could not be altered 
at all, and variable parts that were formed and infl uenced by political, 
social, and cultural factors that were subject to change and could be 
changed intentionally.81
76  His lecture notes suggest that he was more open to these ideas. Hoover 
Institution, Schmölders Papers, Box-folder 70.
77  Günter Schmölders, “Der Beitrag der Verhaltensforschung zur Th eorie der 
wirtschaft lichen Entwicklung,” in Systeme und Methoden in den Wirtschaft s- und 
Sozialwissenschaft en: Erwin von Beckerath zum 75. Geburtstag, ed. Norbert Kloten et al. 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1964), 371.
78  Ibid., 368–70.
79  Ibid., 385.
80  Günter Schmölders and Burkhard Strümpel, Vergleichende Finanzpsychologie: 
Besteuerung und Steuermentalität in einigen europäischen Ländern (Wiesbaden: 
Akademie der Wissenschaft en und der Literatur, 1968).
81  Schmölders, “10 Jahre sozialökonomische Verhaltensforschung in Köln,” 260.
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As noted earlier, as president of the Mont Pèlerin Society, Schmölders 
suggested the “entrepreneur in modern economy and society” as the 
theme for the conference he organized in Munich in 1970. Vigorously 
raising fi nancial support from German companies for the ambitious 
conference program, Schmölders saw the meeting of the “neoliberal 
thought collective” as an opportunity to present his research agenda in 
empirical socioeconomics to an international audience. It was not suffi  -
cient to analyze the real function of the entrepreneur within the econ-
omy, Schmölders explained in his opening address, but also public opin-
ion, which infl uenced economic decision-making processes and 
economic policy.82 Starting with the fi ndings of Schmölders’s institute, 
presenters on the fi rst day thus reported on the “image of the entrepre-
neur” in Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain, Japan, India, 
South Africa and in “Underdeveloped (Poor) Countries,” before others 
concentrated particularly on the entrepreneur’s image among certain 
groups. Schmölders’s success in convincing his fellow neoliberals to 
follow his research agenda, however, was rather limited.
With the end of his university career in sight, in the early 1970s 
Schmölders became an increasingly vocal public intellectual, spreading his 
ideas in publications written for broader audiences. His behavioral research 
should illuminate what he, like many other conservatives of the time, 
considered a fundamental “crisis between citizens and authorities.”83 Th is 
alleged crisis derived from the lawmakers’ neglect of their citizens’ nature. 
Schmölders remarked ironically that they seemed to be making laws for 
“superhumans” (Übermenschen), entertaining a boundless trust in the 
people’s wisdom and strength of will.84 With the expansion of the welfare 
state, the number of laws and rules had increased and, in his view, they 
severely restricted the citizens’ freedom of action. Th e authorities either 
overestimated or overburdened their citizens and sometimes even tried to 
dupe them. As a result, people became cunning rascals (schlitzohrige 
Staatsbürger) or defected by transferring their money abroad (abtrünnige 
Staatsbürger). In Schmölders’s view, these despicable behaviors resulted 
82  See Plehwe’s contribution to this volume.
83  Schmölders, Der verlorene Untertan; Michel Crozier, Jōji Watanuki, and Samuel 
P. Huntington, Th e Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to 
the Trilateral Commission (New York: University Press, 1975); Johannes Großmann, Die 
Internationale der Konservativen: Transnationale Elitenzirkel und private Außenpolitik in 
Westeuropa seit 1945 (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014).
84  Schmölders, Der verlorene Untertan, 10.
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from the government’s neglect of human nature which limited its infl u-
ence. Behavioral research was supposed to defi ne these limits.85
If the state did not take the basic principles of human behavior into 
account, Schmölders argued, it undermined its very foundations. Even 
before infl ation spiked aft er 1973, Schmölders suggested that increasing 
taxes while not guaranteeing the stability of the money’s value would 
necessarily weaken tax morale.86 In line with the emerging monetarist 
orthodoxy in the 1970s, he reasoned that infl ation was the central prob-
lem that modern industrialized economies had to control.87 He main-
tained that, in contrast to the tenets of Keynesianism, unemployment 
and infl ation were not alternatives but mutually reinforcing evils stem-
ming from the same source.88 Above all, he asserted, Keynesianism had 
failed because of its overly simplistic assumptions about human behav-
ior and psychology. Even if democratic states rejected Keynesianism, 
however, Schmölders was skeptical that they were capable of conducting 
the necessary economic reforms. Re-invoking a critique that ordoliber-
als had voiced already against the Weimar Republic, Schmölders main-
tained that West Germany and other industrialized countries were 
“complacency democracies” (Gefälligkeitsdemokratien), being inher-
ently corrupt in their attempts to please interest groups.89
Schmölders understood the dictatorial overthrow of democracies 
with high infl ation rates by military juntas as indicating that democra-
cies were simply not capable of conducting the harsh reforms necessary 
to return to a hard currency. Travelling to Chile in 1981, he published an 
enthusiastic report in the conservative International Background about 
the “restoration of order” aft er “the liquidation of the communist-
dominated dictatorship of Salvador Allende.” Relying on the expertise 
of the so-called “Chicago Boys,” the military junta had managed to set 
the conditions for an economic development that Schmölders compared 
to the economic miracle in West Germany under the guidance of Ludwig 
Erhard.90 Behind Schmölders’s praise of Pinochet’s Chile lurked his 
85  Ibid.
86  Ibid., 11. 
87  Günter Schmölders, Die Infl ation: Ein Kernproblem in Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft  
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1976).
88  Ibid., 28.
89  Ibid. See also Ptak, Ordoliberalismus, 36–7.
90  Günter Schmölders, “A Visit to Santiago de Chile,” International Background 8, 
no. 6 (1981).
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fascination for the technocratic potential of dictatorships expressed in 
his early writings under National Socialism. Issues of fi nance and 
currency were too complex for representatives in the parliaments to 
understand, Schmölders maintained, so it was better if experts set the 
rules for the economy.91
At the beginning of the 1980s, Schmölders saw the modern welfare 
state at a fatal impasse because governments had lived beyond their 
economic means. Th e Social Democrats especially had been dominated 
by a “childlike belief ” in the malleability of everything, neglecting alleged 
economic realities.92 Publicly Schmölders supported the so-called 
Lambsdorff  Paper that called for neoliberal economic measures and 
contributed to the breakdown of the social-liberal coalition government 
in West Germany in 1982. However, he attributed the crisis not only to 
the expansion of the welfare state and Keynesian fi scal policy that had 
produced ever-larger public defi cits over the preceding decade. Rather, at 
the bottom, lay a more general discontent with the intrusion of the regu-
latory state into public and private life. In all areas, Schmölders criticized, 
the state overburdened its citizens with an increasing number of rules 
and behavioral norms that contradicted allegedly natural ways of behav-
ior. Apparently, he saw his freedom restricted and felt almost personally 
humiliated and insulted by the rules that surrounded him everywhere:
Crossing the street is allowed only at crossroads and crosswalks. 
Blinking red and green, traffi  c lights breathe the same monotonous 
rhythm during the whole day and oft en even night. Orders and rules 
everywhere. In the event of a traffi  c jam, their purpose easily turns 
into nonsense. Shrugging his shoulders, the citizen accepts that he has 
to obey robots under the threat of fi nes while the machines are not 
fl exible enough to adjust to the changing traffi  c conditions; he has 
learned to obey.93
Whereas freedom is commonly described as the highest neoliberal value, 
Schmölders’s advocacy of freedom was apparently very selective. Visiting 
91  Günter Schmölders, Einführung in die Geld- und Finanzpsychologie (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaft liche Buchgesellschaft , 1975), 154. 
92  Günter Schmölders, Der Wohlfahrtsstaat am Ende: Adam Riese schlägt zurück, 
3rd edition (Munich: Langen-Müller/Herbig, 1983), 9. Th at is fully in line with Hayek, 
“Th e Pretense of Knowledge.”
93  Schmölders, Der Wohlfahrtsstaat am Ende, 150.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   163 10/03/2020   13:59:59
164 Rüdiger Graf
Santiago de Chile he had only witnessed “many police regulating traffi  c 
and guaranteeing public order,” but not heard any “cries of those 
tortured  . . . penetrating the thick walls of the prison” as media reports 
would have suggested.94 Yet, at home, even traffi  c regulation seemed to be 
too burdensome to endure. Despite sharing Hayek’s critique of the 
Keynesian “pretense of knowledge,” Schmölders was still very confi dent of 
being able to off er the right recipes for national economic policy.
Conclusion: Behavioral Economics and Neoliberalism
Research in behavioral economics has boomed since the second half of 
the 1970s. Th e boom was initiated largely by the studies of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky on the “heuristics and biases” of human 
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Using mostly class-
room surveys with simple decision problems, Kahneman and Tversky 
argued that people’s decisions systematically deviate from the expecta-
tions of economic rationality, and not because of mere carelessness.95 
While behavioral economists generally acknowledge Herbert A. Simon 
as an early precursor, and some even claim that his concept of bounded 
rationality is superior to the Kahneman/Tversky approach, there are no 
references to Günter Schmölders’s earlier work. Even in Germany, the 
recent surge of behavioral economics traces its roots to Reinhard Selten’s 
reception of American experimental economics and Simon’s concept of 
bounded rationality.96 In many ways, the newly emerging form of 
behavioral economics diff ers signifi cantly from Schmölders’s approach. 
While Schmölders tried to describe normal behavior of people in 
specifi c economic circumstances, the school originating with Kahneman 
and Tversky has a specifi c interest in producing counter-intuitive 
insights into the deviations from the model of the homo economicus.97 
Th e latter school applies a stricter mathematical calculus with the aim of 
94  Schmölders, “A Visit to Santiago de Chile,” 183f.
95  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases,” Science 185 (1974).
96  Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten, eds, Bounded Rationality: Th e Adaptive 
Toolbox (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Axel Ockenfels and Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 
eds, Th e Selten School of Behavioral Economics: A Collection of Essays in Honor of 
Reinhard Selten (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer, 2010).
97  Floris Heukelom, “Th ree Explanations for the Kahneman-Tversky Programme 
of the 1970s,” Th e European Journal of the History of Economic Th ought 19, no. 5 (2012).
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conducting basic research on the principles of human decision-making 
as such. By contrast, Schmölders’s research was much less theoretically 
ambitious and much more policy-oriented.
Yet, from its beginnings in the 1970s and 1980s, proponents of behav-
ioral economics stressed the relevance of their research for policy-
making—not the least to secure funding. In 1986, the editors of the fi rst 
handbook of behavioral economics claimed that “several studies suggest 
a new rationale for government intervention in the economy, given the 
failure of markets  to promote a classical optimization due to individual 
judgment bias.”98 Th e acknowledgment that markets might fail to 
provide for the common good because individuals were unable to act in 
accordance with the rules of economic logic and their own well-
understood interests is remarkable in an age of deregulation when 
marketization and neoliberalism allegedly triumphed.99 Simultaneously, 
behavioral economists promised to off er the means to use and overcome 
people’s judgment biases by designing the choice architecture of the 
marketplace. Th us, at a time of increasing welfare costs and shrinking 
state fi nancial capacities to conduct economic policy, they off ered a low-
cost and allegedly non-intrusive way to enlarge government interven-
tion. Despite Th aler and Sunstein’s eff orts to describe their political 
program as libertarian paternalism, not diminishing people’s freedom of 
choice but only rearranging the choice architecture and behavioral envi-
ronment, to many neoliberals it smacks of old-school paternalism. 
Whereas for Hayek the limits to individual knowledge off ered a reason 
to assume that only market interaction can produce a desirable outcome, 
behavioral economists generally accept the government’s capacity to 
defi ne the desirable outcome and arrange the market accordingly. As P. 
W. Zuidhof describes the confl ict, neoliberals want to secure and govern 
through markets, while behavioral economists try to off er means to 
govern markets by directly infl uencing the actors’ choices.100
In recent debates, the application of behavioral insights to public 
policy appears mostly as a means to widen and strengthen the capacity 
for state regulation, sparking fears of manipulation and control. As the 
98  Gilad and Kaish, Handbook of Behavioral Economics, xx.
99  Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 41–76.
100  Peter-Wim Zuidhoff , “Behaviouralizing Europe: Behavioural Economics 
Enters EU Policy-making” in Handbook of Behavioral Change and Public Policy, ed. 
Holger Strassheim and Silke Beck (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 2019).
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case of Günter Schmölders shows, however, behavioral economics, or 
socioeconomic behavioral research/empirical socioeconomics as 
Schmölders called it, is not necessarily at odds with a neoliberal project. 
Th e empirical analysis of economic behavior can serve both as a means 
to increase state intervention into areas of individual choice that had 
formerly been considered impenetrable in liberal democracies or as an 
attempt to defi ne the limits of state intervention. Schmölders intended 
to empirically establish the principles of human behavior that could not 
be changed and, therefore, also not be the object of economic policy. In 
this approach, he was in line with the older German ordoliberals who 
did not believe in the abstraction of a homo economicus but rather held 
the view that competitive markets produced the best economic outcomes 
given the limitations of human knowledge and rationality. Th us, a 
behavioral approach to economics is politically polyvalent with appeal 
across the political spectrum, which is one of the major reasons for its 
recent success in political consulting.
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Embedded Early Neoliberalism: 
Transnational Origins of the Agenda 
of Liberalism Reconsidered
Hagen Schulz-Forberg
Introduction: The Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium and Early Neoliberalism
Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium (WLC) in Paris in 1938 is widely 
recognized as the birthplace of neoliberalism as an intellectual and 
political project. Participants at the WLC included fi gures who later 
joined the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), including F. A. Hayek, Wilhelm 
Röpke, Ludwig von Mises, Michael Polanyi, Alexander Rüstow, Michael 
Heilperin, and Jacques Rueff . It also included actors more prominent in 
the postwar era and aligned with diff erent organizations, such as Walter 
Lippmann (Ford Foundation), Stefan Possony (life-long Pentagon advi-
sor, fellow and director at the Hoover Institution in the 1970s), Robert 
Marjolin (OEEC, EC), and Raymond Aron (who joined MPS in 1951, 
but left  in 1956). Th e roster was fi lled out with industrialists, bankers, 
and assorted experts, from Ernest Mercier and Louis Marlio to Alfred 
Schütz and John Bell Condliff e. Despite their range of backgrounds and 
starting points, the participants agreed at the workshop’s conclusion on 
an “Agenda of Liberalism” that summarized the essential features of 
their shared approach. Over the protests of some, they settled on the 
label of “neoliberalism.”1
1  On the Walter Lippmann Colloquium see, for example: François Denord, 
Néo-libéralisme version française. Histoire d’une idéologie politique (Paris: Demopolis, 
2007), 112–25; Serge Audier, Néo-libéralisme(s). Une archéologie intellectuelle (Paris: 
Grasset, 2012), 59–164, and Serge Audier, Le Colloque Lippmann. Aux origines de 
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As we know, however, birth is preceded by pregnancy and 
midwifes are usually involved. This article deals with the time before 
delivery, long overlooked by scholars. While neoliberalism might 
have been named at the WLC, its early features had been worked out 
and argued for before within an elite transnational network of intel-
lectuals and institutions related to the League of Nations. Early 
neoliberals were part of a larger effort at shaping core concepts for 
a new liberal order, both nationally and globally. Core concepts, in 
Reinhart Koselleck’s sense, serve as fundamental points of reference 
in any political system, their interpretation providing legitimacy for 
political action. Because of their role as normative points of refer-
ence, core concepts are contested, their interpretations are fought 
over and change over time. Core concepts are characterised by their 
ability to create timelessness, or, in other words, they make claims 
of universal truths.2 At the same time, their contested character 
creates the urge to produce value judgments as meanings are nego-
tiated.3 The new conceptualization of liberal concepts during the 
1930s included such semantic negotiations and an active announce-
ment of what early neoliberals (and their international interlocu-
tors) called “values.”
What kind of values should the new liberal order represent? Th e 
formation of neoliberal core concepts still needs to be understood 
more completely. A set of questions facilitating such understanding 
néo-libéralisme (Lormont: Editions Bord de l’Eau, 2008). See also the English translation 
of the verbatim protocol recently published by Jurgen Reinhoudt and Serge Audier, Th e 
Walter Lippmann Colloquium: Th e Birth of Neo-Liberalism (London: Palgrave, 2017). 
For a fi rst eff ort at contextualization, see Hagen Schulz-Forberg, “Laying the 
Groundwork: Th e Semantics of Neoliberalism in the 1930s,” in Re-Inventing Western 
Civilisation: Transnational Reconstructions of Liberalism in Europe in the Twentieth 
Century, ed. Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Niklas Olsen (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Press, 2014), 13–39. Walter Lippmann, Die Gesellschaft  freier Menschen, trans. 
E. Schneider (Bern: A. Francke Verlag, 1945), “Einführung” by Wilhelm Röpke, 25–33, 
28. See also “Centre International d’études pour la rénovation du libéralisme, Le 
néo-libéralisme,” Inaugural discussion on March 8, 1939, reprinted in Les Essais. Cahiers 
bimestriels (Nancy: Didry and Varcollier, 1961), 86–108, 94.
2  See Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of 
Modern Society (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1988); Futures Past: On the Semantics of 
Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Sediments of Time: On 
Possible Histories, trans. Sean Franzel and Stefan-Ludwig Hoff mann (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2018).
3  See Walter Bryce Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 56 (1955–56): 167–98.
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might be raised regarding the semantics of neoliberal core concepts in 
the 1930s and the network of actors and institutions in which these 
concepts matured. In this chapter I look at the normative content 
neoliberals associated with a “good society”4 and explore how far the 
WLC was part of a larger debate. In a second step, the institutional 
embeddedness of the WLC is highlighted through biographical aspects 
of its participants and an illustration of the League of Nations’ impres-
sive knowledge- and policy-making network built around the 
International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) and the 
International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC). In a third 
step, I focus on the particular expertise of early neoliberals in business 
cycle research, understood as a broad program of studying cyclical 
and structural change. Finally, some concluding thoughts and ques-
tions will raise points relevant for future research on the evolution of 
neoliberalism in general and on the role and founding of the MPS in 
particular.
Early Neoliberalism Before and After the 
Walter Lippmann Colloquium
According to the agenda of neoliberalism agreed on in 1938, the norma-
tive “good society” comprised fi ve elements, most of which concerned 
the role of the state. Beyond its responsibility to, fi rst, protect the price 
mechanism, the state must, second, put in place and guarantee a legal 
order to safeguard the market’s development and legally justify any inter-
vention. Th ird, political liberalism must embrace law as the cornerstone 
of legitimacy, and the codifi cation of law must be based on representative 
debates capable of establishing general norms. Fourth, such a legal 
regime constitutes the liberal method to “control the social”; and fi ft h, a 
liberal state is responsible for continuously providing society with fi ve 
essential elements, for which taxes could be imposed: national defence, 
social insurance, social services, education, and scientifi c research.5
4  The research behind this chapter was made possible through the generous 
funding of the VELUX Foundation, Denmark, of a larger research project entitled 
Towards Good Society: Constructing the Social through the Economic since the 
1930s. 
5  Lippmann at the WLC, in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium, 177–9.
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Although it did not appear on their agenda, early neoliberals also 
placed the concepts of the “human person” and “human dignity” at the 
heart of the matter. For many, these were the fundamental concepts and 
“freedom” was the best means to achieve them, particularly in times of 
authoritarian regimes and war. Others, like Hayek, saw in “freedom” a 
fundamental concept in its own right. Hayek surely thought that the 
dignity of the individual was fundamental, but he rejected—as always—
fi xed prescriptions about how to secure it or about what freedom 
should serve exactly. Freedom needed to be seen as a fundamental 
concept, not as a way to implement other fundamental concepts, he 
would maintain, for in a free society one also has the choice to act 
wrongly.6 More in tune with other early neoliberals he argued that 
certain values form the basis of a moral order, which a legal order 
represents and maintains. As he asked in the discussion on liberalism 
and Christianity during the fi rst MPS meeting in 1947: “Does liberal-
ism presuppose some set of values which are commonly accepted as a 
faith and in themselves not capable of rational demonstration?” Hayek 
and the other discussants agreed. Hayek then strategically argued that 
“there is no chance of any extensive support for a liberal program unless 
the opposition between liberals and Christians can somehow be 
bridged. Th is antagonism is an accidental accretion of liberalism, rather 
than one of the essentials to liberalism.”7
Yet for Hayek the concept of freedom was central, rather than the 
dignity of man on its own. Hayek suspected that without the concept of 
freedom as the cornerstone of a liberal value system, eff orts at defi ning 
sound moral behavior in a top-down manner are likely to take place. 
Others were less cautious and saw in human dignity an end to strive for 
during dire times. Marjolin, for example, saw freedom as the best 
method to reach human dignity.8 Baudin, too, thought that “freedom, 
however, is only a means whereas the end is a certain notion of the 
development of the human personality.”9
6  F. A. Hayek, Th e Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1960), 142–3.
7  Hayek during the discussion on “Liberalism and Christianity,” 1947, Liberaal 
Archief, Folder 01–1-08–14–01. 
8  Marjolin at the WLC, in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium, 
113.
9  Baudin at the WLC, in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium, 
111. 
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In general, early neoliberals would follow the trend of the time and 
embrace the concepts of Man, of “human dignity,” of the “human 
person” and its “inviolability,” a position developed in international 
law particularly by Hans Kelsen with his concept of the “basic norm,” 
and also by Christian thought.10 In 1942, Pope Pius XII put the concept 
at the center of his Christmas address,11 but it already had an ascend-
ing usage by that time. Th e German sociologist Alexander Rüstow 
summarized the general position developed at the WLC when he said 
that
discussions have led to the common conviction that, of all possible 
economic systems, it is the system of liberalism, of the economy of the 
free market, that combines the following advantages: 1. It is a system 
that is durable on its own because it is in stable equilibrium. 2. It 
ensures the maximum degree of productivity and the highest stand-
ard of living. 3. It alone is reconcilable with freedom and with the 
dignity of man.12
Rüstow had developed his position regarding the concept of the 
human person in a critical dialogue with Carl Schmitt, the legal philoso-
pher who had erected an anti-liberal edifi ce of thought throughout the 
1920s and whom Rüstow had admired for some time. In a letter to 
Schmitt from July 4, 1930, Rüstow remarked on the relation between a 
value-based rule of law and a self-limiting notion of “the political.” “It 
seems to me,” he wrote, “that the idea of a democratic state based on the 
concept of humanity represents not only a possible, but in a certain way 
an unavoidable utopia.”13 Other early neoliberals followed similar argu-
ments, particularly Röpke, who built his “Civitas Humana” on the same 
10  Hans Kelsen, General Th eory of Law and State (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1949), 110–22; Hans Kelsen, Pure Th eory of Law (Berkeley CA: 
University of California Press, 1969 [1934]). Hayek is an exception here again. For an 
elaboration of the opposing views of Hayek and Kelsen, see Richard A. Posner, Law, 
Pragmatism and Democracy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 
275–84.
11  See Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
12  Rüstow at the WLC, in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium, 
157.
13  Rüstow, Letter to Schmitt, dated July 4, 1930, Carl Schmitt Papers, Federal State 
Archive of North Rhine-Wesphalia, Duisburg, RW 265–11879/3.
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fundamental concept, calling it at times “economic humanism” or 
“humane economy.”14 Aron argued in his work on the philosophy of 
history from 1938 that there “is no comprehension of the future without 
a doctrine of Man.”15
Closer to the WLC, Lippmann’s Good Society resonates with the 
concepts of human dignity and the human person, positing them as the 
foundation of civilization and what in the end constitutes the West and 
needed to be re-made. He insisted that “[i]t is just here, that the ultimate 
issue is joined, on the question whether men shall be treated as inviola-
ble persons or as things to be disposed of.”16 In his opening speech at 
the WLC Lippmann stressed again that
Civilized men will have to submit the conceptions they found novel 
before the war to new scrutiny, determined as they will be to discover 
those that are and those that are not compatible with the vital needs 
and the permanent ideal of humanity. It is to these vital needs and to 
this permanent ideal, and not to the doctrines of the nineteenth 
century, that one should refer to, so as to undertake the reconstruc-
tion of liberalism.17
Rougier probably summarized best what that reconstructed liberalism 
should be: “it is being an activist, it is fi ghting for the safeguard and the 
renovation of the only economic and political system compatible with 
spiritual life, human dignity, the common good, the peace of peoples, and 
the progress of civilization: liberalism.”18
Early neoliberals were unanimous that fundamental values repre-
senting a moral order needed to be embraced and placed at the origins 
14  Wilhelm Röpke, Civitas Humana. Grundfragen der Gesellschaft s- und 
Wirtschaft sreform (Zurich: Eugen Rentsch, 1944); Mass und Mitte (Zurich: Eugen 
Rentsch, 1950); Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage (Zurich: Eugen Rentsch, 1958). 
15  Raymond Aron, Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1986 
[1938]), 14.
16  Walter Lippmann, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1937), 375.
17  Lippmann at WLC, in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium, 
105.
18  Louis Rougier at the WLC, in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium, 102. See also Röpke, Civitas Humana; see also discussions at the 
foundational meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society on liberalism in relation to Christianity, 
Liberaal Archief, Folder 01–1-08–14–01.
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of a liberal society. Th ere was disagreement over whether or not the 
concept of freedom was already a fundamental value or whether it was 
a means to an end, namely the realization of the fundamental concept 
of human dignity and the human person, the way in which man can, 
possibly, live up to his full potential. Hayek would agree on the very 
construction of society and its basic norms: “Like all other values, our 
morals are not a product but a presupposition of reason, part of the 
ends which the instrument of our intellect has been developed to 
serve. At any one stage of our evolution, the system of values into 
which we are born supplies the ends which our reason must serve.”19 
He was also deeply impressed by the Catholic liberal philosopher and 
historian, Lord Acton, who placed human dignity at the heart of his 
thought. Hayek also defi ned “true individualism” as being based on 
the concept of man as a social being rather than a purely self-suffi  cient 
and isolated individual.20 Yet, Hayek did not call his 1960 book Th e 
Constitution of Human Dignity, but Th e Constitution of Liberty. Wary 
of what proactive jurists might do with the concept—namely, prescribe 
and spell out what human dignity supposedly was—Hayek always 
stressed the weight of the concept of freedom as fundamental, not only 
as a means to an end as it was for many of his fellow early neoliberals.
Th e human person, its inviolability and dignity, was, however, the 
dominating global concept at the time, particularly in international 
law.21 Any positive law, any constitution, is ultimately based on basic 
moral presuppositions. Early neoliberalism built its economic and polit-
ical ideology on the same basic norm. Röpke explicitly said the economy 
was of “second rank,” the fi rst rank being the imposition of a moral 
authority.22 Jacques Rueff  could not have agreed more, for, he argued, if 
19  In 1960, Hayek has grown more critical of a certain way of using the concept of 
human dignity. See Hayek, Constitution of Liberty, 365.
20  F. A. Hayek, “Wahrer und falscher Individualismus,” Ordo 1 (1948): 23. 
21  See Moyn, Christian Human Rights; Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law 
as Political Th eology: How to Read Nomos der Erde?” Constellations 11, no. 4 (2004): 
492–511; “International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfi guration,” Cambridge Review 
of International Aff airs 17, no. 2 (2004): 197–218; Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and 
the Foundations of International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009); Stephen Riley, Human 
Dignity and Law: Legal and Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Routledge, 2017). 
22  Röpke in discussion with Rueff , Rougier, and Baudin at a meeting with French 
employer representatives in Avignon, April 1–3, 1948, explaining what the gist of the 
fi rst MPS meeting was all about. “Le Colloque d’Avignon,” Rougier Papers, Chateau de 
Lourmarin, Box R3, Annex.
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man did not impose a moral authority he would not be civilized.23 To 
avoid political catastrophes and too much arbitrary political will, the 
rule of law was conceptualized as a check on politics, taming it and 
keeping it within a set frame of norms and red lines. Th e rule of law was 
seen as the best way to guarantee the inviolability of the human person.24 
Early neoliberals added the price mechanism to the formula: its smooth, 
unhampered running was the benchmark for the liberal society and 
economy.
What I call “early neoliberalism” captures the period of self-declared 
neoliberalism from the 1930s to the 1960s. It is quite diff erent semanti-
cally to what one would today associate with the concept when it serves 
as a critical term pointing at others or at certain conditions and policies 
as being neoliberal. Yet, at its birth and during its adolescence, neoliber-
alism was self-referential. Between the 1930s and the 1960s one can 
follow its proponents in various forums and debates and one still fi nds 
the label actively mentioned and defended.25 As Louis Baudin reminded 
Röpke and Rueff  in 1948 during yet another colloquium, the term was 
known in the world and one could not take it back.26
In order to realize the agenda of liberalism, early neoliberalism 
rejected the notion of laissez-faire as the preferred means to serve the 
human individual. Rather, the competitive order, a man-made moral 
and legal framework within which markets would be as free as possi-
ble, was identifi ed as the new means to the end.27 In addition, early 
neoliberalism was conscious of social concerns and tasked the state 
with social responsibilities as well as the protection of the free market 
23  Jacques Rueff , L’Ordre Social (Paris: Librairie de Médicis, 1949), 563.
24  See Ben Jackson, “Freedom, the Common Good, and the Rule of Law: Lippmann 
and Hayek on Economic Planning,” Journal of the History of Ideas 73, no. 1 (2012): 
47–68.
25  See the proceedings the Oostende Colloquium in 1957, and Alexander Rüstow, 
“Paläoliberalismus, Kollektivismus und Neoliberalismus,” in Wirtschaft , Gesellschaft 
und Kultur. Festgabe für Alfred Müller-Armack, ed. Franz Greiß and Fritz W. Meyer 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961), 61–70. 
26  Baudin at the Colloque d’Avignon in discussion with Röpke and Rougier about 
the term “neoliberal.”
27  See the discussion following Hayek’s introductory paper at the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, April 1, 1947, Liberaal Archief, Folder 01–1-08–14–01; also Milton Friedman, 
“Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects,” Farmand (February 1951): 1–4; for the German case 
of ordoliberalism as competitive order see Eucken’s remarks at the fi rst session of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society and Franz Böhm, Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft  als geschichtliche 
Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung (Stuttgart and Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1937).
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order. As the WLC participants argued in a discussion following the 
agreement on the fi ve essential points of the agenda of liberalism, 
“maximum utility is a social good, but is not necessarily the only one 
that must be sought.”28 Admitting that the economy was shaped to 
build a society of a certain kind, early neoliberals were engaged in the 
conscious construction of a state to safeguard the so-called competi-
tive order in both its internal setup and its relations to other states. 
Th is competitive order could well be run according to certain social 
goals and based on certain social convictions, but the operationaliza-
tion needed to be carried out according to a liberal script. Any state 
agency had to be based on liberal interventionism, avoiding arbitrary 
political decisions and case-by-case action. Th e call was for principled 
legal and market-conforming intervention that would not endanger 
the price mechanism.
Embedding the Walter Lippmann Colloquium
It is important to emphasize that the main ideas of the Agenda of 
Liberalism were not originally worked out just at the WLC. Th e WLC 
was part of a large, transnational institutional landscape that was erected 
by and for the League of Nations aft er the First World War. Th e work-
shop itself took place at the International Institute of Intellectual 
Cooperation (IIIC), a transnational organization and League of Nations 
consultative body bringing together leading researchers and research 
institutions dealing with questions of global order and peace.29 Within 
28  Lippmann at the WLC, in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium, 178.
29  Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Daniel Laqua, “Transnational Intellectual 
Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order,” Journal of Global 
History 6 no. 2 (2011): 223–47; Michael Riemens, “International Academic 
Cooperation on International Relations in the Interwar Period: the International 
Studies Conference,” Review of International Studies, no. 37/2 (2011), 911–28; 
Katharina Rietzler, “Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of Philanthropic 
Internationalism in the Interwar Years,” in Internationalism Reconfigured: 
Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars, ed. Daniel Laqua 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 45–65; Jo-Anne Pemberton, “The Changing Shape of 
Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO,” Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 58, no. 1 (March 2012): 34–50; Schulz-Forberg, 
“Laying the Groundwork.”
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the IIIC’s permanent International Studies Conference (ISC), the rela-
tion between state and economy in view of its global function was the 
central topic of the 1930s. Th e groundwork for the Agenda of Liberalism 
was prepared within the universe of the IIIC/ISC.
Existing histories of neoliberalism have either struggled to explain 
the composition of the WLC or focused on a handful of participants, 
usually the better-known intellectuals and economists.30 Yet what about 
the others? What about José Castillejo, a Spanish lawyer? What about a 
group of French industrialists, bankers, and young scholars like Etienne 
Mantoux and Robert Marjolin, the latter known for his spell at the 
OEEC and the European Commission, but less for his neoliberalism? 
Unable to account for the presence of most participants, existing histo-
ries either ignore or simply enumerate them. But if the Agenda of 
Liberalism represents early neoliberalism, then who were all the other 
participants besides the well-known protagonists? Were they not neolib-
erals? Aft er all, they all agreed on the same agenda. I will follow their 
paths through the transnational network of the IIIC and the ISC in this 
section.
Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium bore both resemblances and 
concrete connections to the International Studies Conferences devel-
oped by the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation 
(ICIC), established in January 1922, and the IIIC, established in Paris in 
1926 as the ICIC’s executive branch. From 1931 onward, ISC study 
groups worked on a chosen topic over a cycle of two years. Th e chosen 
study cycles were: “Th e State and Economic Life” (1932–33), “Collective 
Security” (34–35), “Peaceful Change” (36–37) and “Economic Policies 
in Relation to World Peace” (38–39). At the 1939 meeting in Bergen, 
held at the precise time that Nazi Germany invaded Poland, “International 
Organization” was the theme agreed upon for the 1940–41 cycle. Th e 
WLC was also planned originally to initiate a larger, international 
conference on the same topic in 1939.31
By 1937, thirty-eight National Committees of Intellectual Cooperation 
(NCICs) were in place.32 Th e reach of the system itself was global, as 
30  Angus Burgin, Th e Great Persuasion. Reinventing Free Markets since the 
Depression (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 71.
31  Rougier, the organizer of the WLC, mentioned this plan in his letter of invitation. 
See Audier, Le Colloque Lippmann, 140.
32  League of Nations, National Committees on Intellectual Co-operation (Geneva, 
1937). 
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NCICs sprouted in Argentina, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Syria. Experts from affi  liated institutions were 
commissioned to write memoranda on assigned themes and questions. 
Once the memoranda had all been submitted (they were oft en quite 
voluminous) a general rapporteur, appointed by the ISC and funded by 
the Rockefeller Foundation, would summarize the main points of view 
in a kick-off  lecture setting the stage for the discussions during the 
conference.33
By the late 1930s, the IIIC and the ISC had gained significant 
experience and grown into a large knowledge- and policy-making 
institutional arrangement. The tenth ISC conference from 1937, for 
example, needed ten preliminary meetings on specific sub-topics 
held in Geneva, London, Paris, and Vienna. The conference then 
had to digest more than 100 memoranda from Australia, Canada, 
the United States, and thirteen European countries. Overall, 142 
participants came to Paris from June 27 to July 3, representing 
twenty national research institutes and national coordinating 
committees. They came mostly from Europe, but also from Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, and the US. Five countries sent invited experts or 
observers: China, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Mexico. Furthermore, 
organizations the IIIC grouped under the headline “international” 
also participated or sent experts: the Carnegie Endowment, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Pacific Institute of International Affairs, 
the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, the 
Academy of International Law, the New Commonwealth Institute 
(which published Hayek’s essay on the effect of inter-state federa-
tion on the economy seen by many as an original script for contem-
porary neoliberalism34) and the International Labour Organization 
came to the ISCs.35
The culture of the meetings was one of open discussion without 
expectation of unanimity. Dialogue and contestation were expected. 
33  League of Nations Sixth International Studies Conference, A Record of a Second 
Study Conference on the State and Economic Life (Paris: IIIC, 1934), xiv–xv. 
34  See Wolfgang Streeck, Gekauft e Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen 
Kapitalismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013), 141; similarly, Lars Magnusson and Bo Stråth, A 
Brief History of Political Economy: Tales of Marx, Keynes and Hayek (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2016), 119–21.
35  Emanuel Moresco, Peaceful Change International Studies Conference, Vol. III, 
Colonial Questions and Peace (Paris: IIIC, 1939). 
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The fact that there was agreement on the new “Agenda of Liberalism” 
at the WLC actually surprised Louis Rougier, the WLC’s organizer, 
even if its substance was less than novel. The question of legitimate 
state intervention, in particular, had been mulled over many times 
before the WLC. At the ISC’s London meeting in 1933, for example, 
sessions dealt extensively with various “philosophical aspects of 
state intervention” as well as “practical aspects of state intervention.”36 
Among the WLC participants, Baudin, Condliffe, Heilperin, Mises, 
and Piatier worked as expert authors for the IIIC on other occa-
sions.37 Additionally, the Graduate Institute of International Studies 
(from where Baudin, Heilperin, Röpke, and Mises were recruited 
for the WLC) acted as a reliable source of much commissioned 
research.
Today, when interpretations of the WLC try to connect the differ-
ent individuals attending the Paris colloquium of 1938 and make 
sense of the heterogeneous group of participants, they have failed to 
look at the institutional framework within which the WLC was real-
ized.38 The list of participants in Paris included the international 
mix of experts characteristic of the IIIC who had already been 
involved with the League in one way or another, including repre-
sentatives from knowledge- and policy-making institutions and 
practitioners from banks or large industries. When the list of 
invitees is broadened to include all those who were not able (or did 
not want) to attend the colloquium, the weight of the League’s IIIC 
and the Rockefeller Foundation becomes even more obvious. For 
the WLC, Rougier sent invitations to Luigi Einaudi, Johan Huizinga, 
Tracy Kittredge, Francesco Nitti, José Ortega y Gasset, William 
Rappard, Charles Rist, and Lionel Robbins (these names provide 
36  IIIC, Second Study Conference on the State and Economic Life, 181–263.
37  Louis Baudin, Free Trade and Peace (Paris: IIIC, 1939); Condliff e’s fi rst report 
from 1930 was about  International Collaboration in the Study of International 
Relations (Archives of the IIIC, Paris, FR PUNES AG 1-IICI-C-88); Michael 
Heilperin, International Monetary Organisation (Paris: IIIC, 1939); Heilperin had 
already written for the tenth ISC in 1937 on Peaceful Change, this time on Les Aspects 
Monétaires du Problèmes des Matières Premières (Paris: IIIC, 1937); André Piatier, 
Report on the Study of Exchange Control (Archives of the IIIC, Paris, FR PUNES AG 
1-IICI-K-XII-12.a).
38  Th e most recent presentation of the WLC again avoids any institutional refl ection 
on the origins of neoliberalism. See the introductory essay by Reinhoudt and Audier, 
Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium. 
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two more participants at the founding meeting of the MPS in 
Rappard and Robbins).39
Apart from containing two towering fi gures of Italian political and 
intellectual history and the Spanish lodestar of conservative European 
thought, this list includes, with Robbins, one of the main protagonists of 
the early years of the MPS, and, with Rist, one of the most infl uential 
fi gures in relevant French and international academic as well as fi nan-
cial aff airs. With Huizinga and Rappard, the list of invitees also includes 
two members of the ICIC’s Executive Committee from Geneva (which, 
as a matter of fact, also acted as the governing body of the IIIC).40 
Rappard was the director of the League’s Mandate Section and co-
director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.41 Th e second 
co-director was Paul Mantoux, who was also director of the League’s 
Political Section and father of the WLC participant, Etienne Mantoux.
One member of the ICIC’s Executive Committee, José Castillejo, 
actually did make it to Paris. When reading the verbatim protocol of the 
WLC, one wonders why he was such an outspoken, self-confi dent 
speaker. With a specialization in Roman law, his knowledge on economic 
matters or liberal thought was not his major professional asset. Th e 
answer may be that Castillejo, who had initiated the foundation (again 
through co-fi nancing by government and Rockefeller funds) of the 
Spanish Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y Económicos in early 
1931,42 was a longstanding member of the ICIC’s Executive Committee 
and possessed the highest institutional authority among the pa rtici-
pants.43 Tracy Kittredge, fi nally, was the Assistant Director of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s European Social Sciences Division offi  ce from 
1931 to 1942 and participant at a number of ISCs. In 1919, Kittredge was 
a staff  member of the Supreme Economic Council during the Paris 
Peace Conference.
39  Audier, Le Colloque Lippmann, 140.
40  biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-3–1939_EN.pdf, 8.
41  Susan Pedersen, Th e Guardians: Th e League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Pedersen stresses that beside the mandates, the 
most important and under-researched issue is the League’s role in economic thought 
and policy-making.
42  José Castillejo, Letter to Ortega y Gasset, dated January 31, 1931, to which he 
attached a note explaining the organization and fi nancing of the institute. See Epistolario 
de José Castillejo, Vol. III, Fatalidad y Porvenir, 1913–1937 (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 
1999), 673–7.
43  Archives of the League of Nations, Geneva, Box R4000, 5B/25160/9508. 
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Almost all WLC participants came from within the existing transna-
tional networks of the IIIC/ISC. Th is is true for Condliff e, who was hired 
from the Institute of Pacifi c Relations to join the IIIC/ISC as rapporteur 
and research manager (popping up everywhere in the correspondence 
between Rockefeller and IIIC) in 1931. It is also true for Heilperin from 
the Graduate Institute in Geneva and Castillejo from the ICIC. Bruce 
Hopper was affi  liated with Harvard, the Sorbonne and the Pacifi c 
Institute as well. Both Mises and Hayek worked at two of the leading 
research institutes supplying ideas to the IIIC. Marcel van Zeeland acted 
probably more as a representative of his brother, Paul, Belgian prime 
minister until 1937 and author of the “Van Zeeland Report” from 
January 1938, around which Rougier would organize the next collo-
quium in 1939 (an occasion that received Lippmann’s blessing and 
congratulations,44 but is otherwise hard to reconstruct empirically so 
far). Marcel worked for the National Bank of Belgium (and later joined 
the Bank for International Settlements).
Th e economists and philosophers Rüstow, Röpke, Mises, and Hayek 
had all been associated with either the Rockefeller Foundation or the 
League or both, as in the case of Röpke who received a large grant from 
the foundation and whose business cycle theory was translated into 
English on the League’s initiative. Rüstow was Röpke’s friend from 
Istanbul, where they shared the experience of exile (and the privilege of 
founding a whole social science faculty at Istanbul University). Mises 
and Hayek worked at the two most prominent research institutions the 
League had within the IIIC/ISC network, the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies in Geneva and the LSE. Th ey were also connected 
by the Business Cycle Research Institute they had founded in Vienna 
and whose expertise was drawn upon by the League.
Before turning to the thirteen French WLC participants, this 
leaves Michael Polanyi, Stefan Possony, and Alfred Schütz. The latter 
two had both attended Mises’s private seminars in Vienna and were 
in exile at the moment of the WLC. Both had also been recent authors 
of studies related to the WLC’s topic. Possony had written and 
published on the war economy in 1938, whereas Schütz (who also 
studied with Hans Kelsen and heard Max Weber in Vienna) was a 
friend of Fritz Machlup and Erich Vögelin and had been in Paris 
44  Walter Lippmann, Letter to Louis Rougier, October 28, 1938, Box R1, Fonds 
Rougier, Château de Lourmarin. 
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since March 1938. Schütz was not an early macroeconomist, but an 
expert in epistemology inspired by von Mises and particularly 
phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl. Schütz’s contributions to 
early neoliberal thought are within social theory and relate more to 
von Mises’s Human Action and the theory of praxeology than to 
business cycle research.45 By the late 1930s, Polanyi, the polymath 
older brother of Karl, had turned away from his core specialty in 
chemistry to the social sciences. At the time of the WLC, he was 
shooting his Rockefeller Foundation-funded film on Unemployment 
and Money. He had also been to the Soviet Union on several occa-
sions in the 1930s, where he had seen the alternative to the liberal 
way and formed his opinion on both the kind of society he believed 
in and science’s role for that society.46
Th e thirteen French participants can be dealt with in groups. First, 
there is a trio of brilliant young scholars: Raymond Aron, Etienne 
Mantoux, and Robert Marjolin. Aron had just defended his PhD in the 
spring of 1938. Fundamental for his connection to the IIIC was his rela-
tion to Celestin Bouglé. Th e latter was not only a member of the French 
National Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, but also an advisor 
for the League and regular participant (and outspoken discussant) at the 
IIIC/ISC annual conferences as the offi  cial delegate of the French 
government to the IIIC.47 Th e second major academic fi gure of impor-
tance for Aron was Bouglé’s good friend, Elie Halévy, who was a much 
admired, well-connected philosopher and historian specializing in 
economic and political thought and deeply devoted to the question as to 
how the circle of social justice and economic freedom might be squared. 
In fact, Halévy, who had died from heart disease in 1937, taught the 
young French WLC participants and they all were enthralled by his 
intellectual and human capacities.48 In 1921, Bouglé founded the Centre 
45  See Alfred Schütz, Der sinnhaft e Aufb au der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die 
verstehende Soziologie (Vienna: J. Springer, 1932); Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A 
Treatise on Economics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), 24 and 100, actually 
builds on Schütz.
46  See Michael Polanyi, “USSR Economics: Fundamental Data, System and Spirit,” 
Th e Manchester School 6, no. 2 (December 1935): 67–88.
47  IIIC, Second Study Conference on the State and Economic Life, 416.
48  Robert Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie. Mémoirs 1911–1986 (Paris: Robert Laff ont, 
1986), 54. Halévy’s 1936 lectures on the ‘age of tyranny’ were particularly formative for 
Aron, Marjolin, and Mantoux. See Halévy’s posthumously published work (prefaced by 
Bouglé), L’Ère des tyrannies. Etudes sur le socialisme et la guerre (Paris: Gallimard, 1938). 
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de Documentations Sociales (CDS) at the École Normale Supérieure, to 
which he was deputy director. Aron joined the CDS while he wrote his 
PhD on the philosophy of history in relation to social theory, specifi cally 
on Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Wilhelm Dilthey, and German thought 
more specifi cally. Aron’s PhD was representative of early neoliberal epis-
temology in many ways and particularly close to Popper’s strong critique 
of “historicism.”49
Critical of a liberal paradigm rooted in laissez-faire and in a philoso-
phy of history based on the interpretation of the concept of nature, 
Aron, perfectly in tune with fellow early neoliberals (see Martin 
Beddeleem’s contribution to this volume), argued for a conscious devel-
opment of values on which society might be built as a consequence of 
the critique of earlier liberal epistemologies and understandings of the 
science of history.50 Th e CDS was the perfect place for this kind of 
research and it is another good example of the funding strategy 
Rockefeller had at the time. Initially fi nanced by the banker Albert 
Kahn, Rockefeller took over the CDS’s fi nancial support following the 
fi nancial crisis of 1929. Th e grant allowed the employment of research 
assistants, and the foundation had certain ideas regarding the nature of 
the research to be carried out at the center. Sociology had been identi-
fi ed by Rockefeller as one of the disciplines able to develop “methods for 
social control” and he was particularly supportive of research in the vein 
of “inductive sociology.”51
Etienne Mantoux was recognized among the circles of early neolib-
erals as a highly promising scholar, mostly through his essay on 
Keynes’s claim that Germany could not pay back the reparations 
demanded aft er the First World War. He argued the opposite (as did 
others among the early neoliberal economists, especially Rueff  and 
Heilperin).52 Educated at Sciences Po in Paris as a student of Halévy’s, 
See also Ludovic Frobert, “Elie Halé vy’s First Lectures on the History of European 
Socialism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 68, no. 2 (2007): 329–53.
49  Karl Popper, Th e Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 1957).
50  Aron, Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire. 
51  See Marcel Fournier, Marcel Mauss: A Biography (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 293.
52  Etienne Mantoux, La paix calomniée ou les conséquences économiques de M. Keynes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1946). Mantoux died in April 1945. His work, posthumously published, 
was immediately translated as Th e Carthaginian Peace or the Economic Consequences of Mr 
Keynes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), and then just as immediately praised by 
fellow early neoliberals in a string of reviews for academic journals. 
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whom he admired and visited privately on a regular basis, he moved 
to London in the mid-1930s to study with Harold Laski and Hayek at 
the LSE.
Marjolin worked as chief assistant for Charles Rist’s research insti-
tute at the time of the colloquium. Rist was certainly among the intel-
lectual infl uences on Marjolin, who was otherwise inspired in his 
economic thinking by both Keynes and Hayek as well as Knut Wicksell, 
Gunnar Myrdal, and John Hicks.53 At the time of the WLC, Marjolin 
had just turned twenty-seven and he was already a specialist in macro-
economics and business cycle theory as well as the relation between 
socially conscious politics and liberal markets. He was in the midst of 
his PhD project, which was fi nally published in 1941.54 He was a life-
long friend of Aron’s with whom he claims to have been in full agree-
ment intellectually.55
Th e second group of WLC participants from France were the 
industrialists. Th ey were Louis Marlio, Marcel Bourgeois, Auguste 
Detœuf, and Ernest Mercier. Marlio, though working for the French 
energy industry, was likely the most academic among them and he 
also had a background in working for the League of Nations. He was 
entrusted with the mandate of becoming the fi rst president of the 
Centre International d’Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralisme 
(CIRL) in 1939 following the WLC, and together with Baudin and 
Rüstow probably among the most enthusiastic champions of the term 
“neoliberalism.”56
Detœuf, founder and long-term director of the French energy 
giant Alstom, had gained some intellectual profile through his activ-
ities within the interdisciplinary intellectual platform of the 1930s 
called Groupe x-crise. He had published a strong critique of capital-
ism and liberalism, not believing in their survival. Rougier sent him 
a copy of Lippmann’s Good Society to convince him that there were 
still ways of redesigning liberalism and Detœuf joined the WLC as a 
53  Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie, 52.
54  Robert Marjolin, Prix, monnaie et production: Essai sur les mouvements 
économiques de longue durée (Paris: Th èses, Universités de Paris, Faculté de droit, 1941), 
prefaced by Charles Rist. 
55  Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie, 56. 
56  Louis Marlio, “Le Néo-libéralisme,” talk at CIRL in Paris, 1939, in Les Essais. 
Cahiers bimestriels, 86–108. 
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supporter of Lippmann’s ideas—and a critic of Mises.57 Ernest 
Mercier was connected to Marlio and Detœuf via Groupe x-crise, but 
even more via another platform called Redressement français, which 
Mercier had founded and for which he acted as president until 1932. 
It aimed at shaping and uniting the elite as well as educating the 
masses and running t he country in a technocratic, corporative 
manner. Mercier was director of the Compagnie française du petrol 
(CFP), the predecessor of the French petroleum group Total. Marcel 
Bourgeois was connected to the French chemical industry, but was 
also co-founder of the Librairie de Mèdicis, the liberal French 
publishing house in which The Good Society appeared in French 
translation as La Cité Libre and where the WLC proceedings were 
published originally in 1939.58
Th e third group of French participants is characterized by their more 
senior academic status and by their connections to the League and its 
affi  liated international organizations. Th ey are Roger Auboin, Louis 
Baudin, Bernard Lavergne, André Piatier, Louis Rougier, and Jacques 
Rueff . Auboin had been appointed as General Manager of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in early 1938. Ever since its foundation 
in 1930, the Bank’s representatives had been involved in meetings and 
dialogue with the League. In the mid-1930s, the BIS’s economic advisor, 
Per Jacobsson, was present in the wider circle of actors following 
Rockefeller’s Annecy conference from 1936 on business cycles and the 
concept of the world economy.59
Baudin was an internationally respected economist during the late 
1930s, author of a memorandum for the IIIC, and among the more 
enthusiastic users of the term neoliberalism, the “basic idea” of which, 
he explained again aft er the war in 1953, “is the rescue of the human 
person.”60 He was affi  liated to the Sorbonne and to the Geneva 
57  See their discussions in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann Colloquium. 
For Rougier’s approaching of Detœuf, see also Box R1, Fonds Rougier, Château de 
Lourmarin. 
58  See François Denord, “Aux origines du néo-libéralisme en France. Louis Rougier 
et le Colloque Walter Lippmann de 1938,” Le Mouvement Social 195, no. 2 (2001): 9–34. 
59  See the detailed description in Jérôme Wilson, Robert Triffi  n. Milieux 
académiques et cénacles économiques internationaux 1935–1951 (Fond Camille Gutt: 
Editions Versant Sud), particularly chaper 2, “Naissance d’un économiste 
(1932–1935).” 
60  Louis Baudin, L’Aube d’un nouveau libéralisme (Paris: Librairie de Médicis, 
1953), 146.
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Graduate Institute of International Studies as well as to the League, 
where he joined Oscar Morgenstern and Bertil Ohlin in a group of 
experts with the marvelously bulky name of the Committee of 
Economists to assist the Fiscal Committee in the Enquiry on the 
Behaviour of Tax Systems.61
Bernard Lavergne was again a Sorbonne graduate, a collaborator 
with Rist, and on friendly terms with Halévy, with whom he corre-
sponded regularly.62 Lavergne worked mainly on the fi eld of coopera-
tive movements and on the concept and role of the consumer.63 In fact, 
the co-opératif was a particularly articulated idea (and also practice) in 
French economic thought. During IIIC/ISC meetings, Bouglé would 
make sure to enumerate the cooperative movement as one of the key 
examples for the possible coexistence of free markets with more socially 
controlled elements of the economy.64
André Piatier is a lesser known character who appears in the sources 
as a young expert who worked for the IIIC/ISC on the Danubian 
Economic Study, as an author of a memorandum for the 1939 confer-
ence, and at the WLC. He was also a Sorbonne graduate and the fi rst 
secretary of the Paris-based International Institute of Public Finances 
that had been founded in 1937 (by the omnipresent William Rappard 
among others) on the initiative of Edgar Allix, the Dean of the Law 
Faculty at Paris University. When Allix died unexpectedly in mid-1938, 
Piatier, initially Allix’s assistant, took over.65
Th e last actors to consider are Louis Rougier and Jacques Rueff . Both 
are key fi gures for the history of neoliberalism. Rougier has received 
more attention than Rueff  from scholars thus far, mainly because he was 
the WLC’s organiser. While he tarnished his image politically during the 
61  biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-3–1939_EN.pdf, 7. 
62  For example, in 1936, Lavergne turned to Halévy in a handful of letters about his 
candidature for the Collège de France. See the Papers of Elie Halévy at the École Normale 
Supérieure, Box 7 (1930–37).
63  See, based on his PhD at the law faculty: Bernard Lavergne, Le Régime coopératif. 
Etude général de la coopération de consommation en Europe (Paris: Rousseau, 1908); 
L’hégémonie du consommateur: vers une renovation de la science économique (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1958).
64  For France, he enumerated four strong powers to reckon with when shaping 
economic policies: “peasants, democrats, trade-unionists and co-operators.” Célestin 
Bouglé, in League of Nations, Th e State and Economic Life with Special Reference to 
International Economic and Political Relations (Paris: IIIC, 1932), 46.
65  “IIPF History,” at iipf.net.
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war through his collaboration with the Vichy regime, he remained affi  li-
ated to the transnational network of economists.66 Rougier reappeared 
in the mid-1950s aft er he was allowed to resume teaching in France, and 
participated in the discussion of neoliberalism at Oostende, Belgium, in 
mid-September 1957, twenty years aft er the publication of Lippmann’s 
Th e Good Society.67
More important and infl uential intellectually and politically was 
Rueff . A renowned expert on monetary issues, he was the mastermind 
behind the change from the old to the new franc in 1960. He hammered 
home the key message of early neoliberalism throughout—that the price 
mechanism needs to be in place as the decisive element indicative of a 
liberal society, yet that this price mechanism may well live in peaceful 
coexistence with certain forms of state intervention (of a liberal kind) 
and even tariff s.68 In addition, he was also immensely active as a policy-
maker and within international organizations. And of course, he was 
well known as Charles de Gaulle’s economic advisor and as an ardent 
advocate of the gold standard.
For the League, Rueff  served (together with, again, Morgenstern 
and Ohlin) as a member of the Special Delegation of the Financial 
and Economic Committees for the Study of Economic Depressions. 
He continued his political work as a strong supporter of European 
integration and as the fi rst president of UNESCO’s International 
Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, where, in conversa-
tion with colleagues from other disciplines and with more global 
origins he repeated his most infl uential message about the price 
mechanism’s role in safeguarding civilization, and continued to refl ect 
deeply on the very role and function of core concepts for societies and 
their interrelations.69 While his clarity and strong convictions in this 
area qualifi ed him for membership in the Mont Pèlerin Society, it was 
66  See his Mission Sectète à Londres. Les Accords Pétain-Churchill (Geneva: Les 
Editions du Cheval Ailé, 1946). 
67  Travaux du Colloque International du Libéralisme Economique (Brussels: Editions 
du Centre Paul Hymans, 1957), 279–93, where he would continue to separate 
“neoliberalism” from “liberalism of strict observance.” 
68  See Rueff ’s interventions in Reinhoudt and Audier, Th e Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium and perhaps most importantly in L’Ordre Social (Paris: Librairie de Médicis, 
1949) and Épitre aux Dirigistes (Paris: Gallimard, 1949). 
69  UNESCO Archive. See for example the “Report of the Meeting of the Committee 
on the Philosophical Analysis of Fundamental Concepts,” May 3–7, 1949, Paris, Box 
CISHP 1, UNESCO/PHS/12.
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his capacity in the fi eld of macroeconomics avant la lettre that quali-
fi ed him for the League’s roster of economists and the WLC in the fi rst 
place.
Embedding Early Neoliberals into the Origins 
of “Macro-Dynamic Economics”
Jacques Rueff ’s connections to the League of Nations were shared by 
many of those present in Paris in 1938. From the beginning of its exist-
ence, the League had looked for expertise in what Ragnar Frisch had 
baptized “macro-dynamic” economics. Th e Norwegian economist was 
the fi rst laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics in 1969 
(see Philip Mirowski’s contribution to this volume). In the early 1930s 
he served as director of the University Institute of Economics in Oslo, 
which had been funded by “generous grants” of the Rockefeller 
Foundation together with a Norwegian source, A/S Norsk Varekrig.70 
As he explained in 1933:
When we approach the study of the business cycle with the intention 
of carrying through an analysis that is truly dynamic and determi-
nate   . . ., we are naturally led to distinguish between two types of 
analyses: the micro-dynamic and the macro-dynamic types. Th e 
micro-dynamic analysis is an analysis by which we try to explain in 
some detail the behaviour of a certain section of the huge economic 
mechanism . . . Th e macro-dynamic analysis, on the other hand, tries 
to give an account of the fl uctuations of the whole economic system 
taken in its entirety.71
For the League, the “whole economic system” was indeed global, and 
among the general crowd of experts in “dynamic economics” a number 
of early neoliberals had their share in shaping the League’s policies—
until the intervention of a certain Mr. Keynes. Apart from the League, 
the growing transnational breed of “macro-dynamic” economists found 
an academic home in the Econometric Society that was founded in late 
70  Ragnar Frisch, “Propagation Problems and Impulse Problems in Dynamic 
Economics,” Publications of the University Institute of Economics, no. 3 (1933), 1–35.
71  Ibid., 2.
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1930 by the same Ragnar Frisch, with Joseph Schumpeter, Keynes, and 
Rueff  as founding fellows.72 Th e Econometric Society continued to 
serve UNESCO as a consultative organization once the IIIC had been 
dismantled and UNESCO became its successor.
Early neoliberal forms of macro analysis were fundamentally 
different to that of Keynes’s General Theory and to other spin-offs of 
the new discipline at the time, for example that of Schumpeter.73 
Keynes’s focus on crisis amendment—the “bust” side of the business 
cycle—is diametrically opposed to how early neoliberals approached 
business cycles. For them, the policies steering the boom are what 
matters. Intervention needs to act on the framework for growth, and 
not be based on urgent social needs when the crisis has hit. At the 
same time, they also acknowledged some of Keynes’s ideas, particu-
larly the insight that a purely monetary policy to prevent deflation 
would not be enough in cases of deep depression. The “how” of the 
policy then mattered and was disputed.74 Notwithstanding their 
objections to the emerging mainstream, early neoliberals were part 
of the transnational team of experts providing models of business 
cycle analysis for Geneva. In fact, looking at the WLC participants 
once again, expertise in early forms of macroeconomics (back then 
still a rather indistinct field far from the mathematically based 
models of econometrics today) is what unites the majority of the 
economists present in Paris.
Austrian business cycle theory was developed by Hayek and Mises in 
the 1920s, and Hayek’s main contribution to the fi eld came out soon 
aft er.75 It argues, in a nutshell, that the reason for any crisis of capitalism 
lies not in the moment and context of crisis itself. Treatment should be 
for the boom, not for the bust. Crises, in this shorthand, become malfor-
mations of mishandled growth processes and responsibility for them 
can thus be laid at the doorsteps of politics. As a result of such a position 
(which Hayek revised throughout the 1930s aft er a spate of criticism), 
72  See the memo by Frisch and Schumpeter at www.dev.econometricsociety.org.
73  John Maynard Keynes, General Th eory of Employment, Interest, and Money 
(London: Macmillan, 1936); Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Th eoretical, 
Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process (New York, Toronto, and 
London: McGraw-Hill Co., 1939).
74  See “Between Mises and Keynes: An Interview with Gottfried von Haberler,” 
Austrian Economics Newsletter 20, no. 1 (Spring 2000), at mises.org.
75  F. A. Hayek, Prices and Production (London: Routledge, 1931).
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those suff ering from economic crises would be left  without any support 
until markets rebalance and new employment emerges. Beside more 
obvious critics of such a position, such as fellow macroeconomist and 
welfare theorist John Hicks,76 even Milton Friedman later criticized 
Austrian business cycle theory for its apparent prescription of letting 
“the bottom drop out of the world.”77
In 1927, the Österreichisches Institut für Konjunkturforschung 
(Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research) began its work with 
Hayek as director and Mises as spiritus rector. In its early stages, the 
institute was fi nanced by the latter’s contacts at the Chamber of 
Commerce in Vienna, the Austrian National Bank and the Railway 
Federation. Later, it received support from the Rockefeller Foundation 
and became one of a string of funded business cycle institutes across 
Europe, which formed a Standing Committee of Business Cycle 
Institutes with Charles Rist as its president.78
From the pioneering work of the Swedish economists Carl Gustav 
Cassel (the intellectual pioneer of the rediscovered Purchasing Power 
Parity paradigm particularly infl uential in the 1920s at the League79) 
and Knut Wicksell to Gottfried Haberler’s League-commissioned 
writing on business cycles, the League actively attracted research-
based policy recommendations. Th e Business Cycle Institute’s 
approach, besides the leading Swedish economists of the time, 
informed the League’s approach to Central and Eastern Europe in the 
1930s. Haberler had moved on from Hayek’s original position, but as 
a member of Mises’s Vienna circle and an employee of the Business 
Cycle Institute, he was never far away. Th e Business Cycle Institute 
became particularly important for the League during the Danubian 
Economic Study project, a large-scale comparison of Danubian coun-
tries east of Austria that was proposed to the League by the institute 
in 1934 and took off  aft er the 1935 meeting of the ISC in Copenhagen. 
Th e Business Cycle Institute then also formally applied to the ISC in 
76  John Hicks, “Th e Hayek Story,” in Critical Essays in Monetary Th eory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1967), 203–15.
77  Milton Friedman, “Mr. Market,” Hoover Digest 1999/1, at hoover.org.
78  Neil de Marchi, “League of Nations Economists and the Ideal of Peaceful Change 
in the Decade of the ‘Th irties’,” in: Craufurd D. Goodwin, Economics and National 
Security: A History of their Interaction, Duke University Press, 1991. Series: History of 
Political Economy Annual Supplement (Book 23), 143–78, 149.
79  Gustav Cassel, “Abnormal Deviations in International Exchanges,” Th e Economic 
Journal 28 (1918): 413–15. 
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March 1936 to become an “indirect member,” represented via the offi  -
cial Austrian representative, the Konsularakademie, the leading diplo-
matic school with an international student body that served as the 
IIIC’s main research hotspot in the fi eld of international studies in 
Austria.80
Early “macro-dynamic” economics, which included business cycle 
analysis along with statistics as major methods in the 1930s, was also 
linked to the ISC when the Rockefeller Foundation agreed to support 
the Danubian Economic Study, and was included within the “Peaceful 
Change” study cycle from 1935 to 1937. At the second study group 
meeting, held in Paris, results needed to be reported.81 The Danubian 
Economic Study was directed by Oscar Morgenstern, who had 
succeeded Hayek as the director of the Business Cycle Institute when 
the latter left for the LSE in 1931. Morgenstern shared a methodo-
logical uneasiness towards statistical data with Hayek, whose first 
publications were in this field, recalling the “fuzziness” of both the 
data and the theory that go into business cycle analysis.82 But as 
business cycle research was prominent with the League otherwise, 
Morgenstern became a member of the League’s Committee of 
Statistical Experts.83
Th e Danubian Economic Study stirred the interest of economists 
interested in business cycle theory—or, as the Rockefeller Foundation 
put it, in “the problem of cyclical and structural change”—and was 
connected to the network of business cycle institutes coordinated by 
Rist. In the spring of 1937, preparing for the Paris conference, the 
prolongation of the grant was further discussed and the interest of 
economists like Wilhelm Röpke and John Bell Condliff e—who would 
later participate at the WLC—was noted by Rockefeller.84 Röpke was 
brought into the League’s rank of experts because his work on business 
cycle theory had made him an internationally recognized expert in the 
fi eld. Th e translation from Röpke’s German original (1931) got 
80  See the Rockefeller Foundation Archive, RG1, S100, Box 110, Folder 1002, and 
particularly the internal letter from Tracy Kittredge, dated December 10, 1935. 
81  See International Studies Conference, Peaceful Change: Procedures, Populations, 
Raw Materials, Colonies (IIIC: Paris, 1938), 214-57. 
82  Oskar Morgenstern, International Financial Transactions and Business Cycles 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 10.
83  biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-3–1939_EN.pdf, 6.
84  RG1, S100, Box 110, Folder 1002, see proposed resolution from January 12, 
1937.
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underway on the initiative of the League’s Ragnar Nurkse and was 
fi nally published in 1936, the year of the Annecy conference on inter-
national economy.85 At the conference, Röpke was given the task of 
initiating research on “postwar agrarian and industrial protectionism.”86 
He carried out the research under the auspices of the Graduate Institute 
in Geneva from 1937 onward. He then applied for funding at the 
Rockefeller Foundation to realize the study in the best possible manner. 
In March 1938, a group of experts had been charged by Rockefeller to 
review Röpke’s proposal. Th ey met at the Paris-based Institut de 
Recherche Economiques et Sociales directed by Rist on 19 March and 
decided that the project deserved funding. Röpke was granted 
$60,000.87 Members of the board judging Röpke’s proposal belonged 
to the permanent committee of Instituts de conjuncture (business cycle 
institutes) mentioned above. Among them were Charles Rist, John 
Condliff e, and William Rappard. Indeed, the business cycle part of the 
story brings the WLC in touch with the ISC and Rockefeller once 
more. Not only were WLC participants and invitees found within the 
deeper trenches of the funding network and at the Instituts de conjunc-
ture, but they had also been to the 1936 Annecy conference. Mises, 
Röpke, and Condliff e participated both in Annecy and in Paris in 
1938. Rappard, Rist, and Robbins were at least invited to Paris and 
participated in Annecy.88
Th e short story of the business cycle theory and its connection to 
both early neoliberalism and the League shows that those early neolib-
erals who were in Paris for the WLC were, among other things, experts 
in the emerging fi eld of what Frisch had called “macro-dynamic” 
economics and dealt with empirical and theoretical eff orts to get a grip 
on the global economy. Th is was spot-on in terms of the focus of the 
League’s interest. When looking at the list of participants and invitees of 
the WLC one can already fi nd Condliff e, Hayek, Marjolin, Mantoux, 
Mises, Rist, Röpke, and Rappard involved in business cycle analysis. All 
of them were invited to join the WLC, though not all of them managed 
to attend.
85  Wilhelm Röpke, Cycles and Crises (London: W. Hodge, 1936), iv.
86  See the preface in Wilhelm Röpke, International Economic Disintegration 
(London: W. Hodge, 1942). 
87  Charles Rist, Letter to Tracy B. Kittredge, dated March 9, 1938, IIIC Archives, 
Folder K.1.3. 
88  See De Marchi, “League of Nations Economists,” 149–50.
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Conclusion
Reading the Walter Lippmann Colloquium in the context of its time 
shows that it did not fall from the sky in the summer of 1938 as the fi rst 
seed of a robust and unchanging worldview of what would later become 
an ever-growing ideological fl ora in the Mont Pèlerin Society. It shows 
that neoliberalism was entrenched from the beginning in transnational 
elite networks whose goal was (and still is) to defi ne ideas of normative 
statehood and liberal governance able to keep politics within its “proper 
limits” while making sure that nation-states share an ideological DNA 
without being identical.89
Early neoliberals were fully aware of the scale of their project. Th ey 
were making states and economies. Th eir ambitions were never small 
but they had the confi dence of their proximity to powerful political and 
fi nancial sources. Because of this awareness they can be thought of as 
normative actors fully aware of their very norm making. Th e liberal 
variety of the “good society” had to be shaped and molded like any other 
society. Conscious of their fundamental work, they built the ideological 
elements of neoliberal language and discourse.
Early neoliberalism was embedded in the transnational networks 
of expertise emerging in the 1930s in a number of ways. It was embed-
ded institutionally through the League of Nations, its consultative 
bodies of the ICIC and the IIIC, and was particularly inspired by the 
ISC, linked to and developed in dialogue with the newly forming 
discipline of international studies. In the latter, it was embedded also 
conceptually, building its ideological semantics alongside the general 
trends in international law, political theory, and international rela-
tions. Despite later characterizations of Karl Polanyi and neoliberals 
as ideological and methodological opposites, the institutional focus 
of early neoliberals even suggested the embedding of the economy in 
a sense reminiscent of Polanyi. Of course, Karl Polanyi argued for 
diff erent forms of embedding, and early neoliberals were clearly in 
favor of retaining land, labor, and capital as commodities (the root 
cause of capitalism’s crisis according to Polanyi),90 but they were also 
acutely aware that nation-states were here to stay and that national 
89  Carl J. Friedrich, “Th e Political Th ought of Neo-Liberalism,” Th e American 
Political Science Review 49, no. 2 (1955), 509–25, 525.
90  Karl Polanyi, Th e Great Transformation (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944).
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   194 10/03/2020   14:00:00
Embedded Early Neoliberalism 195
economies had to be embedded politically and socially to fi t in with 
other national economies on a global economic playing fi eld. Th e 
Agenda of Liberalism was their proposal to reach such an interna-
tional order.
Furthermore, early neoliberalism found nourishment in the theories 
of business cycle analysis, understood as a research program on cyclical 
and structural economic change. In general, ideas of normative state-
hood—the need to build states in certain ways in order to guarantee 
economic success and with it internal peace—began to thrive within the 
League’s institutional network as answers were sought to questions 
emerging both from European state-building aft er the unravelling of 
empires in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and from the 
Mandate System that needed to defi ne how former colonies might reach 
full independence.91
A number of early neoliberals who participated at the WLC 
continued their careers within global elite networks. Rueff became 
the first director of UNESCO’s International Council for Philosophy 
and Humanistic Studies. Marjolin became the first director of the 
OEEC. Auboin continued as general director of the BIS until 1958. 
Yet new questions arise. For if neoliberalism was already deeply 
entrenched in global governance networks, why was there a need for 
the MPS in the first place? One answer is that the embedding 
enacted with the postwar reconstruction, the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, the UN, and the early European integration process was not 
the kind of embedded liberalism early neoliberals wholeheartedly 
supported.92 While their ideas were mainstream in the late 1930s, 
they were marginal by 1945. Bretton Woods’ fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates, the dominance of Keynesian macroeconomics, and 
the increasing limitation of the price mechanism’s scope by welfare 
state practices and various plans within the European reconstruc-
tion process might have motivated some early neoliberals to purify 
their doctrine and to gather their strength in the MPS (see Matthias 
91  See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: Th e 
End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2018).
92  John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, 
no. 2 (1982): 379–415.
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Schmelzer’s contribution to this volume), while others remained 
powerful policy-makers, for example Marjolin, and tolerated a more 
pragmatic approach. Yet this purification must be seen as one of 
many possible outcomes of the original Agenda of Liberalism from 
1938, not as an ironclad inevitability. Seeing the Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium in context reveals the importance of a more globally 
oriented conceptual history that is aware of institutional conditions 
and possibilities. We must locate the origins of neoliberalism within 
a contested field of thought rather than track a putatively pure 
essence. Neoliberalism was born in dialogue with other views and 
should be studied in such a way too.
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What Comes After Bretton Woods? 
Neoliberals Debate and Fight 
for a Future Monetary Order
Matthias Schmelzer
Who killed Bretton Woods?1 Scholars have yet to deliver a fi nal verdict 
on the question of how and why we moved from an age of fi xed but 
adjustable exchange rates and capital controls designed by John Maynard 
Keynes and others in 1944 to that of fl exible rates and free capital move-
ments in which we still live—a shift  that proved fundamental for the 
neoliberal counter-revolution at large. Aft er the Great Depression and 
well into the 1960s, most economists and policy-makers saw free 
markets for international capital and currency fl ows as too destabilizing 
for a robust and well-functioning capitalism. Th e neoliberals around the 
Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) disagreed and the Bretton Woods order 
was a deep thorn in their side. In fact, they saw capital and exchange 
controls as one of the most fundamental threats not only to the market 
system but to Western civilization itself.
For all their consternation, neoliberals remained in the minority on 
matters of international monetary order until the early 1970s, when the 
hemorrhaging of gold from US coff ers and what policy-makers saw as 
the persistent overvaluation of the dollar drove Richard Nixon’s admin-
istration to seek drastic solutions, culminating in the closure of the gold 
window and beginning the move to fl oating exchange rates. In 1982, 
Milton Friedman famously observed that when a “crisis occurs, the 
1  For helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter, I want to thank in 
particular Quinn Slobodian, but also Dieter Plehwe, Harmut Kaelble, and Alexander 
Nützenadel. 
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actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.” Th e 
goal was “to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive 
and available until the politically impossible becomes politically 
inevitable.”2 Friedman illustrated his key dictum by reference to the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods: “Such a crisis arose in 1971. If the alterna-
tive of fl oating exchange rates had not been fully explored in the 
academic literature  . . . it is not clear what solution would have been 
adopted.”3
Th e neoliberal campaign to end the Bretton Woods system of “embed-
ded liberalism” was an example of Friedman’s strategy in action and 
off ers one of the earliest and most comprehensive examples of successful 
neoliberal policy entrepreneurship in academic, political, and business 
circles.4 How did Friedman and other neoliberal economists become 
infl uential? What did “keeping options available” mean in practice? 
Alongside US national interests, scholars have highlighted the impor-
tance of the ideological outlook of key decision-makers of the Nixon 
administration in the decision to dismantle Bretton Woods. Th ey have 
pointed to the infl uence of individuals like Herbert Stein, Paul 
McCracken, William Fellner (all members of the Council of Economic 
Advisers), Gottfried Haberler (head of Nixon’s Task Force on US Balance 
of Payments Policies), and Milton Friedman.5 Th ese economists, 
together with their academic and think tank networks, were able to 
place their interpretations, arguments, and strategies within the Nixon 
administration and to portray fl exible exchange rates as an attractive 
resort for US policy-makers in times of balance of payments crisis.
Less oft en observed is the shared membership of almost all of these 
individuals within the Mont Pèlerin Society and their participation in 
2  Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), ix.
3  Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 220. 
4  John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, 
no. 2 (1982): 379–415.
5  See for example Carol M. Connell, Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz 
Machlup and the Bellagio Group (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Eric Helleiner, States and 
the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994); Robert Leeson, Ideology and the International Economy: Th e 
Decline and Fall of Bretton Woods (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); John S. Odell, 
US International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
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debates about the future of monetary order within the MPS that 
stretched back to the 1940s. Whereas neoliberalism is oft en presented as 
an internally consistent and unifi ed ideology, the case of monetary order 
belies this impression. While the fi nal message may have been that 
“there is no alternative,” debates took place fi rst about what that one 
policy option was, to which there is no alternative. Indeed, the rather 
complicated, arcane, and seemingly technical question of the interna-
tional monetary system was the most controversial and divisive among 
organized neoliberals in the postwar decades. It resulted in the longest 
and most contentious internal controversy between two fundamentally 
opposed camps that dominated many of the yearly MPS meetings in the 
postwar period and threatened to split the emerging neoliberal interna-
tional in the course of the 1960s. Th us, even as it documents a consider-
able policy victory, this chapter shows that neoliberals did not always 
speak with a single voice. Although unifi ed around the need to free 
international movements of capital, investment, and money, neoliberals 
could not agree at fi rst on the specifi c nature of the alternative to the 
Bretton Woods order.
Th e controversy pitted the proponents of the gold standard led by 
Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Röpke, and F. A. Hayek against advocates 
of fl oating exchange rates, most saliently Milton Friedman, Fritz 
Machlup, and Gottfried Haberler. Th e advocates of fl exible exchange 
rates eventually prevailed. In the long run, they argued, fl oating currency 
markets would establish market discipline for national monetary and 
fi scal policy because there would be limits to using devaluation as an 
easy way to address a lack of competitiveness. And by pushing for “inde-
pendent” central banks that followed set rules rather than relying on 
democratic decision-making, monetarists could also control the money 
supply, thus keeping it within strict limits and limiting the infl ation they 
saw as caused by escalating social demands for state spending.
Aft er the neoliberal advocates of fl oating rates won out in the internal 
debates, they launched a remarkable transnational campaign aimed at 
convincing key decision-makers and experts of the merits of such a 
post-Bretton Woods order. Th e campaign was carried out by both 
academics and experts from fi nancial institutions. MPS members were 
prominent in the coordination of the campaign, which involved a 
concerted communication strategy and sweeping publication eff orts on 
both sides of the Atlantic. It also relied on the organization of the era’s 
most infl uential academic conference series on monetary questions 
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aimed at economists, central bankers, and the private banking commu-
nity. When the Bretton Woods system was on the verge of collapsing in 
the early 1970s, the fl exible exchange rate discourse coalition had built 
up a powerful international alliance ready with an alternative. It exerted 
infl uence through key expert and advisory posts in the Nixon adminis-
tration, which fi nally ended the gold parity of the US dollar in 1971 and 
did not return to a fi xed exchange rate regime at the global level thereaf-
ter. If not the primary culprits in the death of Bretton Woods, the neolib-
erals were enthusiastic accomplices in its euthanasia.
From the Classical Gold Standard to Bretton 
Woods: The Historical Context
While opinions within the neoliberal thought collective of the MPS 
converged on most issues, the question of the monetary system proved 
an exception. In his insider’s history of the MPS, Max Hartwell 
observed that the only two topics that sparked continuous controver-
sies were the gold standard and the related question of “fi xed versus 
fl exible exchange rates.”6 At the 1984 conference in Cambridge, John 
Davenport could still draw “a laugh by observing that the original 
Pèlerinians could agree on everything save the subjects of God and 
gold.”7 Why was the money question so important? Th e fi rst obvious 
point is that the neoliberals were not alone in their interest. Questions 
about monetary order, the stability of international trade, and the 
balance of payments were among the most relevant and broadly 
discussed issues in the transatlantic policy community from the 1950s 
to the 1970s.8 However, a more specifi c reason helps illuminate the 
relationship of the emerging neoliberal thought collective to questions 
of democracy and freedom.
Th e gold standard—the liberal economic order that shaped the fi rst 
phase of globalization between 1871 and 1914, lasted until the outbreak 
of the First World War, and was resuscitated in the interwar 
6  Max Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1995), xvii; see also 114, 119.
7  Greg Kaza, “Th e Mont Pèlerin Society’s 50th Anniversary,” Th e Freeman 47, no. 6 
(June 1997), https://archive.li/4RBCN.
8  Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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period—was fundamentally anti-democratic. To enable free interna-
tional capital fl ows at an astonishingly high level—around 1900 at a 
similar level to the year 1990 in proportional terms—this system of fi xed 
exchange rates and gold backing posed strict limits to domestic 
economic policies.9 Karl Polanyi has given a moving description of what 
this meant for working people and the poor: if the balance of payments, 
volatile international capital markets, and the stabilization of exchange 
rates demanded domestic restraint, then high unemployment and fall-
ing wages were condoned.10 As stated in a standard textbook, the “stabil-
ity of exchange rates relied on the submission of national economic poli-
cies under the diktat of balance of payments adjustment.”11
Barry Eichengreen has demonstrated how this monetary system of 
the gold standard grew increasingly dysfunctional with the rise of 
democracies, strong trade unions, and the rise to prominence of inter-
ventionist and (proto-)Keynesian theories and state practices around 
the world. Under these new circumstances, governments had a hard 
time aligning their monetary policies solely to stabilize the necessary 
amount of gold and defend the currency peg when demands such as full 
employment and economic growth were gaining in importance.12 Th e 
gold standard broke down during the First World War, and all eff orts to 
reinstall a gold exchange standard during the 1920s—that is, all attempts 
to contain the political power of trade unions and voting people—failed 
due to a lack of harmonization between central banks, protectionist 
capital controls, and a new social balance of power.13 In reaction to the 
widely perceived failure of laissez-faire policies leading to the Great 
Depression, governments around the world enacted new policies, 
including extensive social programs, new forms of government 
9  Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: Th e Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 
1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
10  Karl Polanyi, Th e Great Transformation (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944).
11  Rolf Caspers, Zahlungsbilanz und Wechselkure (Munich und Wien: Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 2002).
12  Eichengreen has argued that the main conditions underpinning the functioning 
of the gold standard were that voting rights were limited, workers’ parties and trade 
unions were weak, wages and prices were highly fl exible, and there was a willingness to 
accept high unemployment. See Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the 
International Monetary System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
13  Matt Hampton, “Hegemony, Class Struggle and the Radical Historiography of 
Global Monetary Standards,” Capital & Class 30, no. 2 (2006): 131–64; Maurice Obstfeld 
and Alan M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37.
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intervention and tariff s, and abandoning the gold standard, thus destroy-
ing “economic liberalism for half a century.”14
When a new international economic order for the postwar period 
was craft ed at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the agreement was 
based on a widely held consensus that rejected both the gold standard 
and free-fl oating exchange rates in favor of a prioritization of domestic 
policy goals—most importantly full employment—and the need for 
widespread capital controls. Th e mainstream rejection of the two options 
discussed by the neoliberals demonstrates how far their views were from 
the economic consensus in the mid-twentieth century and is thus worth 
explaining at some length.
Circa 1945, the belief in automatically equilibrating market forces 
and the dangers of government controls of capital movements was 
widely regarded as historically obsolete. Henry Dexter White, leader of 
the US delegation to the conference, argued characteristically that objec-
tions to interference with capital and gold movements were “hangovers 
from a Nineteenth Century economic creed, which held that interna-
tional economic adjustments, if left  alone, would work themselves out 
towards an ‘equilibrium’ with a minimum of harm to world trade and 
prosperity.”15 In an infl uential publication from the League of Nations, 
Ragnar Nurkse explained the dominant professional opinion of the time 
that “international monetary policy [should] conform to domestic 
social and economic policy and not the other way round.”16
Th e rejection of fl oating exchange rates was equally strong, in particu-
lar because the short experience of run-away infl ation in the 1920s were 
interpreted as causally responsible for the Great Depression. Economists 
argued against the dangers of competitive devaluation and speculative, 
destabilizing capital movements. Nurkse captured the Zeitgeist when he 
wrote that “if there is anything that the inter-war experience has clearly 
demonstrated, it is that paper currency exchanges cannot be left  free to 
fl uctuate.” To do, he continued, “would almost certainly result in 
14  Eric J. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: Th e Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 
(London: Abacus, 1995), 94–5.
15  Cited in J. Keith Horsefi eld et al., Th e International Monetary Fund 1945–1965: 
Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, 1969), vol. 3, 64.
16  Ragnar Nurkse, International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Inter-War 
Period (Princeton: League of Nations Publications Department, 1944), 230.
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chaos.”17 Th us the belief underpinning the Bretton Woods system was 
that the stability of the international monetary and trade order could 
only be guaranteed through fi xed exchange rates, which had to be 
managed by central banks—with the support of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)—and through deliberate interventions in 
currency markets.
Rejecting both the discipline of the gold standard and the instability 
of fl oating exchange rates, the international gathering of policy-makers 
at Bretton Woods established a monetary system that combined two 
policy goals: on the one hand, enabling sovereign, autonomous, and 
democratic economic policies aimed at full employment; and on the 
other hand, fi xed but adjustable exchange rates that were pegged to the 
US dollar, which in turn had a gold parity (gold exchange standard 
coupled with IMF assistance). Th e dominant opinion at Bretton Woods 
was that strict capital controls were needed to make democratic domes-
tic fi scal and monetary policies compatible with fi xed exchange rates, 
and “almost every analyst” regarded “control of capital movements for 
unlimited time” as a precondition for the restoration of stable interna-
tional trade.18
As indicated by the impossible trilemma developed much later, 
according to which governments can only realize two out of the three 
policy goals of fi xed exchange rates, free capital movements, and mone-
tary autonomy, the Bretton Woods system sacrifi ced free capital 
17  Ibid., 118, 128.
18  James, International Monetary Cooperation, 38.
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movements (see Figure 8.1).19 At the time, this was not perceived as a 
sacrifi ce by most economists and politicians. On the contrary, govern-
ments were even invited to control all international capital movements.20 
Accordingly, the postwar decades developed into the period with the 
densest capital controls in the history of international capitalism.21
It was precisely the matter of capital controls that neoliberal promot-
ers of the gold standard and fl oating exchange rates saw as the key threat 
to a liberal order. Two recurring points can be regarded as fundamental 
axioms of neoliberal monetary thought: First, the rejection of any form 
of currency and capital controls. Second, the attempt to use automatic 
market mechanisms to impede or roll back democratic (and Keynesian) 
economic policies and thus reintroduce fi scal and monetary restraint. 
While the rejection of government controls was generally constitutive of 
liberal worldviews—and the pathos behind these arguments for free-
dom within the Cold War context can hardly be overlooked—capital 
controls were of particular concern for neoliberals. Hayek highlighted 
the special status of international currency controls in one of the found-
ing documents of neoliberalism, Th e Road to Serfdom.22 He argued that 
currency controls demonstrated best his main argument that govern-
ment controls of the economy or “planning” led to slavery. He wrote that 
government controls of foreign exchange are “the decisive advance on 
the path to totalitarianism and the suppression of individual liberty. It is, 
in fact, the complete delivery of the individual to the tyranny of the 
state, the fi nal suppression of all means of escape—not merely for the 
rich, but for everyone.”23 In a similar vein, Friedman argued in 
Capitalism and Freedom that exchange controls are the “most serious 
threat to freedom in the US” and, even more fundamentally, that “the 
most eff ective way to convert a market economy into an authoritarian 
economic society is to start by imposing direct controls on foreign 
19  Th e trilemma was originally formally developed in the early 1960s by Fleming 
and Mundell. More recent accounts include Obstfeld and Taylor, Global Capital Markets; 
James, International Monetary Cooperation.
20  Helleiner, States, 49. See also Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital, 93–135.
21  Jö rg Huff schmid, Politische Ö konomie der Finanzmä rkte (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 
2002), 117; Obstfeld and Taylor, Global Capital Markets.
22  F. A. Hayek, Th e Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944). 
Short biographies of all the MPS economists discussed in this paper can be found in 
Matthias Schmelzer, Freiheit für Wechselkurse und Kapital. Die Ursprünge neoliberaler 
Währungspolitik und die Mont Pèlerin Society (Marburg: Metropolis, 2010), 217–25.
23  Hayek, Th e Road to Serfdom, 92.
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exchange.”24 Friedman and Haberler argued that controls “congeal the 
blood of capitalism,”25 could lead to the abandonment of the market 
system,26 and, in von Mises’s words, even to the “demise of Western 
civilization.”27
It reveals much about the neoliberal notion of freedom that they saw 
the most powerful threat to the freedom of individuals and to Western 
civilization as such in the government regulation of foreign exchange, 
that is, in regulations instituted in an eff ort to enhance economic stabil-
ity and general welfare, which posed little restriction on those not 
engaged in international investment and trade. Yet for the MPS, these 
controls were a key threat, and its internal debates and external advo-
cacy thus revolved around the question of which monetary system could 
make controls for capital and foreign exchange superfl uous or even 
impossible.28
Alongside capital controls, Bretton Woods established an interna-
tional framework for the domestic interventionist policies of the Fordist 
regime of “embedded liberalism.” One could argue that this was the 
international institutionalization of what Hayek had criticized as 
“monetary nationalism” since the 1930s—the idea that an autonomous 
and democratic monetary policy was possible within the boundaries of 
nation-states.29 Keynesianism and monetary nationalism were “built 
into the international postwar order,” Hayek claimed in his only publica-
tion on these questions during the Bretton Woods era.30 In the view of 
Hayek and many of his colleagues from the MPS, the Bretton Woods 
system practically forced governments on a path of infl ationary and 
24  Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 57.
25  In Milton Friedman and Robert Roosa, Th e Balance of Payments: Free Versus 
Fixed Exchange Rates (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1967), 82f.
26  Fritz Machlup, “Th ree Concepts of the Balance of Payments and the so-called 
Dollar Shortage,” Th e Economic Journal 60 (March 1950), 46–68.
27  Ludwig von Mises, Th e Th eory of Money and Credit (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1954), 434.
28  Philip Mirowski, “Postface: Defi ning Neoliberalism,” in Th e Road from Mont 
Pèlerin, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 417–55.
29  F. A. Hayek, Monetary Nationalism and International Stability (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1937).
30  F. A. Hayek, “Bemerkungen über die Funktion von Währungsreserven und den 
Begriff  der internationalen Liquidität,” in Was mit der Goldwährung geschehen ist. Ein 
Bericht aus dem Jahre 1932 mit zwei Ergänzungen (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965), 31–4. 
See also Mises, Th eory of Money, 434.
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expansionist monetary policy, which in turn leads to an expansion of 
the state apparatus and increases the danger of collectivist and totalitar-
ian developments.31
Rather than a global order that allowed for national-economic exper-
imentation and expansion, neoliberals aimed at turning the causal chain 
around and establishing an international monetary order that would 
force societies onto a market-liberal and anti-infl ationary path. Th e key 
question that shaped the neoliberal debates for the coming quarter 
century was posed by Hayek at the founding meeting of the MPS: “how 
can monetary policy be automatic, and outside the range of politics?”32 
Th e classical solution to the twin neoliberal demands of free capital 
fl ows and automatic market mechanisms to roll back democratic 
economic policies had been the gold standard. Yet, aft er 1945, neoliber-
als launched an intense and enduring debate, in which the classical solu-
tion was criticized as unrealistic and was increasingly displaced by 
another proposal—that of fl oating exchange rates.
‘Pèlerinians Could Agree on Everything Save God and 
Gold’: The Internal Debates in the Postwar Decades
To properly understand the debates among neoliberals about alternative 
international monetary systems it is key to situate them in the general 
intellectual climate of the postwar decades. Even amid a prevailing 
mood of skepticism towards market forces, the price system, and liber-
alized and deregulated capital markets, the gold standard and fl exible 
exchange rates were rejected particularly strongly. Th is situation lasted 
well into the 1960s.33 Th e gold standard was widely regarded as an 
outdated artifact of the past and was only supported by an extremely 
small minority of economists—estimates suggest well below 1 percent. 
One advocate of the gold standard, MPS member Murray Rothbard, 
31  See F. A. Hayek, “Opening Address to Mont Pèlerin Conference, 1947,” Liberaal 
Archief, Ghent, MPS-fi les (henceforth LA). Aft er the collapse of Bretton Woods, Hayek 
started to advocate for free banking through competitive currencies, thus overcoming 
the government monopoly on the creation and printing of money. F. A. Hayek, 
Denationalization of Money (London: IEA, 1976).
32  Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society, 37.
33  Leeson, Ideology and the International Economy, 20; Odell, US International 
Monetary Policy, 22.
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described the situation in 1962 aptly: “now [the gold standard] is consid-
ered an absurd anachronism, a relic of a tribal fetish.”34
In a similar vein, fl oating exchange rates were almost universally 
dismissed and ignored, as summarized by US economist Richard 
Cooper: “Initially Friedman was nearly alone in his views. Most contem-
porary economists favored fi xed exchange rates and feared the instabili-
ties that fl exible exchange rates might bring, or reveal.”35 Until the 
1960s, one historian has argued, “it was widely accepted both by 
academic and IMF economists that fl oating exchange rates were a 
species of law-breaking behavior.”36 Th is skeptical view was even more 
pronounced among politicians and businesspeople than among econo-
mists. With the exception of France under de Gaulle in the 1960s, who 
invoked the gold standard idea, and Canada’s experience with its fl oat-
ing currency during the 1950s, both were entirely ignored. Within this 
rather hostile intellectual climate that dismissed both the gold standard 
and fl oating exchange rates, the community of organized neoliberals 
strove to fi nd agreement on a solution to the challenges posed by the 
existing international monetary order of Bretton Woods.
In the beginning, the neoliberals were almost all gold bugs. At the 
founding MPS conference in 1947, nearly every participant agreed that 
the reintroduction of the classical gold standard with liberalized capital 
movements would be the monetary system consistent with the core 
values of the new society, while fl exible exchange rates were regarded as 
Keynesian, nationalist, and unstable. Yet there was dissent even at this 
fi rst conference as the renowned Princeton economist Frank Graham 
presented the idea of a “Commodity Reserve Standard” as a preferable 
alternative to the gold standard.37 Graham died in 1949 and could not 
continue the project further, but it was taken up by Milton Friedman, 
whose arguments for fl exible exchange rates developed in the years 
following the foundation of the MPS bore a clear resemblance to those 
34  Murray N. Rothbard, “Th e Case for a Genuine Gold Dollar,” in In Search of a 
Monetary Constitution, ed. Leland Yeager (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1962), 94.
35  Richard N. Cooper, “Exchange Rate Choices,” Conference Series, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston (June 1999), 103. See also Milton Friedman, Edward M. 
Bernstein, Milton Gilbert, “Discussion,” Th e American Economic Review 55, no. 1/2 
(1965), 183; Friedman and Roosa, Balance, 133.
36  Anthony M. Endres, Great Architects of International Finance: Th e Bretton Woods 
Era (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 9.
37  Schmelzer, Freiheit für Wechselkurse und Kapital, 76–8.
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of Graham.38 Friedman formulated his position in a memorandum 
written as part of his service as an advisor to the OEEC, in which he 
made the provocative suggestion that the German balance of payments 
problem would be solved by fl oating the deutsche mark—a suggestion 
that received little sympathy from German authorities. Completed aft er 
the MPS conference in 1950, his seminal article on “the case for fl exible 
exchange rates” was published in 1953.39
In the following years, Friedman, supported by the German econo-
mists and former gold standard advocates Friedrich Lutz and Albert 
Hahn, developed his argument for fl oating exchange rates, which was 
discussed at various MPS conferences. In particular, he argued that 
while the gold standard would function fully automatically in principle 
and would guarantee “freedom of political control” under the prevalent 
social and political circumstances, it was questionable whether govern-
ments would stick to the rules.40 He defended the stability of fl exible 
exchange rates through a twofold argument. On the one hand, he rein-
terpreted the historical experiences of the 1920s by focusing on the 
“underlying instability of economic conditions.” On the other hand, he 
criticized the idea of destabilizing currency speculations theoretically, 
arguing that profi table speculations could actually stabilize the system.41
Both sets of arguments—that the gold standard advocates relied on 
unrealistic assumptions and that fl exible exchange rates are a viable and 
stable alternative—came to shape the debate in the coming decades and 
were repeated time and again by Friedman and other disciples of fl oat-
ing exchange rates. In many cases, these were combined with an insist-
ence on domestic monetarism as the “logical” counterpart strategy that 
also aimed at demarcating this policy set from the Keynesian proposals 
for fl exible rates, promoted most notably by James Meade.42
By the mid-1950s, advocates of fl oating seem to have won over the 
two “American Austrians,” Gottfried Haberler and Fritz Machlup, both 
38  Leeson, Ideology and the International Economy; Anthony M. Endres, “Frank 
Graham’s Case for Flexible Exchange Rates: A Doctrinal Perspective,” History of Political 
Economy 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 133–62.
39  Milton Friedman, “Th e Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” in Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 157–203.
40  Milton Friedman, “Commodity Reserve Money,” 1950, LA.
41  Ibid.; Friedman, “Th e Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” 177.
42  Friedrich Lutz, “Comment,” 1950, LA; Friedman, “Th e Case for Flexible 
Exchange Rates,” 158; James Meade, Th e Balance of Payments (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1951).
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former students of von Mises and advocates of the gold standard who 
became key protagonists in the neoliberal crusade for fl oating exchange 
rates. Th ey were joined by others from the German tradition of the 
Freiburg school of ordoliberalism, including Friedrich Lutz and Fritz 
Meyer.43 At the discussions within the MPS, however, the position 
remained unpopular. As reported from the 1957 meeting in St. Moritz, 
“the advocates of fl exible exchange rates [were a] minority” and were 
“accused of monetary nationalism by Prof. Heilperin.”44
Nonetheless, ever more MPS economists converted to fl oating 
exchange rates, partly convinced by the arguments of their peers, partly 
by real world events such as rising infl ation in West Germany and US 
balance of payments problems. Among these converts was Ludwig A. 
Hahn, a West German economist, stock trader, and banker, who used his 
private fi nancial success to gain authority in monetary debates and intro-
duced the argument of “imported infl ation” due to rigid exchange rates 
in hard currency countries such as the Federal Republic.45 Similarly, the 
German ordoliberal and former student of Walter Eucken, Fritz Meyer, 
changed his opinion in the early 1950s and promoted fl exible exchange 
rates as a member of the Federal Republic’s government expert advisory 
board (Sachverständigenrat) from 1954 onward.46 Another example of 
conversion was the Yale economist William Fellner, another Central 
European émigré, and a key protagonist of the transnational debates of 
the 1960s and later a member of Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisers.47
43  Gottfried Haberler, Currency Convertibility (Washington: AEI, 1954); Schmelzer, 
Freiheit für Wechselkurse und Kapital, 88–90. On Machlup see in particular Connell, 
Reforming the World Monetary System.
44  Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 16, 1957, 10.
45  Ludwig A. Hahn, “Autonomous Monetary Policy and Fixed Exchange Rates,” 
1957; Ludwig A. Hahn, “Gold-Revaluation and Dollar-Devaluation?” 1960, LA; 
Jan-Otmar Hesse, “Some Relationships between a Scholar’s and an Entrepreneur’s Life: 
Th e Biography of L. Albert Hahn,” History of Political Economy 39 (2007): 215–33.
46  “Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaft lichen 
Entwicklung,” Jahresgutachten 1964/65 (1964), reprinted 1994 by Schmidt Periodicals 
GmbH, Bad Feilnbach; Fritz W. Meyer, “Die internationale Währungsordnung im 
Dienste der stabilitätspolitischen Grenzmoral und die Möglichkeiten einer Reform,” in 
25 Jahre Marktwirtschaft  in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Dieter Cassel et al. 
(Stuttgart: Fischer, 1972), 283–96.
47  William Fellner, Amerikanische Erfahrungen mit der Lohninfl ation in den Fünfziger 
Jahren (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1962); William Fellner, “On Limited Exchange-rate 
Flexibility,” in Maintaining and Restoring Balance in International Payments, ed. William 
Fellner et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 111–22. See also James N. 
Marshall, William J. Fellner. A Bio-Bibliography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992).
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   209 10/03/2020   14:00:01
210 Matthias Schmelzer
Some new MPS members also joined the camp of fl exible exchange 
rate advocates, most importantly the following: Egon Sohmen, who was 
infl uenced by his mentors Machlup, Haberler, and Fellner, and played a 
key role at the international level in making fl oating acceptable through 
conferences, public talks, and political networking;48 James Buchanan, 
student of Friedman and Frank Knight in Chicago and founder of the 
Virginia School for Political Economy, who helped publicize Friedman’s 
dictum inside the MPS and beyond;49 and Leland B. Yeager, the 
co-founder (with James M. Buchanan) of the neoliberal Virginia School, 
who became crucially important for the academic formalization and 
dissemination of Friedman’s arguments, in particular through his 1966 
textbook.50 Finally, an internal dispute within the MPS about the policy 
outlook of the society—the so-called Hunold-Hayek crisis in 1960—led 
to the exclusion from the MPS of some key promoters of the gold stand-
ard, most importantly Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow.51
Th e controversy pitting advocates of gold against those of fl oating rates 
came to a head at the longest-ever discussion at MPS general meetings, in 
1961 in Turin, which crystallized the internal dynamics and key argu-
ments.52 Some elements are worth highlighting. Firstly, many speakers 
emphasized that the neoliberals’ inability to agree on these basic questions 
was a “shame,” and that this “embittered controversy” within the neolib-
eral camp had given “help and encouragement to a common enemy.”53 
Confl icts should be dealt with internally, participants argued, while in the 
48  Egon Sohmen, Flexible Exchange Rates: Th eory and Controversy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1961).
49  James M. Buchanan, “Staatliche Souveränität, nationale Planung und 
wirtschaft liche Freiheit,” Ordo 14 (1963): 249–58. Th e article is a published version of a 
talk given at an MPS meeting. Th anks to Quinn Slobodian for this reference. See also 
Washington Post, May 19, 1967, D9.
50  Leland B. Yeager, International Monetary Relations: Th eory, History, and Policy 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966).
51  Bernhard Walpen, Die off enen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft . Eine 
hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 2004), 
131–51.
52  At least thirteen men gave presentations, among them as supporters of the gold 
standard Michael Heilperin, Philip Cortney, Jacques Rueff , Henry Hazlitt, Alexander 
Loveday, Hans Sennholz, and Arthur Kemp; and the advocates of fl exible exchange rates 
Friedman, Lutz, Machlup, Hahn, and Hans Ilau. It is the only general meeting of which 
an audio recording exists, which makes a detailed analysis possible.
53  Cortney in MPS, “Audio Recordings of the General Meeting 1961,” 1961, 
available at brunoleoni.it. 
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public they should aim at emphasizing the commonalities.54 Yet in the 
debate, discrediting the opposing neoliberal position was the dominant 
strategy. Promoters of fl exible exchange rates argued that a gold standard 
was plainly impossible “in the face of the strengthened political power of 
trade unions.”55 For their part, gold standard promoters accused their 
opponents of basing their arguments on the unrealistic assumption that 
monetary policy could function in a stable and anti-infl ationary fashion 
without the discipline of a gold-based monetary system.56
Far from being a single-minded homogeneous bloc, the neoliberal 
thought collective was deeply divided. Both camps argued that only 
their proposal would enable free fl ows of capital and that their oppo-
nents’ position was not compatible with liberal core values and was thus 
secretly supporting dirigiste and collectivist policies.57 A split in the 
gold standard camp developed when they could not agree if the gold 
price would need to be substantially raised (a position fervently 
promoted by Philip Cortney, Heilperin, and Rueff ), or whether such a 
move would lead to infl ationary disaster (as argued by Arthur Kemp 
and others around the US think tank Economists’ National Committee 
on Monetary Policy).
Th e controversy continued through the 1960s but support for the 
gold standard option eroded steadily, particularly aft er the 1965 MPS 
meeting in Stresa. Haberler and Machlup acted as key mediators in the 
debate by dissecting assumptions, and off ering arguments, counter-
arguments, and logical conclusions. Th eir attempts at diplomacy were 
only partially successful. Aft er the 1965 meeting, debates over the proper 
monetary order ultimately dissolved longstanding friendships, includ-
ing that of Mises and Machlup, who had been a close friend of both 
Mises and his wife since the Vienna years, and that of Mises and 
Haberler, who had acted as the witness at Mises’s wedding in Geneva.58 
Even Friedman’s attempt at the 1968 meeting to resolve the controversy 
by presenting a “list of propositions agreed to by both proponents and 
54  Arthur Kemp, “Th e International Monetary Order,” 1961, LA.
55  Ilau in MPS, “Audio Recordings”; Fritz Machlup, “International Liquidity and 
International Money Creation,” 1961, LA. 
56  Michael Heilperin, “Monetary Reform in an Atlantic Setting,” 1961; Hans 
Sennholz, “From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut,” 1961, LA.
57  Friedman in MPS, “Audio Recordings”; Kemp, “International Monetary Order.”
58  Fritz Machlup, “Ludwig von Mises: Th e Academic Scholar Who Would Not 
Compromise,” Wirtschaft spolitische Blätter 28, no. 4 (1981), 13. 
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opponents of free exchange rates” failed to reconcile the fundamentally 
incompatible positions.59
How can we explain the depth of feeling inspired by the monetary issue? 
Th e question of generational diff erences off ers some clues. Looking at age 
cohorts, one fi nds that the gold standard was promoted primarily by econ-
omists born before 1900, who had experienced not only the functioning 
classical gold standard but, more importantly, the catastrophic experiences 
with fl oating exchange rates in the 1920s, and who had been socialized 
before Keynesianism began to shape the discipline of economics.60 
Economists born in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century constitute a 
saddle group, advocating the gold standard until the 1950s or early 1960s 
before shift ing to fl exible exchange rates.61 Younger economists born aft er 
1910 and socialized during the height of Keynesianism and intervention-
ism tended to promote fl oating rates almost exclusively, which they 
regarded as more realistic in the face of prevailing circumstances.62
Th e combination of young advocates and converts from the middle 
generational cohort meant that fl oating exchange rates emerged over time 
at the MPS meetings as the privileged neoliberal proposal for a new inter-
national monetary system. By providing a space to debate and largely 
work through entrenched divisions, the meetings helped build a transna-
tional elite network of advocates for fl exible exchange rates that can be 
characterized as an epistemic community following Peter Haas’s defi ni-
tion: an advocacy coalition with shared normative assumptions and prin-
ciples (all of which were also shared within the entire MPS), shared causal 
beliefs, shared notions of validity (both widely diverging from the gold 
standard camp), and, fi nally, “a common policy enterprise.”63
59  Milton Friedman, “Free vs Fixed Exchange Rates. List of propositions agreed to 
by both proponents and opponents of free exchange rates,” 1968, LA. For a detailed 
analysis of all MPS meetings in this period see Schmelzer, Freiheit für Wechselkurse und 
Kapital, 74–118.
60  Th is group includes Ludwig von Mises (born 1981), Henry Hazlitt (1894), Philip 
Cortney (1895), Jacques Rueff  (1896), Otto Veit (1898), Wilhelm Röpke (1899), F. A. 
Hayek (1899), William Hutt (1899). A younger exception was Michael Heilperin (1909).
61  Gottfried Haberler (1900), Friedrich Lutz (1901), Fritz Machlup (1902), William 
Fellner (1905), Fritz Meyer (1907).
62  George Stigler (1911), Milton Friedman (1912), Enoch Powell (1912), Paul 
McCracken (1915), Herbert Stein (1916), Herbert Giersch (1921), Leeland B. Yeager 
(1923), Arnold Harberger (1924), Egon Sohmen (1930). 
63  Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 3; Schmelzer, Freiheit für 
Wechselkurse und Kapital, 118–27.
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Th e defeat of the proposal to return to the nineteenth-century model 
of the gold standard off ers strong evidence that neoliberalism itself was 
and is not simply the return of laissez-faire or classical liberalism reborn 
but a genuinely novel response to changed circumstances. Yet even 
here the process of creating a common internal opinion was not abso-
lute. As later developments demonstrated, the losing side remained 
relevant in debates on a monetary union in Western Europe (which was 
similarly divisive in neoliberal circles) and in discussions about 
currency boards and dollarization in the Global South. Th us, the debate 
over monetary order demonstrates both the existence of divergent 
epistemic communities within the thought collective of the MPS, and 
also the fact that their commitment to a set of core values still held the 
group together.64 It off ers an insight into neoliberal thought as a 
doctrine in a constant process of becoming, not emerging from whole 
cloth in founding texts of the movement but constantly reworked 
according to shift ing conditions.
Conferences, Think Tanks and the Nixon 
Administration: Freedom Fighters in Action
When Milton Friedman published his article calling for fl exible exchange 
rates in 1953, fewer than 5 percent of economists worldwide shared his 
opinion; by the end of the 1960s, approximately 90 percent of economists 
did, and they were joined by powerful fi gures within government and the 
banking community.65 Th e early neoliberal debates and later campaign to 
promote fl exible exchange rates thus laid the epistemological and organi-
zational groundwork for the end of Bretton Woods. During the 1960s 
and early 1970s, the campaign manifested an astonishing degree of activ-
ity and became one of the early high points of neoliberal infl uence.66 Th e 
organizational background of the protagonists of the agenda within the 
64  Dieter Plehwe, “Transnational Discourse Coalitions and Monetary Policy: 
Argentina and the Limited Powers of the ‘Washington Consensus,’ ” Critical Policy 
Studies 5, no. 2 (2011), 127–48; see also Dieter Plehwe, “Neoliberal Th ought Collectives: 
Integrating Social Science and Intellectual History,” in Sage Handbook of Neoliberalism, 
ed. Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings, and David Primrose (Los 
Angeles: Sage, 2018).
65  Schmelzer, Freiheit für Wechselkurse und Kapital, 96.
66  Connell, Reforming the World Monetary System; Schmelzer, Freiheit für 
Wechselkurse und Kapital, 129-96.
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MPS is key to understanding the breadth and coordination of their activ-
ities. Th ese included a large series of lectures, academic and journalistic 
articles, pamphlets and books, public calls in daily newspapers, public 
debates and appearances in the media, and international conferences in 
all Western countries, all targeting not only the general public but, more 
importantly, academics, private bankers, and politicians.
Th e origin of the collective eff ort to push for fl exible exchange rates 
can be dated to 1963, when an international reform debate took off  aft er 
a series of publications by Robert Triffi  n, and the policy-makers of the 
large industrialized countries initiated a fundamental study on the 
international monetary system at that year’s IMF meeting. Th e study, 
they argued, was to be written by government economists, since academ-
ics in their view could not agree on anything, and it should be based on 
the consensus that the fundamental structure of fi xed exchange rates 
and the established gold price should remain the foundation for future 
arrangements.67 Th is sparked the ambition of a group of academics 
around Machlup, Fellner, and Triffi  n to organize what became the 
Bellagio conferences to regain authority for academics in these debates 
and, equally important but largely overlooked in the literature, to 
broaden the scope of the debate by integrating both fl exible exchange 
rates and the gold standard as two of four options discussed.68
Charles Kindleberger later labeled this a “new industry”: “the holding 
of conferences on the international monetary system by academic econ-
omists with an occasional admixture of central and commercial 
bankers.”69 Neoliberals were the prime motors of the new industry. 
From the wealth of conferences that followed, three are regarded as the 
most important ones of the postwar era: Th e Bellagio conferences by the 
Group of 32 economists in 1963 and 1964; the Bellagio conferences that 
followed from 1964 onward, targeted at a dialogue between economists, 
central bankers, and politicians; and the Bürgenstock conferences in 
1969, which were aimed mainly at international private bankers and 
67  Fritz Machlup and Burton Malkiel, eds, International Monetary Arrangements: 
Th e Problem of Choice. Report on the Deliberations of an International Study Group of 
Th irty-two Economists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 5.
68  Ibid.; Connell, Reforming the World Monetary System; Carol M. Connell and 
Joseph Salerno, eds, Monetary Reform and the Bellagio Group: Selected Letters and Papers 
of Fritz Machlup, Robert Triffi  n and William Fellner, 5 vols (London: Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2014).
69  Charles Kindleberger, “Review of Mundell/Swoboda,” Journal of International 
Economics 1 (1971), 127–40, here 127.
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business representatives.70 MPS members not only initiated and organ-
ized all of these conferences, they also dominated in personnel and 
content, comprising eight of the thirty-two participants of the Bellagio 
conference, four out of fourteen central economists of the following 
conferences with politicians, and eight out of seventeen economists at 
the Bürgenstock conference. Th e only economists that participated in 
all three conference series—except the Chicagoan Harry Johnson—
were all MPS members: Machlup, Haberler, Fellner, and Lutz.71 While 
not present in person at all conferences, Friedman played a key role as 
the uncompromising “extremist.”72
Th ough not in the majority, neoliberals were especially infl uential 
because, as initiators, keynote speakers, and organizers, they held key 
positions and, in contrast to the other participants, acted as an organi-
zationally networked epistemic community. Th ese “ ‘vital few’ in the 
great battle for ideas” were supported by an entire network of MPS 
economists and politicians, all promoting free capital movements and 
exchange rates with similar arguments at these conferences and beyond, 
who could be characterized as “the many disciples.”73 Th is group 
included Rómulo Ferrero, Eugenio Gudin, Arnold Harberger, Bertrand 
de Jouvenel, Wolfgang Kasper, Paul McCracken, Allan Meltzer, Frank 
W. Paish, Herbert Stein, George Stigler, and Th omas F. Johnson. Other 
key institutions in spreading the gospel of fl exible exchange rates were 
the International Finance Section at Princeton University headed by 
Machlup, which held many key conferences, and the Economics 
Department at the University of Chicago, where Friedman, Johnson, 
Stigler, Meltzer, and Stein taught. Th ese were joined by think tanks such 
as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Institute of Economic 
Aff airs in Britain, and the Walter Eucken Institute in West Germany.74
70  Connell, Reforming the World Monetary System; Endres, Great Architects, 7; Leeson, 
Ideology and the International Economy, 48; Odell, US International Monetary Policy, 92, 182.
71  Th e only other organized group of economists was the Brookings Institution. At 
the fi rst Bellagio conference, only one economist from Brookings participated. At the 
Bürgenstock conference only two did. Economists participating at two of the key 
conferences were Egon Sohmen (MPS), Robert Triffi  n, Walter Salant, Jürg Niehans, 
Alexandre Lamfalussy, and Peter B. Kenen.
72  New York Times, May 23, 1971.
73  Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society, 228.
74  See Schmelzer, Freiheit für Wechselkurse und Kapital, for more details of their 
respective activities in publishing pamphlets, holding seminars and conferences, 
organizing debates, etc.
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Th e importance of these conferences, the related publicity work, and 
the follow-up process with politicians, central bankers, and the private 
sector during the rest of the 1960s cannot be overestimated. In this 
endeavor, the neoliberal promoters organizationally connected through 
the MPS played a key role. As summarized by Triffi  n: “Th ese discussions 
undoubtedly initiated a slow but radical evolution in the thinking of our 
offi  cial colleagues, preparing them at least for the decisions that were 
fi nally forced upon them by the events rather than as a deliberate choice 
many years later in 1971 and 1973.”75
Th e involvement of MPS economists in these conferences was an 
explicit expansion of the neoliberal project into wider circles. It was also 
a remarkable translation of private authority into public power pre-
dating the rise of conservative think tanks in the 1980s. Th e approach 
foreshadowed later practices. As Machlup explained at a monetary 
symposium held at the American Enterprise Institute in 1965, if politi-
cians were “unwilling to discuss, let alone adopt” fl exible exchange rates, 
their advocates should not fall into a “ten-year period of inaction but, 
instead, should get busy teaching the politicians,” because they “lag 
behind in their intellectual development.”76 Similarly, Friedman argued 
that there were two possibilities for introducing fl oating exchange rates: 
either during a serious economic crisis—but only if it was academically 
recognized and decision-makers had been made accustomed to it—or 
in the fi rst month aft er a new cabinet of the opposing party was installed. 
Only three years later, Friedman wrote a memorandum to this eff ect to 
Nixon.77 As scholars have documented, the infl uence of MPS econo-
mists culminated with the Nixon administration and its 1971 decision 
to unilaterally abandon gold parity and introduce freely fl oating 
exchange rates. Th e policy of fl oating exchange rates, argued fi rst as a 
minority position not only within the economic mainstream but even 
within the neoliberal camp, became reality. A process of persuasion 
75  Robert Triffi  n, “Th e Impact of the Bellagio Group on International Reform,” in 
Breadth and Depth in Economics. Fritz Machlup—Th e Man and His Ideas, ed. Jacob S. 
Dreyer (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1978), 145–58; Marshall, William J. Fellner; 
Schmelzer, Freiheit für Wechselkurse und Kapital.
76  Fritz Machlup, “International Monetary Systems and the Free Market Economy,” 
in International Payments Problems. A Symposium Sponsored by the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research (Washington: AEI, 1966), 153–76, here 159f.
77  Milton Friedman, “Discussion,” in International Payments Problems. A 
Symposium, 87–90. For more on this mode of policy-making see Naomi Klein, Th e 
Shock Doctrine: Th e Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Penguin, 2007), 75–106.
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which emerged contentiously among neoliberals helped redefi ne the 
monetary order of the world.
Conclusion
In his book on the decline and fall of Bretton Woods, Robert Leeson 
argued that intellectuals, economists, and academics “behaved ‘as if ’ 
they were members of a coordinated coalition pressing for fl exible 
exchange rates.”78 An analysis of these persons in their organizational 
context within the MPS makes the thesis plausible. Indeed, the key 
economists involved in the process of propagating fl oating exchange 
rates were almost all members of a transnational neoliberal network 
who debated theories and strategies at the regular MPS meetings and 
who collaborated closely in popularizing their vision for taming democ-
racy and liberalizing capital.
While the decision to dismantle the Bretton Woods system cannot be 
directly attributed to neoliberals, their internal debates and, more 
importantly, their advocacy paved the way and thus proved to be a 
necessary condition. By disseminating the idea of fl exible exchange 
rates assiduously, they helped to shift  the terrain of the feasible. It is tell-
ing that Hayek saw something similar in the 1930s demise of the gold 
standard. As he argued in 1932, the fact that “the otherwise so conserva-
tive leaders of central banks drift ed from the traditional rules of mone-
tary policy with relatively light hearts must be attributed to the infl uence 
of new ideas of currency policy propagated by academics.”79 One might 
argue by analogy that the departure from the rules of Bretton Woods 
can also be ascribed to the infl uence of new monetary ideas propagated 
by transnationally connected neoliberals, ideas which gained wide 
prominence during the 1960s.
What were the long-term eff ects of the success of the neoliberal argu-
ment? Floating exchange rates largely became the global norm in the 
following decades, with the remarkable exception of Western Europe. 
Here, a diverging neoliberal conception became infl uential through the 
78  Leeson, Ideology and the International Economy, 2.
79  F. A. Hayek, “Was der Goldwä hrung geschehen ist,” in Was mit der Goldwä hrung 
geschehen ist. Ein Bericht aus dem Jahre 1932 mit zwei Ergä nzungen (Tü bingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr, 1965), 7. 
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increasing power of the West German Bundesbank and the creation of 
the European Monetary System—an experiment which continues to 
divide neoliberal opinion internally.80 Most importantly, the more 
widespread adoption of fl exible exchange rates became the central 
precondition for the rapid liberalization of global capital movements 
and thus the explosion of fi nancial markets, which have been adequately 
described as the lever of the neoliberal counter-revolution in the coming 
decades.81
Th e adoption of this new order, where speculation and so-called hot 
money fl ows became the rule and not the exception, produced the 
conditions for the fi nancialized hyper-globalization that has helped 
exacerbate ever-expanding chasms of economic inequality across much 
of the world and brought the global economic order to the brink of 
collapse in 2008. Understanding historically how new paradigms, 
initially contested, became the new normal is essential to an alertness 
about how new forms of commonsense are being created today. 
Unraveling internal debates such as those over monetary order also 
off ers a prophylactic against attributing to neoliberals superhuman or 
unrealistic levels of internal consistency, party discipline, or foresight. 
Indeed, part of the effi  cacy of the neoliberal strategy must be seen in the 
fl exible two-step process outlined here: the MPS off ers fi rst a space for 
fi ery internal debate then a base for unifi ed mobilization.
80  Kathleen R. McNamara, Th e Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European 
Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, A Europe 
Made of Money: Th e Emergence of the European Monetary System (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2012).
81  Helleiner, States; Huff schmid, Politische Ökonomie; Obstfeld and Taylor, Global 
Capital Markets.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   218 10/03/2020   14:00:01
9
The Neoliberal Ersatz Nobel Prize
Philip Mirowski1
People must have their heroes; or as Th omas Carlyle put it, “Universal 
History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at 
bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here.”2 Trends in 
historiography have intermittently warmed and chilled to this proposition 
since 1840, but it should be obvious that much of the general public continue 
to prefer to understand their hopes, their worldviews, and their complex 
personal doctrinal commitments through the biographies of exemplary 
thinkers. Th e great mass of people prefer to signal their fealties by testifying 
their allegiance to a few heroic personages, be they a religious guru, a movie 
star, a politician, or, in some cases, a ‘public intellectual’. Historians who 
pander to the bottomless market for biographies of politicians and key intel-
lectuals understand this implicitly. Heroes have always served as placehold-
ers for ideas; none more so than in the case of economics.
Here we engage in a bit of old-fashioned, fi ne-grained institutional 
history to describe the role and meaning of the Bank of Sweden Award 
in Economic Sciences in Honor of Alfred Nobel, oft en mistakenly 
referred to as the “Nobel Prize in Economics.” Th at nominal confusion 
alone should signal that something odd has been going on in this 
instance; but the role of the neoliberal thought collective (NTC) in this 
1  I am very grateful to Gabriel Soderberg, Quinn Slobodian, and Beatrice Cherrier 
for their help on archival issues.
2  Th omas Carlyle, “On Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History,” at 
gutenberg.org.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   219 10/03/2020   14:00:01
220 Philip Mirowski
story is something almost universally overlooked.3 Indeed, I shall 
argue that this ersatz Nobel Prize has been a very eff ective component of 
the neoliberal toolkit for constructing an alternative regime of truth, 
particularly with regard to the public face and the content of the 
economic orthodoxy, and their place in it. Because the NTC has under-
stood the integral role of hero-worship in the construction of public 
understanding of ideas, their intervention in this particular case helps 
us understand how neoliberal concepts have become established as the 
generic commonsense wisdom of the early twenty-fi rst century.
The Real Nobel Prizes
People who know next to nothing about science and literature and care 
even less are still aware of the Nobel Prizes: they are regularly cited in 
most contemporary cultures as the ultimate act of recognition of worth 
and intellectual consequence. When Alfred Nobel died in December 
1896, he left  the bulk of his considerable fortune to institute fi ve prizes 
annually to those who:
shall have conferred the greatest benefi t on mankind. Th e said interest 
shall be divided into fi ve equal parts, which shall be apportioned as 
follows: one part to the person who shall have made the most impor-
tant discovery or invention within the fi eld of physics; one part to the 
person who shall have made the most important chemical discovery 
or improvement; one part to the person who shall have made the 
most important discovery within the domain of physiology or medi-
cine; one part to the person who shall have produced in the fi eld of 
literature the most outstanding work of an idealistic tendency; and 
one part to the person who shall have done the most or best work for 
fraternity among nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing 
armies and for the holding and promotion of peace conferences.4
3  But not completely. I must acknowledge Avner Off er and Gabriel Soderberg, Th e 
Nobel Factor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), which does touch on the 
subject. I should admit here I was originally a member of that project team, but decided 
to resign when I grew dissatisfi ed with the way the politics of the Prize was being dealt 
with by Off er. Indeed, much of the historical detail herein overlaps with that in their 
book; this paper is an attempt to set down my version of the events surrounding the Prize.
4  Alfred Nobel’s will, quoted in Robert Marc Friedman, Th e Politics of Excellence 
(New York: Times Books, 2001), 13–14.
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He further stipulated that the physics and chemistry prizes would be 
awarded by the Swedish Academy of Sciences, the medicine prize by 
the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm, the literature prize by the 
Swedish Academy, and the peace prize by a committee elected by the 
Norwegian Parliament. According to the most perceptive historian of 
the prizes, Robert Marc Friedman, for the fi rst few decades the prizes 
did not enjoy the global signifi cance they have today. Th ere were issues 
of ‘internal’ politics—for instance, the perceived tendency to award 
certain prizes to Swedes who were not perceived by outsiders as quite 
up to world standards5—as well as ‘external’ politics—such as the storm 
of controversy and shame whipped up by the award of the chemistry 
prize in 1919 to Fritz Haber, who had been responsible for poison gas 
research in World War I.6 Th is seemed precisely the bellicose heritage 
(of the source of the bequest in dynamite and other war industries) 
which Nobel’s prizes were intended to erase. Th ere was also the ques-
tion of the Swedish capacity to continue activating the prizes through 
the disruption of World War II, and no prize in any category was 
awarded from 1940–42. Although the sums of prize money were 
substantial, it is fair to say that, with the exception of the physics prize, 
the Nobels were predominantly considered more of parochial 
Scandinavian signifi cance in those early decades.
Friedman dates the elevation of the prizes in public esteem to the 
period immediately following World War II, especially in the United 
States.7 Th is timing corresponds to the destruction of German science, 
the military assumption of science policy in the US, and the fascina-
tion with the role of science in the Cold War.8 Under these dramatic 
shift s, Sweden sought to realign itself relative to the new world 
hegemons; the league tables turned defi nitively in America’s favor; 
this was the period when Nobels were widely promoted to the general 
public as the canonization of the heroes exemplifying what was best 
in the human race. It is oft en said that the Nobels are awarded for 
achievements, not to people; but both Alfred Nobel’s own will and the 
ceremony surrounding the modern prizes suggest otherwise. What 
all and sundry now expect every November is the deliverance of a 
5  See, for instance, ibid., 56ff .
6  Ibid., 111–15.
7  Ibid., 251ff .
8  On the importance of this watershed for US science, see Philip Mirowski, 
ScienceMart (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), Chapter 3.
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new slate in the pantheon of heroes, based upon Romantic overtones 
of genius-kissed individuals.
Th e Nobels have been promoted as a pristine indicator of what is true 
and virtuous in human intellectual endeavor; but of course, they are no 
such thing. Th ey are, rather, another human device constructed to shore 
up a regime of human veridiction. As Friedman has written:
Th ere are no grounds, based on history, for assuring the laureates 
constitute a unique population of the very best in science; even less so, 
to impute to them, as a class, the status of genius . . . Th e oft -repeated 
claim that the prize’s prestige has refl ected the skill of the Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences in picking the right winners simply 
does not hold up to inspection.9
Th at is the considered opinion of the premier historian of the actual 
Nobels in the natural sciences. So, what can it portend for the existence 
of an ersatz Nobel Prize, one instituted sixty-eight years aft er the real 
prizes, explicitly constructed to bask in the refl ected glory of the real 
Nobels? Th e ersatz prize grew out of an inception that was so controver-
sial that the Nobel Foundation went out of its way to insist that no more 
new Nobels would ever be countenanced by the Foundation into the 
future.10 What was so very embarrassing that it warranted this spasm of 
manic repression? Th at is the question explored in the rest of this 
chapter.
9  Friedman, Th e Politics of Excellence, 267.
10  “Every now and then there are proposals to establish additional Nobel Prizes, for 
example in Mathematics or Environmental science. Th e foundation as well as the prize 
juries have rejected such requests. Th ey consider themselves bound by the testament, 
wondering what it would lead to if new Nobel Prizes or equivalents were created  . . . 
However, this principle has been departed from on one occasion, regarding the prize in 
economics. Th is prize must not be treated as a Nobel Prize and is for this reason titled 
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel  . . . Th ere was considerable 
doubt among the Nobel committees about accepting the prize. Propaganda activities 
were intense, especially from the Governor of the Central Bank, Per Åsbrink  . . . Th e 
prize in economics has continued in causing controversy.” Lars Gyllensten (former 
chairman of the Nobel Foundation), Minnen, bara minnen (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers 
förlag, 2000), 281 (translated from Swedish). See also Agneta Levinovitz and Nils 
Ringertz, eds, Th e Nobel Prize: Th e First 100 Years (London: Imperial College Press, 
2001).
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The Bank of Sweden Goes Rogue
Th ere are only two academic sources in English which hint that there 
might be something mildly fi shy about the Bank of Sweden Prize. Th e 
fi rst is by Assar Lindbeck,11 and was intended as a defense of the prize; 
but there is buried within it a single clause, stating that there existed “a 
certain skepticism towards the new prize idea among some natural 
scientists in the Academy.” Th is glancing acknowledgment signals some-
thing that is absent, something signifi cant, something that is central to 
an understanding of Lindbeck’s own defi nitive role in stabilizing the 
prize. We shall deal with Lindbeck’s central contribution shortly. Th e 
other intervention was by Yves Gingras,12 who came at the prize from 
the opposite stance. In a short paper, he indicated that we should stare 
intently at the Bank of Sweden as a major protagonist in the inception of 
the prize, and that the process needed to be understood in terms of the 
eff ects it was intended to produce: “this prize does not exist: and moreo-
ver, . . . this so-called ‘Nobel prize’ is an extraordinary case study in the 
successful transformation of economic capital into symbolic capital, a 
transformation which greatly infl ates the symbolic power of the disci-
pline of economics in the public mind.”13
Neither paper bothered to explore these hints further, and this is all 
the more striking given the stretch of time that has elapsed since their 
publications. A little extra digging in the original sources reveals a 
narrative far more twisted than anything either commentator had hinted 
at. Th e name of the prize is the fi rst clue: the story should begin with the 
history of the Swedish Riksbank.
Th is is not the place to become excessively embroiled in the economic 
history of Sweden, yet a modicum of monetary history is a necessary 
prerequisite for understanding the prize. Th e place to start is to recog-
nize one fact that set the Riksbank apart from other European central 
banks in the early twentieth century: Th e Swedish central bank was 
entirely owned by the Swedish state. Th e reigning government appointed 
the chair of the court of directors, while the Parliament elected the 
remaining six directors. In its attempts to set monetary policy aft er 
11  Assar Lindbeck, “Th e Prize in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 23 (1985): 38.
12  Yves Gingras, “Nobel by Association: Beautiful Mind, Non-existent Prize,” Open 
Democracy, October 23, 2002, opendemocracy.net.
13  Ibid.
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World War I, the bank was repeatedly overruled by Parliament.14 One 
should not infer that there was a political option of pure central bank 
independence anywhere else in the developed world prior to the 1970s; 
rather, diff erent central banks enjoyed varying degrees of being tethered 
to their respective governments. Until the 1930s, the belief held sway 
that the ‘gold standard’ rendered any policy independence unnecessary; 
yet the Bank of England had managed to carve out a modicum of room 
for maneuver on the grounds that it maintained a private ownership 
status. Th e repeated breakdown of the gold standard up to the Great 
Depression certainly raised the possibility that central banks might 
perform some more active management role. In any event, there was 
almost no theoretical tradition of a ‘public interest’ for such banks to 
serve; mostly, they regarded themselves as guarantors of the interests of 
their private domestic banks, not as the protagonists of some sort of 
abstract ‘macroeconomic policy’ informed by economists. Indeed, the 
shift  to a doctrine of the political imperative of central bank independ-
ence only dates from the 1980s.15
Th e Riksbank began to chafe at the fetters imposed by its Swedish 
parliamentary masters aft er World War II. With the appointment of the 
new central bank governor in 1955, Per Åsbrink, the bank welcomed a 
turncoat from the reigning Social Democratic Party who would skill-
fully assert bank prerogatives in what the modern Riksbank calls on its 
own website the “interest rate coup” of 1957.
Th e details of the coup would be an unnecessary distraction;16 suffi  ce 
it to say that Åsbrink persuaded his Board to raise the discount rate in 
1957 by 1 percent without fi rst notifying its nominal owner, the govern-
ment. A political crisis for the Social Democratic Party ensued; Åsbrink’s 
right-hand economist Erik Lindahl countered that there was no place 
for political meddling in monetary policy, as did the younger economist 
Erik Lundberg, and both argued that the central bank should be subject 
14  See Martin Eriksson, “A Golden Combination: Th e Formation of Monetary 
Policy in Sweden aft er WWI,” Enterprise & Society, no. 16 (2015): 556–79.
15  See, for instance, James Forder, “Why is Central Bank Independence so Widely 
Approved?” Journal of Economic Issues, no. 39 (2005): 843–65. Forder directly relates 
this to the enhanced status of the economics profession, which ties nicely into our own 
narrative.
16  But see Gabriel Soderberg, “Constructing Invisible Hands: Market Technocrats 
in Sweden 1880–2000,” Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis (Uppsala Studies in Economic 
History) 98 (2013). Much of the narrative detail of the following three paragraphs is 
derived from this source.
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to a regimen of depoliticization. In Swedish history, this is oft en 
portrayed as the fi rst salvo in a full-blown attack on the economic poli-
cies of the left -wing Social Democratic Party in the postwar period. For 
various reasons, the government did not opt to punish Åsbrink, and he 
was allowed to remain as Riksbank governor.
Th e successful interest rate coup strengthened Åsbrink’s hand politi-
cally, but it also had a further unintended consequence. Th e period 
following 1957 was one of prosperity for Sweden; with the higher inter-
est rates came substantially enhanced profi ts for the central bank in the 
subsequent years, on the order of 20–40 million USD per year. Th ese 
growing surpluses themselves became a further bone of contention 
between the bank and its nominal owner, the government. Th e bank 
conceded it was obliged to hand over some fraction of the surplus to the 
Treasury, but insisted privately that it should control the remainder 
itself, arguing that it was better situated to decide how and when it 
should be expended. Again, the Social Democrats countered that the 
Board did not possess the offi  cial discretion to make such a call. Th e 
Riksbank peremptorily settled the issue by publicly asserting the crea-
tion of a Jubilee Fund for research to celebrate the impending tercente-
nary of the bank in 1968. Some Members of Parliament were shocked to 
hear of the plan initially through newspaper and radio outlets, since 
they had not been previously approached to approve such a fund; others 
complained that the Riksbank was recklessly behaving as though it were 
a “state within a state,” something that was not remotely permitted in its 
charter. Nevertheless, over strenuous objections, the Parliament voted 
to approve the proposed fund in April 1962. Th e bank then proceeded 
to build itself a new black granite fortress with some of the funds, and 
contemplated how to allocate another moiety to “research.”
Th e Bank of England had commissioned a scholarly history of the 
institution for its 250th birthday; but Åsbrink had far more grandiose 
plans for the Riksbank’ s birthday celebration in 1968, which involved 
an even more audacious power play than the interest rate coup or the 
Jubilee Fund. While the bank publicly explored the subsidized publica-
tion of a number of commissioned books on economics, Åsbrink began 
to sound out some key players behind the scenes about the possibility of 
a dedicated Nobel Prize for Economics organized and funded by the 
bank. No other political actor at the time thought that such a prize was 
anything other than a delusion, not to mention a remotely sensible way 
to spend the revenues accruing to the bank from its restrictive monetary 
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policies. Th e real Nobels, aft er all, had been the consequence of a private 
bequest. Lindbeck, then a professor at the Stockholm School of 
Economics and a formal advisor to the bank since 1964, reports that he 
was approached by Åsbrink in 1967 or early 1968 to evaluate the possi-
bility of such a prize funded entirely by the Riksbank out of the surplus. 
Because it might be unseemly for the chairman of the Riksbank to go 
skulking about surreptitiously laying the groundwork for such a prize 
with absolutely no prior political mandate whatsoever, Lindbeck was 
enlisted as a go-between for Åsbrink and the Nobel Foundation. 
Lindbeck consulted the chair of the Nobel Foundation, Nils Ståhle, and 
its fi nancial advisor, Jacob Wallenberg; but the latter felt that adding 
another Nobel was out of the question. Aft er intense negotiations, a 
‘compromise’ was reached: the bank could fund a ‘diff erent’ prize that 
nevertheless looked suspiciously like a real Nobel; that is, a parallel 
ersatz prize; a “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science in Memory 
of Alfred Nobel.” It was just a slight inconvenience that Alfred Nobel 
would be spinning in his grave.
Something about the “celebration” did not smell quite right; but the 
ever-entrepreneurial Åsbrink once more revealed his disdain for rules 
and protocol, in a manner almost as despotic and high-handed as in the 
previous cases of the interest rate coup and the Jubilee Fund. In short, 
the Riksbank bureaucracy resorted to deception and worse in order to 
steamroller the prize. Almost all the stakeholders were opposed in 1968: 
the Foundation to some extent, the Nobel family, the existing Nobel 
infrastructure, and the Parliament. Th e fi rst trick was to usher the inter-
ests arrayed against the prize into an abrupt ambush. While still negoti-
ating in secret, the bank announced the prize’s existence in the press as 
a fait accompli—two weeks before the agreement was signed with the 
Nobel Foundation on May 14, 1968! Some of the principals were thus 
shamed into compliance by not allowing the dispute over an illicit 
conspiracy to go public. Also, Åsbrink used his regulatory leverage over 
the Foundation to get them to agree; existing tax rules prevented the 
Foundation from investing in certain securities, which was causing the 
endowment to be hemmed in; the bank got the rules applying to the 
Foundation’s capital management changed in their favor.17
Th e second trick involved neutralizing the Nobel family. In 2010, 
Peter Nobel issued the following statement:
17  Gabriel Soderberg, Email to author, November 22, 2010.
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What was the position of the Nobel family? Th ree days before the 
meeting of April 26, the then director of the Nobel Foundation, Nils 
Ståhle, met two members of the family and telephonically talked with 
a third one. Th eir position was that “it should not become like a sixth 
Nobel Prize,” but that if the economics prize could be kept clearly 
separate from the Nobel Prizes then it might be an acceptable idea. 
On May 10, Ståhle and the president of the Nobel Foundation, von 
Euler, visited the family’s eldest, Martha Nobel, then 87 years old—
with severely impaired hearing but intellectually in good form. Th ey 
obtained her written approval of the economics prize “under given 
conditions,” namely that the new prize in all offi  cial documents and 
statements should be kept separated from the Nobel prize, and called 
the “prize in economic science in memory of Alfred Nobel.” In a tele-
phonic conversation with a nephew, Martha Nobel said that the whole 
thing was prearranged and impossible to oppose, so that one could 
only hope that they would keep their pledge that no confusion with 
the real Nobel prize should occur. Th ere was no approval from the 
Nobel family as a whole. We were informed only much later.18
Peter Nobel has stated in public this was an unparalleled example of 
successful trademark infringement; but it was also much more. Members 
of the organizations formally tasked with judging the real Nobels were 
left  in the dust as the steamroller passed by. A few notables, such as 
Professor Sten Friberg, rector of the Karolinska Institute, attempted to 
speak out in opposition, but to no avail. Th e bank’s third trick was to 
extend the strong-arm tactics to its nominal owner, the Swedish state. 
Th e Riksbank had wandered very far off  reservation by mounting this 
full-court press to create an ersatz Nobel; some sort of approval was 
required. A special committee pointed out that the bank’s charter limited 
it to running a banking service, a printing press, and production of bank 
paper; anything else would require special legislation. A bill was rushed 
through Parliament, and votes were held with no public debate whatsoev-
er.19 On April 11, 1969 the fi rst chamber voted 79 in favor, 20 against 
18  Jorge Buzaglo, “Th e Nobel Family Dissociates itself from the Economics Prize,” 
Real-World Economics Review Blog (October 22, 2010). Th ere is also some unconfi rmed 
information that government offi  cials used some tax problems suff ered by Martha 
Nobel to make her an off er she couldn’t refuse.
19  Gabriel Soderberg, Email to author, June 24, 2013. Parenthetically, Assar Lindbeck 
(“Th e Prize”, 38) misreports the fi nal government sanction as occurring on January 1969. One 
therefore expects he is a less than reliable source for the timeline concerning these events.
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and 18 abstaining; on April 16, the second chamber voted 152 in favor, 
28 against and 28 abstaining. With this last obstacle removed, it became 
possible for the Riksbank to construct a Nobel which resembled as 
much as possible as the real thing.
This attempt to render the prize “close but not identical to the real 
Nobels” was engineered directly by the bank, not by any of the other 
stakeholders. Lindbeck’s published statement that “the Procedures 
for the choice of the winner of the economics prize are the same as 
for the original Nobel prizes” is therefore not strictly correct.20 If it 
were true, that would violate the terms of the original agreement that 
it could not be put on a thoroughgoing equivalent footing with the 
real Nobels. It is true that the bank managed to get the date of the 
award to be identical with the other Nobels—December 10—and 
guaranteed that the Bank of Sweden Prize be bestowed in the very 
same ceremony as the real Nobels. Outward conformity tends to 
mask the small but telling ways that signal the ersatz character of the 
Bank of Sweden Prize. One small sign is that the Bank of Sweden 
medal, reproduced in Figure 9.1, is of a somewhat different design 
than the other real Nobel medals.
Figure 9.1. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize Medal
Far more importantly, the constitution of the prize committee did 
not parallel that of the other real Nobels. Alfred Nobel’s will stipulated 
that the prize committees be chosen and staff ed for the natural science 
20  Ibid., 45.
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Nobels by the designated Royal Academies. Th ere was no Royal 
Swedish Academy of Economics, so presumably this meant that, if it 
truly mimicked the real science Nobels, the prize would have to be 
controlled by the Royal Academy of Sciences. However, it seems in 
retrospect that the bank itself was active in constituting the original 
Economics prize committee. For instance, one key player in the narra-
tive, Assar Lindbeck, was not a member of the Royal Swedish Academy 
of Sciences when appointed to the committee; according to his own 
vita, that did not occur until 1971. Another member, Ragnar Bentzel, 
was not inducted until 1972. Much of this suggests Academy member-
ship being bestowed as an aft erthought to being appointed to the Bank 
of Sweden committee, to hide the fl outing of the rules. Since the 
composition of the prize committee plays a dominant role in our 
subsequent narrative, this divergence from the real Nobels was not an 
insignifi cant detail. Th e bank, having gone to such great lengths to 
institute the prize, was not going to simply withdraw altogether from 
the stipulation of what sort of economists would benefi t from it, at 
least at the outset.
The insistent question for the historian is why Åsbrink, Lindbeck, 
and a few others would sail so close to the wind merely for the sake 
of blowing a hefty sum of public money on a prize for economists. 
(Public choice theory would later suggest they should have simply 
embezzled it instead.) The contemporary PR campaign by the 
Riksbank was fulsome in its evocation of enhanced prestige for 
Sweden, but given the prospective recipients were economists, this 
seems a rather thin justification. Åsbrink was himself frequently 
challenged as to the rationale for such a prize, and was dogmatically 
unapologetic:
I do not fi nd it particularly diffi  cult to motivate the new prize. Th e 
domain, that is the object of economic science, is if anything central 
and important for all people and all societies around the world. Would 
anyone claim that the advances in this area are less important or less 
pressing than advances for instance in medicine, physics or 
chemistry? I can certainly understand if anyone thinks that these 
things cannot be compared, or even if someone fi nds that other 
circumstances, for instance the diffi  culties in separating politics and 
science in this particular area, make it problematic to award a prize in 
economics. But I would still like to believe that the economic science 
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today is so developed and established as a scientifi c discipline, that 
such caveats cannot be decisive.21
Our protagonist gets close to the deep structure of the politics of the 
prize, but cannot state the obvious. Few people in 1968 would have 
conceded that economics, as it was then constituted, enjoyed an intel-
lectual stature commensurate with medicine, physics, or chemistry. 
However, the purpose of the prize was not to ‘recognize’ that fact, but 
rather, to conjure the appearance of similar stature by fronting a prize 
that closely mimicked existing prizes that did enjoy that esteem in the 
mind of the public. Th e purpose of the prize was to elevate the stature of 
the economics profession, not to acknowledge its already hallowed status. 
Economics was supposed to look like a science to spectators, and the 
prize was just one means for the makeover. But that seems to beg the 
question: Why did Åsbrink do it?
Cast your eye back over our brief history, and you will discover that 
Åsbrink, Lindbeck, Lindahl, and Lundberg were all part of a school of 
thought that was convinced that the Social Democrats and the so-called 
‘Swedish model’ were threatening the economic stability of Sweden, that 
the distinctive social welfare state that it represented in the minds of 
foreigners should be curtailed and cut back, and that one immediate way 
to achieve that end was to render the central bank more independent 
from its nominal owner, the Swedish state. But that would involve basing 
the independence of the bank upon the untrammeled rule of experts 
such as themselves, freed from the fetters of political subordination. In 
1968, most Swedes would not have acquiesced in the credo that creden-
tialed economists just naturally knew better than the man in the street 
how to run the economy without any democratic input. Th erefore, it was 
in the interest of the Swedish Riksbank to indirectly promote the disci-
pline of economics as a vibrant and successful science, so that the general 
public would eventually come to defer to its expertise, and let the central 
bank get along and run things unencumbered, the way it saw fi t.
Indeed, conveniently, the fortifi ed economics profession turned its 
macroeconomic cadres to explicitly argue for the necessity of an inde-
pendent central bank as a prerequisite for rational monetary policy in 
the 1970s and 1980s. But in a ‘virtuous’ (or vicious?) cycle, central banks 
21  Per Åsbrink, Letter to Gez Holzer, dated May 27, 1968. Correspondence of Per 
Åsbrink, Bank of Sweden Archive.
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began to hire vast phalanxes of economists as part of their staff s, and, 
increasingly, even as their governors. Aft er all, the purpose of ‘inde-
pendence’ was to actualize expertise. Th us professional economists 
enjoyed new paths to power unencumbered by political accountability, 
and the central banks in turn devoted resources to enhancing econo-
mists’ intellectual credibility. As Forder has pointed out, “Th e idea of 
central bank independence and the doctrines surrounding it contribute 
in signifi cant ways to the standing and self-esteem of the economics 
profession.”22 Any macroeconomic failures can be blamed on the 
misdeeds of outsiders, with their tainted political interventions, while 
the economists deem themselves absolved of all blame. One observes 
this dynamic in recent exculpatory memoirs of the main protagonists of 
the erstwhile Great Recession. Th is symbiotic dependence certainly 
paid off  for the Swedish Riksbank, which managed to attain full political 
independence from democratic accountability in 1999.
But, returning to the 1960s, we observe that the Nobel dynamic in 
Sweden existed to promote a certain species of economics, not all possi-
ble versions of economics indiscriminately. Th e legitimate profession 
had to be constrained to a sharply circumscribed intellectual ambit. Th is 
is another fact to which Åsbrink, Lindbeck, and Lundberg could not 
openly admit. Lindbeck, in his retrospective off ered to an American 
audience, made the smarmy comment that the ideological perspectives 
of the prizewinners “have, of course, been neglected.”23 It was impera-
tive that the Swedish committee for the ersatz Nobel evade the very 
thing that outsiders suspected all along was defi nitely a major consid-
eration. As Lindbeck continued, “Has the selection committee viewed 
the award as a chance to infl uence the direction of new research in 
economics? Th e answer is defi nitely no.”24
Th ese protests are themselves another ‘supplement’, marking out 
another willful silence concerning the most important aspect of the 
Bank of Sweden Prize—and the Memory of Alfred Nobel has nothing to 
do with that.
22  Forder, “Why is Central Banking Independence so Widely Approved?” 854. See 
also Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste (London: Verso, 2013), 
204–23. 
23  Lindbeck, “Th e Prize,” 51.
24  Ibid., 55.
9781788732536 Nine Lives of Neoliberalism (469j) - 7th pass.indd   231 10/03/2020   14:00:01
232 Philip Mirowski
The Mont Pèlerin Connection
It is an error to think that the Nobel Prizes eff ortlessly represent the 
distillation of the historical hive mind of the invisible college of scien-
tists distributed across the world; if that were the case, one could simply 
distribute awards according the highest citation counts and h-indexes, 
and do away with the rigmarole of nomination rules, committees and 
consultations, plus the elaborate press briefi ngs and PR that surround 
the event. Both disciplinary dynamics and local context matter, and 
never more so than with the Bank of Sweden Prize.
Th ere were two major trends that played out in the fi rst few decades 
of the Bank of Sweden Prize with regard to selectivity concerning prize-
worthy economics: one that was obvious, and another that was obscured 
to a substantial degree. Th e obvious trend was the reorientation of the 
Swedish community away from their earlier pre-World War II focus on 
European schools of economic thought, and in particular Germanic 
sources, to home in on American economics as the new standard of 
orthodoxy. Whereas the interwar Swedish scene had been neoclassical 
in some Wicksellian sense, it soon became apparent that the versions of 
neoclassical economics being forged in postwar America were deemed 
to be the wave of the future, at least when it came to much of the Swedish 
profession.
Many of the founder generation, such as Lindbeck himself, had spent 
time at US universities soaking up the novel idioms and research prac-
tices, in preparation for producing publications in English for American 
journals.25 Th ere was a suspicion that Sweden lagged behind in mathe-
matical technique, and perhaps even econometric sophistication, although 
Herman Wold had enjoyed an international reputation in the latter fi eld. 
It was therefore foreordained that aft er the very fi rst prize in 1969 was 
bestowed upon the Norwegian Ragnar Frisch and the Dutch Jan 
Tinbergen, the American dominance of the prize hardened rapidly into 
an unabated trend. It was the rare recipient from thenceforth who did not 
study at US institutions, or else hold a position sometime during their life 
at an American university, no matter what their country of birth.
American orthodox neoclassical economics was deemed world 
benchmark economics by the Bank of Sweden Prize committee, and this 
25  Lindbeck himself studied at Yale with a Rockefeller fellowship, and was then a 
visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan in 1958.
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had very profound consequences for the trajectory of economics in 
Europe. In the 1950s and ’60s there were still scattered home-grown 
schools of economic thought in various countries that generally 
published the bulk of their research in their home language; some, such 
as the French regulation school or the Italian neo-Ricardians, were 
openly hostile to the American version of neoclassical economics. 
Marxian economics was ensconced behind the Iron Curtain. Th ere were 
even reputable Brits such as the Cambridge Keynesians who were very 
skeptical concerning the American ascendancy.26 Not only did none of 
these groups ever merit a Bank of Sweden Prize in the opinion of the 
Swedes; but the prize served to sanction the displacement of the cutting 
edge of economics in Europe from indigenous traditions to a narrow 
(and sometimes tone-deaf) construction of the American economic 
orthodoxy. In some instances, the purge was brutal and quick;27 but 
more frequently it took decades of replacing older faculty with young-
sters who had read the writing on the wall. Perhaps European econo-
mists would have intellectually knelt to the hegemon in any event in the 
absence of the prize; but one suspects the local politics might have 
played out very diff erently.
It is the second, far less visible, trend that will take up the rest of this 
chapter. It is not at all clear that, initially, the Bank of Sweden consciously 
sought to elevate the American orthodoxy to primus inter pares as a 
major consequence of its ersatz prize; but a case can be made that they 
did seek to skew the prize, and therefore the economics profession, in a 
far more neoliberal direction than would have been expected in the late 
1960s. Th us, the prize provided a fulcrum which permanently moved 
the Overton Window.
Th e intimate relations of the neoliberals of the early Mont Pèlerin 
Society with the pinnacles of European high fi nance is a history which 
still remains to be written in suffi  cient detail. Max Hartwell, the insider 
historian of the MPS, admits that the money to fund the fi rst meeting 
in April 1947 came from the William Volker Fund to support the 
American side, and, somewhat more vaguely, a subvention “provided 
by Albert Hunold, who raised the money from Swiss sources,” which 
26  Paul Samuelson actually nominated Joan Robinson: Letter to Assar Lindbeck, 
dated February 14, 1977, Paul Samuelson’s Papers, Box 4, File “Nobel Nominating 
Committee,” Perkins Library, Duke University.
27  For the situation at Humboldt University in Berlin, see Till Duppe, “Economic 
Science in Berlin,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, no. 51 (2015): 22–32.
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paid for the European expenses.28 One can understand Hartwell’s 
circumspection when one realizes it was largely Swiss banking and 
fi nance interests that lavishly subsidized the early Mont Pèlerin meet-
ings. Indeed, it appears Hayek’s fi rst proposal for a new organization to 
rethink liberalism occurred at a reception thrown for him by Swiss 
banking and industrial interests in Zurich, November 1945.29 For many, 
the Swiss banks had been caught out playing both sides of the gold 
street during World War II, and were especially concerned to plead 
their ideological purity to counter the skepticism of the victorious 
allies. With the encouragement of Hunold, they were brought around 
to the notion that by supporting the political and intellectual plans of 
Hayek they would demonstrate their unstinting opposition to any form 
of socialism. Th e reason the fi rst meeting took place on the slopes of 
Mont Pèlerin is that it was funded largely in Swiss Francs, primarily 
from Credit Suisse, the United Bank of Switzerland (UBS), and the 
insurance companies Swiss Re and Zurich Assurances.30 Hunold had 
worked for Credit Suisse from 1945–47, and was able to keep returning 
to the well for further subventions in support of the MPS, to the tune of 
largely funding three more meetings (1949, 1953, and 1957) out of 
Swiss funds.31 So the MPS were lucky in their Swiss patrons; but there 
was another, possibly more consequential aspect to the Swiss 
Connection. Th e Swiss banks were also the wellspring of support for a 
transnational organization of central bankers in the aft ermath of World 
War II. Th e Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a private coordi-
nation institution for central bankers dating from 1930, was another 
instrument enabling Swiss banks to reintegrate themselves into the 
postwar global fi nancial system.32
Far from serving as a mere clearinghouse, the BIS also became a 
source of intellectual arguments to be spread to other member banks 
and their countries. Hence, the BIS turned out to be an important 
conduit for neoliberal ideas and neoliberal support in the period of the 
28  Max Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
1995), 26.
29  Ibid., 30.
30  See Yves Steiner, “Les riches amis suisses du néolibéralisme. De la debacle de la 
revue Occident à la Conférence du Mont Pèlerin d’avril,” Traverse, no. 1 (2007).
31  See Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society, 67.
32  For the history, see Kazuhiko Yago, Th e Financial History of the Bank for 
International Settlements (London: Routledge, 2013); Adam LeBor, Tower of Basel (New 
York: Public Aff airs, 2013).
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1930s through the 1950s throughout Europe. For instance, the second 
general manager of the BIS, Roger Auboin, was an MPS member who 
maintained close contacts with Swiss banks, and had attended the 
Lippman Colloquium in 1938. Other members of the BIS included 
Marcus Wallenberg, brother of Jacob Wallenberg (encountered in the 
previous section as a Nobel conspirator). But more relevant to our 
current narrative, the fi rst Chair of the BIS, the Swede Per Jacobsson, 
found the ideas of MPS fi gures such as Fritz Machlup, Wilhelm Röpke, 
and Walter Eucken to be incisive expressions of the versions of econom-
ics which underwrote his agenda for ‘sound money’.33 Although 
Jacobsson left  the BIS in 1956 to helm the International Monetary Fund, 
one of his main legacies was the ongoing support of his primary Swedish 
protégé, Per Åsbrink.
To document these links in detail more research is required, but 
nevertheless, there is suffi  cient indication that there was a sub rosa Swiss 
Connection to the Swedish central bank, and it was consistent with the 
ideals of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Th e Swedish bankers were second 
only to the Swiss in dealing with Nazi funds, and so they too required an 
ideological clean bill of health aft er the war.34 Th e neoliberal thought 
collective eventually seemed to provide them with a sterling postwar 
doctor’s scrip forswearing any whiff  of collectivism, if not a completely 
clean bill of health.
Returning to our original observation, Per Åsbrink had surrounded 
himself at the Riksbank with economist advisors who were hostile in 
varying degrees to the then-dominant “Swedish model” of the welfare 
state; these were naturally the sorts of economists that the central bank 
would have been inclined to have on its roster of advisors, given its 
recent political contretemps with the Social Democrats. Perhaps the 
most outspoken of the bank cabal’s attitudes towards the rest of the 
Swedish economics profession has been Assar Lindbeck: in his impres-
sions in retrospect, Swedish economists
were on their way in Sweden to put the market out of play from the 
beginning of the 70s to the early 90s . . . Beginning in the mid-90s, we 
introduced a new, rule-based economic policy with an independent 
33  See Yago, Financial History, 44ff ., and Off er and Soderberg, Th e Nobel Factor, 
81–8.
34  See LeBor, Tower of Basel.
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Riksbank, limits for allowable budget defi cit, and a new budget 
process in which one fi rst determines expenditure levels before start-
ing negotiations on how much money the various activities should be 
assigned. We have therefore achieved fi scal discipline and an inde-
pendent Riksbank in combination with deregulation.35
Th e bank cabal included Lindbeck, Lundberg, and Bentzel, in conjunc-
tion with Bertil Ohlin, leader of the People’s Party, the main opposition 
to the Social Democrats from the right in that era; they were all mobi-
lized to bring about a set of rollbacks of the Swedish welfare state, objec-
tives which were achieved by the 1990s.36
Hence it was the great good fortune of the NTC in 1969 to have either 
actual MPS members or their overt sympathizers conveniently available 
to be plucked from the Riksbank stables to staff  the early ersatz Nobel 
committee, essentially hand-picked by Åsbrink in the fi rst instance. Far 
from conforming to some bland notion of “ideological balance,” the 
Bank of Sweden Prize committee had one actual MPS member on board 
from its inception until 1995, and during the early years was majority 
dominated by neoliberal economists. For the fi rst six years they were in 
the majority—which will shortly go some distance in explaining the 
contentious 1974 prize—and thereaft er were represented primarily by 
Assar Lindbeck, who had an outsized infl uence on deliberations in the 
key years from 1974 to 1994. Since that period, their representation has 
been diminished, and this has had a pronounced eff ect on the track 
record of the prize. We can summarize the trend as follows:
1. Th e award bestowed upon Friedrich Hayek in 1974 was the fi rst, and 
perhaps the greatest coup of the MPS and the neoliberal thought collec-
tive in the history of the ersatz Nobel. Th is was recognized as such at the 
time.
35  Quoted in Lars Nordbakken, “Interview with Assar Lindbeck,” 2012, minervanett.
no. Lars Nordbakken is himself a member of the MPS. One of the main targets in the 
1970s was Rudolf Meidner’s “solidarity wage policy.”
36  “Th e social democrats had obviously lost their political hegemony in the 1990s 
and 2000s [in Sweden].” Lennart Erixon, Th e Economic Policy and Macroeconomic 
Performance of Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s (Bingley: Emerald House, 2011), 285. 
Ohlin’s politics were apparently infl uenced by his encounter with Hayek’s Road to 
Serfdom.
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2. Beginning in 1974, the MPS had the most extraordinary run of 
favorable prizes, extending over two decades. Seven awards in total went 
to MPS members in this period.
3. Th e consequence of these two trends was the marked expansion of the 
proportion of neoliberal winners (a category larger than simply MPS 
members) relative to the cumulative population of total winners. Th e 
proportion of neoliberal winners rose from 11 percent in 1974 to 38 
percent in 1993.
4. MPS members had far fewer winners from 1994 forwards. Th e only 
additional member was Vernon Smith in 2002. Th is slowdown corre-
sponds to Assar Lindbeck’s removal from the committee in 1994, as well 
as the last actual MPS member cycling off  the committee.
5. However, the fl ow of new neoliberal additions to the prize has been 
such that the neoliberal representation of the cumulative stock of 
winners has remained around 38–40 percent since 1993.
6. While the ersatz Nobel has never experienced a majority of neoliber-
als in its cumulative stock of laureates, the selection committee has 
guaranteed that neoliberalism enjoys a stable proportional representa-
tion in the supposed “best of the orthodoxy.” Th is is the second major 
coup of the MPS with regard to the Bank of Sweden Prize.
Before we deal with the actual sequence of prizes and vexed questions 
of ideological defi nition, it is critical to note just how unlikely it would 
have been that any exclusive club consisting of roughly 300 or so 
members worldwide during the period under consideration would 
manage to capture such an outsized proportion of Bank of Sweden 
Prizes.37 Conveniently, we have one of the members of the selection 
committee himself admitting the very same thing in, of all things, an 
address to the MPS: “Th ere seems to be an overrepresentation in the 
Nobel Prize Hall of Fame of the MPS group. [Milton] Friedman indi-
cates some kind of political bias against an outspoken Marxist 
37  Some authors have noticed this—e.g. Th omas Karier, Intellectual Capital (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 14—but are never suffi  ciently curious to 
explore it further.
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economist when it comes to not awarding the prize. But is there a corre-
sponding positive bias in favour of the other camp?”38 Furthermore, the 
neoliberal thought collective has not been shy in trumpeting this 
extraordinary set of events. As Max Hartwell, the designated historian 
of MPS put it: “A main reason for the heightened public profi le of the 
Society was the awarding of the Nobel Prize in economics to seven of its 
members between 1974 and 1991 . . . Th ere is no doubt that the Nobel 
Prizes, with their worldwide recognition, strengthened the status of the 
Society.”39
All and sundry treat this as some sort of marvelous confi rmation that 
the Swedish Prize committee miraculously manages to power through 
all the noise and fl ummery of “irrelevant” considerations to an objective 
valuation of the truth in economics; but of course, there is another more 
historically accurate and ultimately more insightful explanation of these 
events. It consists of the combination of some elements of pure histori-
cal contingency, along with other actions of the most direct and 
unabashed intentionality. Th e dose of contingency came in the form of 
the Swiss Connection to the Swedish central bank, the audacity of Per 
Åsbrink in pursuing an ersatz Nobel, and the alliance of convenience 
between Åsbrink and a set of Swedish economists bent upon rolling 
back the Swedish welfare state. Of course, Swedes harboring those sorts 
of political ambitions would tend to be familiar with many of the neolib-
eral protagonists of the MPS in the late 1960s, and indeed would include 
in their number a few actual MPS members. Once those stochastic 
preconditions were baked into place, the subsequent sequence of events 
was more or less due to premeditated planned agendas.
Th e outsized representation of MPS in the ersatz Nobel was a direct 
consequence of Per Åsbrink creating the nascent Swedish Prize commit-
tee from scratch, and then accessing the same cabal of right-leaning 
Swedish economists and Riksbank consultants who had helped him get 
the ersatz Nobel off  the ground to staff  its bureaucratic structure. Th ese 
scholars, consisting of Assar Lindbeck, Erik Lundberg, and Ragnar 
Bentzel, with the tacit cooperation of Bertil Ohlin, sought to bolster the 
intellectual credibility of their program by initially making the prize 
38  Ingemar Ståhl, “Th e Prize in Economic Science and Maurice Allais,” Paper 
presented to MPS meeting, 1990, 2. Not unexpectedly, in the next sentence the author 
goes on to deny the very thing he has brought to our attention.
39  Hartwell, A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society, 160. Th is is confi rmed in Lanny 
Eberstein, Chicagonomics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 135.
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seem “apolitical” for the fi rst fi ve years, only then to embark on a number 
of awards (including one to Ohlin himself) designed to make the hard-
right MPS appear as a legitimate orthodox component of world econom-
ics. In other words, they laid the groundwork for the program described 
by Lindbeck: “fi scal discipline and an independent Riksbank in combi-
nation with deregulation,” and subsequently pursued by the Riksbank.
So far, this might seem an excessively parochial Swedish story: intel-
lectual fortifi cations summoned to reinforce one side of a local political 
battle. But by construction, the ersatz Nobel was intended to have inter-
national repercussions as well. First, there was the reorientation of 
global “orthodoxy” to the new American normal, which meant a 
commitment to a formal understanding of the centrality of the Walrasian 
system of equilibrium as constituting the heart of economics, which in 
turn accounted for the initial prizes bestowed upon Paul Samuelson, 
Kenneth Arrow, Wassily Leontief, Tjalling Koopmans, and that most 
Walrasian of Brits, John R. Hicks. Th e problem faced by the early 
committee was that this “new postwar orthodoxy” represented by the 
above roster was pretty uniformly dismissive of the MPS cadre in the 
1960s, to the extent of an intransigent unwillingness to allow most of 
them into the tent named “orthodox economics.” Th e Nobel committee 
did end up with a lopsided emphasis on American economics, but they 
also forced the issue of reconciliation of these two imperatives through 
a decisive set of awards in 1974–77, as described in the next section.
Another objective of the ersatz Nobel in the 1970s was therefore to 
raise the level of scientifi c credibility of the MPS within the postwar 
economics profession. Th at is why Lindbeck’s subsequent denial that 
“the selection committee viewed the award as a chance to infl uence the 
direction of new research in economics” is utterly unavailing, once one 
examines the historical record in greater detail.40 Th e general level of 
denial in this respect (usually paired with an unwillingness to acknowl-
edge the ersatz status of the economics “Nobel”) has spread throughout 
much of the modern economics profession, especially aft er the history 
of economic thought has been summarily banished from orthodox 
economics departments worldwide. It has gotten so bad that even Nobel 
laureates can spout the most misleading rubbish, secure in the convic-
tion that no one will ever call them out on their ignorance:
40  See Lindbeck, “Th e Prize,” 55.
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So far as I know, the MPS never produced and distributed an agreed 
public statement of its program. Outside the economics profession, it 
was invisible.
Th e MPS was no more infl uential inside the economics profession. 
Th ere were no publications to be discussed. Th e American member-
ship was apparently limited to economists of the Chicago School and 
its scattered university outposts, plus a few transplanted Europeans. 
“Some of my best friends” belonged. Th ere was, of course, continuing 
research and debate among economists on the good and bad proper-
ties of competitive and noncompetitive markets, and the capacities 
and limitations of corrective regulation. But these would have gone 
on in the same way had the MPS not existed.41
Some Episodes on the Road to a Neoliberal Economics
Th e historical materials to support the thesis of this chapter are partly 
available from scattered sources in the history of economics, and partly 
hidden in the archives of the Swedish Academy, subject to a fi ft y-year 
embargo. Th e evidence in this chapter is derived in part from the archives 
of the Mont Pèlerin Society, partly from the archives of selected Bank of 
Sweden Prize laureates, and partly from the publications of the neoliberal 
thought collective itself. From the MPS, we have a number of members 
discussing the track record and signifi cance of the prize at various meet-
ings. Th ere is the revealing talk by Ingemar Ståhl in 1990 that we have 
already quoted. Th ere was also a regional conclave of the MPS in 
Stockholm in 2009; not only did Assar Lindbeck address that meeting on 
the defeat of the “Swedish model” (although it appears Lindbeck never 
did assume formal MPS membership), but Ståhl presided over a session 
devoted to the lessons to be derived from the track record of the prize. Th e 
MPS has always displayed an unapologetic fascination with the ersatz 
Nobel, as one might expect from its curious inception. And then there is 
the issue of the larger archive of the Neoliberal Th ought Collective.
I can anticipate that some readers might feel uneasy with the notion 
of neoliberalism as a coherent intellectual movement, thus it would be 
prudent to give some account of the selection principles behind Table 
41  Robert Solow, “Hayek, Friedman and the Illusions of Conservative Economics,” 
New Republic, November 16, 2012.
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9.1, which constitutes a central piece of evidence supporting the argu-
ments of this chapter.
Table 9.1. Neoliberal Winners of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economics
Year Prizewinner Mont Pèlerin Joint Cumulative
Percent
1974 Friedrich Hayek Yes Yes 11
1976 Milton Friedman Yes 16
1977 Bertil Ohlin Yes 21
1979 Theodore Schultz Yes 25
1982 George Stigler Yes 26
1986 James Buchanan Yes 26
1988 Maurice Allais Yes 33
1990 Merton Miller Yes 32
1991 Ronald Coase Yes 34
1992 Gary Becker Yes 37
1993 Douglass North Yes 38
1995 Robert Lucas 36
1997 Robert Merton Yes 38
Myron Scholes Yes 38
1999 Robert Mundell 38
2001 Michael Spence Yes 36
2002 Vernon Smith Yes Yes 37
2004 Fynn Kydland Yes 38
Edward Prescott Yes 38
2005 Robert Aumann 37
2006 Edmund Phelps 38
2007 Eric Maskin Yes 40
2009 Elinor Ostrom 39
2010 Christopher Pissarides Yes 40
2011 Thomas Sargent Yes 39
2013 Robert Shiller Yes 39
Eugene Fama Yes 39
What does it mean to be a neoliberal economist? I think most can 
agree that membership in the MPS serves as a fairly non-contentious 
litmus test, but that would be too limited, since it would only account for 
eight of our roster of twenty-seven Bank of Sweden laureates in the years 
1969–2013. One consideration which factors into this statistic is the 
observation that, while the MPS was once the core furnace of intellectual 
white heat in forging new ideological principles in the fi rst four decades 
of its existence, its centrality to the neoliberal project has diminished as 
we approach the present, and its intellectual heat has cooled appreciably. 
In eff ect, the level of practical success of neoliberal politics has resulted in 
the core now being primarily populated by affl  uent people who view 
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membership as a status symbol, another Davos to inscribe on the social 
calendar, rather than joining a hand-picked crew of innovative thinkers 
cloistered away in intense debate and subtle disputation.
Th e neoliberal thought collective is far more likely to be found nowa-
days in the outer rings of its dedicated institutional structures, in the 
numerous think tanks, news outlets, tied academic units, NGOs and 
shell foundations which litter the political landscape. Here is one telling 
example. Although the laureates Th omas Sargent, Douglass North, and 
Michael Spence have never been MPS members, they have enjoyed 
extended tenure as Hoover Institution Fellows, which in some ways is 
far more indicative of their modern political and intellectual commit-
ments. Th is is one class of information that has been factored into the 
creation of the neoliberal roster in Table 9.1. Beyond that, it should be 
conceded that there exists no engraved catechism of tenets which one 
could check off  in evaluating the published work of any economist in 
question. A certain level of specialized knowledge of the careers of those 
involved must provide an inescapable backdrop to the attribution of 
neoliberal commitments. For instance, much of the popular press still 
mistakenly thinks that Robert Shiller is some species of left -liberal econ-
omist, at least in part due to his evocation of certain strains of behavioral 
economics, and his warnings of the instability of the mortgage market in 
the run-up to the Great Recession. However, one need only read his 
extensive works to realize that he subscribes to most of the major tenets 
of a neoliberal theory of fi nance.42
Nevertheless, the reader need not depend entirely upon the discern-
ment of authors such as myself to assign the laureates to neoliberal catego-
ries. Th e neoliberal thought collective has been so fascinated by the ersatz 
Nobel and its implications that they themselves have devoted substantial 
resources to taking the ideological temperature of each and every prize 
winner. In eff ect, neoliberals strive to have summary box scores, in order 
to gauge whether or not, from their vantage point, they are winning, and 
by how much. Conveniently, there exists a journal issued by the Koch-
funded Mercatus Institute at George Mason University called Econ Journal 
Watch, which itself devoted a 450+ page issue43 in 2013 to testing the 
42  See Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 353–5.
43  See Daniel Klein, “Special Issue: Th e Ideological Migration of the Economics 
Laureates,” Econ Journal Watch, no. 10 (2013): 218–682. Honestly, I cannot understand 
those who rail against the notion of the neoliberal thought collective as a phantasm born 
of a ‘conspiracy theory’, when one observes the exorbitant amounts of money and eff ort 
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neoliberal mettle of each and every individual Bank of Sweden prizewin-
ner up to that point. While not agreeing in every case with its political 
verdicts—for instance, it is derived entirely from readily available 
published sources, and makes no eff ort to tap archives—it provides a good 
fi rst pass at the classifi cation embodied in our Table 9.1. As in so many 
other cases of the political sociology of science, one fi nds that it was the 
NTC that managed to get there fi rst.
With those considerations out of the way, we will conclude this chap-
ter with two episodes from the history of the Bank of Sweden Prize 
which capture to varying degrees the myriad ways the prize has served 
to further the neoliberal project.
The 1974 Prize Awarded to Friedrich
Hayek and Gunnar Myrdal
As mentioned, the early Swedish Prize committee was heavily stacked 
with neoliberal sympathizers, but from 1970–73 it set out to elevate the 
American neoclassical orthodoxy as the gold standard for what it would 
henceforth consider cutting-edge world economics. Aft er having estab-
lished this as its primary mandate, it then abruptly revealed an alterna-
tive agenda with the 1974 prize, awarded to Friedrich Hayek and Gunnar 
Myrdal. Th us began a practice, which would surface again a few more 
times, of bestowing a joint award to economists asserting A and not-A, 
respectively, while keeping a straight poker face. Clearly something like 
this had never happened in the real Nobels for the natural sciences, and 
it was perceived as an outlandish departure from standard operating 
procedure at the time.
Forty years later, it is perhaps diffi  cult to recapture just how prepos-
terous this award seemed to most contemporary economists. It seemed 
that the Swedes had just abnegated their own prior defi nition of ortho-
doxy, because it was apparent that almost no one in the American 
profession considered Hayek qualifi ed as an economist back in 1974. I 
and organization that have been poured into the monitoring and commentary on 
intellectual trends in the modern world in order to rate and intervene in their political 
valence, as exemplifi ed in this instance. For another instance out of George Mason, see 
Peter Boettke, Alexander Fink, and Daniel Smith, “Th e Impact of Nobel Prize Winners 
in Economics: Mainline vs. Mainstream,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 
no. 71 (2012): 1219–49.
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defer here to one of the previous laureates, himself struck by the grace-
lessness of the award:
in the 1974 common rooms of Harvard and MIT, the majority of 
the inhabitants there seemed not to know the name of this new 
laureate [Hayek]. By contrast, the following year I was in Stockholm 
to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the original fi ve Nobel Prizes, it 
was my vague impression that the Royal Swedish Academy electors 
paid greater deference to Hayek than to their own native son 
Myrdal.44
To telegraph the scene to those not aware of Hayek’s biography, he 
began his career as an Austrian economist attempting to argue against 
government attempts to off set business cycles, and continued to do so at 
the LSE long aft er the 1929 crash. Th ere he was attacked by the 
Keynesians in the later 1930s and by Gunnar Myrdal for serious errors 
in his version of monetary theory.45 Hayek was deeply disheartened by 
the chorus of disdain, as well as the failure of his next book Th e Pure 
Th eory of Capital, and turned away from the genre of “economic theory” 
altogether in favor of philosophy, publishing his popular book on poli-
tics, Th e Road to Serfdom (1944). At that point he was condemned to the 
status of being “not an economist,” particularly in the American context; 
so much so that he was denied a position in the University of Chicago 
economics department, although he was hired to the Committee on 
Social Th ought in 1950.46
Th is long period of wandering in the wilderness of intellectual 
banishment would have been the fi rst thing to have struck insiders 
back then about the 1974 prize. Hayek had “lost” status, because he 
could no longer participate in “scientifi c economics.” Hence it would 
seem all the more striking to an outsider like Samuelson that such 
deference was shown to Hayek in Stockholm, beyond that towards 
native son Myrdal. Some would say that Myrdal himself had also drift ed 
away from economics in the interim, to something akin to sociology 
with his work on American segregation and Indian development 
44  Paul Samuelson, “A Few Remembrances of Friedrich von Hayek,” Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization, no. 69 (2009): 1.
45  See Bruce Caldwell, Hayek’s Challenge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 178ff .
46  Ibid., 297.
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problems. Yet it was their diametrically opposed politics which drew 
the most strident commentary.
Th e contempt for Myrdal was intense within the MPS thought collec-
tive. As P. T. Bauer wrote to Hayek, “I can well understand your feelings 
about being bracketed with Myrdal. If you had waded through 2300 
pages of Asian Drama (as I did), you would feel this even more. Myrdal’s 
and Tinbergen’s Nobel Prizes tell us quite a lot about the state of econom-
ics. But we must try not to be trapped in a feeling analogous to that of 
guilt by association.”47
Aft er the prize was announced, there were all sorts of criticisms of the 
aberrant behavior of the Bank of Sweden committee; they were forced to 
defend their choice over and over again. Indeed, the Hayek/Myrdal 
pairing remained the most controversial award until the 1994 prize 
bestowed upon John Nash, which caused such a hubbub that the prize 
committee was itself reconstituted by the Royal Swedish Academy.48 
Th e complaints about the 1974 prize occurred in public and in private. 
One particularly plangent example was Assar Lindbeck’s response to 
Paul Samuelson’s request for clarifi cation:
Th e background for the Hayek-Myrdal prize was that the committee 
was eager to ‘fi nish’ the backlog as soon as possible, which resulted in 
a number of shared prizes during the seventies. Th at specifi c prize 
refl ected perhaps, to some extent, also Erik Lundberg’s sense of 
humor! But more seriously, both H. and M. were pioneers in aggre-
gate analysis of output fl uctuation by the concepts of aggregate saving 
and aggregate investment. Both later turned to broader issues of the 
relations between institutions, economic mechanisms, and political 
processes. Th e fact that they came up with contrary policy prescrip-
tions was not regarded by the committee as an obstacle for the prize.49
Th is gloss was widely perceived as implausible. No one in the American 
orthodoxy would have considered either Hayek or Myrdal part of the 
‘backlog’ of orthodox economists to be cleared; almost no one would 
47  Bauer, Letter to Hayek, dated August 18, 1975, Box 11, Folder 33, Hayek Papers, 
Hoover Institution.
48  See Sylvia Nasar, A Beautiful Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).
49  Assar Lindbeck, Letter to Paul Samuelson, dated February 3 1989, Paul 
Samuelson Archives, Box 4, File: “Nobel Nominating Committee,” Perkins Library, 
Duke University.
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have deemed that either Hayek or Myrdal had made any lasting contri-
bution to orthodox macroeconomics, as it stood in 1974.50 And the 
notion that the prize was in any sense a “joke” bordered on off ensive.
Perhaps the person most disturbed by the prize was its other recipi-
ent. Although he did not decline the award, remorse soon set in, and 
Myrdal went public a few times in subsequent years suggesting he 
should have renounced it.51 He openly questioned the pairing of two 
such diametrically opposed thinkers in the interests of “balance.” In a 
widely reprinted article, he suggested the award to Milton Friedman in 
1976 had fi nally made him see what was really going on. Economics was 
not a science like those celebrated by the other Nobels; due to the 
“confused admixture of science and politics, the awarding of a Nobel 
Prize in economic science will commonly be conceived as a political act 
of the Academy. Th is, of course, is what has happened in the case of 
Milton Friedman.” His proposal was that the Royal Academy divest 
itself of the Bank of Sweden Prize, “an opinion of mine  . . . shared by 
many members of the Academy and not only by natural sciences.” 
Perhaps he felt prudence dictated leaving out how his own remorse at 
having cooperated with Åsbrink in the late 1960s to get the prize insti-
tuted in the fi rst place was also eating away at him.
A case can be made that Hayek was equally in the dark when it came 
to comprehension of the subtle tactics of the award committee. 
Unexpectedly, Hayek had the nerve to denounce the Bank of Sweden 
Prize in his acceptance speech:
Yet I must confess that if I had been consulted whether to establish a 
Nobel Prize in economics, I should have decidedly advised against it. 
One reason was that I feared that such a prize, as I believe is true of 
the activities of some of the great scientifi c foundations, would tend to 
accentuate the swings of scientifi c fashion. Th is apprehension the 
selection committee has brilliantly refuted by awarding the prize to 
one whose views are as unfashionable as mine are. I do not yet feel 
50  Th at is why I do not fi nd creditable the secondhand claim by David Laidler that 
in a conversation between Erik Lundberg and Herbert Giersch in 1973 they had claimed 
that Myrdal was perceived as being at the top of the queue, and then they had to fi nd 
someone else for “balance.” See Robert Leeson, ed., Hayek: A Collaborative Biography 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 72.
51  Th e rest of this paragraph is derived from Gunnar Myrdal, “Th e Nobel Prize in 
Economic Science,” Challenge (March–April 1977): 50–2.
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equally reassured concerning my second cause of apprehension. It is 
that the Nobel Prize confers on an individual an authority which in 
economics no man ought to possess.52
At fi rst sight, it may seem that Hayek’s denunciation (but note well—
combined with acceptance) of the prize might seem to contradict the 
major thesis of this chapter: How could the Riksbank award be skewed 
to promote the MPS and its doctrines when its most famous member 
was so disparaging about the functions of the prize at the award cere-
mony? Here, I think, it becomes necessary to insist once again that 
neoliberalism and the NTC cannot be reduced to the utterances of 
Hayek alone.53 However brilliant Hayek may have been, he was distinctly 
inferior in his understanding of the sociology of the economics profes-
sion than many other members of the NTC, as the quote from Hartwell 
above implicitly indicates. If he really believed the ersatz Nobel was so 
deleterious for economic thought, then he should have practiced what 
he preached and renounced the prize. I think it plain that the wisdom of 
Lundberg, Lindbeck, and the others ultimately won out: all agree Hayek’s 
stock as an economist began its recovery with the bestowal of the Bank 
of Sweden Prize. And, validating NTC wisdom, Hayek is second-most 
cited laureate in the other Bank of Sweden Prize lectures, just aft er 
Kenneth Arrow.54
Th ere has grown up an urban legend that Myrdal was inevitably in 
line for a prize, but that the Swedes disliked him to such an extent that 
they paired him with Hayek to forever make his life (and legacy) miser-
able. One might think that credible if one restricted one’s gaze solely to 
that single prize, but the evidence gathered herein about the longer term 
suggests otherwise. Th e rival interpretation is that the committee 
consisting of one MPS member plus three neoliberals tipped their hand 
as to their second project in the Bank of Sweden Prize: to lend public 
credibility to the Mont Pèlerin Society in particular and the neoliberal 
52  Friedrich Hayek, Nobel Banquet Speech, Dec. 10, 1974, at: https://www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1974/hayek/speech/
53  Th is is a case I have been making repeatedly. See Philip Mirowski and Dieter 
Plehwe, eds, Th e Road from Mont Pèlerin: Th e Making of the Neoliberal Th ought Collective 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), and Mirowski, Never Let a Serious 
Crisis Go to Waste.
54  See David Skarbeck, “F. A. Hayek’s Infl uence on the Nobel Prize Winners,” 
Review of Austrian Economics, no. 22 (2009): 109–12.
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project in general, by inserting targeted awards intercalated with those 
to the American orthodoxy. Th e committee could never have bestowed 
the award on Hayek alone, since that would have put the kibosh on the 
prize for good; the purely political character of such a singleton would 
have left  no grounds for plausible deniability. So they paired him with 
Myrdal to disguise what would soon become a striking run of single-
person prizes to MPS members. Th e prize committee was willing to put 
up with a modicum of grief concerning the Hayek/Myrdal prize, because 
it broke the global ice dam which had frozen out the MPS from the 
realm of legitimate economic discourse since World War II. Th e ploy 
worked like a charm for Hayek; numerous historians have commented 
that his ‘rehabilitation’ as an economist dates from the 1974 prize. 
Myrdal experienced no such similar rehabilitation, and soon realized he 
had been a cat’s paw for the neoliberals on the committee. By 1976, with 
the prize going to Milton Friedman, and to Bertil Ohlin in 1977, Myrdal 
fi nally saw the writing on the wall. Th e Bank of Sweden Prize was being 
driven by two diff erent and confl icting agendas, or at least so it seemed 
in the 1970s: promote the American hegemony, and promote the MPS 
and neoliberal arguments. True success would arrive when neoliberal 
orthodox economists had become so commonplace that no one would 
think to make an issue of them any longer.
Other Economics Prizes Abandoned
So far we have approached the ersatz Nobel almost exclusively from the 
vantage point of the Swedes, but another way to gauge the signifi cance 
and infl uence of the prize is to briefl y examine its consequences from 
the side of its main benefi ciaries, viz., the American economics ortho-
doxy. Lindbeck’s disavowal that the prize did not aff ect the subsequent 
direction of research can be directly refuted by looking at what happened 
to other economist prizes in the American context.
In retrospect, Hayek was essentially correct in his diagnosis that 
high-profi le prizes tend to accentuate swings in scientifi c fashion, and 
confer authority on certain heroic fi gures, in order to imperfectly 
telegraph what certain professional organizations deem to be exemplary 
lines of inquiry worthy of emulation. Th e way we have related the story 
so far tends to portray the dynamic as the Swedes single-handedly 
performing this function, but that would be too narrow a construction 
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of events. Some insist that the Swedes on the committee attended closely 
to the advice of early American winners for their selection of choices of 
subsequent laureates, but the archival record equally reveals a certain 
modicum of perplexity concerning the motives of the Swedish commit-
tee on the part of past laureates. One example can be found in the later 
correspondence of Paul Samuelson:
All who count in Cambridge, Massachusetts, regretted that a 
Krugman-Helpman award was not given. Same was lamented that no 
gold medal for George Dantzig or Peter Diamond. (Just why Lewis, 
Schultz, Buchanan, Stone or North scored, we’ll never know. Who 
said life is fair?) Th ere were too many single-person prizes. In 1970, 
better than a Samuelson award would have been an Arrow-Hicks-
Samuelson award. Hayek-Friedman would have been better than 
Hayek-Myrdal and Friedman.55
Outside of that little bit of faux-modesty, and some MIT home-team 
bias, this correspondence reveals that many Americans believed they 
knew better than their Swedish colleagues whom and what should be 
elevated in the public mind as exemplary performances in cutting-edge 
economics. So the question naturally arises: Why did they not just give 
out their own prizes instead? Th e surprising answer is: they did, for a 
while, but then opted to defer to the Swedes in the early 1980s.
Most contemporary economists are familiar with the John Bates 
Clark medal, awarded to the American economist under forty who is 
judged to have made a signifi cant contribution to economics; but, 
signifi cantly, most are unaware that the American Economic Association 
(AEA) instituted two prizes in 1947. One was the Clark medal, and the 
other was the now-defunct Francis Amasa Walker medal, depicted in 
Figure 9.2. Originally, the two awards were conceived as a complemen-
tary package aft er World War II; so, it is all the more telling that in less 
than four decades the package was torn asunder.
55  Paul Samuelson, Letter to Stanley Fischer, dated December 24, 2008, Box 31, 
Paul Samuelson Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University. Th is is more evidence that the 
MIT School never really understood the role and importance of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society in postwar economics orthodoxy. See Samuelson to Fischer, January 6, 1997: 
“My generation were mostly scared of Milton. I knew his potential but never envied or 
admired him.”
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Figure 9.2. Francis Amasa Walker Medal
Th e Walker medal, named aft er the Association’s fi rst president, 
Francis Amasa Walker, was inaugurated in 1947 by the AEA, and was 
to be awarded every fi ve years “to the living American economist who 
in the judgment of the awarding body has during his career made the 
greatest contribution to economics.” Th e Walker Prize was instituted 
at an interesting juncture in the history of American economics. It is 
now widely conceded that in the interwar period there was no domi-
nant orthodoxy regnant in the American context.56 Yet, with stunning 
alacrity, American economics became unusually homogeneous over 
the next three decades. Since, by construction, the Walker Prize would 
be bestowed in retrospective recognition of an entire career, that 
necessarily dictated that many of the initial winners would have made 
their mark in an earlier era, and in idioms other than the nascent post-
war orthodoxy, which was only recently becoming narrowly neoclas-
sical and substantially more mathematical than anything that had 
come before. (Th e Clark medal had no similar problem: Its fi rst recipi-
ent in 1947 was none other than Paul Samuelson.) So, curiously, the 
Walker medal was awarded to a number of individuals who would 
come to be deemed “not real economists” by the congealing postwar 
orthodoxy. Th e record of the Walker Prize (see Table 9.2) is illustrative 
56  See the papers in Malcolm Rutherford and Mary Morgan, eds, From Interwar 
Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism: 1998 Supplement to vol. 30, History of Political 
Economy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
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of the problem. Th e fi rst two winners—Mitchell and Clark—were 
fi gureheads of the Institutionalist School of economics; this school 
had come under vicious attack by the Walrasian advocates of high-
tech mathematical economics in what became known as the 
“Measurement without Th eory” controversy in the late 1940s.57 By the 
1970s, the school was essentially kaput in formal economics depart-
ments in the US. Th e next Walker winner, Frank Knight, was being 
disparaged by his colleagues as a philosopher, not an economist, as 
early as the 1950s. Th e next two winners—Viner and Hansen—while 
certainly closer to the postwar neoclassical orthodoxy, would have 
been regarded as too retrograde and literary to resonate with the newly 
adopted self-conception of the skills and demeanor of the professional 
American economist by 1960. So although the American economics 
profession came equipped with a high-profi le prize, it was not so clear 
that it was performing the all-important function of elevating the new 
model of exemplary performance to iconic status.
Table 9.2. Walker Medal Awards
 1947—Wesley Clair Mitchell, 1874–1948
 1952—John Maurice Clark, 1884–1963
 1957—Frank H. Knight, 1885–1972
 1962—Jacob Viner, 1892–1970
 1967—Alvin H. Hansen, 1887–1975
 1972—Theodore W. Schultz, 1902–1998
 1977—Simon Kuznets, 1901–1985
Th e historian Beatrice Cherrier has drawn our attention to the fact 
that both AEA prizes, the Clark and Walker medals, faced criticism and 
challenge in the fi rst decades of their existence.58 Perhaps unexpectedly, 
the Clark medal came in for some disparagement as being too narrow, 
too theoretical, insuffi  ciently elevating empirical work, and not 
adequately concerned with public policy. Th e discontent came to a head 
at the 1958 AEA meeting, where there was a proposal to mint another 
medal to highlight the empirical and public policy side of economics, to 
be named the Wesley Clair Mitchell medal. In the executive committee 
meeting, a motion was proposed to either pair the Clark medal with the 
57  On the Measurement without Th eory controversy, see Mirowski, “Th e Measurement 
Without Th eory Controversy: Defeating Rival Research Programs by Accusing Th em of 
Naive Empiricism,” Economies et Sociétés, Serie Oeconomia, no. 11 (1989): 65–87.
58  See Beatrice Cherrier, “Th e Wesley Clair Mitchell Medal: Th e AEA Award that Never 
Came to Be,” Institute for New Economic Th inking, November 11, 2015, ineteconomics.org.
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new Mitchell medal, or else discontinue the Clark medal altogether. 
Some of the membership began to chafe at the “all must have prizes” 
argument, and controversy broke out about the whole idea of having 
formal prizes of any stripe sponsored by the AEA. Th e executive 
committee refused to respond to the hubbub, but that did not signify 
that the diffi  culties were in any sense mitigated.
Th e stalwarts of the AEA could have had no way of knowing that the 
resolution of the impasse would be conveniently provided by the Bank 
of Sweden in the 1960s. As we have argued, due to their own geopolitical 
and intellectual imperatives, the Swedish committee had decided to 
privilege the nouvelle vague américaine as the future of economics. Th is 
became practically apparent by the later 1970s, as did the principle that 
no other schools of thought than an American neoclassicism or an MPS 
neoliberalism would ever be graced with a call from Stockholm. 
Furthermore, it was obvious that the Bank of Sweden ersatz Nobel drew 
far more press attention and commentary than either the Clark or 
Walker prizes. As Ståhl said to the MPS in 1990: “it is a good thing for a 
scientifi c society to have something like a Nobel Prize . . . Th e contest 
character, the secrecy around the selection procedure and the fi nal luxu-
rious prize award ceremony and banquet are necessary ingredients in 
this public relations connection.”59 It did not take long for the grey-
beards of the AEA to realize they had made some grievous mistakes 
with their trophy bestowal when it came to promoting the image of the 
economics profession among the larger public. Clearly the Swedes had 
something to teach them concerning pomp and circumstance, but they 
also brought a clarity to the PR project which was seriously lacking in 
the existing array of professional prizes in America.
Th e fi rst lesson was: do not name your prize aft er someone who 
could not in all good conscience himself be portrayed as exemplifying 
the virtues that the prize is intended to extol. In this instance, however 
important Francis Amasa Walker had been in the nineteenth-century 
context,60 he could by no stretch of the imagination be refurbished as 
59  Ståhl, “Th e Prize.”
60  Walker had been brigadier general at age twenty-four for the Army of the 
Potomac during the Civil War, superintendent of the US Census at thirty, one of the fi rst 
presidents of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), president of the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) and the fi rst president of the American 
Economic Association. He was also an economics professor at Yale and head of the 
statistical bureau of the US Treasury.
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an American neoclassical economist avant la lettre. Th is point was 
made rather brutally in the 1980s by that arbiter of all things orthodox 
in the history of economics, Robert Solow.61 Th e second lesson was: 
never give the prize to avatars of schools more or less opposed to the 
outlines of the postwar neoclassical orthodoxy. Th e Walker medal was 
wrong-footed from the starting line, bestowing eminence on fi gures 
such as Wesley Clair Mitchell, J. M. Clark, and Frank Knight. Only late 
in the game did the AEA medal begin going to people whom the 
Swedes would come to acknowledge as members in good standing of 
the new model orthodoxy: Th eodore Schultz and Simon Kuznets. But 
there persisted the nagging issue of the unseemly prior track record.
Having learned their lesson from the Swedes, the AEA took the star-
tling tack of quietly discontinuing the Walker medal in 1982. It is oft en 
said that the ersatz Nobel rendered the Walker medal obsolete, but 
rarely has it been spelled out exactly what this means. Th e purpose of 
the ersatz Nobel was to elevate certain strains of economic thought 
above their competitors; those strains were an Americanized version of 
Walrasianism and an MPS-inspired neoliberalism. If the two strains 
found a stilted hybrid at the University of Chicago, then all the better for 
Chicago and its global reputation. Th e Swedes were forward-looking, 
realizing they were intervening to bring about an outcome that had not 
yet become a global standard: English-infl ected American orthodoxy, 
tricked out to resemble the natural sciences, with a dollop of neoliberal 
political theory. Th e American prizes, by contrast, had been sadly
backward-looking; therefore, it was the better part of valor to simply 
retire the Walker medal with little fanfare.
Conclusion
Th e role of prizes deserves to be taken more seriously in an expansive 
social epistemology. Prizes serve to inform and structure the internal 
dynamics of an intellectual fi eld like economics; and equally, they 
play an important part in the validation of the doctrines of the fi eld 
amongst the larger public. But in this case, there is a further consid-
eration that is frequently overlooked. Because epistemology is so very 
61  Robert Solow, “What Do We Know that Francis Amasa Walker Didn’t?” History 
of Political Economy 19, no. 2 (1987), 183–89.
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central to neoliberalism, they were well poised to take advantage of 
the opportunity created by the rogue behavior of the Bank of Sweden 
to upgrade their standing in the postwar economics profession, 
through occupation of the newly formed Prize committee, and the 
elevation of MPS members to the exalted status of ‘winners of the 
Nobel Prize’.
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How the Neoliberal Think Tank 
Went Global: The Atlas Network, 
1981 to the Present
Marie-Laure Djelic and Reza Mousavi
Since the late 1970s, neoliberalism has transformed the world. It has 
impacted the structures and strategies of fi rms and organizations—
whether private, public, or not-for-profi t.1 It has infl uenced policy-
making at national and transnational levels.2 It has transformed our 
private lives and our very sense of self.3 Th e idea of a market society 
has become performative in the Austinian sense.4 Yet not all ideas that 
circulate become performative—only those that are framed, carried, 
adopted, appropriated, enacted, and institutionalized successfully. 
Despite the many studies of neoliberalism as a doctrine and way of life, 
scholars have yet to explain fully how this particular set of ideas was 
translated into institutions and practices with a global reach.
1  E. Vaara, J. Tienari, and J. Laurila, “Pulp and Paper Fiction: On the Discursive 
Legitimation of Global Industrial Restructuring,” Organization Studies 27, no. 6 (2006). 
E. Girei, “NGOs, Management and Development: Harnessing Counter-Hegemonic 
Possibilities,” Organization Studies 37, no. 2 (2016).
2  L. Baccaro and C. Howell, “A Common Neoliberal Trajectory: Th e Transformation 
of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism,” Politics & Society 39, no. 4 (2011). S. 
Böhm, M. C. Misoczky, and S. Moog, “Greening Capitalism? A Marxist Critique of 
Carbon-Markets,” Organization Studies 33, no. 11 (2012). H. Buch-Hansen and A. 
Wigger, “Revisiting Fift y Years of Market-Making: Th e Neoliberal Transformation of 
European Competition Policy,” Review of International Political Economy 17, no. 1 
(2010).
3  C. Graham, “Th e Calculation of Age,” Organization Studies 35, no. 11 (2014). M. 
Lazzarato, Th e Making of the Indebted Man (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).
4  J. L. Austin, How to Do Th ings with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1962).
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Th is chapter contributes to our understanding of this institutionali-
zation process by exploring the role of a singular organization, the Atlas 
Network.5 Founded in 1981, Atlas played a strategic role as an architect 
organization in the transnational liberal constellation. In this chapter, 
we follow the development of Atlas as it constructed and expanded a 
broad network of neoliberal think tanks across the world. We delve into 
the mechanisms that turned it into the hub organization of a dense 
transnational community of neoliberal think tanks. From a network of 
fi ft een think tanks in nine countries in the mid-1980s, Atlas now brings 
together 457 ‘partner organizations’ in ninety-six countries. In the 
meantime, the organization’s operating budget has gone from $150,000 
to over $15 million. Over three decades, Atlas self-consciously refi ned 
and diff used an organizational blueprint for public opinion and policy 
infl uence to win what it oft en called “the war of ideas.”6
More than any other single organization, Atlas was responsible for 
the globalization of the neoliberal think tank model. By tracking a 
history surprisingly neglected by scholars to date, we can better under-
stand the durability of neoliberal policy networks. Unaff ected by politi-
cal and administrative changeovers, these networks have embedded 
over time a particular ideology and sets of policy imaginaries in many 
countries around the world. By focusing on geographical reach, modes of 
enlisting, mechanisms for diff usion, and strategies of stabilization, this 
chapter shows how Atlas has fostered the spread of a transnational 
organizational architecture to structure and uphold the diff usion and 
institutionalization of neoliberalism. Ideas matter, but they need institu-
tions in order to travel as well as to survive and embed themselves into 
policies. Our exploration of Atlas off ers a view of neoliberalism in 
motion.
5  Founded in 1981 as the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, the organization 
was renamed the Atlas Network in 2011. Henceforth in this chapter, we will refer to it 
using the shorter ‘Atlas’. In the footnotes, references to Atlas Highlights, 1987–2015 
(entirely downloaded in 2015, all available upon request) are made in the following way: 
AtlasH (YEAR), and when there are several issues that year we add a (Winter), b 
(Spring), c (Summer), d (Fall). For example: AtlasH (1995c) corresponds to Atlas 
Highlights Summer of 1995. References to the Atlas Investor Report Special Year-in-
Review, 2001–2013 (entirely downloaded in 2014, all available upon request) are made 
in the following way: AtlasIR (YEAR).
6  Colleen Dyble, ed., Taming Leviathan: Waging the War of Ideas around the World 
(London: Institute of Economic Aff airs, 2008).
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At the Creation: The Origins of Atlas
Atlas was incorporated in July 1981. Th e founder, Sir Antony Fisher, had 
created the Institute of Economic Aff airs (IEA) in London in 1955, 
which played a pivotal role in spreading neoliberal ideology within 
British public opinion, policy, and political circles in the 1970s and 
1980s.7 Th e success of the IEA meant that Fisher was invited to launch 
sister organizations in Canada and the US and soon became a “think 
tank entrepreneur.”8 In the late 1970s, Fisher was ready to take the next 
step—to create an organization with the mission to “litter the world 
with free-market think tanks.”9 In 1979, he sought formal endorsement 
from key neoliberal luminaries—Margaret Th atcher, F. A. Hayek, and 
Milton Friedman, writing “A letter from you . . . expressing your confi -
dence in the eff ectiveness of a proliferation of the IEA idea would be 
immensely valuable.”10
Securing the support of this trio allowed Fisher to raise funds and 
incorporate Atlas. The objective of the new organization was to push 
for and help the seeding, staffing, and coaching of neoliberal think 
tanks across the world to “influence public sentiment” and in the 
process “make legislation possible.”11 Initially located in San 
Francisco, Atlas started small with a budget of $150,000. Early donors 
were the Sarah (Mellon) Scaife Foundation, Fisher’s second wife 
Dorian, and private philanthropists from the US and Canada.12 The 
budget was stable at around $2 million from 1995 to 2005. From that 
point, it increased rapidly—reaching over $15 million in 2016.13 
When Fisher died in 1988, the new director, John Blundell, moved 
the organization to George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, 
already the home of the Center for the Study of Public Choice since 
1983 and the Mercatus Center founded in 1980. In 1991, Alejandro 
7  C. Muller, “Th e Institute of Economic Aff airs: Undermining the Post‐war 
Consensus,” Contemporary British History 10, no. 1 (1996). D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, 
Th e Commanding Heights (New York: Touchstone, 1998).
8  G. Frost, Antony Fisher: Champion of Liberty (London: Profi le Books, 2008).
9  R. Cockett: Th inking the Unthinkable (London: HarperCollins, 1994), 307.
10  A. Fisher, Letter to Friedrich Hayek, dated December 31, 1979, Box 4, Folder 
1, Document 80, Friedrich von Hayek’s Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University.
11  A. Fisher, Atlas Presentation and Promotion Video, 1985, youtube.com.
12  A. Chafuen, “Atlas Economic Research Foundation Early History,” chafuen.com.
13  Atlas, “Annual Report 2016,” atlasnetwork.org.
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Chafuen took over Atlas and remained president and CEO until 
2009.14 Since 2009, Chafuen has kept the role of president while Brad 
Lips, a former equity research analyst on Wall Street who joined 
Atlas in 1998, took over as CEO. In 2011, the Atlas Economic 
Research Foundation was renamed the Atlas Network—
underscoring its increasing organizational density and keeping pace 
with trends in the Zeitgeist of management, marketing, and academia, 
where everything is or becomes a ‘network’.
In 1982, Atlas brought together fi ft een think tanks from nine coun-
tries. Today, as shown in Figure 10.1 and as indicated on its website, the 
network boasts a “global network of more than 450 free-market organi-
zations in over 90 countries.”
Th ink tanks are not “member” but “partner” organizations; together 
they make up a broad transnational network with Atlas as the hub. Atlas 
was created to institutionalize the process of helping start up new think 
tanks. And it has played that role, being a catalyst through the years for 
the setting up and the stabilization of many such organizations. More 
than half of the think tanks are located in North America and Europe 
but, as Figure 10.2 shows, the network has a global presence. We identify 
two distinct but complementary periods in the development of Atlas. 
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During the fl edgling years (1981 to 1995), the survival and legitimacy of 
the organization depended on its capacity to expand the network. Th e 
period of expansion and maturity started in earnest in the mid-1990s 
(1996–2015). Atlas then became an attractor organization and partner 
organizations needed it more than it needed them.
Geographical Reach: From Controlled 
Expansion to Global Ambition
When Atlas was incorporated in the early 1980s, Fisher had personal 
connections with all the existing think tanks, most of which he had helped 
to create. Th ey shaped an emergent neoliberal constellation around Atlas. 
As it was then an organization with limited resources and capabilities, 
Fisher and his team implemented a geographically controlled expansion, 
starting with the American continent. By 1981, thanks in part to Fisher’s 
activism during the 1970s, the neoliberal think tank was already becom-
ing an identifi able organizational category in North America. Along with 
the rise of “Reaganomics,” this made the US fertile soil for Atlas. By 1995, 
there were already 122 think tanks in the Atlas network and sixty-nine 
were based in North America (see Figure 10.3).
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In the 1980s, Latin America was also an important target region. Chile 
had been an early laboratory for neoliberal ideas and policies. Augusto 
Pinochet had called upon a local group of Chicago-trained economists to 
propose a radically diff erent economic program.15 By 1976, the “Chicago 
Boys” were in control of Chilean economic policy.16 Hayek and Friedman 
traveled to Chile, consulting with and encouraging this team of pioneers. 
In the process, they bestowed their legitimacy as recent Nobel Prize 
winners (in 1974 and 1976 respectively) upon the new economic experi-
ment and, indirectly, on the brutal dictatorial government of Pinochet.
Economic conditions were bad throughout Latin America in the 
1980s. Following the rise in interest rates with the Volcker Shock in 
1979, and offi  cially initiated by the Mexican default in 1982, debt crises 
wreaked havoc in the region. For Atlas, however, this “lost decade” 
carried a promise and created a window of opportunity for the dissemi-
nation and application of neoliberal ideas. It was in this context that 
Fisher met Alejandro Chafuen, a young Argentinian economist and 
member of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS). Chafuen joined Atlas in 
1985 to create the Direction of Latin American Aff airs. Th e focus on 
Latin America resulted in a rapid expansion of the network in that part 
of the world. Figure 10.4 shows that a total of twenty-fi ve Latin American 
think tanks were integrated between 1981 and 1995—not all of which 
have survived.
15  J. G. Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).
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Speaking at the 28th Atlas International Workshop in Istanbul in 
1996, Deepak Lal, economist and MPS member, rejoiced that “the intel-
lectual battle was being won.”17 Th e fall of the Berlin Wall, the accelera-
tion of globalization, and the impact of the Pinochet, Th atcher, and 
Reagan “revolutions” meant that ever more regions of the world were 
targets of neoliberal proselytism. Th e time was ripe for Atlas, with 
around 120 think tanks in its “family,” to expand its international ambi-
tions. Letting the American continent develop on existing dynamics, 
Atlas turned to those regions where the network was non-existent or 
weak—Asia, Europe (West and East), and Africa. Aft er 2001, Atlas also 
targeted the Middle East, trying to reach the Muslim world. Th e increas-
ing international reach of Atlas was refl ected in the structure of its 
annual reports—starting in 2004, there were dedicated pages for each 
region. In 2008, Atlas also changed its website name from atlasUSA.org 
to atlasnetwork.org.
One new focus was Asia. In the mid-1990s, Atlas’s footprint in the 
continent was limited, with a notable exception in the Hong Kong 
Centre for Economic Research founded in 1987 by Y. C. Richard 
Wong with the help of Atlas. In the early 1990s, Atlas combined its 
expertise with the resources of the German Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation (FNF), which had a presence in China. Together, they 
organized a workshop in Beijing in 1995. Th e Atlas team took this 
opportunity to explore China, Hong Kong, and India.18 In India, 
Chafuen met Barun Mitra, a “science writer” with whom he had been 
17  AtlasH (1996d): 2.
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in written contact. Mitra founded a think tank in New Delhi the 
following year, the Liberty Institute, and remained an important 
contact for Atlas in South Asia. Other workshops and forums were 
organized in Asia, particularly aft er 2002, and generated a base of 
contacts for Atlas in China, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
India, Pakistan, Philippines, and Vietnam. Some of these contacts 
came to Fairfax, Virginia and, with the help of Atlas, established their 
own institutes. Th ey also over time created a regional network of 
support and resource sharing.19 Figure 10.5 shows the expansion of 
the network, from a net of seven institutes in 1995 to fi ft y-fi ve today 
in Asia/Pacifi c.
Another new site of attention was Europe. Europe had historically 
been Atlas’s worst disappointment—Western Europe being “mired in 
heavy regulation and taxation” and Eastern Europe lacking “a strong 
rule of law.”20 Understanding that Europe was not welcoming to the 
neoliberal “think tank culture,” Atlas leaders decided to enter through 
academia. Atlas helped the pro-market teaching and research eff orts 
of some European scholars while also encouraging them to establish 
free market think tanks. From the mid-2000s, Atlas organized 
regional gatherings in Europe to boost resource sharing and collabo-
ration among the fl edgling institutes and isolated academic centers. 
Th e hope was also to bridge the East-West divide. Th e eff orts paid off  
in the new millennium. Th e European network quadrupled aft er 2000 
(Figure 10.6). Numbers went from a net of nine institutes in 2000 to 
19  AtlasH (2006a).
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forty-nine today in Eastern Europe and from thirteen to eighty-one 
in Western Europe.
Even more than Europe, “Atlas’ most challenging and untapped 
markets” have been Africa and the Middle East.21 In 2000, the network 
only had two associated institutes in Africa: IEA Ghana and the Free 
Market Foundation in South Africa. Th ere was a double diffi  culty—
fi nding motivated champions and convincing donors. Th ings slowly 
started to change, however, when James Shikwati, from Kenya, contacted 
Atlas in 2001 announcing that he was keen on creating a think tank.22 
Th e International Policy Network (a British institute run by Linda 
Whetstone, Fisher’s daughter) funded his trip and that of Th ompson 
Ayodele, from Nigeria, to the 5th anniversary of the Liberty Institutes in 
India in 2001.23 Having shown their commitment by launching Kenya’s 
(Inter Regional Economic Network) and Nigeria’s (Institute for Public 
Policy Analysis) fi rst neoliberal think tanks, both were invited to Fairfax 
for a month in 2002. Subsequent trips to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, and Lesotho 
helped identify other interesting and committed contacts.
Th e Middle East proved more challenging still. Despite outreach 
attempts, Atlas’s success in fi nding local institute leaders has been 
limited. Today, its presence there is mostly through local-language 
websites. Figure 10.7 shows that Atlas’s network in Africa and the Middle 
East expanded from a net of 4 think tanks in 2000 to 31 in 2015.
21  AtlasH (2004b).
22  AtlasIR (2002): 5.
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Modes of Enlisting: From ad hoc Identifi cation 
to Organized Outreach
Finding individuals willing to subscribe to and champion the cause was a 
necessary fi rst step to diff using the think tank model. Initially, the identi-
fi cation of those potential champions was mostly ad hoc—happening 
through the mobilization of direct and indirect personal networks. In the 
US, Fisher could rely on his own personal connections to identify the new 
generation of think tank leaders. In Latin America, however, his personal 
contacts were limited. Hence he used indirect mechanisms. First he lever-
aged his contacts within the MPS, of which he had been a member since 
1954. When Hayek or Friedman traveled to South America and met inter-
esting prospects, they connected them with Fisher. Th is was how, for 
example, Fisher met Hernando de Soto. Fisher spurred de Soto, a Peruvian 
economist trained in Switzerland, to create his home country’s fi rst think 
tank—the Instituto Libertad y Democracia (ILD) in 1981. When Chafuen 
joined Atlas in 1985 and started to mobilize his personal network, scout-
ing eff orts in Latin America intensifi ed.
Th e identifi cation and mobilization of prospective foot soldiers also 
happened through the organization of workshops. Th e fi rst workshop 
took place in 1983, in Vancouver, Canada, and by 1995, Atlas had organ-
ized twenty-fi ve. Annual workshops were organized in connection with 
MPS meetings. Th is allowed Atlas to piggyback on MPS intellectual 
resources, renowned members being invited as speakers. Th e proximity 
of both events was an attraction for liberal champions from around the 
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workshop did not carry a parallel invitation to the MPS meeting. Th ese 
workshops were small (around 100 participants) and co-organized with 
local affi  liate think tanks. Th is made it easier to attract local participants 
and gave local think tanks and their leaders legitimacy and visibility.
Th e workshops had several objectives: to share information and best 
practices; to discuss key policy issues with particular consideration for 
concrete realizations; and to showcase the work of think tanks to foun-
dations and corporate offi  cers.24 Th e workshops also proved useful to 
identify new contacts. Hence, Fisher and Chafuen soon organized 
regional variants, starting with Latin America, to bolster Atlas’s projects 
there. Th e fi rst regional workshop took place in Jamaica in 1987 and was 
followed by seven more in Latin America before 1995 (see Table 10.1).










1986 St Vincent, Italy
1987 Indianapolis, Indiana, US Montego Bay, Jamaica
1988 Herndon, Virginia, US Caracas, Venezuela
1989 Christchurch, New Zealand Sao Paulo, Brazil




1991 Herndon, Virginia, US Punta del Este, Urugay
1992 Cuernavaca, Mexico Guayaquil, Ecuador
1993 Herndon, Virginia, US Santa Cruz, Bolivia Stockholm, Sweden
1994 East Sussex, UK
1995 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, US Beijing, China
Regional workshops were smaller (around forty participants). Th e 
objective was to champion the think tank-model and to “provide support 
and advice to regional free-market policy institutes.”25 One of the speak-
ers at the Jamaica meeting, Walter Williams, economics professor at 
George Mason University, was impressed by what he heard. He intro-
duced Chafuen to Gordon St. Angelo, from the Lilly Endowment. Th is 
marked the beginning of one of Atlas’s strongest “fi nancial ties.”26 In 
1990, Lilly Endowment Inc. provided Atlas with a three-year grant to 
24  AtlasH (1989).
25  AtlasH (1990b): 3. 
26  Chafuen, “Atlas Economic Research Foundation Early History.”
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expand its activities in Latin America. Th is helped signifi cantly with the 
local seeding of new think tanks.
As the Atlas organizational network expanded, the search for and 
development of motivated champions could no longer be accommo-
dated by occasional fi eld trips and targeted workshops. Atlas hence 
fostered the systematic formalization, organization, and branding of its 
outreach eff orts. With a view to systematize and formalize its outreach 
and scouting eff orts, it also created the Atlas International Freedom 
Corps (IFC) in 2003, as “the free market alternative to Peace Corps.”27 
Th rough the discovery arm of IFC, Atlas dispatched senior members of 
the network to “scout for intellectual entrepreneurs in diffi  cult parts of 
the world.”28 Th e potential “freedom fi ghters” thus identifi ed could be 
invited to Atlas, as part of IFC’s visiting fellow arm. Th e fellowships, from 
several weeks to a few months, allowed newcomers to “learn about think 
tanks,” prepare for their think tank entrepreneur role and develop a 
sense of belonging to the Atlas “family.”29 Th e fellows then oft en became 
themselves eff ective “scouts.” In the fi rst half of 2000s, Atlas fi nanced 
fi ve missionary trips to Asia and Africa and hosted thirty-three visiting 
fellows from Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Th ese eff orts 
accelerated the expansion of the network and fostered the integration of 
a core of connected think tanks across diff erent regions of the world.
By the late 2000s, each arm of the IFC became a full-fl edged program. 
In 2009, the Cato Institute transferred its internationalization service to 
Atlas. Tom Palmer, from Cato, became Vice-President for International 
Programs at Atlas, absorbing the discovery arm of the IFC. Palmer soon 
became the symbolic fi gure of Atlas’s missionary and discovery activities. 
He worked with a team of native speakers (in a dozen languages) and 
deployed an outreach and discovery strategy for challenging regions. 
Classic texts were translated and distributed and new material produced 
and shared through web platforms tailored for a given language.30 Th e 
platforms also organized essay contests and relayed information on initia-
tives like Freedom Schools or university tours. Th is online strategy implied 
“aggressive branding and integration of programs around a website.”31
Another strategy targeted academia. Initially, Atlas scorned universities 
27  AtlasIR (2003): 13.
28  AtlasIR (2003): 13.
29  AtlasIR (2003): 13.
30  AtlasH (2009a).
31  AtlasH (2009a): 3.
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as “ideological monopolies of the Left .”32 Vocal in its contempt, it 
constructed itself as an alternative to academia, contributing to 
“un-politicized” public policy “based on sound science.”33 Th e realiza-
tion, however, that “many cultures of the world [had] not yet fully 
embraced the think tank model” imposed a pragmatic reorientation.34 A 
key actor here was Leonard Liggio, law professor at George Mason, and 
veteran of the Institute of Humane Studies, who joined Atlas in 1994. In 
1999, the John Templeton Foundation gave Liggio and Atlas a grant to 
target academia. Th e International Freedom Project (IFP) fi nanced 
through this grant aimed at planting “seeds of truth” in academia outside 
North America.35 Th e plan was to fund university professors (ranging 
from $10,000 to $40,000) to develop free market courses and invite 
prominent guest lecturers. Between 1999 and 2002, Atlas funded sixty-
eight courses in twenty-seven countries, an estimated 1,500 students 
being reached.36 Although this program ended in 2002, Sir John 
Templeton (investor, philanthropist, friend of Fisher, and longtime MPS 
member) remained an important funder of Atlas, underwriting various 
initiatives through his Foundation.
In the mid-2000s, Atlas broadened its academic ambitions. Th rough 
the Teach Freedom Initiative (TFI), Atlas helped a select group of profes-
sors to sponsor speakers, craft  workshops, and fi nd adequate fellowships 
and internships for their students. Th rough TFI, Atlas organized confer-
ences to showcase the contributions of free market oriented academic 
centers—hoping to help along their ultimate transformation into think 
tanks.37 Th e Fund for the Study of Spontaneous Orders (FSSO) was 
oriented to research designed to support and reward academic scholar-
ship in the tradition of Austrian methodological individualism. 
Underwritten by an anonymous donor, FSSO held annual conferences 
and granted fellowships ($10,000) to young scholars and life-time 
achievement awards ($50,000) to scholars “whose work exemplifi es the 
ideals of the Fund.”38
32  AtlasIR (2002): 14. 
33  AtlasH (1995b): 2.
34  AtlasH (2000a): 3.
35  AtlasH (2001c): 7.
36  AtlasIR (2002). Th e potential was even more signifi cant as there were around 
100 applications per year. 
37  AtlasIR (2005): 26.
38  AtlasH (2003b): 2.
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By the late 2000s, these initiatives had lost momentum. Whether due 
to limited returns on investment or to Liggio’s bad health, the focus on 
academia receded. Th is happened as Palmer rose to prominence. 
Palmer had close ties with Students for Liberty (SFL) networks, which 
brought together graduates of the Institute for Humane Studies Koch 
Summer Fellowship Program. In the new approach, academia was 
bypassed and scorn returned: What Your Professors Won’t Tell You was 
the subtitle of a series of books edited by Palmer and distributed by 
SFL. Academic hierarchies were being bypassed and college students 
became direct targets.
Mechanisms of Diff usion: From Tailored 
Interventions to Standardized Processes
Th e early expansion of Atlas was rapid but controlled and geographi-
cally bounded. Th e Atlas network grew from eight members in 1981 to 
122 in 1995. In the next twenty years the network would be nearly multi-
plied by four. In these two periods, Atlas deployed tools of intervention 
that were fi tted to the specifi cities of the network and context.
Initially, Atlas fostered diff usion through practical “venturing” 
actions. Having identifi ed individual foot soldiers, it worked to empower 
them by helping them materially and coaching them directly. Atlas then 
made sure to keep in contact, with a double objective—to stabilize the 
think tank locally and to tighten its integration into the transnational 
neoliberal community. When the Atlas team met motivated individuals, 
it was ready to fi nance exploratory trips. In 1988, it thus fi nanced one 
trip to India and two to Ghana. Shyam Kamath, a young economics 
professor from California State University, and Parth Shah, a PhD 
student, went to India. Kamath had already mobilized potential donors 
and the objective of the trip was to fi nd “the right individuals to manage 
and run the institute locally.”39 Charles Mensah, PhD candidate in 
economics at George Mason, organized the trips to Ghana. 
“Incorporation, fi nding premises, recruiting a board of directors, and 
seeking fi nancial support were all on his agenda.”40 Th e Indian trip only 
bore fruit in 1997 when Shah returned to India to found the Centre for 
39  AtlasH (1988a): 3.
40  AtlasH (1989): 4.
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Civil Society. Th e African trips proved rapidly successful: IEA Ghana 
was created in 1989 in a country governed by the military.
As Fisher had underscored, “one of the diffi  culties in setting up an 
institute is to raise the money in the fi rst place, because usually business-
men don’t know what it’s all about.”41 Atlas could help through “provision 
of seed money, which could mean an instant start.”42 Altas’s fi rst invest-
ment was in a French institute—the Institut Economique de Paris.43 In the 
US, Fisher put high hopes in John Goodman, a PhD graduate in econom-
ics from Columbia. In 1983, with a starting grant of $20,000, Goodman 
launched the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) in Dallas, 
Texas.44 In Latin America, Fisher supported de Soto in establishing ILD. 
Many other fl edgling institutes received seed money from Atlas in that 
period—in Iceland, Australia, Italy, Spain, Latin and North America, and, 
in the early 1990s, in Russia, Romania, and the Czech Republic.45
Initially, Fisher used his personal contacts to raise funds for this purpose. 
As Atlas and its role became more visible, established foundations contrib-
uted structured grant packages. We mentioned above the Lilly Endowment 
grant with a focus on Latin America. Other foundations followed—Smith 
Richardson, Sarah Scaife, Carthage—as well as anonymous donors.46 Th is 
successful fundraising—“revenues doubled in 1989 . . . donors continue to 
respond magnifi cently”—was a powerful accelerator and allowed Atlas to 
rapidly expand its network.47 It also meant that Atlas could diversify the 
nature of fi nancial assistance—from only “seed money” to a menu of start-
up, project, visiting, or conference attendance grants.48
Beyond fi nancial assistance, Atlas also provided one-on-one coach-
ing to help institutes develop in unique contexts. Th e idea was to relay 
“the experience of the [IEA]” and other fi rst generation think tanks to 
“advise an ever-growing family of institutes.”49 Initially, this took the 
41  A. Fisher, “Letter to a Businessman in Jamaica, 1981,” extracts available on 
chafuen.com.
42  Ibid.
43  A. Fisher, “Pourquoi l’Institute of Economic Aff airs?” Speech at the Inauguration 
of the Institut Economique de Paris, September 29, 1982, Liberté économique et progrès 
social, no. 46–7 (October 1983).
44  Chafuen, “Atlas Economic Research Foundation Early History.”
45  AtlasH (1990a), AtlasH (1992a).
46  AtlasH (1988a), AtlasH (1988b), AtlasH (1990b).
47  AtlasH (1989d): 4.
48  AtlasH (1991b), AtlasH (1992c), Atlas (1993a).
49  AtlasH (1987b): 2.
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form of personal visits by Fisher. As de Soto later recalled, for example: 
“It was on the basis of his vision that we designed the structure of the 
ILD. He then came to Lima and told us how to structure the statutes, 
how to plan our goals, how to build the foundation, what to expect in 
the short and long term.”50
Fisher did the same for most think tanks created before his death.51 
Building on his experience, he had a clear framework in mind.52 First, a 
think tank should stay out of politics and focus instead on building 
infl uence. Hence, key targets were the media and policy infl uencers 
even more than policy-makers. Second, think tanks should stay away 
from governmental or political fi nancing. Hence foundation and private 
funding were privileged. Th ird, think tanks should work like businesses. 
While Fisher was singularly active, other staff  members soon got 
involved by helping write the bylaws of new institutes, constitute boards 
of directors (oft en with Atlas trustees or team members), develop budget 
plans, and initiate research and publishing projects.
Workshops, particularly regional ones, also played an important role in 
relaying the think tank model. Th e 1988 workshop in Venezuela, for exam-
ple, proposed seminars on “all aspects of founding, funding and running 
an institute.”53 In 1990, the structuring, funding, and organizing of insti-
tutes were also discussed at length in a regional meeting in Moscow.54 In 
the early 1990s, the evolution towards the professionalization and manage-
rialization of think tanks started in earnest. Private models and templates 
were transferred to the nonprofi t think tanks to ensure effi  ciency and 
accountability to funders. In November 1991, the Heritage Foundation 
organized a workshop on “Fundraising in the New Policy Environment,” 
where Atlas was represented. Th e workshop was “devoted to the impor-
tance of developing clear organizational missions, devising better methods 
of marketing products and services and refi ning donor relations.”55
As the number of initiatives and targeted countries increased rapidly 
in the 1990s, diff usion mechanisms had to be rethought. Indirect and 
mediated forms of infl uence came to complement direct interaction and 
50  T. Mitchell, “Th e Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes its World,” 
European Journal of Sociology 46 (2005). 
51  Frost, Antony Fisher.
52  Chafuen, “Atlas Economic Research Foundation Early History.”
53  AtlasH (1988a).
54  AtlasH (1990b).
55  AtlasH (1992a): 4.
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communication. Initially, Atlas had provided seed money in an ad hoc 
manner to “worthy” think tanks. From the early 2000s, it moved to 
distribute general purpose funds through grant competitions. Th ink 
tanks fi lled out a six-page grant application, accessible from the website. 
Atlas organized the review and selection. Most of the grants went to 
non-US think tanks (around 85 percent between 2004 and 2013). Grant 
competitions meant that Atlas could have leverage on and steer the 
agenda of network members. Whereas initially it had to persuade think-
tank leaders to engage with certain debates, through grant competitions 
it could nudge them towards the issues it deemed important. Atlas set 
up, for example, a grant competition to foster private solutions to health 
and welfare issues. Th irty institutes were awarded this grant ($10,000) 
between 2002 and 2004. Grant programs multiplied over the years (see 
Table 10.2). Start-up, Student Project, and Video Production grants 
were created alongside the standard General grant. New topical short-
term grant competitions also emerge regularly—they currently include 
a “Liberating Enterprise to Advance Prosperity Grant” for think tanks 
outside North America who want to work on improving the regulatory 
environment in their countries, and an “Illiberalism Grant” designed to 
help think tanks who are involved in combating new forms of authori-
tarianism and statism.56
Table 10.2. Atlas Grants in Recent Years
Year Amount Number of recipients Number of countries
2010 $2,575,000 – –
2011 $3,110,000 – –
2012 $3,515,000 147 57
2013 $4,042,000 – 62
2014 $4,340,000 177 67
Source: Atlas’ annual reports
Th e fi rst phase of coaching had built upon the experience of veterans 
of the think tank world. Early on, though, Fisher had thought of making 
the rules for think tank creation and development explicit. In 1983, he 
circulated a fi ft y-page text—Some Do’s and Don’ts for Public Policy 
Institutes. Th e Atlas team worked to refi ne and make these recommen-
dations more explicit—producing “recipe books,” modular “manage-
ment toolkits,” and ultimately a blueprint that became accessible through 
56  Grants and Awards, atlasnetwork.org.
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the website in 2000.57 Th e blueprint covered many dimensions. Th ere 
were start-up guidelines—how to select a name; how to write bylaws; 
how to defi ne the mission and set up a proper governance. Th ere were 
functioning guidelines—how to organize everyday activities; how to 
remain independent from government and political parties; how to 
conduct market analysis. And fi nally, there were development guide-
lines—how to raise funds; how to fi nd and work with authors; how to 
market and sell ideas; how to project competence and expertise.58 In 
addition to the blueprint, sample documents were collated—bylaws, 
three-year action plans, detailed planning for an annual dinner, opera-
tion budgets. With the development of the internet, the blueprint 
morphed into a directory of links to material produced by Atlas and 
major think tanks.
Aft er 2000, with an increasingly dense network, Atlas restructured its 
international operations to create regional sub-networks.59 Regional 
networks were an attempt to deal with the diffi  cult question of local 
inscription. Th ey proved eff ective in facilitating collaboration, fostering 
synergies among local institutes, and “hooking” new contacts to the 
cause. Building upon an initiative of the Heritage Foundation, Atlas 
encouraged local institutes to establish regional resource banks to foster 
regional networking and coalition building. Th e African Resource Bank 
was launched in 2003, the Asian and Eastern European ones in 2004. In 
the late 2000s, a few successful think tanks were upgraded as Atlas “satel-
lites” to act as regional gatekeepers and relays. Th e idea was to push some 
of Atlas’s discovery, organizing, and training operations downstream.60
Strategies of Stabilization: From Network 
Consolidation to Community Integration
Initially, most of the resources and activities deployed by Atlas targeted 
the diff usion of the think tank model. Soon, however, Fisher and the 
Atlas team realized the importance of longer-term objectives—ensur-
ing the survival of individual think tanks and fostering their 
57  Atlas, “Guidelines, Suggestions, and Ideas for Public Policy Institutes, 2000,” 
web.archive.org.
58  Ibid.
59  AtlasIR (2009).
60  AtlasIR (2009): 9.
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integration into a larger (neoliberal) community. An important chal-
lenge during the fi rst period was to create a sense of belonging and to 
sustain mobilization around a common project. Atlas deployed diff er-
ent mechanisms in that direction. One eff ective mechanism was to 
invite think tank leaders to Fairfax. Th e Lilly Endowment grant made 
it possible to bring Latin American leaders for periods of six months, 
allowing real immersion. Th e program was small but its alumni 
became infl uential in the Latin American neoliberal landscape and 
retained strong ties with Atlas. Dora de Ampureo set up the Instituto 
Ecuatoriano de Economia Politica (IEEP) in 1992 and joined the MPS 
in 2000. Rocio Guijarro Saucedo became the executive director of 
CEDICE, a Venezuelan think tank with strong ties to Atlas. Similarly, 
in the 1990s, Atlas invited Eastern Europeans. Daniel Stancu, Executive 
Director of the Liberty Institute in Romania, Leslaw Kuzaj of the 
Cracow Industrial Society, Poland, and Jiri Schwartz of the Liberal 
Institute in Prague, Czechoslovakia, came for several months. Th is 
allowed them to strengthen links with Atlas and other institutes in the 
broad Washington region.61
Th e broad diff usion of intellectual products and the circulation of a 
small group of so-called freedom intellectuals were also eff ective mech-
anisms to strengthen connections between Atlas, think tanks, and the 
core of the neoliberal community (the MPS). Initially, a handful of 
neoliberal luminaries did the rounds, including Hayek, Friedman, James 
Buchanan, and Henri Lepage. Soon, however, the circle expanded to 
include leaders from older think tanks—Lord Ralph Harris from the 
IEA, Michael Walker from the Fraser Institute, Ed Crane from the Cato 
Institute, de Soto from the ILD, and Goodman from the NCPA.62 Atlas 
was the connector—putting “freedom intellectuals” and local think 
tanks in contact and fi nancing the trips.
Atlas also fostered the diff usion of intellectual products across the 
network, including books, reports, memos, and videos. Convinced 
that “the widespread availability of pro-market books is a critical 
element in communicating the principles of a free society,” Atlas 
fi nanced translations of the classics of liberalism, including books by 
Adam Smith, Hayek, Buchanan, and Friedman.63 Th e corpus evolved 
61  AtlasH (1990a), AtlasH (1992a).
62  AtlasH (1987b), Atlas (1988a), Atlas (1989d), Atlas (1994c). 
63  AtlasH (1988a).
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through time and Atlas also helped translate and diff use texts produced 
by members of associated institutes, including de Soto, Goodman, and 
many others. In the 1990s, those texts championed private and market 
solutions with a particular focus on healthcare, welfare, and environ-
mental issues.64
Showcasing the concrete results and successes of institutes made it 
possible to foster a sense of pride and belonging and heighten the 
perception of an urgent shared project. Th ere were two main channels—
the Atlas Highlights newsletter and the workshops. Atlas Highlights iden-
tifi ed concrete initiatives, “showing how the institutes in the Atlas 
network are redefi ning the boundaries of ‘politically impossible’ policies 
worldwide.”65 For example, the strategies by which Atlas and associated 
think tanks have weighed in on the healthcare and climate change 
debates since the mid-1980s were given prominence.66 Th e newsletter 
also relayed information on the “Better Government Contests”—a 1991 
initiative of the Pioneer Institute in Boston that rapidly spread through-
out the network. Soliciting “citizen plans to cut government spending,” 
these contests mobilized government representatives who promised 
implementation.67
Workshops created further opportunities for the presentation, discus-
sion, and showcasing of concrete realizations. During the Indianapolis 
workshop in 1987, speakers were to “address a particular facet of [their] 
work and its consequences.” In that context, John Goodman discussed 
“Th e role of the new think tank: How privatizing came to the White 
House.”68 Th e showcasing of realizations took another dimension with 
the fi rst edition, in 1990, of the Fisher Memorial Award Competition for 
Best Publications. Th e award honored institutes that published “a book, 
report, monograph, or study that in the opinion of the judges made the 
greatest contribution to the public understanding of the free economy.”69 
A list of winners, from 1990 to 1995, presented in Table 10.3 below, 
included essays in both English and Spanish on topics ranging from 
“free market environmentalism” to “families without fathers.”
64  AtlasH (1991–94) all issues.
65  AtlasH (1988a).
66  AtlasH (1989–94) all issues.
67  AtlasH (1992b).
68  AtlasH (1987b).
69  AtlasH (1989d): 1.
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Table 10.3. Fisher Memorial Award Competition, 1990–1995
Year Title Author Think Tank
1990 1st. The Other Path 2nd.The 
Economic Consequences of 
Immigration









1991 1st. Economics and the 
Environment 2nd. Welfare 
State or Constitutional 
State
3rd. Work and Welfare in 
Massachusetts
3rd. Para Combatir la Pobreza
















3rd. Social Security in 
Venezuela
T. Anderson & D. 
Leal
M. Mueller
C. Sabino & J.E. 
Rodriguez
PRI & PERC, Montana
Hong Kong CER
CEDICE, Venezuela
1993 1st. Drug Policy and Decline 
of American Cities
2nd. Patient Power
3rd. Families without 
Fatherhood
3rd. The Heated Debate
S. Staley
J. Goodman and G. 
Musgrave







1994 1st. The Loss of Virtue
1st. Property Rights and the 
Limits of Democracy
2nd. Federalism and Free 
Trade
3rd. Grand Theft and Petty 
Larceny





R. Vedder & L. 
Gallaway





1995 1st. Public Goods and Private 
Communities
2nd. Las Tareas de Hoy
2nd. Perpetuating Poverty





D. Bandow & I. 
Vasquez
S. Richman
W. Mitchell & R. 
Simmons
Locke Institute, Virginia





While diff usion work remained important aft er 1995, the prolifera-
tion of think tanks meant that Atlas increasingly had to focus on the 
challenge of integrating the broader “Atlas family.” Flagship events were 
adapted to the needs of the new era in both content and form. First, the 
content of the workshops shift ed from a focus on policy issues and 
promotion of the think tank model to discussions of strategies and the 
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sharing of best practices for managing think tanks. Second, the form 
changed too. In 2001, the Atlas Liberty Forum, held every year in the 
US (and recently always in New York), replaced roving international 
workshops. Initially, Atlas workshops had always coincided with the 
annual meetings of the MPS and the Heritage Foundation Resource 
Bank in what were “three jam-packed days of free-market networking 
and programs.” Th is aggregation of events could hook newcomers 
“overwhelmed by the magnitude of the vibrant American movement.”70 
As Atlas became ever more central in the neoliberal constellation, it 
turned the Liberty Forum into a stand-alone event highly attractive in 
itself. In 2003, 150 participants came from twenty-six countries while 
the 2014 forum brought 600 participants from fi ft y-nine countries. In 
parallel, Atlas developed the practice of co-sponsoring events in diff er-
ent parts of the world. Many workshops were thus organized—includ-
ing regional Liberty Forums in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Th ese contrib-
uted to the development and even more to the stabilization of the Atlas 
network.
As that network became increasingly dense, Atlas spent more time 
and resources showcasing the impact of institutes. Th e newsletter 
remained an important outlet, going from an average of eight to twenty 
pages. In 2002, Atlas started to publish annual investor reports that also 
became a tool for showcasing success. Th e newsletter and investor 
reports featured long pieces on aspiring think tank entrepreneurs, 
successful or promising new institutes and best or innovative practices. 
Th e new format, lively and fi lled with stories and anecdotes, gave a 
“personal touch,” avoiding the impersonality that could come with a 
growing network.71
Showcasing and recognition took another turn in 2003 when the 
John Templeton Foundation underwrote a $2 million pledge to 
fi nance the Atlas’s Templeton Freedom Awards (TFA). Every year 
Atlas could award, during the Liberty Forum, two prizes of $10,000 
each in eight categories—Free Market Solutions to Poverty, Social 
Entrepreneurship, Ethics and Values, Student Outreach, Initiative in 
Public Relations, Innovative Media Award, University-based Centers, 
and Young Th ink Tanks. In 2013, the Templeton Religion Trust took 
over, granting each year a single $100,000 grand prize recognizing 
70  AtlasIR (2004): 4. 
71  AtlasIR (2013): 1.
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“exceptional think tank achievement.”72 New awards have been 
launched over the years. Recognizing specifi c achievements, these 
awards come with monetary rewards and are handed out during offi  -
cial events. Th ey celebrate individuals and organizations but they also 
serve to integrate the network around its common project and 
common successes.
Towards the end of the 2000s, particularly with the arrival of Tom 
Palmer, Atlas started to take advantage of its dense network to encour-
age cooperation between institutes on the co-production and co-
diff usion of contents. Atlas commissioned co-authored “snack box” 
books featuring plain-language essays promoting free market ideology. 
Th e authors include celebrated fi gures in the network such as Nobel 
Laureate Mario Vargas Llosa, famous CEOs or journalists, but also 
young “liberty champions” from around the world. Atlas monitors the 
writing, translation, and distribution of these books and other produced 
contents (videos, blog posts . . .) through its designated outreach chan-
nels, including local language websites, organized liberty tours, summer 
schools, and seminars.
While Atlas was involved from the start in the development of 
“think-tank entrepreneurs,” training efforts were only institutional-
ized in the late 2000s. The Atlas Leadership Academy (ALA), 
announced in 2008, was formalized in 2012. The idea was to offer a 
“thorough education in the fundamentals of think tank 
management.”73 The ALA proposes various training modules tailored 
to different stages of maturity—from beginner online courses and 
webinars, regional schools, onsite leadership training courses, 
mentoring programs, all the way to the recently launched Atlas 
Think Tank MBA (TTMBA). Online courses explore the basics of 
starting and running a think tank, while the onsite two-week TTMBA 
covers all stages of think tank development (strategic and program 
planning, fundraising, branding, marketing, communication, evalu-
ation). A new mentorship program matches “high potentials” with 
successful veterans for nine-month, one-on-one correspondence 
and meetings. Completing twelve credits leads to graduation from 
ALA. Becoming an alumnus has perks—“access to a community of 
leaders, stakeholders, and benefactors, in addition to eligibility to 
72  AtlasIR (2013): 15.
73  AtlasIR (2008): 4. 
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compete in the annual Think Tank Shark Tank competition (a project 
pitching competition) to win a $25,000 project grant,” as listed on the 
Atlas website. Table 10.4 below shows the rapid increase in the 
number of people going through the ALA.
Table 10.4. ALA Training and Graduates
Year Number of people who received 
training (number of countries)





2014 1000 (90) 34 (25)
Th e objective of the ALA is to “apply sound business practices” to the 
domain of infl uence building and public policy shaping.74 As such its 
training programs progress from basic ideas about the free market to 
practical business skills:
Freedom is our business: we believe that using the best business 
methods is the key to advancing the ideas and the policies of free-
dom. Accordingly, Atlas teams plan strategically, seek the highest 
value added, engage in competitor analysis, brand our products and 
use the most suitable marketing techniques to encourage our target 
markets to “consume” our products, and measure our successes 
(and our failures).75
By the 2010s, the think tank model, born in England in 1955 with the 
IEA, had become a formalized and explicit blueprint, a modularized 
solution, and an object for global diff usion and emulation.
Conclusion
Th e case of the Atlas Network helps us understand how the neoliberal 
think tank model went global. Its history illustrates the deployment of 
a structural, material, and organizational architecture that helped 
create the conditions for certain ideas to spread, have an infl uence, and 
74  AtlasIR (2008): 5.
75  AtlasIR (2010): 13. 
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ultimately become potentially performative. Atlas was instrumental 
not only in the construction and densifi cation of the network but also 
in the institutionalization through time of the well-delineated organi-
zational template of the modern (neoliberal) think tank. From 1981 to 
the present, Atlas has been the linchpin of the organizational deploy-
ment, diff usion, and activation of neoliberal ideas. It became a “diff usor 
and connector” organization—a transnational architect organization. 
Th rough a systematic exploration of the public archives of Atlas, we 
have traced the impact of its activities on the construction and increas-
ing density, through time, of what we call, with Hayek, a “second-hand 
dealer” organizational circle in the transnational architecture of 
neoliberalism.76
Some of the changes in this evolution refl ected scale eff ects. As the 
network expanded, Atlas had to reassess its tools and practices and 
move from a craft -like to a mass process. Other changes were connected 
to evolving legitimacy. Initially, Atlas and its few associated think tanks 
were marginal organizations. Th ey had no chance of recognition from 
better-established producers and diff usors of knowledge like universi-
ties. Th eir strategy was to play up the position of the outcast and insist 
on their own singularity. Over time, however, Atlas gained centrality 
and legitimacy in the transnational neoliberal community, and think 
tanks became locally institutionalized. As a consequence, a signifi cant 
evolution took place. Instead of scorning academia, Atlas and the think 
tanks aspired to and embraced academic legitimacy. Th is happened fi rst 
through the co-optation of academics sympathetic to the cause as well 
as through think tank leaders acquiring academic credentials, usually a 
PhD in economics.
In a later phase, Atlas and the think tanks distanced themselves from 
and bypassed professors to directly target college and university students. 
Today, they have appropriated the tools and some of the regalia of 
academia; they do “scientifi c” research and even deliver “diplomas” 
through their own Academy. Achieving legitimacy through association 
with mainstream academia seems less necessary; Atlas and the think 
tanks have become legitimate entities in their own right. A related set of 
changes was connected to broader societal trends towards manageriali-
zation. Like most nonprofi t and voluntary sector organizations across 
76  F. A. Hayek, “Intellectuals and Socialism,” Th e University of Chicago Law Review 
16, no. 3 (1949).
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the world in that period, Atlas and the think tanks have been infl uenced 
by managerial ideas and practices.77
While the starting point of this chapter was that ideas matter, we have 
not focused on the nature of those ideas per se. Instead we illuminated 
the conditions in which ideas can be made to matter. Ideas do not fl oat 
nor do they do things by themselves. Th ey are championed, carried, 
inscribed organizationally and institutionally, fought over, appropriated, 
and interpreted. Only then can they come to have an impact. Th is chap-
ter has shown the performance of the conditions necessary for ideas to 
have an impact transnationally—a performance, in large part, compris-
ing organization building, network creation, and community integra-
tion. Th e deployment of an organizational architecture is a necessary 
precondition for the infl uence of ideas. Only through the careful work of 
reconstructing lines of funding, organizing, network building, and infl u-
ence framing can we understand the globalization of neoliberalism as a 
coherent body of thought and of self-conscious policy activism.
77  H. Hwang and W. Powell, “Th e Rationalization of Charity: Th e Infl uences of 
Professionalism in the Non-Profi t Sector,” Administrative Science Quarterly 54, no. 2 
(2009). F. Maier, M. Meyer, and M. Steinbereithner, “Nonprofi t Organizations Becoming 
Business-Like: A Systematic Review,” Nonprofi t and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 45 (2016).
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Think Tank Networks of German 
Neoliberalism: Power Structures 
in Economics and Economic 
Policies in Postwar Germany
Stephan Pühringer
Economics itself (that is the subject as it is taught in universities and 
evening classes and pronounced upon in leading articles) has always 
been partly a vehicle for the ruling ideology of each period as well as 
partly a method of scientifi c investigation.
Joan Robinson1
Th e debate about the political and social impact of “economic 
imaginaries”2 is not a new one. As early as 1936 John Maynard Keynes 
pointed out that “the ideas of economists and political philosophers . . . 
are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is 
ruled by little else.”3 F. A. Hayek, one of Keynes’s early opponents, 
added the caveat that “economists have this great infl uence only in the 
long run and indirectly.”4 Many scholars have explored the political 
impact of economic ideas and specifi c schools of economic thought 
particularly in times of politico-economic crisis. Peter Hall emphasizes 
1  Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (London: Watts, 1962), 7.
2  Bob Jessop, “Cultural Political Economy and Critical Policy Studies,” Critical 
Policy Studies 3, no. 3–4 (2010); Bob Jessop, “Recovered Imaginaries, Imagined 
Recoveries: A Cultural Political Economy of Crisis Construals and Crisis-Management 
in the North Atlantic Financial Crisis,” in Before and Beyond the Global Economic 
Crisis: Economics, Politics and Settlement, ed. Mats Benner (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013).
3  John Maynard Keynes, Th e General Th eory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(London: Macmillan, 1936), 383. 
4  F. A. Hayek, Economic Freedom (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 37.
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the impact of economic ideas as a “guiding principle” for politics, and 
others stress the role of actors or institutions in the process of the trans-
mission of economic ideas into politics.5
Questions about the political and social infl uence of economics 
became more pointed in the aft ermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) of 2007–8. On the level of economic policy, against the political 
background of the Cold War and then especially aft er the breakdown of 
Keynesian economics in the 1970s, the reference to the economic imagi-
naries of free markets and the free market mechanism served as the 
theoretical frame for promoting neoliberal policies of deregulation, 
privatization, and austerity. Although the GFC could have induced a 
paradigm shift  in the fi eld of economic policy, the dominance of neolib-
eral policies does not seem to be contested. Colin Crouch has described 
this persistence as the “strange non-death of neoliberalism,” while Mark 
Blyth has warned of the social and societal consequences of austerity 
policies.6
Th ere has been special attention paid to the role of Germany in the 
context of the European crisis. Some scholars have focused on the (new) 
hegemonic position of Germany as the central actor in European 
economic crisis policies—with, e.g., the Fiscal Compact, the eurozone 
crisis or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—due to its economic 
power and its status as principal creditor.7 Others have suggested that 
the European post-crisis economic policies refl ect a “return of ordolib-
eralism” or even an “ordoliberal transformation” or “ordoliberalization 
of Europe.”8 Some observers have detected the “long shadow of 
5  Peter A. Hall, ed., Th e Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Sebastiaan Princen and Femke 
van Esch, “Paradigm Formation and Paradigm Change in the EU’s Stability and Growth 
Pact,” European Political Science Review 8, no.  03 (2016). Daniel Hirschman and 
Elizabeth P. Berman, “Do Economists Make Policies? On the Political Eff ects of 
Economics,” Socio-Economic Review 12, no. 4 (2014).
6  Colin Crouch, Th e Strange Non-death of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); 
Mark Blyth, Austerity: Th e History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013).
7  Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, “Germany as the EU’s Reluctant 
Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 20, no. 10 (2013).
8  Th omas Biebricher, “Th e Return of Ordoliberalism in Europe: Notes on a Research 
Agenda,” i-lex. Scienze Giuridiche, Scienze Cognitive e Intelligenza artifi ciale Rivista 
quadrimestrale, on-line: www.i-lex.it, no.  21 (2014); Brigitte Young, “German 
Ordoliberalism as Agenda Setter for the Euro Crisis: Myth Trumps Reality,” Journal of 
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ordoliberalism” in German economic policies, claiming that especially 
in the fi eld of macroeconomic policy ordoliberalism can be perceived as 
the “basis of German economic thinking.”9 Such claims have been 
contested by diff erent scholars (Wigger, etc.), inter alia pointing to the 
limits of an exclusive focus on the Freiburg School of ordoliberals in 
German neoliberalism.
Yet little work has been done to establish what the networks of ordo-
liberalism—or, more precisely, German neoliberalism—have been since 
1945 and what role they played in German economic policy. Th is chap-
ter provides evidence that German neoliberal thought had a persistent 
and strong impact on German economic policy in the postwar period 
up to the fi nancial and economic crisis policies of 2008 and aft er. It 
begins with a refl ection on German neoliberalism as a central compo-
nent in the common neoliberal thought collective, before introducing 
the category of a “performative footprint of economists” (PFP) in order 
to operationalize the “external,” non-academic infl uence of economists. 
It then highlights the close connections of ordoliberal economists with 
politics in relation to three important phases, or turning points, in 
German politico-economic history. Th e fi nal section uses the PFP meth-
odology to show the persistent dominance of German neoliberalism in 
German economic policy aft er World War II compared to Keynesian 
networks.
Ordoliberalism as Part of the Neoliberal Thought Collective
Th e debate about a possible revival of ordoliberalism aft er the crisis 
requires defi ning it against what is oft en called “American neoliberal-
ism,” i.e. the Chicago School of Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, and 
others associated with today’s mainstream economic approach of 
Chicago-style neoclassical economics, in particular. Foucault set the 
stage by arguing for a “political rationality” of ordoliberalism distinct 
Contemporary European Studies 22, no. 3 (2014); Th omas Biebricher, “Europe and the 
Political Philosophy of Neoliberalism: Critical Exchange on Neoliberalism and Europe,” 
Contemporary Political Th eory 12, no. 4 (2013).
9  Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike Guérot, “Th e Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism: 
Germany’s Approach to the Euro Crisis,” European Council on Foreign Relations Policy 
Brief, 2012: 2.
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from American neoliberalism.10 Nevertheless, American neoliberalism 
and German ordoliberalism are both based on a free market ideology, 
where the functionality of the free market mechanism depends on 
processes of political engineering.11 In 1982, Ver Eecke had already 
used the term neoliberalism to describe both German ordoliberalism 
and American monetarism.12 Due to their similar preference for a 
strong state, whose important but exclusive task is the establishment 
and reestablishment of market mechanisms or the market economy, 
Th omasberger labeled the neoliberal project “planning for the market.”13
Th e ambivalent role of the state in the ordoliberal version of neolib-
eralism is present in founding thinker Walter Eucken’s defi nition of the 
principles of economic policy. Th e fi rst principle, Eucken argues, is that 
“the policy of the state should be focused on dissolving power groups or 
at limiting their functioning.” Th e second principle dictates that “the 
politico-economic activity of the state should focus on the regulation of 
the economy, not on the guidance of the economic process.”14 Whereas 
the fi rst principle stresses the need for a strong state for political engi-
neering (Ordnungspolitik), the second (regarding Prozesspolitik) stresses 
avoiding interventionist policies against the market mechanism. 
Ordoliberalism advocated infl uencing the rules of the game, not the 
process.
Although there are some diff erences between German ordoliberal-
ism and American neoliberalism, especially concerning their policy 
implications, both can be assigned to a common neoliberal thought 
collective in light of the participation of fi gures from both schools of 
thought in the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) founded in 1947.15 Mirowski 
10  Biebricher, “Th e Return of Ordoliberalism in Europe.”
11  Werner Bonefeld, “Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism,” 
New Political Economy 17, no. 5 (2012); Walter O. Ötsch, Stephan Pühringer, and Katrin 
Hirte, Netzwerke des Marktes: Ordoliberalismus als Politische Ökonomie (Wiesbaden: 
Springer VS, 2017).
12  Wilfried v. Eecke, “Ethics in Economics: From Classical Economics to 
Neo-liberalism,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 9, no. 2 (1982). 
13  See Claus Th omasberger, “ ‘Planung für den Markt’ versus ‘Planung für die 
Freiheit’: Zu den stillschweigenden Voraussetzungen des Neoliberalismus,” in Der 
neoliberale Markt-Diskurs: Ursprünge, Geschichte, Wirkungen, ed. Walter O. Ötsch and 
Claus Th omasberger, (Marburg: Metropolis-Verl., 2009).
14  Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaft spolitik (Bern: Francke, 1952), 334, 
translation in Blyth, Austerity, 143.
15  Philip Mirowski, “Th e Political Movement that Dared not Speak its own Name: 
Th e Neoliberal Th ought Collective Under Erasure,” Institute for New Economic Th inking 
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argues that in the initial era of the neoliberal thought collective in the 
1940s ordoliberalism was one of the three important strands, alongside 
Austrian economics and Chicago School neoclassical economics. He 
further points out that the neoliberal thought collective can be under-
stood in analogy to a Russian doll, with the MPS at its center and a set of 
heterogeneous institutions and think tanks around it. Th e MPS and its 
annual meetings off ered a protected place for intellectual exchange and 
confrontation between scholars from these diff erent strands of neolib-
eral thought.
Th is characterization is shared by participants themselves. MPS 
member Joachim Starbatty, a central actor in German neoliberal 
networks and head of the think tank Aktionsgemeinschaft  Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft , defi ned the MPS as the “organizational expression of 
neoliberalism” (“der organisatorische Ausdruck”).16 He argues further 
that ordoliberalism should be seen as the “German variety of neoliberal-
ism.” With this self-declaration by one of Germany’s most prominent 
ordoliberals in mind, it is safe to defi ne a “network of German neoliber-
alism” organized in think tanks and institutions around the MPS. In 
what follows, I defi ne the “German neoliberal network” as comprised of 
think tanks or institutions in which at least one of the founding or lead-
ing members is also a member of the MPS.17
Th e second main justifi cation for interpreting ordoliberalism as an 
integral part of the neoliberal thought collective is based on the strong 
personal connections of main ordoliberal scholars with leading neolib-
eral thinkers, and even more explicitly on the role of Friedrich Hayek as 
a fi gure linking several sites of neoliberal thought. Hayek was the leading 
scholar of the third generation of the Austrian School of Economics, the 
Working Paper Series, no. 23 (2014); Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds, Th e Road 
from Mont Pèlerin: Th e Making of the Neoliberal Th ought Collective (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). I will use the defi nition of the neoliberal thought 
collective off ered by Mirowski “to refer to this multilevel, multiphase, multisector 
approach to the building of political capacity to incubate, critique, and promulgate 
ideas.” Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism 
Survived the Financial Meltdown (London: Verso, 2013), 44.
16  Joachim Starbatty, “Ordoliberalismus,” in Geschichte der Nationalökonomie, ed. 
Otmar Issing (Munich: Vahlen, 1994), 251.
17  See Dieter Plehwe and Bernhard Walpen, “Between Network and Complex 
Organization: Th e Making of Neoliberal Knowledge and Hegemony,” in Neoliberal 
Hegemony: A Global Critique, ed. Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen, and Gisela 
Neunhöff er (London: Routledge, 2006).
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main opponent of John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s at the London 
School of Economics (along with founding MPS member Lionel 
Robbins), and a faculty member at the University of Chicago from 1948 
to 1962. He also had close connections with ordoliberals (and later also 
with MPS members) such as Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke, and 
Alexander Rüstow already in the 1930s.18 In 1962 Hayek was appointed 
professor of economics at the University of Freiburg and became head of 
the Walter Eucken Institute. Furthermore, he contributed continuously 
to ordoliberal publications and was a founding editor of the ordoliberal 
journal Ordo. In the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1960, Henry 
Oliver stated that “in a sense he [Hayek] serves as their [the ordoliberals] 
leading political theorist.”19 In a similar vein Knut Borchardt stresses the 
similarities between ordoliberal scholars and Hayek, especially in their 
emphasis on the role of law, the institutional framework, and the common 
political will to establish and preserve capitalism.20 No less a fi gure than 
Alfred Müller-Armack, one of the most politically active ordoliberal 
scholars in Germany from the 1950s to the 1970s, who also coined the 
term “social market economy,” denoted Hayek, together with Eucken, 
Franz Böhm, Röpke, and Rüstow, as a pioneer of the ordoliberal “theory 
of economic order” (Wirtschaft sordnungstheorie).21
Nevertheless, many ordoliberal scholars stress the heterogeneity of 
diff erent strands of the neoliberal thought collective or even of ordolib-
eralism itself,22 which can, perhaps, be explained by the rather negative 
image of American “deregulatory” neoliberalism in European political 
debates. Although many of the European crisis policies signify ordolib-
eral conceptions, there are those (e.g. Feld et al.) who stress that the 
18  Ralf Ptak, Vom Ordoliberalismus zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft : Stationen des 
Neoliberalismus in Deutschland (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2004); Ekkehard A. 
Köhler and Stefan Kolev, “Th e Conjoint Quest for a Liberal Positive Program: ‘Old 
Chicago,’ Freiburg and Hayek,” HWWI Research Paper, no. 109 (2011); Stefan Kolev, Nils 
Goldschmidt, and Jan-Otmar Hesse, “Walter Eucken’s Role in the Early History of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society,” Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, no. 02 
(2014).
19  Henry Oliver, “German Neoliberalism,” Th e Quarterly Journal of Economics 74, 
no. 1 (1960): 119.
20  See Knut Borchardt, “Die Konzeption der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft  in heutiger 
Sicht,” in Zukunft sprobleme der sozialen Marktwirtschaft , ed. Otmar Issing 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981).
21  Ptak, Ordoliberalismus.
22  See, e.g., Viktor Vanberg, “Th e Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and 
Ordoliberalism,” Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, no. 11 (2004).
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infl uence of ordoliberal thought is oft en overestimated and that the poli-
cies implemented in the aft ermath of the 2007–8 crisis should, instead, 
be characterized as “pragmatic.” However, while European measures to 
stabilize the European Currency Union certainly have not followed an 
orthodox ordoliberal script one can still observe a kind of metamorpho-
sis of hegemonic neoliberal economic imaginaries, indicating a shift  
inside the neoliberal thought collective from American deregulatory 
neoliberalism, especially in the context of fi nancial markets, to more 
restrained markets in an ordoliberal framework.23 As Jamie Peck put it, 
the ordoliberal political project seems to be “back in favour.”24
While the diagnosis of a revival or a comeback of ordoliberalism or 
German neoliberalism in economic policy might hold in the European 
or maybe even the international context, in the next section I will argue 
that it is misleading to claim such a “return thesis” for Germany. 
Although ordoliberalism as an independent economic theory might, in 
fact, have been “marginalized and thus forgotten,”25 the infrastructures 
of German neoliberalism, such as politico-economic think tanks, politi-
cal institutions, and economic research institutes, remained an infl uen-
tial vehicle for the discursive hegemony of German neoliberalism in 
German economic policies.
The Performative Footprint as a Measurement 
of the External Infl uence of Economists
Many of the empirical fi ndings presented in the next two sections stem 
from a research project on the history of German economics aft er World 
War II, supported by the Hans-Böckler-Foundation.26 In this project we 
analyzed the evolution of economics in Germany on two levels. First, we 
compiled a database of about 800 professors of economics at German 
universities from 1954 to 1994. Th e database consisted of biographical 
23  See Biebricher, “Europe and the Political Philosophy of Neoliberalism.”
24  Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 275.
25  Biebricher, “Europe and the Political Philosophy of Neoliberalism.”
26  Th ese results have partly been published in Ötsch et al., Netzwerke des Marktes 
and Stephan Pühringer, “Th e success story of ordoliberalism as guiding principle of 
German economic policy,” in Ordoliberalism. Law and the rule of economics, ed. Josef 
Hien, Christian Joerges (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018).
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details of the economists, particularly about their academic career 
trajectories as well as their academic background, i.e. place, date, and 
supervisors of their doctoral thesis and professorial thesis or habilita-
tion (their “second book”). We also researched other academic and 
external activities of the economists, in particular their policy involve-
ment as political actors or advisors or their memberships in economic 
think tanks. Second, we developed the measure of a “Performative 
Footprint” (PFP) for these 800 economists, as a means to measure the 
potential impact of economists or specifi c economic thought collectives 
on politics and society, thereby going far beyond the narrow range of 
academic rankings. Th e potential infl uence of economists is presented 
in fi ve categories of internal and external infl uence. Whereas the fi rst 
two (academic productivity and academic re-productivity) focus on 
inner-academic infl uence, the other three (political advice, political 
actor, and public presence) take into account the political and societal 
effi  cacy of “economic imaginaries.” In a further step, a social network 
analysis approach was applied in order to highlight personal and insti-
tutional relations in a politico-economic framing, focusing especially on 
the role of think tanks.
Th e three external infl uence coeffi  cients relevant for this chapter are 
the media coeffi  cient, the political actor coeffi  cient and the political 
advice coeffi  cient. Each combines several variables of potential infl u-
ence in its specifi c fi elds. Th e media coeffi  cient measures the presence 
of economists (hits for each person) in leading German newspapers 
and magazines over the whole period analyzed. Th e media coeffi  cient 
builds on a weighted average of hits per person in electronic archives, 
by construing individual reference archives in order to control for 
diff erent academic life spans. Th e political actor coeffi  cient operation-
alizes positions in political institutions (Bundesbank, ministries, 
Bundestag, political parties, monopoly commission), according to the 
specifi c position and the length of time it is occupied, using a classifi ca-
tion scheme (see appendix). Th e political advice coeffi  cient operation-
alizes positions in economic policy advice institutions like the German 
Council of Economic Experts (GCEE), the scientifi c advisory boards of 
the German ministries of fi nance and economics, and economic 
research institutes.
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History of German Neoliberalism in 
Economic Think Tank Networks
Th e roots of German neoliberalism date back to the Freiburg School, built 
around Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, and Leonhard Miksch in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke, two German 
economists in close personal contact with Eucken.27 At the level of 
economic theory, the central aim of these early ordoliberal scholars was to 
attack the “ruins of the German Historical School,”28 which manifested in 
the idea of the foundation of the “Th eoretical Club of Ricardians.” Rüstow 
suggested also inviting Austrian economists such as Hayek, Haberler, 
Machlup, and Mises into this club.29 Beyond the personal contacts of 
ordoliberals with Hayek and later proponents of the Chicago School, 
Köhler and Kolev also stress the similarities in the research agendas 
concerning monetary policy in Freiburg and Chicago in the 1930s, 
particularly in the work of Eucken’s pupils Friedrich Lutz and Henry 
Simons, teacher of Milton Friedman and progenitor of the Chicago School 
of Economics.30 Eucken furthermore played a central role in the founda-
tion of the MPS, as evidenced in the fact that Hayek delegated the right to 
propose German members for the MPS to Eucken.31
Infrastructures of German Neoliberalism in 
the Early Federal Republic of Germany
Although this academic exchange was interrupted in 1933 with the Nazi 
takeover, which forced Röpke and Rüstow to emigrate to Turkey, both 
27  Jan-Otmar Hesse, Wirtschaft  als Wissenschaft : Die Volkswirtschaft slehre in der 
frühen Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2010); Hauke Janssen, 
Milton Friedman und die “monetaristische Revolution” in Deutschland (Marburg: 
Metropolis-Verl., 2006).
28  Rüstow in a letter to Eucken dated 24.1.1927, cited in Janssen, Friedman, p. 104.
29  Hayek retrospectively remarked that this group of Ricardians was the only active 
and infl uential circle of economists fi ghting for a “free economy” before 1933. F. A. 
Hayek, “Die Wiederentdeckung der Freiheit—Persönliche Erinnerungen,” in 
Produktivität, Eigenverantwortung, Beschäft igung:  Für eine wirtschaft spolitische 
Vorwärtsstrategie, ed. VDM 31 (Cologne: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1983), 12.
30  Köhler and Kolev, “Th e Conjoint Quest.”
31  Kolev et al., “Walter Eucken,” 6; for a detailed analysis of early German neoliberal 
economists see Max Bank, “Stunde der Neoliberalen? Politikberatung und 
Wirtschaft spolitik in der Ära Adenauer,” PhD Diss, University of Cologne, 2013.
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the university of Freiburg and the circle around Eucken in particular 
remained core centers of economic research in Germany.32
Th e strong academic infl uence was manifested in the successful academic 
reproduction of the Freiburg School and especially of Eucken’s students. 
Figure 11.1 shows German professors of economics whose doctoral
theses and/or habilitation theses were supervised by Eucken. Although
32  Walter O. Ötsch and Stephan Pühringer, “Marktradikalismus als Politische 
Ökonomie,” ICAE Working Paper Series, no. 38 (2015).
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Eucken died rather young at the age of fi ft y-nine, during a research visit 
at the LSE (to which he had been invited by Hayek), he was one of the 
most successful “producers of pupils” in the history of German econom-
ics.33 Aft er the successful reproduction of the fi rst generation of the 
Freiburg School (Eucken supervised at least eleven pupils who were 
later to become professors of economics at German universities), 
Eucken’s pupils (in particular, Bernhard Pfi ster, Karl Paul Hensel, and 
Fritz Walter Meyer, all of whom later became members of the MPS) 
proved to be very successful academic supervisors, too. Beside the 
academic infl uence on the course of German economic history in and 
immediately aft er World War II, ordoliberal economists were continu-
ously engaged in giving policy advice to the Nazi regime but were also, 
especially in the 1940s, in contact with the “conservative opposition” to 
that regime.34 During the 1940s the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft  Erwin von 
Beckerath” served as a meeting point for ordoliberals, their main objec-
tive being to discuss and develop the economic order for postwar 
Germany.
Th e engagement of German neoliberal economists in policy advice 
continued aft er the capitulation of Germany in 1945 and resulted in a 
strong dominance of ordoliberal economists in the two very infl uential 
scientifi c advisory boards of the ministries of fi nance and economics35 
(see Figure 11.2), as well as in the central role of Ludwig Erhard in the 
adoption of the “currency reform,” which was later discursively framed 
as the starting point for the German economic miracle.36
In addition to having a direct infl uence on German postwar politics, 
ordoliberal economists were closely connected to the international 
networks of the neoliberal thought collective. Four of Eucken’s advisees
33  Stephan Pühringer, “Th e Success Story of Ordoliberalism as Guiding Principle 
of German Economic Policy,” in Ordoliberalism: Law and the Rule of Economics, ed. Josef 
Hien and Christian Joerges (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018).
34  See Ptak, Ordoliberalismus; Nils Goldschmidt, ed., Wirtschaft , Politik und 
Freiheit: Freiburger Wissenschaft ler und der Widerstand (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005); 
Daniela Rüther, “Freiburger Nationalökonomen auf dem Weg in den Widerstand,” 
Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen, no. 10 (2003).
35  Th e Keynesian economist Erich Schneider even labeled the infl uence of German 
neoliberals like Wilhelm Röpke during the 1950s and early 1960s a “dictatorship of the 
liberals.” Hesse, Wirtschaft  als Wissenschaft , 126.
36  See Bank, “Stunde der Neoliberalen?,” for a detailed analysis, particularly of the 
role of German neoliberals on the advisory board of the ministry of economics. 
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(Pfi ster, Maier, Hensel, and Lutz) were early members of the MPS 
already in the 1940s, and seven of the ten advisees indicated in Figure 
11.1 later became members of the MPS. Moreover, up to the third and 
fourth generation aft er Eucken one can fi nd core proponents of the 
German neoliberal network, including Hans Willgerodt, Manfred J. M. 
Neumann, Joachim Starbatty, and Peter Oberender.
Rather than subsuming the diff erent groups of German neoliberals 
under one Freiburg School, we can follow Ptak who speaks of a 
confl uence of three diff erent strands of thought with a shared politi-
cal will: fi rst, the Freiburg School with Eucken, Böhm, and Miksch; 
second, the “sociological wing” of ordoliberalism with Rüstow and 
Röpke; and third, a group of practitioners consisting of Ludwig 
Erhard and the longstanding editor of the newspaper Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Erich Welter. Alfred Müller-Armack could be 
ascribed to the second and third strands of ordoliberalism.37 Th e 
37  Ptak, Ordoliberalismus, 17. Kolev distinguishes between the ordoliberalism of 
the Freiburg School and Rüstow and Röpke, and the “German neoliberalism” of Müller-
Armack and Erhard: Stefan Kolev, “F. A. Hayek as an Ordo-liberal,” HWWI Research 
Paper, no. 5 (2010). Hesse doubts that there is one homogeneous ordoliberal school: 
Jan-Otmar Hesse, “Der Mensch des Unternehmens und der Produktion. Foucaults Sicht 
auf den Ordoliberalismus und die ‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft ’,” Studies in Contemporary 
History, no. 3 (2006).
Figure 11.2 Continuity of German Neoliberal Networks After World War II
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personal and institutional relations of Walter Eucken and other early 
German neoliberals show that German neoliberalism had a central 
presence in the fi eld of economic policy-making and policy advice, 
and the economics discipline itself, in the early Federal Republic of 
Germany.
Infrastructures of German Neoliberalism 
During the Monetarist Turn in Germany
A second episode in German economic history indicating the contin-
uous political influence of economists organized around the infra-
structure of German neoliberalism was the period of the “monetarist 
turn” in the early 1970s after a short period of “German Keynesianism” 
in the late 1960s.38 Janssen analyzed the “counter-revolution in 
German monetary theory”—i.e. the theoretical debate among 
German economists about Milton Friedman’s monetarist theory—
and found that fifteen, mainly young, German economists intro-
duced monetarism into German economics. He concluded that “the 
revolt of the thirty-somethings,” especially from 1970 to 1976, initi-
ated the monetarist anti-Keynesian revolution in German econom-
ics.39 This initiative resulted in the monetarist turn of the German 
Bundesbank, which was the first central bank worldwide to intro-
duce monetarist money supply targeting as suggested by Friedman.40 
Figure 11.3 shows the numerous connections of economists active in
38  Harald Hagemann, “Ordoliberalism, the Social Market Economy, and 
Keynesianism: Germany After 1945,” in Liberalism and the Welfare State: Economists 
and Arguments for the Welfare State, ed. Roger Backhouse, Bradley W. Bateman, 
Tamotsu Nishizawa, and Dieter Plehwe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
The era of “German Keynesianism” was short; the “brief Keynesian experiment” 
ended in 1972 with the resignation of Schiller as minister of economics and 
finance. See Jeremy Leaman, The Political Economy of Germany under Chancellors 
Kohl and Schröder: Decline of the German Model? (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2009), 7.
39  For details see Karl Brunner, ed., Proceedings of the First Konstanzer Seminar on 
Monetary Th eory and Monetary Policy (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1972). 
40  See, e.g., Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paqué, and Holger Schmieding, eds, 
Th e Fading Miracle: Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Rudolf Richter, Deutsche Geldpolitik 1948–1998 
im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen wissenschaft lichen Diskussion (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1999).
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the monetarist revolution to the German neoliberal thought 
collective.41
Th e empirical result partly contradicts Feld et al., who claim that 
there is no common ground between monetarism and ordoliberalism.42 
At least in the common infrastructure of German neoliberalism, there 
are connections on both personal and institutional levels.
Th e persistence of the infl uence of economists organized around the 
infrastructure of German neoliberalism can, furthermore, be empiri-
cally shown in terms of academic advisor-advisee relationships. As indi-
cated in Figure 11.4, there are many connections between the protago-
nists of the monetarist turn (as advisees) and the core early German 
neoliberal economists (as academic advisors), such as Eucken, Hensel, 
Welter, and Müller-Armack.
41  Th e seven actors not plotted in Figure 11.3—and thus according to our 
methodological approach not part of the German neoliberal network organized around 
think tanks and institutions—are Volbert Alexander, Emil-Maria Claassen, Ernst Dürr, 
Werner Ehrlicher, Hans-Edi Loef, Jürgen Siebke, and Manfred Willms.
42  Lars P. Feld, Ekkehard A. Köhler, and Daniel Nientiedt. “Ordoliberalism, 
Pragmatism and the Eurozone Crisis: How the German Tradition Shaped Economic 
Policy in Europe,” CESifo Working Paper, no. 5368 (2015).
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Alongside the group of fi ft een “monetarist rebels,” the monetarist 
turn of the Bundesbank was also supported by the German Council of 
Economic Experts (GCEE), which argued similarly for a Friedman-
oriented money supply target in its annual economic report.43 Aft er a 
paradigm shift  in the GCEE from a Keynesian to a supply-oriented 
policy in the early 1970s44—initiated mainly by MPS member Herbert 
43  Janssen, Friedman; GCEE, Jahresgutachten:  Mut zur Stabilisierung (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1973).
44  Schmelzer even doubts whether there was a Keynesian dominance in the GCEE. 
Matthias Schmelzer, Freiheit für Wechselkurse und Kapital: Die Ursprünge neoliberaler 
Währungspolitik und die Mont Pèlerin Society (Marburg: Metropolis-Verl., 2010), 110.
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Giersch and later his advisee Gerhard Fels in the run-up to the monetar-
ist turn of the Bundesbank—at least three out of fi ve members of the 
GCEE were organized in German neoliberal networks (Norbert Kloten, 
Olaf Sievert, and Armin Gutowski).
Th e infl uence of German neoliberalism in the Bundesbank and later 
also in the ECB has manifested itself at both a theoretical and a personal 
level over several decades.45 Alesina and Grilli, for instance, stress that 
“the institutional design of the ECB is more similar to that of the 
Bundesbank than to any other central bank of the Eurozone.”46 
Furthermore, central actors in the Bundesbank, e.g. Otmar Issing, Hans 
Tietmeyer, Axel Weber, and Jens Weidmann, are linked to the network 
of German neoliberalism through both their academic background and 
their membership in neoliberal think tanks. At a speech at the Euro 
Finance Week in Frankfurt, Jürgen Stark, the former president of the 
Bundesbank and ECB executive board member stressed that the work of 
Eucken had been “a constant source of inspiration throughout my 
career.”47
The Infl uence of German Neoliberalism 
During the Neoliberal Turn
A third episode in German economic history in which the influence 
of economists organized around the infrastructures of German 
neoliberalism is even more clear is in the period of the “neoliberal 
turn” in Germany in the early 1980s.48 Leaman, for instance, argues 
that despite several indicators of continuity, “1982 can still be seen as 
a very significant marker in the history of Germany’s political econ-
omy . . . because it ushered in a period in which there was a gradual 
45  Richter, Deutsche Geldpolitik.
46  Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, Th e European Central Bank: Reshaping 
Monetary Politics in Europe (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1991), 13.
47  Jürgen Stark, “Monetary, Fiscal and Financial Stability in Europe: Speech at the 
11th Euro Finance Week in Frankfurt, 18 November 2008,” ecb.europa.eu.
48  Th e term might be misleading when compared to the “neoliberal turn” in the US 
or the UK; see Martin Werding, “Gab es eine neoliberale Wende? Wirtschaft  und 
Wirtschaft spolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ab Mitte der 1970er Jahre,” 
Vierteljahrsheft e für Zeitgeschichte 56 (2008). Nevertheless market-oriented social and 
economic policies also gained importance in Germany in the 1980s.
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but inexorable shift in the quality of economic policy decisions, the 
ideological paradigm within which they were consistently framed 
and the global context within which national, regional and global 
institutions operated.”49 In 1981, economics minister Otto Graf 
Lambsdorff (Free Democratic Party, FDP) published a seminal paper 
entitled “Manifesto of the Market Economy: Concept for a Policy to 
Overcome Weak Growth Performance and Reduce Unemployment”—
the so-called Lambsdorff Paper—where he stressed that the govern-
ment interfered too much in the free market and suggested radical 
labor market reforms, strict budget consolidation, and deregulation 
policies.
Alongside Lambsdorff , Otto Schlecht—who was already in the minis-
try of economics under Erhard and Tietmeyer, and would later become 
president of the Bundesbank and one of the main initiators of the 
neoliberal advocacy think tank Initiative for New Social Market 
Economy (INSM) in 200050—was responsible for the paper. Together 
with Tietmeyer he authored the memorandum for Otto Graf Lambsdorff . 
Th e Lambsdorff  Paper marked the end of the social-liberal coalition in 
Germany and especially of the (Keynesian) economic concept of macro-
economic management (Globalsteuerung). It can therefore be inter-
preted as inaugurating a politico-economic paradigm shift . From the 
perspective of economic policy advice, the paper can be seen in the 
tradition of the GCCE annual report of 1973/74, indicating a monetarist 
turn, and the 1976/77 report, arguing for a supply-side-orientation of 
economic policy.51
Th e common politico-economic objective of these reform documents 
refl ects the institutional and personal connections of the members of 
the Kronberger Kreis think tank. Th e Kronberger Kreis was founded in 
December 1981 as scientifi c advisory board to the Frankfurter Institut 
49  Leaman, Th e Political Economy of Germany, 5.
50  See, for instance, Christoph Butterwegge, “Rechfertigung, Maßnahmen und 
Folgen einer neoliberalen (Sozial-)Politik,” in Kritik des Neoliberalismus, ed. 
Christoph Butterwegge, Bettina Lösch, and Ralf Ptak (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 135–213; Rudolf Speth, Die politischen Strategien der 
Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft 96 (Dusseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 
2004).
51  Lars P. Feld, “Zur Bedeutung des Manifests der Marktwirtschaft  oder: Das 
Lambsdorff -Papier im 31. Jahr,” Zeitschrift  für Wirtschaft spolitik 62, no. 3 (2013); GCEE, 
Vierzig Jahre Sachverständigenrat: 1963–2003 (Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2003).
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(later, Stift ung Marktwirtschaft ) by the economist and editor of the 
magazine Wirtschaft swoche, Wolfram Engels, and the entrepreneur 
Ludwig Eckes. Th e Kronberger Kreis was organized on the model of a 
modern American think tank with the objective of infl uencing public 
opinion and politico-economic discourse through “organized events, 
publications, individual policy advice, concrete actions as well as formu-
lated legislative texts.”52 Th e initial goal of the Kronberger Kreis was to 
develop a market-oriented politico-economic program for the next 
Bundestag elections in 1984. Aft er the publication of the Lambsdorff  
Paper and the end of the social-liberal coalition—later labeled the “ordo-
political awakening of Germany” by executive board member of the 
Stift ung Marktwirtschaft , Michael Eilfort—the Stift ung Marktwirtschaft  
and the Kronberger Kreis successfully infl uenced the public debate with 
position papers and short statements.53
Over the next decades, under both Chancellors Helmut Kohl and 
Gerhard Schröder, members of the Kronberger Kreis54 held core posi-
tions in or had close ties to central German economic policy institu-
tions, e.g. the ministry of economics (Eekhoff ), the Bundesbank (Issing, 
Neumann), governmental commissions (Möschel, Donges, 
Raff elhüschen), and the monopoly commission (Möschel, von 
Weizsäcker, Hellwig, Haucap). Moreover, members of the Kronberger 
Kreis were very active as economic policy advisors in the GCEE as well 
as in the scientifi c advisory boards of the ministries of fi nance and 
economics. Referring to the multi-dimensional political and public 
infl uence of these economists (see also the PFP-coeffi  cients in Table 
11.1), as well as their dense connections in the network of German 
neoliberalism, Ptak describes the Kronberger Kreis as “an infl uential 
market-radical elite network.”55
52  Stift ung Marktwirtschaft , “Mehr Mut zum Markt  . . .,” Geo.net IT GmbH, 
stift ung-marktwirtschaft .de.
53  Michael Eilfort, “Begüßung,” in 25 JAHRE Stift ung Marktwirtschaft  und 
Kronberger Kreis, ed. Stift ung Marktwirtschaft  (Berlin, 2007), 9.
54  Most members of the Kronberger Kreis are economists; some are also legal 
scholars, which is another similarity to the early Freiburg School.
55  Ralf Ptak, “Grundlagen des Neoliberalismus,” in Butterwegge et al., Kritik des 
Neoliberalismus, 79.
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Wolfgang Franz 1.02 3.60 0.00 0.48 0.83
Olaf Sievert 0.42 3.54 1.17    
Armin Gutowski 0.45 1.75 0.00    
Juergen Donges 0.23 1.25 0.00 0.12  
Carl Christian von 
Weizsäcker
0.52 0.56 3.50   0.52
Gerhard Fels 0.28 0.54 0.00   0.36
Otmar Issing 1.02 0.51 3.50 2.35 0.80
Martin Hellwig 0.22 0.28 4.21   1.15
Wolfgang Stützel 0.51 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.40
Wolfram Engels 0.71 0.00 0.00    
Walter Hamm 0.11 0.00 0.00    
Hans Willgerodt 0.09 0.00 0.00   0.36
An analysis of the Performative Footprint (PFP) of the Kronberger Kreis 
economists supplies further empirical evidence for the think tank’s major 
impact on the course of German economic policy during the last decades. Th e 
immediate infl uence of the Kronberger Kreis, which also indicates the close 
ideological connection between the intention of the Lambsdorff  Paper and the 
think tank, is refl ected in a quote from Otto Lambsdorff ’s speech on the occa-
sion of the 25th anniversary of its foundation: “I think I simply copied from 
the Kronberger Kreis; this was the easiest way because it was always right.”57
The Long Shadow of German Neoliberalism in Economics
In order to highlight the central position of institutions like the 
Kronberger Kreis among politically and publicly infl uential economists, 
I undertook further social network analysis of its members as well as 
members of other institutions of the German neoliberal thought collec-
tive. Th is was based on an institutional analysis of the multiple positions 
occupied by economists in institutions and think tanks (e.g. as founder, 
active member, participant in the advisory board or in an expert
56  Due to limitations of data sources the PFP is only calculated for economists who 
were already professors at German universities by 1996. For the social network analysis 
all members of the Kronberger Kreis are included.
57  Otto G. Lambsdorff , in 25 JAHRE Stift ung Marktwirtschaft  und Kronberger Kreis, 
37–45.
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committee). I also searched for economists with positions in Keynesian, 
union-linked, or economic-alternative think tanks or institutions in 
order to highlight a potential countervailing power of economists. 
While the procedure for assigning institutions to the German neoliberal 
thought collective is standardized (essentially, involving a connection to 
the MPS58), the defi nition of a “Keynesian-Alternative thought collec-
tive” is based on a broad range of politico-economic institutions.
Th e thesis of an infrastructural continuity of German neoliberalism 
among economists can be proven in three steps. First, twenty-two econ-
omists with a high or medium media coeffi  cient score in their think-
tank networks. Twelve out of those twenty-two (55 percent) are linked 
via the network of German neoliberalism, with the MPS (fi ve connec-
tions) and the Kronberger Kreis and the Hayek-Stift ung/Gesellschaft  
(the Hayek Foundation or Society) (each with three connections) hold-
ing central positions. In contrast, one economist with a medium media 
coeffi  cient score is connected to the union-linked Böckler Foundation, 
which in contrast to the neoliberal thought collective could be termed a 
Keynesian-Alternative thought collective.
58  See also Plehwe and Walpen, “Between Network and Complex Organization.”
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Second, among the forty economists with a high or medium policy 
advice coeffi  cient, eleven economists (28 percent) are connected via a 
network of German neoliberalism, and again only one economist is 
connected to a Keynesian thought collective. In the network of infl uen-
tial policy advisers, the AG Soziale Marktwirtschaft , the Kronberger 
Kreis, and the Initiative for New Social Market Economy (INSM) are the 
nodes with the highest degree of centrality. On a personal level, Jürgen 
Donges and Christian Watrin (president of the MPS from 2000–2) hold 
the position of important interlocking directorates.
In a third and fi nal step, the result of a personal and institutional 
network analysis of German economists in my sample with at least a 
“medium” infl uence in at least two PFP coeffi  cients is provided.
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Figure 11.8 again demonstrates the uneven politico-economic power 
structure among German economists. On the one hand in the bottom 
and center there is a group of fi ft een out of twenty-eight economists (54 
percent), connected in a dense network of German neoliberal think 
tanks and institutions and thus part of a German neoliberal thought 
collective. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, Peter Bofi nger, who 
is tellingly oft en termed by the media the “last Keynesian,” is connected 
to the union-linked Böckler Foundation as part of a Keynesian-
Alternative thought collective.
Th e analysis of the political and public infl uence of German econo-
mists with professorships in economics from 1954 to 1995 refl ects a very 
uneven power structure in favor of neoliberals. Both the detailed analysis 
of economists with a high media presence or central policy advice posi-
tions, and the overall analysis of infl uential economists in all fi ve coeffi  -
cients of the PFP, highlight that the majority of economists with an infl u-
ence on politics and the public can be assigned to the German neoliberal 
thought collective. While there also exists a network of economists
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organized in a Keynesian-Alternative thought collective, indicating a poten-
tial countervailing power in politico-economic discourses, the network 
analyses show that this group is in a marginalized minority position.
Conclusion
Th is chapter has examined the ideological and politico-economic power 
structures of German economics since World War II. Using the concept 
of a German neoliberal thought collective organized around the Mont 
Pèlerin Society, I fi rst highlighted the connections between ordoliberal-
ism and other early strands of neoliberalism on a personal as well as on 
an institutional level. Second, I introduced the methodology of a 
performative footprint of economists in order to conceptualize the 
academic, political, and public impacts of economic thought and of 
individual economists.
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Building on this twofold theoretical and methodological basis, the 
chapter showed that economists organized in a German neoliberal 
thought collective had a formative impact on the course of German 
economic policies. Beginning with the foundation of the Federal 
Republic in the late 1940s, and later during the “monetarist turn” of the 
Bundesbank in the 1970s and the “neoliberal turn” in economic politics 
in the early 1980s, economists connected to the infrastructures of 
German neoliberalism had key positions which allowed them to infl u-
ence economic policies.
Beside these concrete examples of the impact of the infrastructures of 
German neoliberalism on the history of economic politics in Germany, 
the chapter provided personal and institutional network analyses of a 
sample of 800 post-World War II German economics professors. Th e 
main conclusion drawn from these analyses is that, among the group of 
economists with a high media presence or important positions in policy 
advice, or even in economic organizations such as the Bundesbank or 
governmental authorities, a majority can be assigned to the German 
neoliberal thought collective. In contrast, only a small minority of 
“infl uential” economists is connected to the Keynesian-Alternative 
thought collective. Th erefore one can conclude that a densely connected 
infrastructure of German neoliberalism, organized around neoliberal 
economists, think tanks, policy advice institutions, and economic 
research institutes, has over many decades exercised a formative infl u-
ence on German economic policies.
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